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
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VIRGIL SCHOLIA IN THE ANSILEUBUS GLOSSARY.

The huge Glossary of Ansileubus (or *Liber Glossarum*), published for the first time in vol. I of my *Glossaria Latina* (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1926), contains Virgil-scholia which are not those of Servius. Four marginal scholia (or five) on *Aen.* 6, 724-6 are combined in one gloss (LU 42):

> *Lucentemque globum lunae*: hoc iuxta physicos qui dicunt in modum pilae lunam esse. *Titaniaque astra*: stellas dicit quae obliquo solis cursu et ⟨ob⟩via feruntur; ideo et Titania, Titan enim sol est. ⟨*camposque liquentes*:⟩ maria. *Spiritus*: divinus; dicit spiritu divino universa regi. *Intus alit*: id est regit, nutrit.

These are welcome, since no Servius auctus (i. e. Donatus) scholia on this passage are extant. Another throws light on Servius' puzzling remark on *sunto* of *Aen.* 4, 624. Servius says: Urbanus dicit verbo eum iuris usum propter odia hereditaria. The gloss-scholium is (SU 664):

> *Sunto*: sint, iuris verbum est et testamentarium, 'ceteri ceteraeque omnes exheredes sunto.'

But usually the glossary, which is arranged in strict alphabetical order, breaks up and disperses a scholium. The Donatus scholium on *Aen.* 4, 335 is shattered and scattered thus:

> (PR 2354) Promeritus apud antiquos dicebatur qui quid benefecisset. *Promeritam*: profuisse, praestitisse.
> (CO 397, in the COM-portion) Commeritus: qui delinquit, ut (Ter., *Andr.* 139) 'quid' (!)
> (CO 1167, in the CON-portion) 'conmerui aut peccavi, pa[ri]ter.' (!)

The difficulty of recovering a scholium which has been so scurvily treated may be imagined.

In 1922 Prof. H. J. Thomson made a gallant attempt to collect them all (*Fragments of Ancient Scholia on Virgil preserved in Latin Glossaries*—part ii of Lindsay and Thomson, *Ancient Lore in Medieval Latin Glossaries*—St. Andrews University Publications, no. XIII, published by the Clarendon Press). But the edition four years later of the huge glossary revealed many more, and Mountford and Schultz (*Index to the Servius and Donatus Scholia* = Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. XXIII, 1930) gave the means of detecting still more. So I asked Mr. E. J. Frank to make as full a collection as he could and bring Thomson's labours up to date. He has just completed it and sent it to Professor Rand for use in the American Mediaeval Academy's edition of the Virgil scholia. It may be published later.

Certainty is not always attainable, since the learned items of the glossary sometimes contain Festus-lore. PO 577 ends thus:

> *potentia*: aeterna perpetuitas dominationis. Nos existimamus potentatum esse opes praevalidas. Itaque etiam Brutus (cf. Boas, *Rhein. Mus.*, 83, p. 181) ita sensit querens de potentatibus Magni Pompeii, 'quod etsi est potentatus'—de potentatu, non de potentia.

Is this a lost section of Festus? Or is it Donatus' note on *Aen.* 1, 664 (nate, meae vires, mea magna *potentia* solus)? My vote goes to Donatus.

LA 211 (repeated in LE 114) is certainly Donatus:

> *Laena*: amictus est rotundus duplex, ut Iulius Suavis; Suetonius (fr. 267) vero ait 'toga duplex qua infibulati flamines sacrificant.' Huius vestis inventor Laenas appellatus est.

It preserves what Donatus wrote and saves us from the recast in Servius auctus at *Aen.* 4, 262: *Alii* amictum rotundum, *alii* togam duplicem in qua flamines sacrificant infibulati. In the large edition of Festus (vol. IV of my *Glossaria Latina*) I should not have doubted this nor mentioned the emendation *Iunilius* (i. e. Filagrius) for *Iulius*.

Doubt is permissible at PI 152:

> *Pinguis*: crassus; nam obesus plus est quam pinguis. Catullus ait (39, 11) 'aut pinguis Umber aut obesus Etruscus.'

Festus or Donatus? And why does Kroll neglect this version of the line? Thomson declares for a scholium on *Geo.* 2, 193 (inflavit cum pinguis ebur Tyrrhenus ad aras).

Although Donatus is often mentioned in these scholia-glosses, they probably come from some later commentary based on Donatus. We may almost identify the source with Filagrius (no more to be called Philargyrius), since a part of his scholium on *Geo.* 1, 399 in the Scholia Bernensia tallies with an item in the Ansileubus Glossary, (AL 78):

> *Alcyone*: avis marina quae pelago nidum medio facit, cuius partus tertio die pullamina excluduntur, quarto cibo foventur, septimo volatui ostenduntur.

Adamnan (?) adds to Filagrius the sentence: Quod in glossematibus inveni. What does this mean? Probably that Adamnan (see *A. J. P.*, LVII, p. 337) remembered and recorded the similarity between a gloss of the Abstrusa Glossary and Filagrius' scholium. And this was the full, original form of the Abstrusa Glossary, not the greatly reduced epitome which we find in our extant manuscripts of Abstrusa. The epitome-form seems to be merely (Abstr. AL 54) Alcyones: aves marinae.

The Ansileubus Glossary absorbed Abstrusa in both forms, the full (Abstrusa maius) and the reduced. A good example of the two is the neighbouring pair, PU 63 (the reduced):

> *Puer*: filius, Graecum (cf. Abstr. PU 10),

and PU 64 (the full):

> *Puer*: filius, Graeca locutio; illi enim παῖδα dicunt,

which is the Donatus scholium on *Aen.* 3, 339.

The Abstrusa materials were mainly Virgil-scholia (see my *Glossaria Latina*, III, pp. vi-viii, xvii-xix) and even in the epitome-form the glosses often retain clear trace of their origin, as will be seen from the apparatus criticus in Thomson's edition. The epitome-form of the gloss *patibulum* is (PA 771):

> *Patibulum*: crux vel stipites aut loca poenarum (cf. Abstr. PA 74).

Why *stipites*? The strange word is explained when we look at the full form (PA 772):

> *Patibulum* est crux et loca poenarum in quibus cruciatus omnes patiuntur; dicitur et patibulum trames, id est pertica in qua pulli dormientes adpensi (*var. lect.* adprensi) sunt.

So *patibulum* and *trames* were farmers' words for a hens' roosting-ladder, and presumably this interesting gloss came from a Virgil-scholium (on *trames*?).

The variant *adprensi* comes from a glossary-torso, which is denoted by the symbol *PP* because one fragment (F-T) is at Paris and the other—a mere scrap (O-P)—at Prague, both of them using eleventh century Spanish script and arranging the glosses in partial alphabetical order (by AB-). It is not only a torso but the merest scrap compared with the huge Ansileubus Glossary. In the M-chapter *PP* has about 220 glosses, Ansileubus about 2950. The relationship of so slight a thing to the other is not quite clear. If *PP* is a mere extract from Ansileubus, the extract was made earlier than the archetype of the extant Ansileubus manuscripts, for in that archetype the strictest alphabetical arrangement was followed. Or *PP* may have merely used some of the materials used for Ansileubus. In any case the worth of *PP* is trifling, although it is the only other glossary with these Virgil-scholia glosses.

It does not label its items according to their source, whereas in the larger glossary this laudable practice is followed though in a somewhat desultory fashion, the Virgil-scholia items getting the label De Glossis, i. e. from a book or books in the monastery-library in which glossary-material was entered. This label is prefixed to the following classes of items:

(1) Abstrusa glosses, both in the full and in the epitomized form.
(2) Abolita glosses; it is these which occasionally preserve Festus-lore.
(3) explanations of some Greek names of ecclesiastic importance, e. g. Georgius, Macarius.
(4) some words culled from Lucan, *Bell. Civ.* and Statius, *Theb.*, etc.

In our edition of Ansileubus (*Gloss. Lat.*, I, p. 3, note) only the first three are mentioned, but Mountford's subsequent book, *Quotations from Classical Authors in Mediaeval Latin Glossaries* (= Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. XXI, 1925)

revealed the necessity for adding the fourth. By far the largest class is the first, and it is in this first class that the Virgil-scholia items appear. Therefore, these were not taken directly from a manuscript of Virgil with marginal scholia, but had already been transferred into Abstrusa Glossary items. And so Adamnan, when he transcribes in his Variorum Commentary on Virgil (from Filagrius, Gaudentius and Gallus) Filagrius' note on *alcyones* (*Geo.* 1, 399), remembers that he had seen something like this in the Abstrusa Glossary and adds the remark: Hoc in glossematibus inveni. That seems to me the true explanation. And if we knew in what monastery the Abstrusa Glossary was compiled, we should guess that its library contained Filagrius' commentary on Virgil.

The Glossary of Ansileubus was, I think, compiled at Corbie in Charlemagne's time under Adalhard's direction (*Gloss. Lat.*, I, p. 8), and the great quarry for its materials was Isidore's *Etymologiae*. These items, being taken directly from Isidore, are labelled ESIDORI. Now Isidore borrowed greatly from Virgil-scholia (of Donatus as well as Servius), often employing their actual words. For example, at *Etym.* 10, 231 (petulcus dictus ab adpetendo, unde etiam et meretrices petulcas vocamus) Isidore borrows the scholium on *Geo.* 4, 10 (petulci dicti ab appetendo, unde et meretrices petulcas vocamus). A Servius auctus gloss (labelled DE GLOSSIS) would sometimes coincide with an Isidore gloss (labelled ESIDORI), and naturally we sometimes find the same gloss labelled DE GLOSSIS at one occurrence and ESIDORI at another: if unlabelled, we are at a loss whether to call it an Isidore gloss or a scholium gloss. Isidore's *Differentiae* borrows as freely from Virgil scholia; the Servius auctus scholium on *Geo.* 1, 146 (peior est egestas quam paupertas; paupertas enim honesta esse potest, egestas etiam turpis est) becomes *Diff.* I, 185 (inter egestatem et paupertatem, etc.) and produces the glosses EG 23 and PA 955. Any attempt to reconstruct the Donatus commentary on Virgil must turn for help to Isidore as well as to our glossary.

Glosses taken directly from Virgil are labelled VIRGILII. They are trivial and usually appear in pairs, where (as is shewn in my *Gloss. Lat.*, V, p. 155) one of the pair comes from the interlinear interpretations in an English (?) manuscript of Virgil

used by a large number of other glossaries, while the other comes from the Virgil manuscript used for *PP*. But here and there we find glosses labelled VIRGILII which cannot be called trivial. They are long and learned, like the scholia glosses labelled DE GLOSSIS. I am inclined to think that they are derived from Servius scholia. Thus CA 297:

> VIRGILII. *Caphereus*: promunturium insulae Euboeae ex qua Nauplius Palamedis pater face elata deceptis Argivis ultus est filii sui mortem,

may be a reduction of Servius on *Aen.* 11, 260 (Euboea insula est in qua mons Caphereus, etc.). Still they are often hard to distinguish from the DE GLOSSIS type and suggest the possibility that VIRGILII has been wrongly substituted by some one who recognized the Virgilian bearing of the gloss. Indeed we occasionally find the same item labelled VIRGILII on one occurrence and DE GLOSSIS on another (IU 135 and IB 27; CO 2211 and 2235; ME 334 and 390). The gloss MA 877:

> VIRGILII. *Materia*: Aeneida, carminum initia a Troiano bello,

suggests the Servian arrangement of the poems with the Aeneid first.

Certainly these larger VIRGILII glosses blur the line between the scholia glosses and the trivial items. Indeed my first example of the former, LU 42 (unlabelled), might be claimed for a mere reduction of Servius' notes; so I will substitute for it a clear Servius auctus item, IA 144 (unlabelled):

> *Iapyge ferri* (*Aen.* 8, 710): Iapygem Varro ventum vocat ab occidente Apulia.

The Servius auctus scholium is: Quem Varro de ora maritima argesten dicit, qui de Occidente aestivo ('in summer') flat; hic in Apulia pestilens est.

W. M. LINDSAY.

ST. ANDREWS.

THE COLONY OF CORNELIUS FUSCUS: AN EPISODE IN THE *BELLUM NERONIS*.

Among the minor characters in the history of imperial Rome a place of some distinction belongs to Cornelius Fuscus, Domitian's Prefect of the Guard, who perished in Dacia at the head of a Roman army. His earlier career was no less dramatic. In the year 69, when procurator of Illyricum,[1] Fuscus came forward as one of the most vigorous of the partisans of Vespasian. Tacitus in the *Histories* gives him a handsome introduction (II, 86):

Tampius Flavianus Pannoniam, Pompeius Silvanus Dalmatiam tenebant, divites senes; sed procurator aderat Cornelius Fuscus, vigens aetate, claris natalibus. Prima iuventa quietis cupidine senatorium ordinem exuerat; idem pro Galba dux coloniae suae, eaque opera procurationem adeptus, susceptis Vespasiani partibus acerrimam bello facem praetulit: non tam praemiis periculorum quam ipsis periculis laetus pro certis et olim partis nova ambigua ancipitia malebat.

Two difficulties beset the interpretation of this passage. The first is this: given the character and actions of Fuscus, it seemed incredible to many scholars that he should have refrained from entering the senatorial career for the reason assigned by Tacitus, *quietis cupidine*. Textual alterations designed to remove this alleged inconsequence, such as *quaestus cupidine* (Grotius) and *inquies cupidine* (Meiser), have therefore enjoyed a certain popularity. Despite this, there is every reason to retain the reading of the manuscript.[2] Fuscus' motive was *quietis cupido*. What is *quies*? Commentators of Tacitus have not always observed that in the literature of the Flavio-Trajanic period the word is almost a technical term of political life. *Quies* denotes a reluctance to bear the dignity, the burdens, and the dangers of the senatorial life. It may be applied to senators or to knights. In the former it designates the pursuit of prudence and inaction

[1] The language of Tacitus suggests the inference that Fuscus was procurator of Illyricum (i. e., Pannonia and Dalmatia together) not of Pannonia only, as is usually assumed, for example, in *P-W* and *PIR*. Cf. *ILS* 9200 (Velius Rufus, under Domitian).

[2] As shown by H. Hill in *CR*, XLI (1927), p. 124, without, however, discussing the peculiar meaning of the word *quies*.

in the Senate, an attitude which, on an unfriendly estimate, is stigmatised as *inertia*.[3] As for knights, *quies* deters them from entering the Senate at all. It will be enough to mention two friends of Pliny. Arrianus Maturus, *Altinatium princeps*, preferred to remain a Roman knight though he could easily have risen higher.[4] Likewise Minicius Macrinus of Brixia "adlectus enim a divo Vespasiano inter praetorios honestam quietem huic nostrae ambitioni dicam an dignitati constantissime praetulit."[5] This predilection for *honesta quies* is not likely to have been of rare occurrence among the opulent families of Northern Italy.

Cornelius Fuscus renounced the career that was open to a senator's son. The Neronian Senate with its alternations of discreet inactivity or futile and often fatal opposition was no place for a man of temperament. The cautious Agricola might be safe,[6] but Fuscus was aware of the dangers to which his character would infallibly expose him. Moreover there were certain material advantages in remaining a knight. Temperament cannot, however, be repressed for ever. In the year 68 Fuscus raised the standard of Galba—"idem pro Galba dux coloniae suae." In the next year his intervention swept the Flavian cause forward to victory.

Secondly, the problem of the colony of Fuscus. This seems incapable of solution, and it is in no way surprising that only two attempts have been made to identify the elusive city. When seeking to establish his theory that the Altar at Adam-Klissi in the Dobrudja not merely commemorated the defeat which Cornelius Fuscus sustained at the hands of the Dacians in the year 86 but even indicated the very site of that disaster, Cichorius conjectured that the nameless prefect occurring on that monument, a man from Pompeii, was no other than Fuscus, the Prefect of the Guard. A. v. Domaszewski dissented vigorously.[7]

[3] For *quies*, cf. Tacitus, *Agr.* 6; *Ann.* XIV, 47. Pliny, *Epp.* X, 58. Martial, V, 28, 4; VIII, 70, 1; Suetonius, *Galba* 7. For *inertia*, cf. Tacitus, *Agr.* 6; Suetonius, *Dom.* 15.

[4] *Epp.* III, 2; cf. II, 11, 1.

[5] *Epp.* I, 14, 5.

[6] Tacitus, *Agr.* 6: "mox inter quaesturam ac tribunatum plebis atque ipsum etiam tribunatus annum quiete et otio transiit, gnarus sub Nerone temporum, quibus inertia pro sapientia fuit."

[7] "Die Heimat des Cornelius Fuscus," *Rh. M.*, LX (1905), pp. 158 f.

"Was ist denn Pompeii für die Politik jener Zeit? Ulubrae." This verdict may be cheerfully endorsed. Domaszewski further maintained that the colony of Fuscus must be sought in the south of Gaul, in his opinion the only scene of hostilities in the civil war of A. D. 68, and identified as Vienna, in Gallia Narbonensis.

At first sight Vienna is plausible, for that city was flagrantly on the side of Vindex, the legate of Lugdunensis, when he rose against Nero,[8] and therefore, it might be presumed, also on the side of Galba, the ally of Vindex. A slight objection arises, however: if strong for Vindex, did Vienna need to be won over to Galba? But there is more than this. Before Vienna could be accepted, it would be necessary to prove that the south of Gaul was the only region in which a colony's espousal of the cause of Galba was a decisive moment in history, a service to be remembered and rewarded. That is by no means the case. An examination of the state of affairs in the western provinces and in Northern Italy from the outbreak of the rising of Vindex in the spring of the year 68 to the time when Galba was recognized as successor to Nero by the Senate and People of Rome—and, more important than that, by the troops on the Rhine and in Northern Italy—will suggest that there are two alternatives.

The first of these is Spain. Yielding to the solicitations of Vindex, Galba, the legate of Tarraconensis, publicly cast off his allegiance to Nero and proclaimed himself Legate of the Senate and People (April 2nd, A. D. 68). This was the beginning, not the end, of his difficulties. The unpopularity of Nero in Spain was hardly enough to secure unanimous support for a pretender among the classes that had most to fear from unsuccessful treason, namely Roman senators and Roman knights in official positions and the leading families in the towns, many of which were by now supplying Rome with senators. Nor is there wanting evidence of opposition to the self-styled Legate of the Senate and People. It is recorded that Galba put governors and procurators to death.[9] Otho, the legate of Lusitania, supported him; but there was trouble in Baetica. Among the victims of Galba are mentioned the names of Obultronius Sabinus and Cornelius

[8] *Hist.* I, 65.

[9] Suetonius, *Galba* 12; cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* I, 37.

Marcellus.[10] Both were senators: it is not too rash to identify them as the proconsul of Baetica and his legate.[11] What of the quaestor of that province? It looks as though he had a hand in suppressing his superiors—at least that young man of energy and ambition, A. Caecina Alienus, quaestor of Baetica, took a risk, declared openly for Galba, and was promoted by him to the command of a legion.[12] There is no evidence of anything that could be called a war in Spain; but in the first days of uncertainty the adhesion to Galba of an important city such as Corduba may have forestalled opposition, impelled the hesitant, and helped to win all Spain. It would therefore be permissible to conjecture that Cornelius Fuscus was a Spanish colonial magnate.

So far so good, in default of a better hypothesis. But it is unnecessary to range so far afield as Pompeii, Vienna, or Corduba when the truth is perhaps to be discovered in Northern Italy, the seat and theatre of the *Bellum Neronis*—for that is the name which Tacitus applies to the chaotic events that preceded the fall of Nero.[13]

On the news of the rising of Vindex, Nero looked about him for troops. The Guard and the urban cohorts would be available; and he set about recruiting a legion from the fleet at Misenum (the later I Adiutrix). Further, Nero recalled the troops that had been despatched to the East for his intended campaign—or campaigns. In this matter the details are obscure and a matter of controversy, but a certain number of facts may be recovered. It is sometimes stated that all the troops destined for the East had been recalled to Italy in time, before the death of Nero.[14] This is highly doubtful. Of the *vexillationes* from the armies of Britain, the Rhine, and the Danube,[15] the German troops at

[10] *Hist.* I, 37.

[11] Obultronius Sabinus was *quaestor aerarii* in A. D. 56, *Ann.* XIII, 28. Cornelius Marcellus is probably to be identified with L. Cornelius Marcellus, quaestor and legate in Sicily and praetor designate (*CIL* X, 7192 = *ILS* 6767; 7266). He was probably legate of the proconsul of Baetica and not legate of a Spanish legion (as assumed by E. Groag in *P-W*), for there was only one legion in Tarraconensis at this time, and it appears to have been commanded by T. Vinius (Plutarch, *Galba* 4).

[12] *Hist.* I, 53: "hunc iuvenem Galba, quaestorem in Baetica impigre in partis suas transgressum, legioni praeposuit."

[13] *Hist.* II, 27.

[14] For example, in *CAH*, X, p. 740.

[15] *Hist.* I, 6; cf. 26 and 31.

least can hardly have returned to Italy before Nero's death (June 9th); for Galba, who did not reach Rome until very late in the year, won their gratitude by alleviating the effects of their painful voyage by sea from Alexandria.[16] As for whole legions, two are concerned, I Italica and XIV Gemina. The former had been levied by Nero, exclusively from Italians, for service in the East, probably in 67. Of its whereabouts nothing at all is known before January, 69, when it was stationed at Lugdunum; it had probably been sent there soon after June, A. D. 68 by Galba.[17] It is possible that it had never left Italy in the last year of Nero,[18] possible too that it had been brought back in time. About the other legion, however, there is definite and valuable information. Along with eight cohorts of Batavians, XIV Gemina had been withdrawn from Britain and was on its way eastwards, probably in Pannonia, for it was through that province that the great highway ran, from Aquileia in Northern Italy by Siscia and Sirmium.[19] The presence of this legion in Northern Italy in the last days of Nero is unimpeachably attested.[20] Further, an important detail, Nero had summoned to Italy detachments from the armies of Illyricum; these latter were certainly in Northern Italy in June, 68.[21]

Despite much that must remain uncertain, it is clear that a formidable army was available under Petronius Turpilianus (a former governor of Britain) and Rubrius Gallus, the men whom Nero had chosen as his generals.[22] It may be presumed that it

[16] *Hist.* I, 31, "quod eos a Nerone Alexandriam praemissos atque inde rursus longa navigatione aegros impensiore cura Galba refovebat."

[17] Rather than by Nero in the spring of A. D. 68, as assumed by E. Ritterling, *P-W, s. v.* Legio, col. 1409; W. Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero*, p. 108; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, p. 139. There is no definite evidence that the legion had crossed the Alps, still less that it had got to Lugdunum before the death of Nero.

[18] E. Ritterling, *P-W, s. v.* Legio, col. 1409.

[19] Ritterling, Schur, and Parker suppose that it was in Dalmatia; but a legion would not normally march to the East through Dalmatia.

[20] *Hist.* II, 27.

[21] *Hist.* I, 9. Excluding XIV Gemina, there were at this time two legions in Pannonia (X, XIII), one in Dalmatia (XI), three in Moesia (III, VII, VIII).

[22] On these men see *Hist.* I, 6; 37; Plutarch, *Galba* 15; Cassius Dio, 63, 27, 1-2.

was mustering in Northern Italy in the last weeks of Nero's reign—that the whole or any part of this army had crossed the Alps into Gaul, as is sometimes assumed in modern accounts of these transactions,[23] is nowhere stated or indicated in the ancient evidence.

Had it not been for Nero, the cause of Nero was not lost. Galba for his part retired in despair to the remote city of Clunia when he heard that Vindex had been defeated by Verginius Rufus, the legate of Upper Germany; and Rufus, though his attitude was ambiguous, was not an open enemy to Nero. But Nero was found lacking in intelligence as well as in energy. What Piso said to troops in the city some six months later might have been said to any of the armies that had once been loyal to their unworthy *Imperator*: "et Nero quoque vos destituit, non vos Neronem."[24]

Another quotation from Tacitus will illustrate the situation: "Nero nuntiis magis et rumoribus quam armis depulsus."[25] Exactly what happened will never be known—was it known at the time? Rumour both anticipated and determined the course of events, and afterwards there were no doubt many things to be hushed up or explained away—the men who were loyal to Nero as long as it was decent or possible would not say much about that under Galba or under the Flavians. Reports came to Rome that Nero's armies were deserting.[26] It was alleged that Petronius Turpilianus had gone over; whether truly or falsely, it is quite uncertain.[27] Many of the legionaries, however, long remained true to Nero, as we may judge from the attitude of

[23] For example, in *CAH*, X, p. 740.

[24] *Hist.* I, 30.

[25] *Hist.* I, 89.

[26] Suetonius, *Nero* 47; Cassius Dio, 63, 27, 1-2.

[27] Cassius Dio, in a fragment preserved by Zonaras, says ὁ δὲ Νέρων μαθὼν καὶ τὸν Πετρώνιον, ὃν κατὰ τῶν ἐπαναστάντων μετὰ τοῦ πλείονος προεπεπόμφει στρατεύματος, τὰ τοῦ Γάλβα φρονήσαντα, οὐκέτ' οὐδεμίαν ἐλπίδα τῶν ὅπλων ἔσχεν (63, 27, 1a, Boissevain). Petronius Turpilianus was put to death at the order of Galba, "ut dux Neronis" (*Hist.* I, 6), cf. Plutarch, *Galba* 15. Boissevain (Vol. III, p. 91) suggests that he remained faithful to Nero; cf. *CAH*, X, p. 740, n. But it is possible that he deserted Nero without declaring for Galba—compare the attitude of Verginius Rufus (*Hist.* I, 8).

XIV Gemina. That legion was checked and coerced by the Batavian cohorts in Northern Italy.[28] As for the Rhine armies, "tarde a Nerone desciverant, nec statim pro Galba Verginius."[29]

And so Nero's doom was sealed. But even now, after Nero's death in Rome (June 9th), it was far from certain that Galba had triumphed. The armies of the Rhine showed no enthusiasm, and Verginius was slow to declare for Galba. Moreover, in Northern Italy the detachments of the army of Illyricum sent word to Verginius, offering him the Empire.[30] It was still in the balance.

This is an ideal setting for the service for which Galba rewarded Fuscus with the procuratorship of Illyricum. Northern Italy with its wealthy and populous cities, the source from which most of the Italian-born legionaries and many of their officers were drawn, was a region of cardinal importance for political as well as for strategic reasons: in a civil war these two factors do not always need to be distinguished. Through Northern Italy ran the lines of communication, westwards and northwestwards to Gaul and the upper Rhine, eastwards to the Danubian provinces. If, in the confused situation that prevailed in May and June of the year 68, either just before or just after the end of Nero, one of the colonies on the great roads, a city like Augusta Praetoria, Verona, or Aquileia, boldly declared for Galba, that might be enough to turn the scale. If Aquileia, for example, were the colony of Fuscus its adhesion to Galba would have been momentous. Aquileia lay on the main road from the Danubian provinces and cut off the legionary detachments which Nero had summoned to Italy. These troops had no quarrel with Nero; after his death, averse from Galba, they would have preferred Verginius Rufus.

There is something else that tells in favor of Northern Italy. When the fleet at Ravenna deserted Vitellius for Vespasian in the autumn of the following year, it asked expressly that Cor-

[28] The Batavian cohorts later boasted, "coercitos a se quartadecimanos, ablatam Neroni Italiam" (*Hist.* II, 27). Compare further, for the loyalty of XIV Gemina, *Hist.* II, 11, "longa illis erga Neronem fides."

[29] *Hist.* I, 8; cf. 52-3.

[30] *Hist.* I, 9, "quies et Illyrico, quamquam excitae a Nerone legiones, dum in Italia cunctantur, Verginium legationibus adissent."

nelius Fuscus should be made its prefect.[31] This request may be taken to presuppose some previous knowledge of the man. The fact that he was procurator of Illyricum might be enough to account for this—the fleet was recruited mainly from Pannonians and Dalmatians.[32] But Fuscus had held that position for only a very short time. This carries the question a stage backwards. Why did Galba make Fuscus procurator of Illyricum? Though wisdom may not be taken as a criterion of Galba's appointments, some familiarity with the Danubian lands, desirable though not essential in a senatorial governor, would surely be requisite in a procurator. Once again our attention is turned to Northern Italy and to Aquileia in particular. As for the commercial relations of that city with the Dalmatian coast and the Danubian lands, no evidence is needed to confirm what nobody has ever doubted. Venice, Trieste, Sušak rolled into one suggest but a faint idea of the importance of Aquileia. Given the nature of the evidence and the negative purpose of this paper, it would be superfluous and perhaps dangerous to put forward the conjecture that Fuscus belonged to a prominent, perhaps to the leading, family of Aquileia, with ample resources in landed property and factories. For such a man, as for Pliny's friend Arrianus Maturus, *Altinatium princeps*, a seat in the Senate was not everything that mattered. Though *quies*, not *quaestus*, was his motive, Fuscus need not be denied the possession of a family business and the honourable ambition to safeguard and augment it.

The foregoing observations might appear to be nothing more than an essay in the seductive science of hypothetics. Though a positive conclusion about the colony of Fuscus cannot be reached, there emerges a negative result of some value for the study of Roman history. Ever since its discovery some forty years ago, the Altar of Adam-Klissi in the Dobrudja has played its rôle in every reconstruction of the Danubian Wars of the Flavio-Trajanic period, and Cichorius' hypothesis that Adam-Klissi was the site of the disaster which the Dacians inflicted upon Cornelius Fuscus and that Cornelius Fuscus himself was

[31] *Hist.* III, 12, "classis Cornelium Fuscum praefectum sibi destinat, qui propere adcucurrit."

[32] *Hist.* III, 12.

the nameless prefect on the inscription of the Altar has been widely accepted.[33] The problems associated with this monument, with the nearby Tropaeum Trajani which bears an inscription dated A. D. 108/9,[34] and with the vallum in the Dobrudja, probably of Domitianic date,[35] are numerous and complex. The present enquiry will deal only with the Altar, and very briefly at that.

Cichorius' hypothesis must be rejected, either wholly or at least in part. It is clear that Fuscus perished, not in the Dobrudja, in the vicinity of the Black Sea coast, but beyond the Danube, in Dacia. Dacian vultures, according to Juvenal, tore his flesh.[36] Martial, in a poem written when Fuscus had been avenged and Dacia reduced, in name at least, to the status of a dependent kingdom, uses language which cannot be given its full meaning unless the grave of Fuscus lay on Dacian soil (VI, 76):

> Ille sacri lateris custos Martisque togati,
> credita cui summi castra fuere ducis,
> hic situs est Fuscus. Licet hoc, Fortuna, fateri:
> non timet hostilis iam lapis iste minas;
> grande iugum domita Dacus cervice recepit
> et famulum victrix possidet umbra nemus.

This interpretation is confirmed by comparison with another poem which contains the same optimistic opinion about the state of Dacia (V, 3):

> Accola iam nostrae Degis, Germanice, ripae,
> a famulis Histri qui tibi venit aquis, etc.

In each case the adjective *famulus* is employed; in the second poem the northern bank of the Danube is described as now Roman (*nostrae . . . ripae*).

This being so, if Fuscus fell in Dacia, it might still be argued that the Altar has something to do with the disaster of Fuscus—

[33] C. Cichorius, *Die römischen Denkmäler in der Dobrudscha*, Berlin, 1904; Weynand, *P-W*, *s. v.* Flavius, col. 2563; B. W. Henderson, *Five Roman Emperors*, pp. 162 ff., 306 f.

[34] *CIL* III, 12467.

[35] Cf. E. Fabricius, *P-W*, *s. v.* Limes, col. 649.

[36] Juvenal, IV, 111.

perhaps a cenotaph. But there are difficulties hardly less great in this. The upper part of the fragmentary inscription of the Altar runs as follows (*ILS* 9107):

. .. . [tri] b. pot . . . . . .
[in]. . . .memoriam fortiss[imorum virorum]
[qui]. . . .pro re p. morte occubu[erunt]
. . . . . .[c]ol. Pomp. domicil. Neapol. Ital., prae[f.]

Below this are the names of many soldiers, praetorians (?), legionaries, and auxiliaries. The name of the prefect, *[c]ol. Pomp. domicil. Neapol. Ital.*, in large letters (though not as large as those of the dedication above it) and occupying so prominent a position, could only be that of the Prefect of the Guard, so Cichorius argued, and the only Prefect of the Guard who fell in battle in the Danubian lands in the Flavio-Trajanic period was Cornelius Fuscus.[37]

Firstly, as for the soldiers who, to judge from their Italian origin, would appear to be praetorians. It could be argued that these men are really legionaries, for it is by no means to be believed that the recruiting of Italians was abruptly terminated at the beginning of Vespasian's reign,[38] and in any case the legion stationed nearest Adam-Klissi was I Italica (at Novae), a legion which in the early years of Domitian would still have in its ranks a number of "foundation-members."[39] But in any case, even if the praetorians be admitted as such, it does not follow that the prefect was the Prefect of the Guard.

Secondly, the prefect. Pompeii, as Domaszewski showed, was a place of no political importance whatever and cannot have been the colony which Fuscus brought over to the side of Galba. Another consideration of some weight can be added. Fuscus was the son of a senator. Pompeii does not look like the kind of town that sent senators to Rome. No Pompeian senators are known. Indeed, equestrian officials are hard enough to find—the only

[37] The peculiar description of the prefect as *[c]ol. Pomp. domicil. Neapol. Ital.* suggests the inference that, after the destruction of Pompeii (A. D. 79), its citizens were assigned to Naples and so provides a rough indication of the period in which the monument was set up.

[38] Certain objections can be raised against Rostovtzeff's theories about legionary recruiting in the first century of the Empire.

[39] As tentatively suggested in *JRS*, XVIII (1928), p. 47.

Pompeian knight in the imperial service appears to be Seneca's friend and correspondent Lucilius, and he may have come from Naples.[40]

But this is not all. Dessau found the mention of the *domus*, rare enough in Roman knights, almost incredible in the case of the highest in rank of them all, the Prefect of the Guard.[41]

The case against Fuscus seems conclusive. A last objection remains to be disposed of. What officer but the Prefect of the Guard has the right to appear so prominently on the inscription?

There are other prefects. The presence of a *praefectus orae maritimae* or *praefectus ripae Danuvii* in this part of the province of Moesia is likely enough. A. v. Premerstein conjectured that a *praefectus orae maritimae* was stationed in the Dobrudja in the last years of Augustus.[42] Further, there is evidence for the existence of some such official under Claudius and Nero. In communications addressed to the city of Istros by Flavius Sabinus, the legate of Moesia, two prefects are mentioned, Arruntius Flamma and Asiaticus.[43] As nothing had happened since then to modify the organisation of Moesia, the presence in the Dobrudja during the Flavian period of an equestrian official of some importance need occasion no surprise.

The higher the social standing and the official position of the prefect the stranger is the mention of the *domus* on the inscription. If this difficulty appeared to tell against a *praefectus orae maritimae*, another hypothesis could be invoked. The unknown prefect may have been the *praefectus castrorum* of a legion. In Augustan days this position seems to have stood at the head of

[40] At least he is the only knight mentioned by A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand*, p. 369.

[41] "Die Herkunft der Offiziere und Beamten des römischen Kaiserreiches," *Hermes*, XLV (1910), p. 5, n. 7. In his note on the inscription *ILS* 9107 he remarks "praeterea praefecti praetorio nomini domum adscriptam fuisse vix credi potest."

[42] "Die Anfänge der Provinz Moesien," *Jahreshefte*, I (1898), *Beiblatt*, col. 194.

[43] *SEG* I, 329, in the first letter of Flavius Sabinus, ἔσται ἐπιμελὴς Ἀρουντίῳ Φλά[μμᾳ] τῷ ἐπάρχῳ; in the second, Ἀσιατικὸς ὁ ἔπαρχος. C. Patsch identifies these men as *praefecti orae maritimae*, "Beiträge zur Völkerkunde von Südosteuropa V, 1" (*Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CCXIV [1932], p. 153. It is unfortunate that they are not given a place in the first volume of the new *PIR*.

the *militia equestris*; from the time of Claudius, however, *praefecti castrorum* seem to be drawn from ex-centurions who have risen from the ranks.[44]

So much for the prefect, whether he fell in battle or was responsible for the construction of the monument. This is not the place to discuss what was, after all, the event, or events, which the Altar and its casualty-list commemorate. If the site of a disaster, Oppius Sabinus, the legate of Moesia, may have been defeated at Adam-Klissi in A. D. 85.[45] But the altar might be a cenotaph for the dead of Domitian's Dacian Wars, including the disasters of Sabinus and Fuscus. Nor, indeed, is the time of Trajan absolutely excluded.

The problem of the Altar must be restored to its original obscurity—enough has been said to show that it is still too early to employ inferences from this monument for the reconstruction of the Danubian wars of Domitian and Trajan.[46] But of one thing we may be reasonably certain: even if the casualty-list contains (alone or along with others) the names of soldiers who fell with Fuscus in Dacia—and that could still be maintained—the fragmentary name of the prefect cannot be the name of Fuscus, for Fuscus cannot have come from Pompeii. Vienna, Corduba, or Aquileia; anywhere but Pompeii.

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[44] A. v. Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, pp. 120 f.

[45] Cf. *JRS*, XVIII (1928), p. 47. In that case it might be supposed that Oppius Sabinus himself had a separate monument.

[46] Cf. *CAH*, XI, p. 170.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE *ASINARIA*.

The *Asinaria* does not present at first sight the mass of contradictions which have made the *Miles*, for example, the chief battle ground for the controversy over Plautine dramatic construction. It is none the less true that careful analysis of the play will show clearly how Plautus interwove two plots which in certain features were mutually exclusive. To the fact that they were not entirely woven into a connected whole, however, we owe our ability to disentangle the threads and not infrequently to peer at Plautus in his workshop—omitting here, altering there, and adding where it suited Roman taste. Older scholarship contented itself with the indication in broad outline of different originals which Plautus probably used, but more recently, under the leadership of Fraenkel, Jachmann, and Drexler, a more careful analytical method has offered more certain criteria for the determination of Plautine technique.

A brief review of the plot of the *Asinaria* will reveal the main difficulties. The original, according to the prologue, was the Ὀναγός of Demophilus. The *senex* Demaenetus tells his slave Libanus that he will help his son Argyrippus win the *meretrix* Philaenium (I, 1); the two depart separately to the forum. Although he has spoken to his father on the subject, Argyrippus, first in a monologue (I, 2), then to Cleareta, the *lena* (I, 3), expresses his financial helplessness, and on being excluded from her house, departs to the forum to find a loan. Libanus returns having made no progress towards a plan (II, 1) but is soon joined by his fellow slave Leonida (II, 2), who suggests an impersonation of the steward Saurea in order to win for Argyrippus 20 *minae* owed to Saurea by an ass-dealer whose arrival Leonida has fortunately discovered. This trick is successfully carried out (II, 3, 4), though not without recourse to Demaenetus, offstage. Upon their departure, Cleareta warns Philaenium to have nothing to do with Argyrippus so long as money is not forthcoming from him (III, 1). The slaves return with the money (III, 2) and find Argyrippus, though he had been banished and had gone to the forum, coming out of the *lena's* house with Philaenium. After much teasing (III, 3) he is given the money, but only on the suddenly introduced condition that a

night with Philaenium be awarded the old man for his services. To this Argyrippus cannot but agree. A new character, Diabolus, now arrives with his parasite (IV, 1) who is preparing a contract evidently previously arranged with the *lena*, calling for the hire of Philaenium. He enters the house (IV, 2) only to see the girl reveling with both father and son. In a rage he sends his parasite to summon Demaenetus' wife Artemona, who makes short shrift of her husband (V).

The most surprising feature of this plot is the sudden appearance of Diabolus,[1] completely unexpected and unmotivated except for a brief statement in the scene immediately preceding his entrance. On three separate counts this rôle raises the suspicion that it did not belong to the original Ὀναγός. These shall be our point of departure.

1) The *rival*, as a stock character in Plautus, performs certain well defined functions making him an integral part of the plot, involving him in the deception in varying degrees, and presenting him as a threat to the hopes of the *adulescens*.[2] Diabolus, however, is subjoined in a loose relationship to the plot of the *Asinaria*, appearing only after the trick has been carried out and the money procured; he neither quickens nor complicates the plot, nor is he made, as commonly, the temporary victim of the trick until the real object of attack is ensnared. His sole function is to bring about the punishment of Demaenetus through Artemona, which he does only indirectly, through his parasite. It is clear, moreover, that this function could easily have been performed by another character who unquestionably does belong to the Ὀναγός, namely Saurea, whom we wait in vain to meet, although the scene of an irate dupe, as he was, was only too frequent in comedy. We see, then, that not only does Diabolus fail to fulfill the theoretical functions of a rival, but

[1] Even Langen (*Plautinische Studien*, Berlin, 1887, pp. 7-11, 97-105, 239-247) has overlooked this point. Havet et Freté (*Les Prix des Ânes*, Coll. G. Budé, Paris, 1925, intr. p. xxviii) mention it as an example of the author's indifference to the art of dramaturgy. But when he wrote this, Havet no longer believed the *Asin.* to have been written by Plautus. Cf. below, n. 15.

[2] A study of the "rival" in Plautus led me some years ago to postulate on this basis alone the existence of a separate original for Diabolus (*P. A. P. A.*, LXIV (1933), p. lxiv). In that paper, however, a full critical analysis was not undertaken.

the only thing he actually does could have been done without him, within the Ὀναγός itself.[3]

2) The conception of Diabolus as an integral part of the Ὀναγός is undermined by the absence of effectual foreshadowing. We are hardly impressed with the urgency of Argyrippus' case, much less with the threat of a rival who may take the girl away this very day. For over six hundred lines the plot proceeds on the assumption that Argyrippus needs money only because he is in love; the sole passage which could be interpreted as a foreshadowing of Diabolus is a threat by Cleareta that if some one else brings money for the girl before Argyrippus does, *vale tu* (231). No word is said about any particular person nor any particular day on which she had expected a rival to pay. So general a reference cannot fairly be said to be sufficient justification in itself for the supposition that a definite individual will appear later. Diabolus appears at line 746, and it is not until 633 that Argyrippus, questioned as to why he will not live till evening, answers:

> argenti viginti minae me ad mortem appulerunt,
> quas hodie adulescens Diabolus ipsi daturus dixit. . . .

At this point, it must be remembered, the trick is complete and the money obtained; Argyrippus does not know it as yet, but his questioners do and will soon inform him (653). This is an amazing reversal of Plautine technique in any play where the rival (or any other important character) plays anything resembling an integral part in the plot, and the activities of Diabolus in Acts IV and V indicate that he played such a rôle in the original. But in the *Asinaria* as we have it, Diabolus' introduction is sudden, unexpected, and, it is noteworthy, not treated as a surprise by Libanus and Leonida to whom Argyrippus is talking. From this we judge that they were acquainted with the information, or else that this information does not really belong in its present context. Which of these alternatives

[3] Even the trader, by a little manipulation, could be brought back to do this. Artemona herself could have traced her husband to the brothel, making some such excuse as that of Dorippa in *Merc.* 667. Her movements and Demaenetus' consequent suffering are not the natural result of plot development as in the *Merc.* or of a definite chain of events belonging to the intrigue itself as in the *Cas.* but are artificially engineered by a character already under suspicion of being an intruder.

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I believe to be the correct one, will appear later as a result of further analysis. Even more suspicion is thrown on this passage by Argyrippus' statement in 638 that Diabolus has as yet not paid the money which he had promised for to-day. In the first place, from his rôle in the *Asinaria* Argyrippus had no knowledge concerning this. Nowhere in connected plot does Plautus ever allow characters to say things which in their dramatic rôle they do not know, and especially where it is a matter of exposition,[4] about which he is doubly careful. We are justified, therefore, in deducing that this passage is now out of its proper surroundings, where Argyrippus both knew of Diabolus and could speak authoritatively of his payment, and where the audience also was in possession of this expository material of first importance. This judgment is confirmed by the realization that whether or not Diabolus had paid is of absolutely no consequence in the plot of the *Asinaria*. If he has, then it is too late for Argyrippus no matter if he does have money; if not, there is no point in mentioning it. Yet the matter clearly had some importance in its context; the expository nature of the passage is unmistakable.

3) Diabolus himself is not the only peculiar feature of his rôle. It has been shown that his sole function is to bring about the punishment of Demaenetus through Artemona. This punishment is exacted for the old man's action in carousing with Philaenium, the condition on which he gave his aid to the trick. Thus Diabolus' rôle depends entirely upon this "night" stipulation. But this very stipulation is introduced as suddenly and as tardily as Diabolus himself, appearing for the first time in

[4] It is unthinkable that this knowledge could have been possessed before the beginning of dramatic action without playing a prominent part in earlier scenes; it would have occasioned greater urgency from the beginning, a result which it cannot achieve even here because Argyrippus is immediately told that the money is ready. This judgment needs support only for those unfamiliar with Plautus. Urgency inherently entails rapid action from the start. The cause may or may not be stated, but the existence of the urgency must be clear. Cf. *Bacch.*, *Curc.*, *Epid.*, *Merc.*, and especially *Pseud.* 51-59. In the *Asin.* there is no urgency until after the money is won, when the slaves do not know whether or not it is too late to use it! Ahrens (*De Plauti Asin.*, diss., Jena, 1907) failed to see this when he wrote (p. 23) ". . . Diabolum autem a poeta inductum esse in primis quo crescat adulescenti timor ne amicam amittat, deinde etiam ut puniendi Demaeneti actor sit."

line 735 and taking Argyrippus quite by surprise, although it is specifically stated that it had been "agreed upon." Although interpretation of character in Plautus is a dangerous criterion, it is nevertheless noteworthy that the Demaenetus of Act V who enjoys this night is a far different person from the mild *senex* of I, 1 and suggests quite a different model.[5]

The evidence for the separation of Diabolus and accompanying motifs from the Ὀναγός is far from exhausted, but these three points directly connected with him will suffice as a point of departure from which further analysis of parts already quoted and observation of other evidence may proceed. Although it is not my intention to postulate the existence of a separate Greek original for the Diabolus motifs without more complete evidence, the advisability of a convenient term in subsequent discussion referring to the possible source of these motifs suggests the adoption of some such term as "the Diabolus play."

The first striking thing in the *Asinaria* is the peculiar arrangement at the end of I, 1 whereby Libanus and Demaenetus, both of whom go to the forum, leave separately nine lines apart, although the latter's monologue is of absolutely no importance, being general remarks on Libanus' cleverness.[6] Libanus returns at the opening of II, 1, having accomplished nothing toward the plan he set out to fabricate (115-117). His monologue (246-266) consists of mere trifles designed solely to amuse the audience. His complaint of wasted time is a common trick to emphasize the passage of dramatic time,[7] while the determination to find a trick is the property of all comic slaves. He is then sidetracked into a discussion of omens from which only Leonida's breathless arrival extracts him. The Roman nature of these auguries [8] is clear evidence of Plautine authorship. This scene

[5] See below, p. 34.

[6] Goetz-Loewe (ed. maior, Leipzig, 1889) suggested that we have here a double recension (106-115 and 106-108, 116-125), but I think my consideration of II, 2 will make this unlikely. It cannot be an economic device for change of rôle, for neither in the *Asin.* nor in the Ὀναγός could Libanus' and Argyrippus' rôles be doubled. Cf. Kurrelmeyer, *The Economy of Actors in Plautus*, diss., Johns Hopkins (Graz, 1932), pp. 53 ff., and bibliog., p. 11.

[7] Cf. *Amph.* 1009 ff., *Bacch.* 109, *Cas.* 566, *Poen.* 504, *Pseud.* 1052, 1157, *Truc.* 912.

[8] Cf. C. B. Gulick, *Harv. Stud.*, VII (1896), pp. 240 ff.

is designed solely to get Libanus back on the stage in order to be available to help Leonida who supplies the vital information for the trick; the manipulation is clearly Plautine. The inference is that Libanus did not go to the forum at all, but remained on the stage for some scene now omitted between I, 1 and II, 2. Thus the awkward ending of I, 1 is explained: Libanus is unceremoniously bundled off to the forum without his exit being made to harmonize with Demaenetus', and now has to be brought back again without his trip having accomplished anything.

Our attention must now be focussed on the intervening scenes (I, 2 and 3). What right have we to excise them in favor of some scene in which Libanus took part? It is here that we meet almost all of the work done on this play.[9] These two scenes have so long been suspected that it is necessary only to refer to the arguments of Havet and others which resulted in all but universal agreement that they were not written for Argyrippus, the *adulescens* of the Ὀναγός. The mention of a contract (238) suggests a connection with Diabolus rather than with Argyrippus. Argyrippus asks the price of the girl (230) although he knew it before the play opened (74, 89). His next statement, that he has the necessary money and will arrange a contract, contradicts his penniless condition.[10] Demaenetus' report of his meeting with his son (74), who asked for help that very day, does not suggest that the youth received a discouraging answer[11] and

[9] Spengel, *Die Akteinteilung der Kom. des Plaut.*, München, 1887, p. 47; Goetz-Loewe, *op. cit.*, praef. pp. xxi ff.; Schenkel, *Zeitschr. f. d. Oest. Gym.*, XXXIII (1882), p. 41; Ribbeck, *Rh. Mus.*, XXXVII (1882), pp. 54-66; Rauterberg, *Quaest. Plaut.*, Wilhemshaven, 1883; Langen, *op. cit.*; Langrehr, progr., Friedland i. M., 1894; Havet, *Rev. de Phil.*, XXIX (1905), pp. 94-103, and see below note 15 for his renunciation of this article in Havet et Freté, *op. cit.*, intr.; Ahrens, *op. cit.* Schenkel's and Rauterberg's views are incorporated into the work of others and will not be mentioned further in this paper.

[10] This is a bluff as shown by his uncertainty about the money when alone, but he is confident he can get it at usury if necessary (243-248). It would be easy to interpret the whole passage as a desperate effort to win Cleareta's confidence were it not that the determination to find money emphatically contradicts the implications of the request to his father reported in I, 1.

[11] Langen (*op. cit.*, p. 100) rightly notes that if the old man had refused or given a discouraging answer, Plautus should have told us. When we are led to believe that money will come from one source,

implies strongly that Argyrippus knew that he could count on his father; but he gives no indication of this in I, 2 or 3. He goes to the forum resolved to borrow money (245) but in 329 is reported by Libanus to be in the *lena's* house from which he was excluded at 127.[12] His previous history is inconsistent with the penniless Argyrippus who has to obtain help from his father (135 ff.).[13]

Plautus does not suggest a new one for no reason, only to drop it later. The source of income is undoubtedly part of the trickery, on the technique of which see Wieand, *Deception in Plautus*, diss., Bryn Mawr (Boston, 1920).

[12] The exclusion is mentioned again only in 522 in III, 1, and 592 in III, 3. Havet stated that 522 contradicted I, 2 and 3, because there he is evicted a second time and some such word as *iterum* should be included. Ahrens' solution also requires an *iterum*, but he argues, most fantastically, that since 149 does not show Cleareta herself to have thrown Argyrippus out, it was probably done by "ancilla seu servo" and that 592 was the first time Cleareta in person did it (*op. cit.*, p. 19)! This is not so: Argyrippus in 149 merely says that Cleareta will not discuss matters with him; nothing is said about exclusion except in 127 where the address is clearly to Cleareta. We shall see later that both 522 and 592 show evidence of belonging to the Diabolus play on grounds other than the mention of the exclusion. Ahrens' theory may best be summarized here. He postulates a scene after line 544 (pp. 18, 35) in which Argyrippus returns from the forum, talks with the *lena* (between III, 1 and 3), states that he has found no money, then goes into her house as she goes away. Upon her return he is treated badly (III, 3). This hypothetical scene, already suggested by Spengel and Schenkel, Ahrens says was never written but assumed by the audience from the statement of Argyrippus' whereabouts in 329 and the treatment he receives in III, 2 and 3. This does not solve the problem of the *Asin.*; and, even if it did, such an assumption for a Roman audience is intolerable. Plautus nowhere shows any traces of such horrible technique, which is alien, also, to everything we know of his audiences. Elsewhere, in his efforts to refute Havet (pp. 13-23) Ahrens is no less specious in his reasoning, only once (see below, note 13) really meeting the argument.

[13] Another argument, based on the absence of Arygrippus' name from the scene heading of I, 3 was well refuted by Ahrens (p. 13). Cf. also Spengel, *Bayer. Akad.*, II (1883), pp. 272 ff., and Leo, *Plaut. Forsch.*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1912), pp. 14-15. Havet also objected that former generosities to Cleareta (171, 196) and possession of the girl on a previous occasion (171) do not fit the *lena's* statement (524) that he never really gave her anything. But her remarks in 524 apply only to the present and *immediate* past. Neither does it seem safe to differ-

These arguments convinced Leo, Goetz-Loewe,[14] and Havet that the speaker of I, 2 and 3 is not Argyrippus. Havet retained this belief even after his original theories concerning the *Asinaria* were abandoned,[15] still maintaining also that the words were originally written for Diabolus. Leo and Goetz-Loewe were content to state that the scenes came from another original; even Ahrens, who retained Argyrippus, built an elaborate system of *lacunae* to reconcile the speech with the rest of the play. I fully agree that Argyrippus was not the original speaker in these scenes, but cannot assent to assign them to Diabolus. Their connection with the Diabolus play is very marked, but not necessarily with Diabolus himself. Ahrens pointed out that the description of a happy life with Philaenium (205) ill befits the frigid consideration she receives in Diabolus' contract (751 ff.). We can hardly picture a rival in comedy as poor as the lover in I, 2 and 3. Nor does placing Diabolus here give him the proper functions of a rival.[16] Finally, if Diabolus be placed here, Argyrippus is still said to be in the house at 329 by a character who cannot know it.[17]

entiate between the character of Argyrippus (wrathful and indignant) in I, 2 and 3 and (whining) in III, 3. The characteristics fit the different situations.

[14] Goetz-Loewe, *op. cit.*, pp. xxiii-xxiv; Leo, ed. (Berlin, 1895), adn. to v. 127: "Argyrippi canticum et cum lena colloquium Plautus ex alia fabula sumpta Demophilo addidisse vel potius alii eius scaenae substituisse videtur, non plane remotis quae his obstant in antecedente scaena (v. 89) et III, 1 (533) 3 (v. 594), cf. v. 329. magnam haec cum Truculento similitudinem habent."

[15] The renunciation of his 1905 article is a necessary prelude to the theory developed with Freté that the *Asin.* is by a "Maccus" not to be identified with Plautus. This theory has been but ill received by Plautine scholars, as evidenced by a host of unfavorable reviews which point out example after example of specious argument and unsatisfactory reasoning unnecessary to recount here.

[16] It would still be necessary to make Argyrippus cognizant of the threat.

[17] Such statements concerning absent characters are not uncommon in Plautus but they are always made by a person possessing the information and follow a well defined technique whereby the character has passed through alleys and gardens so as not to appear on the stage (*Most.* 1046, *ers.* 442, *Asin.* 741, on which see below, p. 13). There are only two violations: *Cas.* 613, 687, variously explained (cf. Ritschl, *Opusc.*, II, p. 746 and Langen, *op. cit.*, p. 126), certainly involves a

It is this very line 329 that gives the key. Here Libanus states that Demaenetus is in the forum, Argyrippus in the *lena's* house. He cannot know this fact unless he has met Argyrippus sometime earlier. We have seen evidence that Libanus did not go to the forum at the end of I, 1 but remained for the following scene, and straight through to II. It must therefore have been Argyrippus whom he met in the scene following I, 1. This scene would find the lover pouring out his woes to Libanus in typical comic fashion; parallels are numerous.[18] At the close of it, Argyrippus evidently entered the house of his mistress, thus giving Libanus the information necessary for 329 and indicating his reappearance therefrom in 591. When this scene was excised in favor of the existing one, Plautus neglected to change 329, an easily overlooked detail which typifies what we call "Plautine carelessness."

The relations of Libanus and Argyrippus are now clear. The former was removed from the stage in order to make way for scenes which did not admit his presence, our I, 2 and 3. Why were these introduced and for whom were they written? The first question is easy to answer. We have seen certain indications that they suggest Diabolus or at least the Diabolus play. It will be recalled that they also contain the threat that if another bring the money before Argyrippus, the latter must give up all hope. This in itself was not considered sufficient justification for identifying the *alius* with *Diabolus* in the *Asinaria*; but, if the scene comes from the Diabolus play where the threats of Diabolus were understood from the beginning, it would be perfectly clear. Plautus undoubtedly intended the insertion of these scenes to be a foreshadowing of Diabolus, but this failed because the passages selected were not specific enough. Upon this interpretation of I, 2 and 3 depends the answer to the second question. If Diabolus is meant by the *alius* of 231, obviously the lover must be some one else. The general tenor of the monologue and the remarks of Cleareta unmistakably suggest the usual love-sick *adulescens*, whom we may without fear identify as the unknown *adulescens*

reworking of the Greek; *Bacch.* 347, 388, 770, is suspected of contamination (Leo, *Röm. Lit.*, 1913, pp. 119 f.) or of some other change or mutilation (cf. Langen, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-116).

[18] *Cist.* I, 1, *Curc.* I, 1, *Epid.* I, 2, *Persa* I, 1, *Poen.* I, 1, *Pseud.* I, 1.

of the Diabolus play. It is he who is excluded from the *lena's* house, not Argyrippus, who goes in according to 329; it is he who goes to the forum to seek money unaware of his father's intent to help; it is he who was once rich but, like Charinus in the *Mercator*, had lost his fortune. These scenes, being expository in nature, probably stood near the beginning of the Diabolus play, perhaps even opened it,[19] and reveal its plot as featuring the exclusion of the lover by his mistress' owner, a character for whose existence in the Ὀναγός we have no clear evidence.

Proceeding now through the main feature of the Ὀναγός, the deception of the ass-dealer, we arrive at the end of II, 4 where the prolonged exit of the slaves and trader (489-503) has raised suspicion among students of the play. Three objections have been raised. First, *sequere hac ergo* (490) seems to bring the scene to a close, but renewed efforts to get the money are immediately made, and the real ending (503) leaves the conversation hanging in the air. Second, Leonida, though insulted by the trader who will not trust him, seems suddenly placated as though the latter had done something to merit thanks and indicates this by his words in 496: *iam nunc secunda mihi facis.* Third, critics are loath to believe that the actual scene wherein Demaenetus identifies Leonida as Saurea did not take place on the stage, and therefore make various suggestions by which such a scene may be restored, regarding the brief report of its action given by Leonida in 580-584 as an insertion referring to it.

To explain the first point Goetz and Loewe[20] regard 491-503 as a later recension, while Langen[21] assumes that they are spoken as the trio move gradually toward the exit. Following a note of Leo's, Ahrens[22] held that Leonida, stalling because he expects Demaenetus, purposely drags out the conversation. On the second point Langen[23] guessed that a few words are lost after 495, wherein an apology from the trader would justify Leonida's soft reply. The third objection is emphasized by

[19] Note the uniformly early positions of the scenes cited in note 18.

[20] Goetz-Loewe, *op. cit.*, praef., p. xxiii.

[21] Langen, *op. cit.*, p. 246. Cf. Leo's similar suggestion for *Amph.* II, 1 (*Röm. Lit.*, 1913, p. 132, n. 1).

[22] Ahrens, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Leo, ed. (Berlin, 1895), I, p. 72: "excusationem quae videri possit arripit Leonida, ut ipse se purget et modestum faciat, multis verbis ad quae paucissima alter, sic exeunt."

[23] Langen, *op. cit.*, pp. 103 f.

Spengel and Ribbeck,[24] who suggested a *lacuna* after 485 wherein the missing scene was enacted, thus regarding 580-584 as an insertion by retractators. Both explanations of the first difficulty are quite possible but, being local in application, have no bearing on the larger problem of the relation of this scene ending to 580-584. Ahrens' theory is untenable because Demaenetus can not be expected to return merely from 367 and 380 which state only that Leonida will inform the *senex* of the plan.[25] If the action were true to life (as Ahrens holds, since he bases his argument on "stalling"), the slaves would long since have gone to Demaenetus because the trader's impatience presents a real danger of his going into the house, where the deception would be revealed. The second point is of no importance; a subjective interpretation at best, it could easily be handled by good acting. Leonida is merely trying softer methods. Spengel and Ribbeck's *lacuna* is unlikely not only because Leonida still seems to be pleading in 503 and because the slaves' song of triumph would be horribly out of place[26] if delayed till III, 2, but because no explanation is given as to why they depart and return before that song and no plausible reason can be given for the omission of the scene in the presentation of the *Asinaria*. Further analysis, however, will show that this omission was indeed made, not at 485 in the *Asinaria* by retractators who wrote 580-584, but by Plautus who omitted it from the Ὀναγός. This conclusion has been reached through the following arguments.

First it must be made clear that 580-584, although they appear to aid the theory of the omission of the scene in question, cannot withstand attack. Consider the presence of both the deception scene and 580-584, and the latter passage still remains a perfectly justifiable chuckle of reminiscence, so natural and inconspicuous that the repetition would hardly be observed. The interpretation of the passage is thoroughly subjective and will be reluctantly dropped from consideration.

[24] Spengel, *op. cit.*, p. 47; Ribbeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 f.

[25] Plautine technique of trickery (cf. Wieand, *op. cit.*) requires the details of the trick to be clear. 367 and 380 are sufficiently clear only if we understand that the slaves go to Demaenetus.

[26] Cf. triumphal songs after the money is won on the stage (as this would be) or during the completion of a trick off-stage: *Bacch.* 1053, 1067; *Epid.* 306; *Pseud.* 667, 1017.

But the manner in which the passage is introduced is of the utmost importance. It is odd that no critic has noted that Libanus, although he accompanied Leonida and the trader to the forum and apparently knows of the winning of the money (545 ff.), asks Leonida if he has the money (579). This is doubly awkward since the audience has heard their triumphal song and probably has seen the wallet itself. But the reason is not far to seek. Libanus finishes the songs, 545-578, with the words: *iam omitte ista atque hoc quod rogo responde. Argenti viginti minas habesne?* Leonida answers: *Hariolare,* and then speaks 580-584. Now Libanus' words in 578 are typical of the phrases by which Plautus ends insertions of his own boisterous Roman humor and renews his use of the Greek model.[27] The Roman color especially of 558-577 lends strong support to the Plautine authorship of these two *ubi* speeches which follow the initial rejoicing in 545-557. If 580 is then a return to the Greek, we must allocate 580-584 to the Ὀναγός and make our decision regarding the deception scene knowing that this passage also stood in the play, a contingency provided for in the preceding paragraph.

The evidence for the original existence of this scene in the Ὀναγός is threefold. 1) Libanus is silent for the last twenty-seven lines of II, 4, although up to 476 he plays a noisy part. 2) In the garbled ending of I, 1 Demaenetus took great care to inform Libanus he would be found at the banker Archibulus', although we saw there that the two were both going to the forum. No such careful precautions appear in Plautus without some result following upon them; but for any in the *Asinaria* we wait in vain. Demaenetus tells Libanus where he will be in order that the latter may be able to find him *si quid opus fuerit* (117). It is not guesswork to see that a trip to the forum to summon Demaenetus is forecast for Libanus somewhere in the Ὀναγός. Libanus' silence during 476-503 provides the place. He goes to get Demaenetus while Leonida retains the trader on the stage. When Plautus omitted this deception scene he did

[27] Cf. references in Fraenkel, *Plaut. im Plaut.* (Berlin, 1922), p. 143, n. 3. The *Asin.* itself presents one of the best examples in 307: *verbi-velitationem fieri compendi volo.* On Plautus' elaboration of such scenes as this in lines 545-577 cf. chaps. IV and V. Fraenkel seems to suggest by implication that 558-577 are a Plautine insertion (p. 410, n. 2).

not eliminate the brief scene between Libanus' exit and Demaenetus entrance but retained it (probably 496-503) after introducing a few lines designed to get the three men off the stage (488-495). The allocation of these lines is of course conjectural, but the alteration of the scene ending from the summoning of Demaenetus to the departure to find him is evident.

3) The third piece of evidence confirms the change from an entirely different point of view. The conversation beginning III, 1 is abrupt and the entire scene unmotivated. Clearèta and Philaenium enter from their house for no reason whatsoever; they reënter after a conversation which has featured the exclusion of Argyrippus. Both this exclusion and the character Cleareta have already been seen in I, 2 and 3, which were unmistakably alien to the Ὀναγός. Moreover, according to the Ὀναγός Argyrippus is at this moment in the house of the girl. Are we to picture him there alone while the women come out on the stage for a conversation the gist of which we have already heard? In the play from which this scene came, then, the *adulescens* lover is probably elsewhere. We have seen that the *adulescens* of the Diabolus play is in the forum from I, 3. No series of facts could point more clearly to the Diabolus play as the source of III, 1. Positively, this scene contains motifs already seen to belong to that play, and negatively, it contradicts, and is unmotivated in, the Ὀναγός. Finally, it coincides exactly with the gap to be filled up when a scene between Demaenetus, the trader, and the slaves is omitted from the Ὀναγός. This gap must be filled because in the revised scene sequence II, 4 ends with the slaves' exit while III, 2 begins with their entrance; time must be provided for the transaction of the deception scene.[28] This is done by the insertion of a scene from the play which Plautus has already used once and will use again. Again, as at the end of I, 1 we see Plautus in his workshop.

The resumption of the Greek Ὀναγός in 580-584 brings us immediately to the slaves' discovery of Argyrippus and Philaenium coming out of the latter's house and bidding farewell. This is

[28] The two most extreme examples of the rapid passage of time offstage occurring in the plays of Plautus (*Cist.* 774; *Trin.* 1115, where characters enter fully informed of matters which only at the preceding line a slave went to tell them) are nothing compared to the impossible situation which would be created by the juxtaposition of II, 4 and III, 2.

the scene (III, 3) in which Diabolus and his motifs are first specifically mentioned, and we return to the point from which our analysis of the *Asinaria* began. A critical investigation of this scene will now show how Plautus combined the two threads here, bringing the Ὀναγός to a close and initiating his complete use of the Diabolus play.

The conversation of the lovers is founded upon the exclusion motif (594-596), a feature of the Diabolus play, but Argyrippus' presence in the girl's house was seen to belong to the Ὀναγός. Thus the opening of this scene reveals a combination of motifs handled together by Plautus in what was without doubt chiefly his own writing. His authorship of 598-602 according to Fraenkel, to which Jachmann adds 597, confirms this view.[29] The slaves alternately eavesdrop and comment upon the farewells in colorless words which might belong to any play until their accosting of Argyrippus leads to the passage dealing with Diabolus. Here, in addition to points already discussed, Argyrippus states definitely that he has been thrown out of the *lena's* house (632). Thus this passage, which on its own merits we at first separated from the Ὀναγός, is now seen to contain still another Diabolus motif unknown at the time of our previous treatment of it. The long passage in which Argyrippus is humiliated before getting the money follows directly. The absence of any logical connection with the Diabolus passage (633-638) has already been noted in the fact that, although introduced by Libanus' assurance that Diabolus has not yet paid for the girl, this question really has no bearing whatever on what the slaves do. Furthermore the humiliation-passage contains a statement by Argyrippus (684) *da mihi istas viginti minas. vides me amantem egere,* which indicates that love, and not any urgency to anticipate a rival, is his motivating force. These contrasting points—separation from the Diabolus passage and connection with the Ὀναγός plot—affirm what we have no reason to doubt, that it was in the Ὀναγός that Argyrippus underwent this disgraceful treatment, which is taken therefrom wholly, or at least in part.[30] Philaenium was also included in the fun, and it was

[29] Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 215; Jachmann, *Plaut. und Attisches* (Berlin, 1931), pp. 35 f.

[30] I say "in part" because the humiliation falls into two distinct parts: 647-681 (insults to Philaenium) and 682-710 (riding on Argy-

therefore necessary to have her on the stage with Argyrippus. This was why Plautus followed the Ὀναγός in having her enter with him at 591, although that earlier section of III, 3 contained Diabolus motifs and did not need her presence.

At 711 Argyrippus is hopefully suggesting that there has been enough, but the slaves turn the action into a wishing game with themselves as *Fortuna Obsequens* and *Salus*. When Argyrippus hears that his wish to have Philaenium is granted, he utters in genuine surprise *ain vero?* (722), and apparently really believes in his hopeless situation when he says to Libanus (724 f.) that he has no possibility of getting the money for the *lena*. Argyrippus' inability to understand an obscure jest (729) is intelligible; but, after he was told the money was in the wallet which he saw (653-655, 677), we cannot still believe he is ignorant of the reason for the teasing; yet he says in 730: *nec quid dicatis scire nec me cur ludatis possum.* These factors all point clearly to the conclusion that Plautus has attached to the horseplay of the Ὀναγός an element from another source, wherein the *adulescens* did not know his good fortune. That the source was the Diabolus play is indicated by the introduction of the "night" motif which accompanies the money in 735. We have seen that no such stipulation was made in the *Asinaria*, although a suitable opportunity would have been offered in I, 1,[31] and that in its subsequent materialization it is bound up with Diabolus' rôle. The scene now closes with still another piece of evidence of Plautine manipulation to introduce the new motif. We do not know where Demaenetus went after the lost decep-

rippus), one of which may very probably be a Plautine addition to extend a scene so dear to Roman taste. I should favor the second section as Plautine, first because an insertion usually follows its model, and second because, though less coarse, it is cruder.

[31] Geppert (*Plaut. Stud.*, Berlin, 1871, I, p. 74) assumed the terms to have been agreed upon after Demaenetus helped the slaves get the money. But Geppert did not believe that this deception scene ever existed and is asking that an essential part of the trickery be imagined by the Roman audience to take place in a non-existent scene. This is indeed asking too much. Had it so taken place, the least we should expect would be some mention of it in the "report" of that scene in 580-584. Our objection holds good even though we have introduced this scene into the Ὀναγός, because to make such a stipulation even at that late date is inconsistent with the technique of ancient comedy and contradicts the course of the Ὀναγός.

tion scene with the slaves and the trader, but for the purposes of the Diabolus play and the *Asinaria* he had somehow to get into the *lena's* house. He is therefore placed there by an impudent dramatic trick not uncommon in Plautus.[32] Argyrippus in 740 says:

> Leonida, curre obsecro, patrem huc orato veniat.
> LEO. iam dudum est intus.

Then, because the audience has not seen Demaenetus since he went to the forum in I, 1, as if to boast of his indifference to more skillful motivation, the dramatist makes Argyrippus retort: *hac quidem non venit.* Leonida explains:

> angiporto
> illac per hortum circum iit clam, ne quis se videret
> huc ire familiarium: ne uxor resciscat metuit.

A lamer dramatic device was never known, but it served the purpose with a Roman audience. Demaenetus of the Ὀναγός has been bodily transferred from the forum to become the *senex* of the Diabolus play in the brothel.

With the gradual introduction of Diabolus motifs surrounding the original ending of the Ὀναγός in this long scene III, 3 the transition is complete. Acts IV and V are centered completely around Diabolus, the night motif, and the punishment of Demaenetus. They offer here and there a few indications of what may have been further details of that play omitted by Plautus in the *Asinaria.*

It has been suggested that Demaenetus in I, 1 is not the same character as the lustful *senex* of V. This is strengthened by a study of Plautine technique which shows that amorous, punishable old men are portrayed as such from the beginning (*Casina, Mercator*). Artemona, too, may have had a fuller part more in accord with wives of such men (cf. both Cleostrata and Dorippa). In the Ὀναγός, on the other hand, it is unlikely that Demaenetus had any more active part in his son's affairs than Periplectomenos in the *Miles,* Micio in the *Adelphoe,* or than that promised by Callipho in the *Pseudolus.*[33]

[32] Cf. above, note 17.

[33] Demaenetus' statement that he will be at the banker's (116) closely resembles Callipho's words in *Pseud.* 559-560, where subsequent

Diabolus' anger on losing the girl is directed neither at Argyrippus nor the *lena,* but at Demaenetus, and at him solely because he is a lecherous individual cheating his wife. This suggests an intimate knowledge of Demaenetus' affairs quite unknown in the Ὀναγός, for in 810-819 Diabolus shows an acquaintance with Demaenetus' habits far more thorough than could be gained solely from a glance into the *lena's* house.[34] Even the parasite knew Demaenetus' respectable side (861).

Ribbeck [35] saw in the metrically imperfect 828-829 fragments of a scene overheard by Diabolus when he first went in at 809. But more likely they are a garbled beginning of V, 1, where they now stand. The parasite declares that Diabolus will pay the *lena* anyway and hopes that Argyrippus may be persuaded to share Philaenium. He strongly implies that she will have more to say about it than Argyrippus. Though this *Eunuchus*-like ending is promised for tomorrow and, as such, is but an epilogue to the plot, it nevertheless suggests that certain arrangements concerning the girl, Diabolus, and Argyrippus in the Diabolus play have been totally lost in the earlier part of the *Asinaria.*

The structure of the *Asinaria* represents very probably an early stage in Plautus' dramatic development,[36] when his primary interest was to introduce elements of coarse rollicking humor (Demaenetus' punishment) and blustering characters (Diabolus), and when he was not too careful to conceal the methods of his insertion and addition. Quite aside from the fact that we have no evidence that Plautus ever made such long additions to his plays, additions which partook of the nature of

assistance from him has almost certainly been lost through contamination. Cf. Hough, *The Composition of the Pseud. of Plautus,* diss., Princeton (Lancaster, 1931).

[34] *suppiles clam domi uxorem tuam?* (815). Whether this refers to a *palla* (870-889, where, however, Diabolus is not listening) or to the twenty *minae* occasioned a dispute between Langrehr (*op. cit.,* p. 7) and Ahrens (*op. cit.,* p. 37) to which I am quite unable to attach any importance. But more marked evidence of Diabolus' acquaintance with Demaenetus and his habits occurs in 813: *uxori excuses te et dicas senem.* How else could he know the excuses Demaenetus had been giving?

[35] Ribbeck, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

[36] Cf. Hough, *Class. Phil.,* XXX (1935), pp. 43-57.

a separate plot, it is almost inconceivable to believe that the parts I have in this paper assigned to the "Diabolus play" were original with Plautus. The character of the exit and entrance sequences involved in I, 1 and II, 1 and the various contradictions elsewhere in the play are what earlier Plautine scholarship used blithely to attribute to Plautine carelessness without ever defining what really was meant. It is apparent to the most casual reader that these difficulties could hardly have arisen if the "Diabolus parts" were Plautine, for he would never have had reason to think up contradictions to the Ὀναγός plot. The rough spots in the *Asinaria* can only be caused by the juxtaposition to the Ὀναγός of elements the details of which were beyond Plautus' control and were imposed on him from without. These he did not take sufficient care to eliminate entirely. Additions of his own may be clearly marked by their sudden break of continuity and exaggeration of elements pleasing to the Romans, but contradictions do not appear in authors' additions to a plot they have well in mind. They appear in additions from other sources, frequently only after several hundred lines have passed.[87]

To summarize briefly the elements which contributed to the *Asinaria*: the Ὀναγός of Demophilus contained the tricking of an ass-dealer to win money for a young man's love affair. To this end the moral, if not material, support of his father was lent to two clever slaves. The loser was his mother who controlled the purse and to whom the trader owed the money through the agency of a steward, her henchman, who was impersonated by one of the slaves and vouched for by the obliging *senex*. To this play Plautus added motifs from another; in this a young man was pressed for funds and overwhelmed by the threat that if they were not immediately forthcoming his *amica* would go probably to another, whom he knew to be a certain Diabolus. This rival appeared in time, with a contract ready, but the girl had been won by her lover who paid, as the price of his father's help, the privilege of a night with her to this amorous old gentleman. The rival in anger informed the old man's wife, who exacted suitable punishment. He may also

[87] E. g., Argyrippus departs to the forum (245), but no trouble is occasioned until he is reported within at 329; he is excluded in 217, which is contradicted verbally by 329, but not physically until 591.

have had some reason yet to hope for a share in the lady's attentions. From the Ὀναγός Plautus took the main trick and from the other the hilarious ending. In the *Asinaria* this resulted as follows. From the Ὀναγός, I, 1; II, 2-4; III, 2.[88] From the other play, I, 2, 3, inserted to replace an omitted scene in the Ὀναγός; III, 1, inserted to replace the scene in which the *senex* actually gave his false identification; IV and V entire. II, 1 was undoubtedly written by Plautus to repair damage to exit and entrance sequence caused by the first replacement above mentioned. Lines 489-503 of III, 3 perform a similar service. Scene III, 3 contains elements from both plays, adapted closely in part and in part rewritten by Plautus in order to ease the transition from the trick to the ending. It is not to be supposed that the scenes assigned to each play were taken bodily therefrom; Plautine additions and alterations of minor importance are without doubt scattered throughout the play, many of which are not detectable or are at best conjectural[89] and which do not affect the determination of Plautine technique of adaptation from separate Greek originals.

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[88] If it be objected that the Ὀναγός is thus stripped of too much of its plot, it may be observed that several elements, now completely lost in the *Asin.*, may have helped it: e. g., Saurea's discovery of his loss, involving the return perhaps of the trader and also Artemona. Even without these conjectural additions the play loses little in comparison with those most similar to it, the *Persa* and *Pseud.*

[89] Cf. Langen, *op. cit.*, especially p. 104, and Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, chaps. IV and V.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF AN ATTIC TREASURE-RECORD[1] (PLATE I).


In my collection of antiquities is an inscribed fragment of Pentelic marble which was acquired many years ago through a dealer in Paris who said that it came from the north slope of the Acropolis in Athens. Its greatest height is 0.20 m., the greatest width 0.18 m. The thickness after much cutting down is today 0.025 m., but it was originally about triple that, certainly more than 0.05 m. There is an original edge at the right for about 0.09 m. The letters are small, in general 0.005 m. in height, but the omicron and omega are only 0.003 m. in height. The inscription is non-stoichedon, but the letters in the second column are better cut and better arranged than in the first. The arrangement of letters in the first seven lines of column II is almost stoichedon.

The stone is interesting as giving parts of two columns of the annual inventories of the treasures, so many of which had been taken from the confiscated property of the Thirty Tyrants or sent to the melting pot during the end of the Peloponnesian War and even in the early fourth century. During the Peloponnesian War there had been two boards of sacred treasurers, one for Athena, one for the other gods. But from 406 to 385 B. C., as Professor Ferguson has established in his excellent book, *The Treasurers of Athena* (Harvard University Press, 1932), there was one board. After 385 two boards reappear. The ancient temples were again filled with new offerings by transforming gold crowns and other gold objects into a second gold Nike and by melting up silver offerings to form sacrificial vessels. Our inscription gives a list of such sacrificial vessels just before 352-1 when Aristodemus (col. II, line 14) was archon.

There were at this time treasures connected with the cults of other gods than Athena and with minor cults on the slopes of the Acropolis, not only in the Asclepieum on the south slope but on the north slope where Broneer[2] has discovered cults of

[1] I am indebted for suggestions to Professors B. D. Meritt, W. S. Ferguson, Allen B. West, and A. M. Woodward.

[2] Cf. *Hesperia*, I (1932), pp. 31-56; II (1933), pp. 329-417; IV (1935), pp. 109-188.



Fragment of an Attic Treasure-Record.

Aphrodite, Eros, etc. Of course our rather unusual record might not be an inventory at all. It might be the record of a commission entrusted with the duty of melting down crowns and other dedications to make new sacrificial vessels, some for Athena and others for "other gods." There seems in any case to have been considerable melting of old dedications just before the time of our inscription.[3] But our inscription seems to belong in the series of treasure-lists published in *I. G.* II², 1445-1447 (376-371 B. C.) and 1450-1454 (367-343 B. C.).[4] The letters are similar in size and form. The disposition in columns is a differential which, even if we lacked a date, would place the inscription in time after *I. G.* II², 1453. Even *I. G.* II², 1457 (339-338 B. C.) may not have a one column arrangement, although it has 48 letters in a line. But its columns are very little longer in number of letters than 1455, which has 40 letters. The letters are actually smaller in 1457. The narrow columns do not seem to have any parallels as late as 352 B. C. The columns of *I. G.* II², 1428, 1429, and 1432, dating about 367 B. C., all seem to have been wider. The next group which can be dated (*I. G.* II², 1436-1437, later than 354-3 B. C.) seem also to have wider columns. The two columns of *I. G.* II², 1436 occupy a lateral space of more than 0.88 m. *I. G.* II², 1438 (later than 353-2 B. C.) is presumably non-columnar because, like 1440, it began with a decree or enactment of some sort. 1444 (344-3 B. C.) may be columnar. All this indicates that the *traditio* of our inscription, with its peculiarly short lines as compared with the Athena-records, may not be part of the regular series. The final lines of column II certainly show that we have part of a *traditio* of the Treasurers of the Other Gods for 353-2, whether the items appear in an earlier inventory or not. The first person plural used for the ταμίαι listed in the preamble is in the style of those traditions.[5] Those of whom the whole document was the record

[3] For other somewhat irregular *traditiones* cf. *I. G.* II², 1454 (343-2 B. C.) and 1541. *I. G.* II², 1442 is also peculiar, if we can judge from the restored prescript, for it has the appearance of belonging to a small, rather narrow stone on which may have been inscribed only a part of the treasures or some special transfer.

[4] *I. G.* II², 1448 and 1449 have been shown by A. M. Woodward to belong elsewhere. Cf. *J. H. S.* LI (1931), pp. 157-161.

[5] Cf. for παρέδομεν, for example, *I. G.* I², 293 ff.; II², 1414, line 51

could say "we," others could not. The point of importance seems to be that hitherto we have had no columnar records of the ταμίαι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, and no certainty whether these Treasurers ever had such a big collection of things to inventory that a columnar system would have been a necessary feature of their lists. We need not equate the history of their régime with the changes in the method of listing shown in the lists of the Athena Treasurers. Our list, then, may not be a normal *traditio*, but whether it was drawn up under abnormal conditions by ταμίαι or by a board of ἐπιστάται must remain uncertain, unless some more fragments can be found. The list might issue from ἐπιστάται who were commissioned to make four new hydriae (possibly by melting down old phialae), and on completion they were handed over to the Tamiae. This might explain the abnormal formula in Col. II and the non-appearance of the dated phialae in any later list (i. e. after the boards were reunited).

The silver hydriae were a noteworthy addition to the treasures in charge of the Tamiae in the early fourth century and, as Ferguson says,[6] these probably belonged to the πομπεῖα made with the confiscated property of the Thirty. In 391-0 B. C. Athena had twenty-seven of these[7] (weighing 1000 drachmas) instead of nineteen or twenty in 400 B. C.[8] Our inscription mentions four hydriae. Their total weight is more than 4006 drachmas. The hydriae were, therefore, about 1000 drachmas each in weight and, hence, uniform with the twenty-seven in the hands of the combined board in 391-0 B. C. and not far from uniform with the twenty-three subsequently added to this collection.[9] This collection, however, remained with the Treasurers of Athena after the division of the combined board in 385 B. C. Our four hydriae belong to a different collection, one given to the Treasurers of the Other Gods. It is notable that, if we give one hydria to each year,[10] the first would have been received in

(385-4 B. C.). We should expect προσπαρέδομεν, but the prefix is not absolutely necessary.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 113, note 2.

[7] *I. G.* II², 1400.

[8] *I. G.* II², 1385.

[9] Cf. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 114 f., n. 1.

[10] Professor Ferguson, *Treasurers of Athena*, p. 125, suspects that "the practice of placing annually in the hands of the Tamiae a silver phiale dedicated to Asklepios was after the overthrow of the democracy in 321 B. C." Cf. also p. 118, n. 1. The objection may be raised that, if our hydriae belonged one to each year, the archon's name would be used as

356-355 B. C., the most likely year for the overhauling made by Androtion and his colleagues.[11] Androtion's house-cleaning activity, his removal of offerings from the treasury and the melting down of crowns and other dedications at which Demosthenes was so incensed, may have started as early as 356, even though Androtion was not a member of the boulê till 355 B. C. Demosthenes may not have delivered his speech against him till 354 B. C. New charges were brought against Androtion and Company in 354, which culminated in the speech against Timocrates (353-2 B. C.), where the crowns and cult vessels are again mentioned. The new vessels had perhaps not all been manufactured when the speech was delivered, and the final accounting may not have been made till the treasurers for the year 352-1 took office. This was also the first year of the fifth Metonic Cycle[12] and the year of the inauguration of the secretary cycle in which for the first time the prytany secretaries began to rotate in the official order.[13] These hydriae were probably public offerings handed over to the Treasurers of the Other Gods. Professor Ferguson is probably right in thinking that the Tamiae of the Other Gods existed for forty-four years as a separate board and that they are still found in 343-2 B. C.[14] He says that the last reference to Treasurers of the Other Gods occurs in 361-0 to 357-6 B. C. (*I. G.* II², 1541), but our inscription, as we have said, gives one for 352 B. C., the very year in which Demosthenes delivered his *Speech Against Timocrates*, in which the two boards are mentioned (Dem., XXIV, 136): *καὶ οἱ ταμίαι ἐφ' ὧν ὁ Ὀπισθόδομος ἐνεπρήσθη, καὶ οἱ τῶν τῆς θεοῦ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ ἦσαν*, though of course these specific boards were in office at the time of the fire. Perhaps after the fire in the Opisthodomus to which Demosthenes refers, which scholars have dated between 403 and 352[15] but which might be dated in 356-5,

with the phialae. But the phialae were not dedicated, one new one every year; and the second column in any case differs from the first.

[11] Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 119, n. 1, to 121 f.

[12] Cf. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens*, p. 354.

[13] Cf. *Klio*, XIV (1915), pp. 393 ff.; Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age*, 1932, p. 49; Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

[14] Cf. *The Treasurers of Athena*, p. 117. We must remember, however, that the restoration of *I. G.* II², 1454, line 1 (343-2 B. C.) is conjectural.

[15] Cf. Paton, *The Erechtheum*, pp. 462 ff.; Kolbe, *Berl. Phil. Wooh.*, 1931, pp. 82 ff.; Dinsmoor, *A. J. A.* XXXVI (1932), pp. 160 ff. The date

a new inventory was made, especially of vessels made to replace those destroyed in the fire.

The first column as preserved would seem to have contained the names of the archons from 369 to 365 B. C. There are many archons' names ending in *-tratos* (Demostratos, Kallistratos, Phanostratos, etc.), but only Lysistratos will fit here, as the genitive of the next archon's name ends in *-ους* and the next in *-ου*. So the restoration of the names of Lysistratos, Nausigenes, Polyzelos, and Kephisodoros, the order of which is well established, seems fairly certain. So in *I. G.* II², Addenda 1428, p. 806 (dated 367-6) we have the ταμίαι τῶν τῆς [θεοῦ, when Polyzelos was archon, who handed over to the treasurers, when Kephisodoros was archon, the things they had received from the treasurers of Athena in the time of Polyzelos and Nausigenes. The hydriae of that inscription are also in earlier inventories, though it is interesting that there are just four of Athena Nike (lines 109-112) which occur also in *I. G.* II², 1425, lines 169 ff. Nor can our four hydriae be the four vessels τοῖν θεοῖν of *I. G.* II², 1445, lines 27 ff., οὐχ ὑγιές (376-5 B. C.) assigned to the Treasurers of the Other Gods. These were in the hands of the Treasurers of the Other Gods long before 352 B. C. and they were handed over to the treasurers of 352 B. C. The statement would have been proper in the prescript, but at the bottom of a list it seems to indicate that these items were treated differently from the remainder. Nor can they be the four hydriae of *I. G.* II², 1432 (367-6 B. C.) weighing about 1200 drachmas each, the total weight more than 4800 (ours are 4006). If it is a list of the treasurers τῆς θεοῦ who passed over four hydriae to the other board, then our four hydriae are not those of *I. G.* II², 1445; and certainly the phialae of *I. G.* II², 1450 and 1451 seem to be different from those of our column I, for they belonged to the other gods. It would then seem that our four hydriae are new ἐπέτεια, even if the verb is παρέδομεν and not προσπαρέδομεν. It is unlikely that they were the property of one of the other

must be after 385 B. C., when the boards of treasurers of Athena and of the Other Gods were separated. Dinsmoor puts it in 377-6 B. C., but 356-5 would do quite as well. In any case our inscription suggests a rearrangement. Dinsmoor also definitely proves a disappearance of many votives and a reorganisation, after a period of confusion, into columnar lists.

gods which had been in the custody of Athena's treasurers and which were given to the Treasurers of the Other Gods in 353-2 B. C. to make room for new dedications in Athena's treasury. They may, however, have replaced the earlier leaky hydriae.

In *I. G.* II², 1425 we have Lysistratos and Nausigenes, but nothing after the year 367-6. That inscription, dating from 367, writes Λυσιστράτο, whereas our inscription uses *-ou* for the genitive ending, showing that by 352-1 the usual form of this genitive was *-ou* and no longer *-o*. In *I. G.* II², 1438, which dates about the same time as our fragment, as the latest item deals with 353-2, we also have Lysistratos (spelled Λυσιστράτου) and Nausigenes, Polyzelos, and Kephisodoros, all in the same succession (already known) as I have restored them in column I. In *I. G.* II², 1450 we have Treasurers of the Other Gods in the archonships of Polyzelos and Kephisodoros and, since our fragment does not fit this one, it obviously is from a different list. This last inscription, however, shows that the Treasurers of the Other Gods received phialae which had been dedicated in the archonship of Kephisodoros and Polyzelos. Possibly a phiale was also dedicated under Nausigenes. This inscription and *I. G.* II², 1451 offer the closest resemblance to our fragment, but there is the following difference. *I. G.* II², 1450 and 1451 list all dedications of a given year made to the other gods under the name of the proper archon. Our list apparently inventories the phialae in a group arranged according to the year of dedication. It is possible that in *I. G.* II², 1451, line 6 the sigma before *σταθμόν* is the final letter of Ναυστγένους, and there is space in the line above for a *φιάλη* dedicated under Lysistratos. From *I. G.* II², 1451, line 6 it perhaps is possible to restore in our inscription column I, line 5 the weight as Η⌈ΔΔΔ.

	Col. I.	*Non Stoichedon.*
	[*σταθμὸν* ...Η⌈Δ]ΔΔ⌈ ⊢ ⊢ ⊢ ⊢ | | |	
369/8	[*ἐπὶ* Λυσισ]*τράτου φιάλη*	
	[*σταθμὸν* Η]⌈ΔΔΔ ⊢ | |	
368/7	[*ἐπὶ* Ναυσιγέν]*ους* [*φ*]*ιάλη*	
line 5	[*σταθμὸν* ...Η⌈ΔΔΔ] vac.	
367/6	[*ἐπὶ* Πολυζήλ]*ου φιάλ*(*η*)	
	[*σταθμὸν* ....] ΔΔ⌈ |	
366/5	[*ἐπὶ* Κηφισοδώρου] *φιάλη*	

Col. II.

πρώτη ὑδρία]
σταθμὸν X]
δ[ευτέρα ὑδρία
στα[θμὸν X
δ. τρίτη [ὑδρία
σταθμὸ[ν X⌜I ?
τετάρτη στ[αθμὸν X
κε(φά)λαιο[ν
σταθμοῦ [16]
10. ὑδριῶν[X]XXX⌜ |
ταύ[τ]ας παρέδομ[εν
ταμ]ίαις τῶν
ἄλλω]ν θεῶν
352/1 τοῖς ἐ]πὶ Ἀριστοδήμο[υ
15. [ἄρχοντο]ς
..... Εὐω]νυμεῖ
[καὶ συνάρχοσιν]

The inscription is carelessly cut. In column I, line 6 the last letter is K for H. In column II, lines 6, 9, and 13 O is for ⊙; line 8, | is cut for Φ and Λ for A. In column II, line 10, / seems to be for X, the cross line not cut. Probably the missing lines or dots were added in color, of which there are traces.

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[16] Professor Woodward suggests the restoration of τῶν at the end of line 9.

AN UN-PLATONIC THEORY OF EVIL IN PLATO.[1]

A. E. Taylor in his magnificent *Commentary on the Timaeus* makes the surprising allegation that "the doctrine of matter as the cause of evil is quite un-Platonic."[2] The contentious question, no doubt, is here as elsewhere just how one can determine *where* Plato's *truly* Platonic views are to be found, as distinguished from merely dramatic representations of Socrates or the Pythagoreans. Taylor insists that the *Timaeus* can voice only certain suggestions or approaches to Plato's own philosophy. Just so Euripides or Shakespeare differs from Bernard Shaw in having no prefaces that emphasize the poet's own point of view or from Dante in having written no complete epistolary interpretation of his work like that famous letter to Can Grande. For Plato, however, we possess other evidence, namely the *Laws*[3] and at times Aristotle's statements. It is to the *Laws* that Taylor appeals in the present case. If a certain passage in the

[1] For valuable suggestions at various points I wish to thank Professor George M. Calhoun of the University of California and Professor William C. Greene of Harvard. In its original form this paper was read before the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast at Pasadena, California, at Thanksgiving, 1933.

[2] P. 117 on Plutarch's and Atticus' exposition of *Timaeus* 35bl-3. See Appendix I.

[3] The *Epistles* may at times be consulted with profit, though the second (cf. VII, 341c.) furnishes Taylor with a strong argument that Plato's own philosophy is not contained in his writings. In that case even the *Laws* is merely a literary exercise. In passing, reference may be made to the following passages in the *Epistles*: II, 312de on the first cause as responsible for all that is good and as containing something akin to the soul, though the labor of inquiry is the source of all sorts of trouble; III, 315c on the divine as beyond pain and pleasure, which cause harm to the soul; 317d on the trouble caused by excessive wealth; VII, 326bc on the incompatibility of a life of luxury with that of the φρόνιμος . . . , καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη. In VII, 334ef. that which is without soul is held to be without either good or evil. At 336b ἀμαθία is described as that out of which all ills arise and bring forth bitterest fruit to their begetters. In VIII, 355bf. the Syracusans are exhorted to honor above all the ἀρετή of the soul, second that of the body, lastly that of χρήματα as subserving that of the other two. The passage VII, 334ef. admirably supports Taylor and the *Laws*, while VIII, 355bf. seems to me to offer by implication the only answer implied also in the *Timaeus*: body is an evil if not kept in subjection.

Laws relating to an evil soul is quite Platonic, and there is nothing that contradicts it, then the doctrine that matter is the cause of evil is, as Taylor alleges, quite un-Platonic.

Is Professor Taylor's contention fairly ineluctable? I would contend for a somewhat different view. I would take Taylor's own words in justification of an attempt to understand otherwise the relations among several of Plato's works. Taylor on the one hand says: "In the main, we must use Platonic dialogues in ascertaining his meaning only where they enable us to draw inferences about the ideas, especially the Pythagorean ideas, current at the opening of the last quarter of the fifth century." With this it is hard to quarrel. Taylor thinks Plato himself might go beyond what his characters could properly say. He proceeds: "This is not to say that we may expect to find Timaeus advocating any view which Plato regarded as merely false. Unless Plato had held that the Pythagorean science of men like Timaeus was in principle on the right lines, he would not have made Timaeus expound it with the approval of Socrates."[4] This principle I think it is fair to apply to the whole of Plato's writing. It is the more convincing when we reflect that, however much Plato is a poet, he is always a philosopher and one who chastises poets. If poets have been taken to task for suggesting by their portraiture of characters on the stage doctrines repulsive to an Aristophanes, then in spite of the *Laws,* Plato may be held to account for what his Dialogues teach, as he holds Homer to account for his narratives.

Furthermore, even if Taylor were incontrovertibly right, it is interesting to note how often Plato gives the opposite impression. To my mind both the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* serve rather to amplify and to give precision to the theory in question than to contradict it flatly. A critical point is the definition of a *cause.*

[4] Taylor, like Burnet, is known for the view that in the dialogues not Plato, but Socrates the Pythagorean philosopher, Timaeus of Locri, et al., are responsible for all that is put into their mouths, p. 11; cf. note on *Epistle* II, 45 above. In the present citation Taylor is attacking (pp. 127-128) the tendency to read into the *Timaeus* Plato's own doctrines or those of his characters: "We are not at liberty to reason as though Timaeus had read the 'works' of Plato, or even attended his discourse on 'the Good.' We are entitled to assume that Timaeus might allude to well-known fifth-century Pythagorean doctrine, or to fifth-century philosophical theories in general."

The *Philebus*[5] and the *Phaedo*[6] lend countenance to the notion that Plato would not recognize a material cause (according to Aristotle's term) as an *αἰτία*, so that we might have to speak of matter at best as an instrument for evil or as its milieu. But I think the *Timaeus* definitely supports the opposite usage in distinguishing[7] expressly between two *αἰτίας εἴδη* of which one is *θεῖον*, kindred to divinity, the other *ἀναγκαῖον*, to brute necessity. It is rather, I think, a question of concepts than of terms in which we are interested, and Plato seems to me, *when he turns to metaphysics*, to fall back upon an analysis of the bodily element in the world in order to account for the badness of what is bad in a soul. It may be, however, that Taylor would with some reason object to these metaphysical collations.

How often may we see in Plato *as a writer* support for the material theory? Or, to put it another way, how seldom does a work of Plato fail to condemn body or exalt the superiority of mind, admonishing man to subordinate the one to the other and avoid the corruption or seduction of material (bodily) interests? Addiction to the flesh is a most potent source, according to Plato, of confusion, error, wrong. The *Politicus*[8] comes out

[5] 26e-27b on the cause of the mixture of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*: note the definitions *τὸ ποιοῦν* or *δημιουργοῦν* = *αἰτία* and *τὸ ποιούμενον* = *δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ*. A famous passage of the *Phaedrus* signalizes the discovery that soul is the principle of motion or origination (245c, cf. Cic., *Tus. Disp.*, I, 23, 53). Cf. *Phaedo* 94de: soul resists bodily affections. Taken in relation with this passage of the *Philebus* and *Laws* 895-6 (cf. *Epist.* II, 312) it may seem to imply Plato's consistent adherence to the view of the *Phaedo*. It is even possible to argue for an intermediate element of the soul as an active principle kindred to the body: the *σωματοειδές* of the *Politicus* 273bc and the *κατὰ σώματα μεριστόν* of the *Timaeus* may be studied in connection with the *εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* of *Pol.* 272e6 and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of the *Republic*; whereby one may be led to see in the bodily nature one aspect of the origin of evil, in the concupiscent part of the soul, another. Such, indeed, is to me a legitimate deduction from the phraseology of the *Timaeus*, which may amount to a reconciliation of Taylor's views with the "Orphic myth" of the *Politicus*. Body itself is an *ἀναγκαῖον* or passive principle, but associated with it is a *τρίτον τι* (see p. 57, App. III) to which must be ascribed the chief instrumentality of evil.

[6] 97 ff. on Anaxagoras' *νοῦς* as unsatisfactory; *αἰτία* is rather *reason* or *responsibility*.

[7] At 68e, and see especially 46cd.

[8] The *Politicus* passages are as follows: 269d5. The unchangeable is most godlike, but body is not of this nature; it is the bodily in the

flatly with the reiterated indictment, body is responsible! But Taylor has stated his opinion of that biased, myth-ridden dialogue. "We have no right," says he,[9] "to interpret the *Timaeus* by this fanciful Orphic myth." Again, "The myth related 'in play' (παιδιὰν ἐγκερασαμένους (!), *Politic.* 268d8) by the 'Eleatic stranger' must not be taken as part of Plato's own 'philosophy.'"

We are constrained, in order to meet this, to run through the other dialogues before we turn to the *Timaeus* and *Laws* themselves to examine the possibility of some more satisfactory interpretation of Taylor's own best authorities. At the very outset we come upon something apparently strongly in Taylor's favor. The *Charmides*, which is of psychological rather than of metaphysical importance, affirms[10] that all evil in body or soul derives from the soul if it is bad. But the balance is overwhelmingly, to the best of my knowledge, on the other side in the *Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus.* I do not maintain that the material theory is adequate, but I firmly believe it was to Plato significant and sufficiently near a satisfactory solution, near the profound though perplexing analysis of *Timaeus*, though it may seem to contradict that which suits his purposes in the *Laws.*

universe which in spite of other blessings makes change inevitable. The speaker goes on to forbid one to believe in two Gods controlling the universe alternately; God Himself cannot be responsible for both motions of the universe, but one must be due to the universe itself.

273b2. The σωματοειδές is responsible for preventing the perfect execution of God's plan; from the Creator are all things good in the cosmos, from its own primordial state all hard and wrongful things.

286a5. See Appendix III.

[9] Page 79. Yet we shall see that Timaeus is made to say almost the very same thing at 86b ff.

[10] 156e6. Cf. *Crito*, 44d, *Gorg.* 525e: not the weak but the strong are supremely bad. *Ap.* 29d, 30b. It is to be observed that in dealing with the psychological question, how a man can be morally at fault, we may assume that evil is possible, though not necessary, and only a bad, weak, or negligent soul can be said to yield to it. In the *Apology* Socrates shows contempt for the material possessions of man and solicitude for his soul's welfare: if the soul is good, no other evil counts. The soul must rule the body, as in the *Laws*, must be the prime mover, so that even the faults of the body should be set right by the soul instead of being allowed to gain the upper hand. The larger problem, *how* evil happens to be possible or how it can overpower even the soul, does not yet occur.

In the *Protagoras* [11] the necessary order and harmony is said to be brought into human life through cultivation of the soul with the object of making the body subserve the intellect (διάνοια), which is good, and not shirk (ἀποδειλιᾶν) on account of the πονηρία of body (τῶν σωμάτων).

The *Gorgias* in the figure of the leaky vessel used to describe the endless pursuit of pleasure and the *Republic* in its picture of κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι (desires being likened to drones) with the teaching that all that is γιγνόμενον (subject to a process of development) must submit to φθορά (decay), these celebrated beliefs of Plato's Socrates point to two things. One cannot, for one thing, dissociate the image of a vessel requiring forever to be filled or the image of an idle, embarassing drone or a theory of the "becoming" that is inevitably doomed to check and corruption, one cannot dissociate any one of these from the notion of something corporeal or contrasted with passionless, immortal spirit. But in addition to this suggestion there is perceptible in such passages also a hint of more subtle metaphysical theory, of something that may *account* for the characteristic weakness of the body. This is not necessarily, I think, the badness of a bad soul, rather than the inherent nature of the body.

Towards the end of the *Republic* [12] Socrates actually says that in this life the soul is marred or disfigured by its union with the body (λελωβημένον ὑπό τε τῆς σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν) among other evils that disfigure. Body, as we see from the immediately preceding discussion on immortality, is not necessarily the sole evil.[13] Plato is not dealing primarily with the

[11] 326b. [12] 611bc.

[13] A critical point is raised in the *Republic*, 608d-610c. It is maintained that though the soul has its particular malady, namely vice, yet death does not follow even the severest attack of this malady; therefore soul must be immortal or outlast body, for surely the maladies of the body which cause its death cannot affect the soul more than its own maladies; unless perchance the sickness or death of the body can make the soul less just or more unholy. It might be inferred from this that Plato looks upon the soul as so detached from the body as never to be affected by it, as if any weakness or vice of the soul must come from within itself. I believe this is sufficiently answered by various passages I have cited, particularly by that from *Republic* 611 above and by the consideration on which I insist, that ἐπιθυμία is an affection of the soul inconceivable in any likely sense apart from the body. Like the *Phaedrus* (248) Butler's *Erewhon* (*si parva licet componere magnis*) even

problem of evil, and so we must be content with hints usually more vague. What may the Allegory of the Cave suggest? May we not interpret it in the light of such passages as we have already found, which may indicate that the Cave in which mortals live represents the prison of our bodies, shut off from the light of truth but ruled by ἔρως τύραννος only too often (as in 587)?

In the *Phaedo* Socrates and Simmias argue that the true philosopher will despise the pleasures and adornment and care of the body as much as he can, seeking to detach himself from it and turn his attention to the soul (65-7, esp. 65a-d). The body is an impediment to intelligence, and so death is a welcome release. We cannot apparently acquire truth so long as we possess this evil (τοιούτου κακοῦ)[14] by which our soul is muddled and confounded (συμπεφυρμένη).[15] The entire passage is eloquent of the danger of bodily wants and passions and the material possessions they call for. Hence are wars. Hence is want of clear thinking; with body (μετὰ τοῦ σώματος) it is impossible καθαρῶς γνῶναι. We must endeavor to the best of our power to get free of τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης. Socrates preaches the gospel of a decent indifference to the desires and applies the scathing epithets of φιλοσώματος,[16] φιλοχρήματος, and φιλότιμος to those who fear the severance of body and soul. The Socratic argument for ἀνάμνησις, memory of prenatal experience of truth in an ideal sphere, is directed towards the inference[17] that soul is hampered, nay sickened, by the confinement in a body.

One need but allude to the celebrated myth in the *Phaedrus* to say confidently once more what Plato seems to have thought

suggests ingeniously the fault of the soul in desiring to be born in a body; the dilemma is the same as in Plato: shall we in such a case say either that body is not a cause of evil or that soul is without evil? Both are responsible, as subject and object, so to speak. Plato has not said that soul is entirely unaffected by body nor yet that soul is without evil, but that there is no proof that the evil is deadly. *Phaedo* 81 ff. may be added to the citations that represent body and the appetites as sickening the soul without killing it. In the myth of the after-world (107 ff.) in the same dialogue (as in others) the soul is viewed as requiring purification even after its separation from the body, but this does not imply that it was not the body which contaminated the soul; on the contrary, release from the body is one of the rewards for a pure and philosophic life. See 114c.

[14] 66b6. [15] Ibid. 5-6. [16] 68bc. [17] 79cd.

about the influence of the body. Man has in him two passions, an *ἔμφυτος ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν* and an *ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου.*[18] The body without wings seeks earth[19] like a steed obsessed by evil that drags the chariot of the soul down. Such a steed involves the soul in wrangling controversy and hinders its view of supramundane truth: *βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἦν τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων.*

Such truth, beauty, virtue as one can dimly discover in the present life may serve to remind the soul of its vision of beauty and all that is of value in a happier state when it was not entombed and imprisoned in the shell of the body: *πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα . . . κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρὸν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ . . . . . εἶδον . . . . . ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν . . . . . καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.*[20]

The *Sophist* and *Philebus* are concerned with mental error and the superiority of mind to pleasure. Ignorance is involuntary, and the excellence and orderly beauty of any part of creation is taken as a sign of the intervention of mind. Mind in man is humanly liable to involuntary error, but the mind that disposes the cosmos is unqualifiedly good. Can we assign any cause for the defeat of mind in mortal creatures? For the answer to this we must go elsewhere; but I have already said that the answer I find in the *Politicus*[21] is too clearly "the body" to require exposition at length. If that is merely an Orphic myth it still remains true that Plato sometimes finds the best approximation to truth in the form of a myth. But does he either in the *Timaeus* or the *Laws* definitely imply that he has rejected the doctrine of the Politicus? Plutarch[22]

[18] 237d6 ff. [19] 247b; cf. 246c-e, 248cd.

[20] 249e-250c: It is fair to point out that the weakness of the poorer types of soul appears to be anterior to their inclusion in bodies, though their punishment and their fatal tendency is downward toward that state.

[21] See p. 48, n. 8.

[22] See Taylor, pp. 116-117, and notes; p. 78. The "boundless" in the *Philebus may*, as Prof. Cherniss points out to me, be equated with Platonic "matter." It would be amusing to find Plutarch committed to identifying the evil soul of the *Laws* with body!

equates *ἀπειρία, ἀνάγκη, σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία,* and the disorderly and maleficent soul of *Laws* 896d. That is, he identifies the "boundless" of *Philebus,* the "necessity" of *Timaeus;* the natural passion of *Politicus,* and the evil or fallible *spirit* of the *Laws.* It is here that Taylor takes occasion to praise the ancient critic for recognizing at least the quite un-Platonic nature of the doctrine of matter. Yet Taylor is not wholly satisfied as to the Platonic orthodoxy either of Plutarch or of the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus.* Some of these dogmas are in his view merely Pythagorean. I have already referred to his own answer [23] and need only mention here his quotation of Aristotle [24] as to the agreement "in the main" between Pythagoreans and Plato.

Taylor's case rests then upon the passage in the *Laws.* From that passage it is clear that in one important dialogue, the last, Plato definitely holds that an evil soul is *so far* the cause of evil as to be capable of it.[25] But does he give up his prejudice against the body? The body is subservient,[26] he says in the same dialogue; and, a few paragraphs below, the order in the universe is made the argument for controlling mind as the force for good.

Soul governs everything by its own proper motions of will, contemplation, attention, deliberation, opinion true or false with all the attendant emotions, but does so through the medium of secondary motions of bodies bringing about growth and decay together with physical properties. If mind, a god, be allied to soul this activity is proper and happy in its results; but if soul joins with folly the contrary is true: *ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν . . . καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἡ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κτλ . . . . καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγιγνομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται.*

Within the soul we see there is not necessarily uniformity but beyond it there are two principles, mind and folly. The Athenian stranger hereupon takes up the question whether the good or the bad species of soul (*ψυχῆς γένος*) holds sway in the world, and concludes from the orderly motions of the universe

[23] See pp. 128, 133. [24] *Metaph.* A, 987a30. [25] 896e6.

[26] 896a: *δεύτερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.* Cf. 892a: *οὔσης γ' αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος.* Cf. *Phaedo* 86.

(ἡ σύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων)[27] that it is the good, τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες.[28] The primacy of the soul, whether good or bad, is affirmed as beyond serious doubt; but the goodness of the world is due to the element of mind. Again without soul and mind the heavenly bodies could not move so exactly according to good plan and purpose: ὑπωπτεύετο τὸ νῦν ὄντως δεδογμένον ὅπως μήποτ' ἂν ἄψυχα ὄντα οὕτως εἰς ἀκρίβειαν θαυμαστοῖς λογισμοῖς ἂν ἐχρῆτο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα, though it was the popular belief that observing ὡς οἷόν τε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις πράγματα ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων men of science were led to atheism.[29]

The corporeal and pleasure[30] then are neither good nor bad, but to give them too great importance is dangerous. There are elements in the soul which fight against the better part[31] and must be held in subjection. Spirit is necessary,[32] likewise self-love; but excess of either is to be avoided, above all excess of self-love, which is an encroachment upon the rational faculty. Man is not completely rational.[33] May we say that Plato in these passages has in mind only one aspect of the problem of evil, namely the moral or psychological aspect, and that something is still required to answer to this in nature, namely the material object of the irrational interest? The test of commercial activity[34] he affirms is an exacting one to determine whether a man is sufficiently strong against desire.[35] Indeed it is hard to see any meaning in the appetitive faculty without some such object; it is hard to conceive of evil at all without both a weakness in the soul and something unworthy outside of soul at which it aims.

In the *Timaeus* the speaker of that name endeavors to penetrate below the merely superficial answer to the problem of evil. Body may be bad in its inert opposition to spirit, but we must seek some definition of the concept of opposition. This brings up in a new context the famous doctrine of the *Sophist,* the doctrine of otherwiseness; yet it is in body that otherwiseness resides, and consequently we must still hold that body is opposed to goodness. Near the beginning of the dialogue[36] the σῶμα

[27] 897c, d1, 898c.
[28] 897b8.
[29] 967a-c.
[30] 658e6-9.
[31] 863bd, 689a-c.
[32] 731b.
[33] 875a-d.
[34] 918e.
[35] Compare the use of wine as a test of character, 649d-650b.
[36] *Tim.* 28, 30ab.

ἔχων οὐρανός is treated as beyond question γιγνόμενος, γεννητός, requiring the infusion of soul and mind. In order to be made good it must be patterned not upon the divisible but, so far as it can, upon unity. At 35a and 37cd the Creator in dealing with body and his creation in general tries to make his work as much like his perfect model as possible, but He cannot make it completely so. But at 30c that which resembles imperfection (τἀτελές) is found in no case καλόν, fine or noble or excellent. Again at 31b the created οὐρανός (firmament and world) is described as σωματοειδές, ὁρατόν, ἁπτόν.[37] But at the very outset [38] God found something laboring under chaotic conditions which could be set only partially right and which without mind and spirit could not be good.[39] Finally at 34c God is said to have created soul first as prior and higher both in origin and in excellence. Later the discussion proceeds to the analytical questions of logical opposition and necessity, in which it is open to anyone to think of the corporeal or with some effort to refrain.[40] Yet it seems to me that I have cited passages enough to show that the body of writings to which we give the name of Plato is *not* decidedly clear in rejecting the theory that matter is, according to one way of putting it, a concrete and tangible source of evil. The *Laws* is concerned with the world as it is rather than the metaphysical problem of how it comes to be so. For that problem I think one may turn to the other dialogues, such as the *Timaeus*, which would not have been written had Plato no strong interest in the answers there offered. I think it possible and desirable to reconcile the passages Professor Taylor finds inconsistent. He objects to *Timaeus* 86 on the ground that the material theory there favored is precluded by the doctrine set forth elsewhere in the dialogue, as e. g., at 47 ff. On the contrary it seems to me preferable to read both the latter and the former as reasonably consistent with each other and with the rest of our Plato. Such a compromise is, I hope, neither unfair nor too difficult.[41]

[37] Cf. 36d-37, and see pp. 55 ff. below.

[38] 27d-29b. Taylor shows that the time-element in this, which does not affect my argument here, must not be taken literally.

[39] 30ab.

[40] See Appendix I.

[41] See Appendix II.

APPENDIX I.

To me it seems almost impossible to agree with Taylor (see pp. 78 and 610-615) that the analysis of the central portion of the *Timaeus* amounts to an elimination of the material theory. It is rather an attempt to define the concept, to reduce all body to the terms of a ὑποδοχή, ὕλη (cf. 69a6) or χώρα in order to simplify the study of its passive nature as related to the formative mind and to the παράδειγμα. If then not σῶμα but that out of which σῶμα is made is responsible, something better described by the words receptacle (of qualifications) or space (in which objects or events are found), then it is in and through the bodily form that this something exerts its evil influence, and soul opposes σῶμα or is addicted to the attraction of σῶμα as much or more than to that ultimate spatial or indeterminate quality. This is at least true of the psychological evil diagnosed at p. 86 of the dialogue. (Cf. Appendix II.)

The passage of the *Timaeus* which gives occasion for these remarks deals with the creation of the soul of the world by the Demiurge, 35a: "He mixed a third type of being out of the indivisible, eternally unchangeable being and the divisible becoming, that has to do with bodies. He mixed it, a third out of the two others between the nature of the same and the nature of the other and by the same token constituted it between the indivisible (*sc.* nature or element) of them (of the two) and the materially divisible; and taking these three he mixed them into one form, joining the nature of the Other forcibly, though it was hard to mix, to the Same." Taylor quotes (p. 116) Plutarch as saying of the primitive disorderliness of the world's soul as an interpretation of this Divisible and Different or Other: "In the *Philebus* he calls it infinitude (ἀπειρία), and absence of number and ratio which has in itself no limit or measure of defect and excess and difference and unlikeness; in the *Timaeus*, the element which is blended with the indivisible and said to become and to be divided in the bodily realm must not be taken to mean plurality of numerical units or geometrical points, or length and breadth, for these belong more properly to bodies than to souls, but must be understood of that disorderly and indeterminate self-moving source of motion which he often names ἀνάγκη, though in the *Laws* he calls it in plain words a disorderly and maleficent soul. This is what soul was by itself, but it received intelligence (νοῦς) and reason (λογισμός) and sane attunement (ἔμφρων ἁρμονία) that it might become the soul of an ordered world (κόσμος)."

At *Tim.* 37cd (cf. 30a2-6) the Creator is said to be unable to make the creation eternal, for a γεννητὸν cannot receive this perfection. In various places the word σῶμα or σωματοειδές is used of the created world. Timaeus begins at 27d with a distinction between knowable eternal reality and perceptible "becoming." If (28a6) the model for creation is the permanent reality the creation is good, but if it is the other, the γεννητόν, it is οὐ καλόν. The creation is a γεγονός because it is perceptibly visible and palpable, and has σῶμα (28b8, τὰ δ' αἰσθητά, δόξῃ

περιληπτὰ μετ' αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη. Before mind, to which soul is necessary, enters, the visible is in a bad state of confusion, so that God by his foresight placed νοῦς in ψυχή, ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἀριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος 30a2-b6). The γενόμενον has to be σωματοειδὲς καὶ ὁρατὸν ἁπτόν τε (31b4-8). He gives it the motion proper to body (34a) but τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν. The whole is made a perfect body of perfect bodies wholly pervaded and enwrapped in soul (34b). The soul is really prior, superior, dominant (compare the language of the *Laws* 892a cited above, p. 52), according to 34b10-35a1, and the σωματοειδές was later fashioned within it, as at 36e8. But by virtue of its tripartite nature (ἅτε ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἔκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκραθεῖσα μοιρῶν κτλ.) soul has the faculty of true opinion as well as of knowledge. So far the soul is ἀρίστη τῶν γεννηθέντων (*ibid.*), and the necessary inferiority of the world to God is excellently discussed by Taylor (p. 78): it is a "metaphysical evil" in the sense that the created thing must be less perfect than perfection itself, without being a positive cause of evil. But of the agreement of Timaeus with the *Politicus* there is no doubt, for the statement of 86b-87b is, if possible, even clearer and more forcible than those of the "Orphic myth" in the earlier work. Taylor (pp. 610-614) objects to it as inconsistent with itself, with the rest of the *Timaeus*, and with Platonic and Socratic doctrine. Yet it seems plausible to answer that the mind in soul in the *Timaeus* has been carefully described as definitely good and requisite to the world, while the thorny metaphysics of 47d ff. are designed to account for a necessity opposed to it: μεμειγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη. Now if, as Taylor (p. 78) maintains, the cosmology of this passage is a cosmology without matter, I think the author goes to considerable trouble to make it appear that the ὑποδοχή of 49a6 is the στοιχεῖον (48b8) of fire, earth, air, water: ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως. To say then that the conflict between good and bad is due not to the often-mentioned σῶμα but to the ὑποδοχή or the ἀνάγκη is merely to analyze further without eliminating σῶμα, whereas pp. 69, 70, 86 recognize the trouble in its most familiar form again. At 70d7 the concupiscent faculty of the soul is described as dealing with wants due to the σώματος φύσις, but 69c is even clearer in associating the body and its passions with a mortal element of soul (ἄλλο εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ σώματι] ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον κτλ.). If soul (or mind) is *per se* good, then Plato must account for the bad kind of soul (or the bad element in the world-soul) by associating some form or part of it with body, as Timaeus explicitly does. Without either body or an element of soul like it or addicted to it evil would have no status whatever. The jarring divisible "other" part of the world-soul is κατὰ τὰ σώματα. So at 86b2 we find diseases of the soul actually due to the body (νοσήματα περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώματος ἔξιν) derived from pleasures and pains; the patient is described as νοσοῦσαν καὶ ἄφρονα ἴσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν (dl and

d7e). There is finally the doctrine: κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός.

Appendix II.

For the ultimate categories we may formulate a hierarchy under God and the παράδειγμα as follows: ψυχή governed by νοῦς is set over ψυχή governed by ἄνοια simply or by the unrational faculties of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία; these last are allied to σῶμα, which is opposed to ψυχή and which may be subordinated to mind but takes its essential (native) character from space or that something which is rather a τιθήνη or ἐκμαγεῖον of reality than anything else. Without the lower element of soul the opposition of body and spirit would have no adverse effect on spirit and be only a logical differentiation, but the dialogue goes further in those passages which do not merely distinguish between body and mind but actually call the one good and the other not. *Timaeus* 86 would be inconsistent, then, with 47 and other passages only in so far as the latter emphasize the formlessness of the body or the effect of that formlessness upon the spirit instead of dwelling upon the body as such.

Appendix III.

The difficulty is to reconcile two natural attitudes towards the whole problem. Each is consonant with the discussion in which Plato seems to reveal that particular point of view. If he begins, as in the so-called Socratic dialogues, with the practical problem of educating the individual, he must assume, as in *Charmides*, that the soul of the individual needs correction, else there would be no need of education at all. But later dialogues are concerned with harder questions; can we reconcile the emphasis laid throughout upon the importance of the soul with cosmogonic doctrines such as that of the above passages from the *Politicus*? In the one case we have begun by recognizing that the soul is often at fault, indeed that if the soul is sound nothing else matters much; in the other we confront the fact that evil is *in rerum natura*, and we must somehow account for this. Why is it that the soul is weak, particularly against bodily pleasures? A ready answer is that body is in the way, body is too strong in its opposition to the soul. But in the *Republic* (v, 430b, 435-42) and the *Philebus* (35d) we find Plato acknowledging ἐπιθυμία as innate in the soul. Soul is not always regarded as perfect, and the question reduces to whether its imperfection is prior to the creation of a κόσμος made of body and soul or is due to a compromise in which perhaps something intermediary (τρίτον τι) suggested by Timaeus at *Timaeus* 35a3 could serve to explain more precisely the difference between soul *per se* and human souls in the present world. Yet this leaves unsolved the ultimate problem (inevitable in metaphysics, and no doubt inevitably insoluble for that very reason). To be brought into even partial subjection to body and its passions, soul must be at least partially weak and liable to subjection. The *Timaeus* seems to me to take us to that conclusion; the *Laws* gives

the conclusion a definite form in recognizing an evil soul. Body alone is not an active principle, but a soul may be wholly or partially σωματοειδής. It is possible to see herein the whole problem of idealism; for if ideas of the ugly and base are to be rejected and if there is to be any reason for believing in a soul as superior to bodily existence, then soul and body must be involved in a complicated relationship to each other and to the ideal outside of them. But it would be exceedingly difficult to refute the doctrines of idealism, even on this ground.

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ALEXANDER AND THE STOICS.

PART I.

In the field of Hellenistic history, there is no more accomplished alchemist than Dr. W. W. Tarn. At his Midas touch the most unpromising materials from the refuse heaps of antiquity take on luster. For many of us the Hellenistic Age first came alive in his *Antigonos Gonatas* and was first brought into focus and perspective by his *Hellenistic Civilisation*; and a new volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History* falls open first at his chapters. But his powers were never exercised on so great a subject, and his way of working was never so open to inspection, as in his recent lecture on *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind.*[1]

An historical lecture, even by an authority in his field, is seldom closely examined. It is presumably an unguarded exposé to "wider circles" of views he has already advanced, in the full armor of scholarship, before the narrower circle of specialists; and chivalry requires that a scholar shall not be pressed when he has laid his armor by. But Dr. Tarn's *Alexander* is an exception. (a) It is so fully documented that the notes and appendix equal the lecture in bulk. (b) It carries forward one of his main lines of attack. Alexander is now "the first man known to us who contemplated the brotherhood of man or the unity of mankind" (148). (c) With a view to securing this position, it abandons another. There is now an "irreconcilable opposition" (137) between Stoicism and the ideas attributed to Alexander,[2] and that is why "they cannot be a projection backwards of Stoic thought" (138). (d) It has extraordinary interest as a specimen of historical reasoning; and on that account as well as for the importance of its subject matter (e) it is likely to be widely read in colleges and universities. It would seem therefore to call for careful scrutiny.

[1] *British Academy Proceedings*, XIX (1933), pp. 123-66; also published separately by the Oxford University Press. References are to the pages of the *Proceedings* (subtract 120 to get those of the separate issue), except that a number preceded by n. is the number of the note, not of the page on which it appears.

[2] In Strabo, 1, 4, 9; Arrian, 7, 11, 9; Plutarch, *Alex.*, 27 and *de Alex. fort. aut virt.*, 1, 6 and 1, 8-9.

I shall (I) indicate more fully the extent of Dr. Tarn's change of mind about the Stoics; (II) attempt to account for it; (III) argue that, so far as his views have changed, they were right before and are wrong now; and (IV) offer a tentative reconstruction of the historical connection between Alexander and the Stoics.

I

The last chapter of *Hellenistic Civilisation* begins and ends in this key: "The philosophy of the Hellenistic world was the Stoa; all else was secondary." The last paragraph but one of the account of Alexander in the *Cambridge Ancient History* contains this striking statement: "The Greece that taught Rome was the Hellenistic world which Alexander made; the old Greece counted for little till modern scholars re-created Periclean Athens." The last paragraph represents the Stoics as the intellectual heirs of Alexander, and concludes that

> "not one but two of the great lines of social-political thought that have divided the world since go back to Alexander of Macedon. For if, as many believe, there is a line of descent from his divine kingship, through Roman Emperor and mediaeval Pope, to the great despotisms of yesterday, despotisms 'by the grace of God,' there is certainly a line of descent from his prayer at Opis, through the Stoics and one portion of the Christian ideal, to that brotherhood of all men which was proclaimed, though only proclaimed, in the French Revolution."

Of what was there briefly indicated, the British Academy lecture professes (n. 1) to be a further consideration. Actually, so far as the Stoics are concerned, the lecture almost completely reverses the views which Dr. Tarn consistently held until 1930. A table of excerpts will make this clear [3] and set the key for the following discussion, the design of which is not to score off the lecture but to appeal from it to his earlier writings.

Alexander the Great	*Earlier Writings*
138 between [the ideas of Alexander] and Stoicism there was a gulf which nothing could bridge.	CAH 6. 437 Above all, Alexander inspired Zeno's vision. HC 73 The Stoic philosophy was quick to grasp the concept [of Alexander].

[3] AG = *Antigonos Gonatas* (1913); HC = *Hellenistic Civilisation*[2] (1930); CAH = *Cambridge Ancient History* (Vol. 6, 1927; 7, 1928). The cautious reader will of course check for contextual qualifications.

Alexander the Great	*Earlier Writings*
n. 98 no ground for the belief that he [Zeno] wrote the *Republic* in his Cynic period.	AG 230 in his youth, when under Cynic influence, Zeno had written . . . 'on the State' . . . the ideal State of the Cynics, of which all men were citizens.
n. 74 The statement in Plutarch . . . that all men were citizens of Zeno's state, must be taken to be a mistake, introduced by him from his own time.	CAH 6. 437 [Alexander] found the Ideal State of Aristotle, and substituted the Ideal State of Zeno . . . to whom it did not [as perhaps to Alexander] mean a brotherhood of aristocracies.
135 only the worthy were citizens of [Zeno's] world-city . . . a State remarkably like Aristotle's, an aristocratic affair with a small class of citizens and a large class of non-citizens.	HC 74 [The Stoics] seem to have understood that if their brotherhood were ever realized it must be through the national state and not by its denial.
146 But Zeno abolished . . . all the apparatus of national groups and particular states.	
129 [If Iambulus' Utopia were Stoic] it would have no business in the line of kingship.	AG 253-6 kingship . . . theoretic base . . . Cynic view . . . Stoic view . . . the philosopher, if he does not actually rule, shall stand behind the chair of the ruler and advise . . . kingship is the possession of the state . . . Antigonos . . . "*our* kingship is a noble servitude" (repeated HC 48 f., 179; CAH 7. 202).
137 irreconcilable opposition between Stoicism and the theory of kingship.	
n. 51 Stoics never thought monarchy the ideal state-form.	
129 f. The one thing in [Iambulus'] Utopia which is Stoic is the absence of classes; nothing else is, not even the equality of the people . . . no Stoic ever claimed that 'equality'—a spiritual matter—meant similar conditions of life.	HC 113 in Iambulus' great Sun-state Stoic Communism appears full-grown. The people were equal in all respects.
	CAH 7. 741 the ideal of Zeno and of that great unknown called Iambulus.
n. 54 Aristonicus' inspiration was not Stoicism, i. e. Blossius . . . precisely as Cleomenes III did not get his ideas from the Stoic Sphaerus; indeed, how could one philosophy produce two such utterly diverse objectives?	AG 286 that other . . . monarch whom [the Stoics] trained, Kleomenes III.
	HC 295 Sphaerus . . . inspired Cleomenes' revolution at Sparta.[4]
	HC 115 f. Aristonicus . . . was joined by the Stoic Blossius of Cumae . . . who played the part of Sphaerus at Sparta.

[4] In CAH 7, 742 Dr. Tarn carries the influence back of Cleomenes to his predecessor Agis: "as [Agis] must have known Stoic theories

Alexander the Great	*Earlier Writings*
137 Stoics never advocated mundane reforms . . . Stoic literature, so far as I know, never says anything anywhere about it being any one's business to promote unity and concord . . . the two Stoics who sat on thrones did nothing to promote unity; Antigonos Gonatas . . . Marcus Aurelius.	HC 297 Fortunately the Stoics were content to do what they could . . . like Sphaerus at Sparta and Blossius at Pergamum, to work for any reform which promised greater equality to the people, any step towards their own form of Communism, which meant Concord and the abolition of class-war.

II

In view of the fact that the evidence for all this remained just what it was when sifted for *Antigonos Gonatas* twenty years before, the table exhibits a change of mind which, in a mature scholar and in the short interval between 1930 and 1933, requires an accounting. But it is not so much as acknowledged, save in the case of Iambulus (n. 41). The explanation must therefore cover not only the change but the apparent unconsciousness of it; and it ought to shed some light on the processes of historical composition. I can only hazard a guess, and the reader who has no time for guesses should skip at this point to § III.

The clue, I think, is a reference (n. 32) to Professor E. R. Goodenough's essay on "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship" (*Yale Classical Studies*, I [1928], pp. 55-102), "a study to which I am much indebted." This essay finds in certain non-Stoic fragments on kingship preserved by Stobaeus a needed corrective of Kaerst, by whose generalizations the matter "has been very much confused" (58). Now Dr. Tarn had all along been following Kaerst in this connection (AG 253 [118]), and continued to do so when he had already made the acquaintance of Professor Goodenough's study (HC 53 [4]); but with important reservations from the start.

The results of Kaerst's researches were incorporated in his masterly *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, now in its third edition, and still unsurpassed. Here the movements of thought and

through Zeno's pupil Sphaerus, who was at Sparta, his leaning was more probably towards Stoic communism."

action converging upon and diverging from Alexander are marshaled with a skill that will be the despair of historians for years to come. The pivotal point is occupied by the chapter on "Alexanders Weltherrschaft." With the view there developed Dr. Tarn joined issue in 1921 in an elaborate article on "Alexander's ὑπομνήματα and the 'World-Kingdom'" (*J. H. S.*, XLI, pp. 1-17), intended, I take it, to clear the ground for his chapters in the *Cambridge Ancient History*.

Dr. Tarn's declaration of independence from Kaerst included, by the time of Goodenough's essay, the following articles: 1913, Antigonos thought kingship not only burden but service; 1921, Alexander's world-empire ambition belongs to the Romance, not to history; 1927, his idea of the brotherhood of man belongs to history, not to Cynic-Stoic fiction. This would seem to be going far enough in paradox, for the world-kingdom and the unity of mankind are not easily separated in the authorities upon whom Dr. Tarn relies (chiefly Plutarch); and if either is to be rejected it should be the latter, since it might be Stoic rationalization of the former. There has been a tone of deprecation, therefore, if not of contempt, in the reception of these articles by Kaerst (I^2, p. 579) and followers of his like Wilcken (*Alexander the Great*, pp. 221^1, 266^1).

Now Dr. Tarn is not a man to retreat under fire, still less under slight. There was one drastic further step that he could take, and that was to disinherit the Stoics; to assert not only that Alexander anticipated them, but that his ideas were not adopted by them until two centuries or more later, when others had made them commonplace. This, however, meant reversing his own view, taken from Kaerst, of the primacy of the Stoa in the Hellenistic Age, and required a show of new evidence. Opportunely enough, here was Goodenough's essay, as if made to his order. The evidence was doubtful and the reasoning weak (as I show in an Appendix); he accepted its conclusions chiefly because he needed them, and that same need induced by the time of the lecture an almost complete forgetfulness of his own former views about the Stoics.

This, I repeat, is only a guess. So far as it truly explains Dr. Tarn's present views, it is important; but it cannot explain them away. They await that consideration on their merits to which we now proceed.

III

The argument of the lecture may be stated thus: (A) The ideas attributed to Alexander cannot be throwbacks from Stoicism, because they are incompatible with Stoicism in its original form. Moreover, (B) the authenticity of the attribution is required to explain "the line of kingship," contemporary with Stoicism but non-Stoic, from Professor Goodenough's Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantus through Iambulus, Aristonicus, the Cleopatra prophecy, and Augustus; and (C) it is *a fortiori* required to explain the pre-Stoic ideas of "the circle of Cassander"; especially of Theophrastus, Alexarchus, and Euhemerus.

A. The Ideas Attributed to Alexander.

Our authorities are (1) Strabo, (2) Plutarch, (3) Eratosthenes as rendered by Strabo and Plutarch, and (4) Arrian. The very names should give pause. Taking them in chronological order: Eratosthenes was a pupil of Zeno and a disciple of Zeno's older pupil Aristo (a Stoic with Cynic leanings); he wrote Aristo's life, and, like Aratus his fellow-Stoic and fellow-librarian at Alexandria, he put Stoic metaphysics into astronomical poetry. Strabo was a Stoic orthodox enough to criticize Posidonius as an Aristotelianizing eclectic. Plutarch was no Stoic by profession; he wrote two captious anti-Stoic essays, making capital of their paradoxes and contradictions; but in his other writings (including those here in question) he borrows from them freely, and, as Mahaffy says, "it would be hard to say whether the number of Stoic dogmas which he rejects, exceeds that which he quotes with approval." Arrian was a disciple of Epictetus, greatest and most orthodox of the later Stoics; and he reported and published the *Discourses of Epictetus* before turning his hand to Alexander. If there was, as I shall argue later, a Cynic-Stoic tradition about Alexander, these men would know it and either silently follow it or explicitly take issue with it. Now it is not questioned that there was a Peripatetic tradition about Alexander, the nature of which has been indicated by Dr. Tarn himself (CAH 6, 400); and this they do attack, from what (in § IV below) I shall show to be the Stoic point of view.

Dr. Tarn thinks, however, that the ideas they attribute to Alexander were incompatible with Stoicism. Let us see. Take first the only case in these passages of ostensible quotation of Alexander's own words. Plutarch (*Alex.*, 27) has him say, apropos of his adoption by Zeus-Ammon, "Yes, God is the common father of all men—but the best of them he takes to himself in a special way!"; i. e., I am the son of God, not merely in the commonplace sense in which all men are, but by election as well. For eighteen pages Dr. Tarn withholds the second half of this remark, leaving us to suppose that Alexander's point was "the natural brotherhood of all men" (127). In the interval he argues that this is not Stoic, for whereas Alexander included all but the small minority that cannot be civilized, the Stoics excluded all but the infinitesimal minority of the wise. Then, when his imaginary opponent is reaching out to gather in the trick, he lays down his long delayed trump. The adoption of the best "is certainly not Stoic, or anything else; I can find no parallel to it anywhere; it seems unique" (145). But this is just the sort of thing for which Alexander would have been prepared by the Cynic exaltation of the sage as the friend of God (DL, 6, 72), and by Isocrates's reminder (5, 132; cf. 1, 50) that his ancestor Heracles "because of his virtue was exalted by his father [Zeus] to the rank of a god." The Stoics took over both these points (*SVF.*, 2, 1009 *fin.*; Dio, *Or.* 4, 41 *f.*), and their preaching was an important factor in the establishment of the second-century Roman policy of elevating the best man to the throne by adoption.[5] The inconvenient truth is that the two halves of Alexander's remark were equally good stoicisms.

Take next the saying of Eratosthenes (Strabo, 1, 4, 9) that Alexander, though advised by Aristotle to treat Greeks as friends and Barbarians as enemies, acted as if on the charitable assumption that by Greeks had been meant the good, and by Barbarians the bad, regardless of race. This cannot be Stoic, says Dr. Tarn (139), for two reasons. "First, no Stoic ever equated the unworthy class with barbarians; for to him there were no barbarians." This would seem to be word-play *ad hoc*, for he had argued only three pages back (136) that Stoicism offered merely

[5] Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, ch. IV. DL = Diogenes Laertius; *SVF* = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. von Arnim, cited by volume and fragment number.

"the substitution of the unworthy for the barbarian as the man who is outside the pale." Now the Stoics did deny that there were "born barbarians" (φύσει βαρβαρικοί) in the ordinary sense, just as they denied that there were "born slaves"; these distinctions as commonly made were not "natural" but "conventional." But the same terms could be given a natural application. It had been the boast of Isocrates (*Paneg.*, 50) that, as a result of the civilizing work of Athens, the name "Hellenes" had come to be applied to those who shared her culture rather than to those who shared a common blood. In the same way we know that the Stoics applied the term "barbarism" to bad Greek or Latin as over against Ἑλληνισμός, *Latinitas*, by whomever spoken or written (*SVF.*, 3, 2, 24); and there can be little doubt that they applied it on occasion to bad morals, as we shall see in a moment. "Secondly, while the unworthy in Zeno, as in Aristotle, are the majority of mankind, Alexander's 'bad men' are not; they are, as Eratosthenes says, merely that small residue everywhere which cannot be civilized." But Eratosthenes says nothing about a "small residue," nor does he give any indication of the proportion of the unworthy to the worthy. What he (or Strabo) does say is that "in *some* people there prevail law-abidingness and public spirit and all that goes with education and refinement of speech, whereas in *other* people the opposite characteristics prevail." This association of good social behavior with educated speech is a natural extension of the above Stoic distinction between Hellenism and Barbarism.

The other passages may be grouped as follows: Arrian (7, 11, 9) says that Alexander finally broke the spirit of the Macedonian rebellion against his policy of equalization, and that at the feast of reconciliation "he prayed for all sorts of blessings, but especially for Homonoia and partnership in rule between the Macedonians and the Persians." Eratosthenes and Plutarch generalize this and connect it with his ambition of world empire, which Dr. Tarn omits from his report. Eratosthenes says that Alexander believed himself divinely commissioned to be "the common harmonizer and reconciler of the world," and that he ordained that everyone should take "the inhabited world" for his fatherland (Plut., *de Alex. fort. aut virt.*, 1, 6 = *Mor.* 329bc). Plutarch (perhaps still following Eratosthenes) says

it was Alexander's design to bring the whole earth under one form of government, to make one people of all mankind, and to establish Homonoia, peace and fellowship among all men (*ibid.*, 1, 8-9 = *Mor.* 330de); "all that is whom his arm could reach, the peoples of his empire," is Dr. Tarn's interpolation (127). All that interests him here is Alexander as promoter of Homonoia among his subjects without discrimination. This is incompatible with Stoicism for two strikingly opposed reasons (136): (1) The Stoics confined Homonoia to the small minority of the worthy, and (2) "far more important," they made it not something to be promoted, but an all-pervasive cosmic reality, already complete and perfect.

First as to the Stoic distinction between the worthy and the unworthy:

(a) It was one of many philosophic versions of the common-sense distinction between those who "amount to something" and those who are "good for nothing"—*οἱ σπουδαῖοι* and *οἱ φαῦλοι*. The nearest Latin equivalents are *honesti* and *tenues*: the heavyweights and the featherweights; those who count and those who don't. No ancient ethics ignored this distinction; at the heart of each was a reinterpretation of it, a shifting of its application. From this point of view, even a "proletarian" ethics like the Cynic was as aristocratic as any other.

(b) Nevertheless, as understood by the Cynics and Stoics, this distinction was not in any sense incompatible, as Dr. Tarn supposes, with a belief in the brotherhood of *all* men. On the contrary, as Professor Ferguson puts it (CAH 7, 39), "the vertical classification of men into sages and fools . . . had as its necessary complement a horizontal grouping of them as kinsmen, it being a matter of no consequence in either case whether they were Greeks or Barbarians, rich or poor, free or slave."

(c) There was no self-righteousness about the distinction. In fact, it was not an empirical classification at all (even Professor Ferguson's statement needs this correction), but a way of formulating the goal of the moral life, toward which one was either making progress (*προκόπτων*) or not, as might be determined by self-examination (for Zeno's test see *SVF.* 1, 234). No Stoic ever professed to have attained; any of them would have said with Paul, to the end of his life, "Brethren, I count

not myself yet to have laid hold, but . . . I press on toward the goal" (*Phil.* 3, 13 f.). It was a doctrine not of arrogance but of humility, since it meant that the philosopher counted himself among the worthless. It was the Stoic form of the Socratic doctrine that philosophy was not the possession but the quest of wisdom. When a young fellow asked Panaetius whether the Sage would allow himself to fall in love, he replied: "As to the Sage, we shall see in due time; but you and I, who are still far from being Sages. . . ." (Sen., *ep.* 116, 5.)

Now as to Homonoia. Zeno took Eros to be the god of friendship and freedom, whose skill was to establish Homonoia and nothing else. For this reason he said in his *Republic* that "Eros is a god and a co-worker for the saving of the state" (*SVF.* 1, 263). Friendship the Stoics defined as a common use (κοινωνία) of all that has to do with life, in which we treat our friends as ourselves (*SVF.* 3, 631). Homonoia, "the unity of the spirit," they said was a matter of understanding the publicness and mutuality of the good (ἐπιστήμη κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, *SVF.* 3, 292, 625, 630). Such friendship and Homonoia, as Dr. Tarn sees quite clearly, exist, strictly speaking, only between Sages; what he does not mention is that this is the Stoic way of saying that those of us who are not Sages, that is all of us, must put ourselves "on the way" to this blessed state. "Homonoia was not for the unworthy" is his prejudicial way of stating the fact that for the Stoics inability to be of one mind was a mark of unworthiness; they did not say that the unworthy could not aim at it, or that they could not be brought to it. The cosmic harmony in whose present reality they believed, moreover, was quite another matter. Of course it was not a man's business to beat time for the music of the spheres; it was rather theirs to beat time for him. That archetypal "state and polity" of which the stars are citizens (*SVF.* 2, 645) in some sense includes us too, and it is from our common participation in it that we derive the rational law-making and law-abiding tendencies which we exercise in the states of our divided local allegiance (M. Aurel., 4, 4; cf. *Cic., de fin.* 3, 20, 67; Epict., 2, 5, 26). But no Stoic ever pretended that any such Homonoia obtained in these local states as in the cosmos at large. Like Diogenes (DL, 6, 72) they thought "the only right polity was that of the universe"; but that was a state of affairs to be remedied, not to be acqui-

esced in. The approximation of the *duae respublicae* (Sen., *de otio* 4, 1; cf. M. Aurel., 6, 44)—that of which Marcus as Antonine to that of which Marcus as man was citizen—was in fact the great dream of the Stoics; and Alexander's and Rome's attempt to unite all local states in a single "world"-state was at least one way of going about its realization.

Dr. Tarn will have it that only the worthy were citizens of Zeno's state (135); but what Zeno said was that only they were "citizens or friends or kindred or free men" (DL, 7, 33); i. e. only they acted as one ought to act in these several capacities. No disfranchisement is implied. It is true that, according to Philo (*SVF.* 1, 228), Zeno said that the unworthy had not equal freedom of speech with the worthy. "This is explicit enough," says Dr. Tarn (n. 74), "and explains why Plutarch (*Lycurg.* 31) compares Zeno's state with Plato's *Republic* and Lycurgus's Sparta." Plutarch's own explanation is quite different. Lycurgus, he says, was more concerned about internal Homonoia than external empire, so he sought to make and keep the citizens free-minded, self-sufficient, and temperate; and in this he was followed by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno and the other approved writers on these matters. It is not likely, of course, that any of them thought Homonoia was to be promoted by attaching the same weight to all opinions on all questions. Actually, however, the remark which Philo quotes from Zeno is not legislative but descriptive. "If the Incompetent disputes with the Competent, he will come off badly, won't he? So there is no equal freedom of speech for the Incompetent against the Competent."

B. The Line of Kingship.

The general point here is the connection of Homonoia with kingship: it is the king's business to promote harmony and fellowship; he is a living law, bearing the same relation to the state as God does to the universe. This cannot be Stoic, we are told, because (a) they could not have thought it was anybody's business to promote harmony, which was not an ideal to be realized but an actuality to be recognized; and (b) they didn't believe in kingship anyway.

Take the latter point first. Diogenes Laertius (7, 131) says that they favored the "mixed constitution," but this refers obviously

to the Middle Stoa of Panaetius, which looked toward Republican Rome; the Cynic-Stoic tradition had been monarchic from the first until then, and was so again from the time of Augustus on. A state is never better off, said Seneca (*Ben.* 2, 20, 2), than under the rule of a just king. Of this tradition in its early Stoic form Dr. Tarn has himself been the most eloquent expositor in English (AG 253-6); but he has since made the acquaintance of what he takes to be another theory, that of Professor Goodenough's Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantus; whereas the essential point of it corresponds closely to one phase of the now forgotten Stoic theory as he once expounded it. The king, as he put it then, was not to be above all law; "he was rather to be the interpreter of law, not indeed of this or that code, but of the divine law immanent in the universe and binding on all men alike." He now asserts (n. 51) that the "Stoics never thought monarchy the ideal state form. Their world-state grew out of the *polis* and was a *polis*, and knew one king only, the Universal Law which was God and 'king of all things both divine and human.'" The sources warrant no such assertion; it is history as one will have it.[6]

The historian's veto power is exercised again in the matter of the connection between Homonoia and kingship. There was an "irreconcilable opposition between Stoicism and the theory" "that it was the business of kings to bring about Homonoia" (137). "Stoic literature, so far as I know, never says anything anywhere about it being *any one's* business to promote unity and concord; *they could not say such a thing, for it would be a denial of one of their first postulates,* that the unity and concord of the universe already existed by divine decree" (*ibid.*,

[6] Further samples bearing on this point: "As regarded the constitutions of earthly states, Stoicism took no sides; individual Stoics might do so, as men, but that depended on the individual and on the king" (n. 51). Yet there is no evidence that any early Stoic favored anything but kingship, and even the Middle Stoa regarded it as the best of the three simple types (Cic., *Rep.* 1, 35, 54). "Sphaerus . . . was openly contemptuous of Ptolemy IV," on the scant evidence of *SVF.* 1, 625. "Chrysippus disliked all kings," because, forsooth, "of all his many writings he dedicated none to any of the kings" (*DL,* 7, 185), and because, "when Ptolemy wrote to Cleanthes requesting him to come himself or else to send some one to his court, Sphaerus undertook the journey, while Chrysippus declined to go" (*ibid.*).

italics mine).[7] Nevertheless, Chrysippus said that "man was born to contemplate and imitate the cosmos" (Cic., *N. D.* 2, 14, 37), and Posidonius defined the *telos* as "living in contemplation of the truth-and-order of the world and doing one's best to help establish it, never giving rein to the irrational part of the soul" (Clem., *Strom.* II, 21 [129, 4], retaining MS *αὐτήν*). Dr. Tarn, oblivious of such statements, accepts without question the reconstruction of Professor Goodenough, whose most important source is certain fragments of Pseudo-Ecphantus, the first of which passes from the assertion of cosmic harmony to the assertion that it is the king's business to reproduce in his kingdom the Homonoia of the cosmos (Stob., 4, 7, 64; *Yale Classical Studies* I, pp. 75 ff., 83 ff.). Dr. Tarn's man may be permitted to reason thus, but not a Stoic. What the Stoics did teach about Homonoia we have already seen (above, pp. 68 f.). It is true that no surviving fragment of the *early* Stoics expressly says that it was a *king's* business to promote Homonoia; but among Zeno's pupils, Persaeus, Sphaerus, and Cleanthes wrote on Kingship, and Chrysippus wrote two or more books on Homonoia. It is not likely that they failed to make the connection as we find it later in Dio (*or.* 1, 42-5).

I pass now from the general character of the line of kingship to the men who belonged to it. With regard to Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantus, Dr. Tarn follows Professor Goodenough, whose argument I have criticized in an Appendix. Here it will suffice to say that these men are otherwise unknown and cannot be dated with confidence; Stobaeus calls them Pythagoreans, in the safe way of anthologists with nobodies; but all that Dr. Tarn finds in them to his purpose (128 f.) is perfectly consistent with early Stoicism and can be found in later Stoics, who are at least as likely to be reproducing early Stoicism as to have been preceded in time by these alleged Pythagoreans. With regard to Iambulus, next in the line, the first question is how he gets into

[7] One imagines some future historian saying in a footnote: "The identification of the agricultural reformer George William Russell with the poet Æ. must of course be rejected; the latter was a mystic and a theosophist and could never have been a promoter of farmers' coöperatives." "We must not confuse the Karl Marx of the *Communist Manifesto* with the theorist of social evolution by economic determinism who wrote *Das Kapital*."

it at all; and the answer is one of Dr. Tarn's master strokes. Diodorus tells us that in Iambulus's Islands of the Sun "they prized Homonoia above all things" (2, 58, 1), and farther on (2, 58, 6) he compares the governors to kings and says everybody obeyed them. "It is a pity," says Dr. Tarn (130), "that this account . . . does not say that the duty of the governor was to maintain the much-prized Homonoia, *though it must have been. But the connexion is clear*; and of course absolute governors or kings have no place in Stoic theory" (my italics). Thus easily is Iambulus brought into the line of kingship, although every inhabitant "in turn filled every office, from servant to governor" (129) and the governors had to die at a given age.

More important is his elaborate argument that Iambulus's inspiration was not, as he had hitherto thought, Stoic.

> The one thing in this Utopia which is Stoic is the absence of classes; nothing else is, not even the equality of the people; for as every one in turn filled every office, circumstances were identical for all, and no Stoic ever claimed that 'equality'—a spiritual matter—meant similar conditions of life (129 f.). Chrysippus' comparison of the world to a theatre, which was common to all but in which each had his own place (*SVF.* 3, 371), implies an acceptance of differences in circumstances, since some seats were of necessity better than others (n. 153).

This looks like the debating device of illicit extension; since Chrysippus said the world was like a theater in *some* respects, he must have meant it was like a theater in *all* respects. It is likely that he was discouraging reckless interpretations of the communism of Zeno's *Republic*; perhaps (as would appear from Epict., 2, 4, 9 f.) with special reference to the "community" of women, he argued, in effect, *just because* the world is public and common like a theater, and there are no seats reserved in advance, *therefore* there is no dispossessing a man once he has taken a seat or a wife. If this involves a qualification of the vaunted equality, so also in Iambulus "circumstances were identical for all" only in the long run, not at any given time; for everybody must wait his turn, and might not live to take it.[8]

[8] "Zeno's acceptance of Antigonos as ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον (*SVF.* 1, 24) implies that all men were not ὅμοιοι" (n. 44). But it is Antigonos who so accepts Zeno; and for a very different interpretation see AG 35[83] and CAH 7, 95.

Iambulus's islanders worshipped Heaven and the Sun, and the Stoics, says Dr. Tarn, did not; but although the Stoic "ruling principle" pervaded the cosmos, there was more of it in some parts than others; and Chrysippus said that Heaven, Cleanthes that the Sun, was by eminence "the ruling power of the world" and "pre-eminently divine" (DL, 7, 138-9).

Although the islanders' careless disposal of corpses may correspond to Stoic doctrine, Dr. Tarn denies Stoic influence on the ground that similar views were held by at least three other philosophic schools. These, it turns out, were the Cynic, the Epicurean, and (doubtfully) the Cyrenaic (n. 49). Surely the latter two may be dismissed, and the first need hardly be counted as a separate influence, since Zeno in his *Republic* was "holding on by the dog's tail" (DL, 7, 4).

Dr. Tarn has consistently maintained in all his writings that, although their preaching counted toward bettering the lot of slaves, "even the Stoics never advocated emancipation, for in their eyes slavery affected only the body, and was immaterial when the poorest slave might be a king in his own soul" (CAH 7, 742). But until the Academy lecture he has recognized Stoic influence in the absence of slaves in Iambulus's Utopia, and in the slave uprising at Pergamum under Aristonicus, joined by the Stoic Blossius, the aim of which was to found a "City of the Sun" after Iambulus's pattern. Now, however, the absence of slaves in Iambulus has nothing to do with Stoicism (130), and the slavery question at Pergamum has become positive evidence that "Aristonicus' inspiration was not Stoicism" (n. 54).[9] I think Dr. Tarn did not go far enough in the

[9] The note continues: "precisely as Cleomenes III did not get his ideas from the Stoic Sphaerus; indeed, *how could one philosophy produce two such utterly diverse objectives?*" (italics mine). The objectives were not so diverse as that; but suppose them so. Stoicism was complex, not simple; but suppose it so. This would still seem to be another case of history by fiat, based on the assumption that opposed actions cannot have a common part-cause. As Mahaffy remarked (*Greek Life and Thought*, 1887, p. 216), Stoicism inspired both Antigonos and the patriots of Athens who revolted against him. He might have added, both the Gracchan reforms and the Scipionic opposition. Dr. Tarn himself (n. 51) notes that "Stoics fought against the Roman Empire, and a Stoic sat on its throne." And it is a commonplace of intellectual history that the Stoic theory of natural law "could be used to con-

right direction before, and has now gone beyond all reason in the wrong one. It is true that the Stoics, like the Christians and like Spinoza, when they wrote "of human bondage" had usually in mind the spiritual rather than the civil kind, but they did not by any means ignore the latter.

They declare that [the wise man] alone is free and bad men (φαῦλοι) are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same: though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; *and this too is evil* (φαύλη) (DL, 7, 121 f., tr. Hicks, my italics).

Like the Sophists and Cynics before them, they said that by nature no man was a slave (*SVF.* 3, 352); and Chrysippus said the slave by convention should be regarded and treated as "a laborer hired for life" (*SVF.* 3, 351; cf. Cic., *de off.* 1, 13, 41). No doubt it was a rare, and perhaps it was an unknown, thing for a Stoic to go about preaching revolt to slaves and emancipation to rulers; but Stoic utopias would of course be slaveless; and when in an existing state the slaves were already in revolt against their masters and against a Rome that had just broken the back of a slave uprising in other parts, a Stoic like Blossius, who had just been on the losing side of a not unrelated reform movement at Rome,[10] would welcome the occasion as if it had been cut to order for one of his faith.

This case of Aristonicus is very important for Dr. Tarn's argument, because "it is the only occasion in antiquity on which

secrate the monarch as well as the people. All through the history of the School of Natural Law we can find advocates of the Sovereignty of the Ruler as well as of the sovereignty of the People—not to mention the champions of the 'double sovereignty' of both, or the exponents of the 'mixed constitution,' who sought to achieve an eirenicon between the two causes" (Barker, intro. to Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, 1934, Vol. I, p. xlviii).

[10] Though the chief aim of Tiberius Gracchus may have been to thin the ranks of the urban unemployed, I infer from Blossius's next step that *he* looked toward the substitution of a diminishing for an increasing rôle of slavery in Roman economic life. When that cause seemed lost, he would welcome eagerly the chance at Pergamum, not to eliminate the slaves by turning the land over to the free proletariat, but to emancipate the slaves themselves.

Homonoia was to extend, not merely laterally—from one race to another—but vertically, to the depths of the slave world; *and the moving spirit of it was a king*" (131, my italics). Precisely; a king joined by a Stoic philosopher with his mind on Iambulus—for the choice of the name "City of the Sun" was almost certainly Blossius's, attracted by the obvious kinship between Iambulus's Utopia and Zeno's *Republic*. Dr. Tarn rightly says that some points in Iambulus cannot be traced to Zeno at all, and that those which can can singly be traced elsewhere; but the coincidence of several (absence of classes and slaves, of law-courts and temples, community of women, and the provisions regarding burial) counts strongly in favor of direct reminiscence of Zeno. And Iambulus's "Islands of the Sun," like the islands of Euhemerus's utopia, derive, I think, from the Cynic Onesicritus, whom Zeno himself almost certainly had in mind, as I shall show in § IV.[11]

As Iambulus's utopia prized Homonoia above all things, so in the Cleopatra prophecy justice and love shall reign upon earth, and with them Homonoia, which "surpasses all earthly things." I shall not pretend to find any connection between this prophecy and Stoicism, except as the tradition to which it belongs is Stoic. On its place in the tradition, what Dr. Tarn has elsewhere said (*JRS.*, XXII [1932], p. 140) may here be quoted:

> Roughly, then, as a prophet might see it, we have four stages in the history of this idea: Alexander in the fourth century had dreamed of it, Iambulus in the third had shown how it might be achieved, Aristonicus in the second had tried to put it into practice and been prevented by Rome; and now in the first century Cleopatra, after defeating Rome, was to carry it through. As the first Macedonian monarch to rule in the east had overthrown Persia and then sought to reconcile her, so the last of Alexander's heirs was to overthrow Rome and then bring about that reconciliation of east and west which Alexander had not lived to achieve.

For Augustus there is of course a wide range of evidence, from which Dr. Tarn selects only so much as, taken by itself, fits his thesis (132 f.). He could not go farther into detail, or go beyond Augustus into the Empire, without bringing the Stoics into the picture; in fact, into the foreground. Throughout its long career the Stoa exhibited a genius far beyond that

[11] Dr. Tarn connects Euhemerus with Onesicritus (165 bottom), but does not see where this would lead him.

of any other school for grappling with the larger movement of affairs. (1) Through treatises On Kingship and personal association with the successors of Alexander, they developed the theory of kingship in the Hellenistic East, as long as the possibility of a resumption of the work of Alexander seemed a live one. (2) When the second century B. C. brought the expansion of Rome towards world empire, the Middle Stoa of Panaetius and Posidonius turned to the winning of the ruling class at Rome. They worked out a philosophical justification of Roman imperialism, durable enough to serve Italy's purposes in Ethiopia today. As kingship had meant the rule of the best man, imperialism mean that of the best people resuming the cultural mission of Alexander. We must not let the "mixed constitution" throw us off the track, since under cover of it came the theory of the principate which paved the way for Augustus. This is a bit of stage business for which the direction would be: Exit Kingship left, reappearing right disguised as Principate. (Contrast at this point the political ineptitude of the Middle Academy of Carneades—a more brilliant thinker than any Stoic ever was—and the indifference of the Epicureans and Peripatetics; and note that if the Pythagoreans had really been responsible for the political philosophy either of Hellenistic kingship or of imperialism, we should have heard of it.) (3) Under Augustus and the later emperors the disguise was soon dropped, and there was a widespread revival of the old Stoic theory of kingship. Its adaptations may be illustrated by (a) the frequent recurrence of the Stoic idea of the *statio principis*; (b) Seneca's *De Clementia*; (c) the senatorial opposition and its Stoic theory of adoption; (d) the fragments of Musonius on kingship; (e) the speeches of Dio. With all of these, but especially with the last-named, compare Pliny's *Panegyric* of Trajan and the *Political Precepts* of Plutarch.[12]

Most of this is familiar enough, but I have not seen an adequate statement of the value of Seneca's *De Clementia* as evi-

[12] On these comparisons see Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, n. 5 above, ch. IV nn. 16, 26. On other points in this paragraph see Kaerst, "Scipio Aemilianus, die Stoa und der Prinzipat," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, V (1929), pp. 653-75; Capelle, "Griechische Ethik und römischer Imperialismus," *Klio*, XXV (1932), pp. 86-113; Kostermann, "statio principis," *Philologus*, LXXXVII (1931-32), pp. 358-68, 430-44.

dence for the nature of this revival. This (a) does not profess to be a fully rounded exposition of the theory of kingship but confines itself to that aspect of it which Nero most needed to have brought home to him; (b) only half of it has come down to us; and (c) it makes a point of adhering to Stoic doctrine even on paradoxical points which hostile critics have made an occasion for condemning the Stoa as incapable of giving good counsel to kings (2, 5, 2). Nevertheless it reproduces most of the points both of the doctrine of kingship formerly expounded by Dr. Tarn (i-iii) and of that which he now borrows from Professor Goodenough (iv-vii): (i) The theme of true kingship vs. tyranny: 1, 11, 4 ff. (ii) A direct echo of Antigonos on kingship as a "noble servitude": 1, 8, 1 as emended by Wilamowitz: *Quid? tu non experiris istud* [*imperium*] *nobilem* [*MSS nobis*] *esse tibi servitutem?* (cf. 1, 8, 3). (iii) A direct echo of the early Stoic fragment in Suidas βασιλεία (3) at 1, 19, 8: "not that the state is the king's, but that he is the state's." (A present-day equivalent of this may be found in the "Emperor-organ" theory recently advanced against the *kami* conception of the Japanese emperorship.) (iv) The naturalness of kingship as shown by the bees: 1, 19, 2 f.; cf. Dio, *or.* 4, 63. (v) The king as viceregent of God on earth, a god among men, upon whom they gaze as upon an epiphany: 1, 1, 2; 5, 7; 7, 1; 19, 8. (vi) The king as a model of virtue into whose likeness all things are to be moulded by imitation: 2, 2, 1. (vii) At least a suggestion of the Animate Law doctrine at 1, 1, 4; cf. 2, 1, 4 for the king as an inspiration *ad aequum bonumque*, and note at 1, 4, 1 the common Stoic language about law applied to the king. I think it extremely unlikely that Seneca was the first to put these ideas together, and extremely probable that they were all to be found in the Stoic treatises on kingship from the beginning. Dr. Tarn's old Stoic theory of kingship and his new "Pythagorean" one were, I think, not two different and competing theories, but two aspects of one and the same theory; and I think Professor Goodenough quite mistaken in isolating half of it as "the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age."

C. The Circle of Cassander.

This group included Euhemerus, Alexarchus, Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum, "and apparently Dicaearchus"; "it

was essentially pre-Stoic"; and its existence "is very important for the subject of Alexander's ideas" (166). It is made out to be pre-Stoic (a) by assigning each of its members the earliest possible date (see e. g., the long appendix on the date of Euhemerus), and (b) by putting Zeno's *floruit* as late as possible. "If the current interpretation of a broken Herculanean papyrus (*SVF.* 1, 42) be correct, there were already Stoics in existence when he published his *Republic*" (140). *SVF.* 1, 2 "gives no ground for the belief that he wrote the *Republic* in his Cynic period; for, if we believe this, we must also believe that (as the same words say) he wrote all his works before he opened his school!" (n. 98). But "the same words" do not say this; Diogenes Laertius merely makes his mention of the *Republic* an occasion for listing Zeno's other writings. And the papyrus does not prove what Dr. Tarn wants it to prove; the interpolator may have been an associate of Zeno's who later followed him into the Stoa. There is, in fact, nothing to the purpose in the circle of Cassander that can be confidently dated earlier than Zeno's *Republic,* unless it be the founding of Ouranopolis.

Demetrius and Dicaearchus do not enter into the argument. Of Euhemerus, beyond referring the reader to note 11 above, I shall only say that the reasons (165 f.) for dating his book before 290 are unconvicing, and that "euhemerism" was Stoic doctrine from the start. As for Alexarchus, who may perhaps be said to belong to the lunatic fringe of the line of kingship, I quote first what Dr. Tarn said of him (AG 185) before he had a thesis to prove:

> Kassandros' half-mad brother Alexarchos, who thought he was the Sun, had refounded [Sane] by the name of Ouranopolis, 'Heaven Town'; he had coined a new speech for the people, among other absurdities, and they had entered into the spirit of his whim; on their coins they called themselves, not 'men of Ouranopolis,' but 'Children of Heaven.'

This *may* have been soon after 316, and therefore pre-Stoic; but the suggestion (142) that Zeno may have taken "his idea of love binding the universe together" from Alexarchus's Aphrodite coins is a very unhappy one. Nor is there much grist for Dr. Tarn's mill in Weinreich's subsequent suggestion of a connection between Alexarchus and Euhemerus on the one hand and Iambulus and Aristonicus on the other. The comic example of Alexarchus may, to be sure, have provided a hint for

euhemerism, but none for the utopia of Euhemerus, which had no earthly King Helios; and there is no evidence that this name was applied to Iambulus's governors or to Aristonicus.[18]

To Dr. Tarn the most important thing about Theophrastus was once his beginning the hostile Peripatetic tradition about Alexander; but that is now forgotten for his belief that "all men were of one family and were kin to one another" (140).

Stoic thought his statement most certainly is not; for he traces a chain of progress, from affection for one's family to affection for one's fellow citizens, thence to affection for one's own race, and thence to affection for all men—'love' might be a better translation;—*and this chain of progress is unknown to Stoicism*. . . . Theophrastus calls mankind children of . . . Heaven and Earth, *which is totally foreign to Stoicism*. . . . His account of the progress of affection from the particular to the general was taken up later by Antiochus of Ascalon, the first eclectic, and Cicero made it current coin; *Stoic it never was* (140 f.) . . . *there is no trace in Stoicism of Theophrastus' chain of progress* (n. 101; italics mine throughout).

He adduces in evidence a fragment from Theophrastus preserved by Porphyry and identified by Bernays; and he argues that a somewhat similar passage in a section of Stobaeus headed "The Teachings of Aristotle and the Other Peripatetics on Ethics" is also from Theophrastus and "represents the same original as the passage in Porphyry" (n. 101). But there are several inconvenient facts of which he makes no mention.

(1) The fragment in Porphyry, as identified by Bernays, does not extend to the claim that men are children of Heaven and Earth; and in any case this is cited from Euripides, who speaks not of men in particular but of all living things. Moreover this unusually transparent mythological commonplace was particularly congenial to Stoicism, which made express provision for its physical interpretation (*SVF.* 1, 124; 2, 1009).

(2) The fragment is not concerned with the brotherhood of

[18] See Otto Weinreich, "Menekrates Zeus," *Tübinger Beiträge*, XVIII (1933). He shows Alexarchus's connection with Menecrates, diagnoses schizophrenia, and remarks how harmless in comparison would have been the execution of "the characteristically Hellenistic project" of Deinocrates, who proposed to carve Mt. Athos into an Alexander colossus holding in one hand a new Alexandria of ten thousand inhabitants.

man and man, but with that of man and beast. It is not a description of developmental stages in the range of human affection, but an argument (on Theophrastus's part) against animal sacrifice, which Porphyry adapts to the purposes of his vegetarian tract. The "chain of progress" is not in man's affections, but in the argument, which moves by analogy from the kinship of members of a family, through that of fellow citizens, of members of the same race, and of all men, to that of men and animals. Theophrastus's point is the impiety of animal sacrifice; Porphyry's, the cannibalism of eating animal food.

(3) In the Stobaeus passage, again, the "chain of progress" is all in the argument, which moves from the "choiceworthiness-for-their-own-sakes" of children and parents, through the obvious intermediate steps, to that of all men. Though there is a parallel between the steps of the two arguments, the suggestion that they represent "the same original" is particularly inept. Whereas the Stobaeus passage is cast in the technical terminology of Stoicism and says nothing of animals, the Theophrastus argument is quite at home in the context of Porphyry's polemic against the Stoics, complaining that, though they derive justice from *oikeiōsis*, they do not extend it to animals (*SVF.* 1, 197 = Porphyry, *de abstinentia* 3, 19; cf. 3, 26).

(4) In spite of Dr. Tarn's too much protesting, *his* chain of progress *was* Stoic, and (so far as anybody now knows) Stoic only until Antiochus took it over. The whole doctrine is implicit in Porphyry's remark that "The followers of Zeno make *oikeiōsis* the source of justice." Cicero puts an explicit statement of the doctrine into the mouth of Cato (who speaks for "Zeno and the Stoics") in *de fin.*, 3, 5, 16; 3, 6, 20–3, 7, 23; and especially 3, 19, 62–3, 21, 71. Note the exclusion of animals in 3, 20, 67, where we learn also that the doctrine goes back at least to Chrysippus, who, says Plutarch (*SVF.* 3, 179), never ceases to weary his reader with it, dragging it into all his books, physical or ethical. There is an inadequate indication of it in DL, 7, 85 ff. (see Philippson's emendation, *Philologus*, LXXXVII [1931-32], p. 452), and one somewhat less so (from Panaetius) in Cic., *de off.* 1, 4, 12. See also *SVF.* 1, 197 f. (showing that it goes back to Zeno himself), 3, 178 ff. For a brief exposition of the doctrine see my Appendix II.

5) Antiochus's version of the doctrine (Cic., *de fin.* 5, 9, 24 ff., esp. 5, 23, 65, 67) is part of a complete theory of ethics which professes to reproduce that which was common to the Old Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, *et al.*) and to Aristotle and Theophrastus (*de fin.* 5, 3, 7; 5, 5, 12), and which was allegedly taken over bodily from them (or more specifically from his teacher Polemo) by Zeno and the Stoics, who invented only a new terminology. This preposterous claim has never been taken at face value, though the proper discount is variously estimated.[14] The commonest view is that Antiochus took the theory from the Stoics, especially Panaetius and Posidonius, and sought to naturalize it in the Academy by reading it into the writings of the older Academics and Peripatetics by main force. Some would add that Peripatetic pupils of Antiochus then incorporated it in textbook epitomes of Peripatetic doctrine, from which it passed into Areius Didymus, and thence to Stobaeus; but, as I have said under (3) above, as a "chain of progress" in Dr. Tarn's sense it is not really in Stobaeus. There is in any case one fatal flaw in Antiochus's claim, one sure indication that he had really got his theory from the Stoics, and that is his inclusion of the distinctively Stoic derivation of Justice from *oikeiōsis* (*de fin.* 5, 23, 65), reprobated not only by Porphyry, but also by such second-century Platonists as Gaius and the anonymous commentator on Plato's *Theaetetus*.

(6) Of the passages cited to prove that "Cicero made it current coin" (n. 105), the first (*de fin.* 3, 19, 62) professes to reproduce the view of "Zeno and the Stoics," the second (*de fin.* 5, 23, 65) that of the early Academics and Peripatetics which Zeno stole, and the third (*de off.* 1, 17, 53 ff.) that of the Stoic Panaetius. Actually, there is no evidence that the *oikeiōsis* doctrine ever did become current coin. Antiochus and his followers very nearly succeeded in domiciling it in the Academy and Peripatus, but it was soon extradited. It is noteworthy, as Philippson remarks (*l. c.*, p. 463), that the greatest of Aristote-

[14] Von Arnim in *SB. d. W. A. d. W., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, CCIV, 3 (1926), pp. 131 ff., 157 ff., makes almost none. I hesitate to disagree with the greatest authority on Stoicism, but I think his arguments are sufficiently answered by what I have said in the text. If, however, he should be right, it will still remain true that the doctrine was Stoic from Zeno on.

lian commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, writing on the Peripatetic theory of the "first oikeiōsis," knows nothing of any treatment of the subject until after the time of Antiochus, when Peripatetic disciples of his began to extract such a theory not from Theophrastus, but from Aristotle. It remained Stoic, and as late as the second century A. D. was made the basis of a *Manual of Ethics* by the Stoic Hierocles.

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(To be continued).

THE BYZANTINE INSCRIPTIONS OF BETHSHAN-SCYTHOPOLIS.

Among the results obtained in the excavation of *Tell el-Ḥoṣn* and the extensive cemetery to the northeast by the expedition of the Philadelphia Museum are a number of Greek lapidary and mosaic inscriptions. These have been published from time to time, but in certain instances only a photograph has appeared, no reading being offered. It is the purpose of this article to treat these texts and also to suggest certain improvements toward the understanding of the remaining inscriptions found at this site, the capital of Palaestina Secunda.

I. The repair of the town-wall.

A[1]

1. + Ἐκ τῆς δοθείσης
2. θίας φιλοτιμίας κ(ατὰ)
3. αἴτησιν Φλ(αβίου) Ἀρσενίου
4. τοῦ ἐνδοξ(οτάτου), τὸ π(ᾶν) ἔργ(ον)
5. τοῦ τίχ(ους) ἀνενεώθη
6. ἐν χρ(όνοις) Φλ(αβίου) Ἀνασ-τασίου
7. Μ ἄρχ(οντος) ἐν(άτου [?]) ἰνδ(ικτιῶνος) γ′, ἔ(τους) ω

B[2]

1. + Ἐκ τῆς δοθείσης θίας
2. φιλοτιμίας κατὰ αἴτη-
3. σιν Φλ(αβίου) Ἀρσενίου τοῦ ἐνδοξ(οτάτου)
4. τὸ πᾶν ἔργον τοῦ τίχους
5. ἀνενεώθη ἐν· χρ(όνοις) Φλ(αβίου) Λέοντος
6. τοῦ μεγαλοπρ(επεστάτου) ἄρχ(οντος) ἰνδ(ικτιῶνος) α′ [or δ′]

A.

"With a grant made by imperial liberality at the instance of Flavius Arsenius, the most glorious, the entire construction

[1] Published by J. Germer-Durand, *Echos d'Orient*, XIV (1911), p. 208; with facsimile. In line 7 he read μ[ηνὸς]...σ′ = 200. But the former sign bears no resemblance to the M of line 2, and is apparently not a *mu* at all. Cf. the revised reading of G. M. FitzGerald, *Beth-Shan Excavations 1921-3, III: The Arab and Byzantine Levels*, Philadelphia, 1931, p. 47. He reads μ[εγαλοπρεπεστάτου] on the analogy of *B*. But the omission of the article and the fact that a number (?) follows make the construction highly improbable. The necessary orthographical changes are: θείας (2), τείχους (5), ἰνδ[ικτιῶνος] (7). On the ambiguous ἐνδοξ. see P. Koch, *Die byzantinischen Beamtentitel von 400 bis 700*, Jena, 1903, pp. 58-73.

[2] FitzGerald, *op. cit.*, Pl. XVIII, 2, pp. 46 f. Orthographical corrections as for *A*. On μεγαλοπρ. cf. Koch, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-57.

of the wall was repaired in the time of Flavius Anastasius . . . , in his ninth year (?) as governor, the third Indiction, the year ....."

B.

"With a grant, etc., the entire construction of the wall was repaired in the time of Fl. Leo, the most magnificent governor, the first (or fourth) Indiction."

While it is clear that both inscriptions refer to one and the same undertaking, the position of the two officials involved requires some explanation. No title is given Flavius Arsenius, while his colleague is termed *archôn*. This is a well-known designation of the incumbent of the civil governorship of a province, Palaestina Secunda in the present context, and is equivalent to the *praeses* and *consularis* of the contemporary Latin sources.[3] It is evident that our Fl. Arsenius ranks higher than the other official; hence we may infer that he was the *dux*, military governor, of both Palaestina Prima and Secunda.[4]

It appears that, despite the flourish in the expression τὸ πᾶν ἔργον, only a portion of the work was completed during the incumbency of one *archôn*, and the rest under his successor. Now an official named Fl. Anastasius appears in a similar inscription, bearing the year 529, as both *archôn* and *dux* of Provincia Arabia. In view of the fact that the early sixth century seems an entirely appropriate period in which to place *A* and *B*,[5] it is very plausible that the official so named served first in Palaestina Secunda and then obtained a position of higher rank in the neighboring province.[6] Unfortunately, there was insufficient space left on *A* for the date and a decorative symbol was substituted; but, if the identification be correct, the most likely date would be 522-3 A. D.

[3] Noted only by R. Mouterde, *Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph*, XVII (1933), p. 183. See R. E. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Die Provincia Arabia*, III, pp. 281-3, Strassburg, 1909; E. Hanton, *Byzantion*, IV (1929), pp. 67 f.

[4] Brünnow and Domaszewski, *op. cit., ibid.* O. Seeck, Pauly-Wissowa's *Real-Encyclopädie*, V (1905), pp. 1869-74.

[5] From the general historical situation one would not expect this type of "imperial liberality" from Justinian or from one of his successors.

[6] Mouterde, *l. c.* The inscription in question, employing the same verb, is given in Brünnow and Domaszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 296. See also L. Robert, M. N. Tod, and E. Ziebarth, *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, VII, nos. 873 f., Leyden, 1934.

II. The monasteries.

Certain indications in the literary sources might have given cause to expect remains of monastic establishments to be uncovered in the vicinity of Scythopolis. At the beginning of the fifth century a group of about eighty Origenist refugees from Egypt were attracted to this region, where the abundant palm-trees would have afforded them materials for the manufacture of baskets and fans, had they not been compelled by the patriarch of Alexandria to continue on to Constantinople.[7] Within the same generation, apparently, the hermit John took up his residence in the Ἐνθενανήθ ("Spring of *Tenanit*"?) which stood outside the town on the grounds of the church of St. John.[8] The partially published Sinai manuscript of Cyril's life of St. Saba contains references to the Ζοῦγγα, founded by Kassianos, abbot of St. Chariton's monastery and a native of Scythopolis, and to a laura called Πηγή.[9] In nearby *Beella* also stood a monastery known by the name of its abbot, George, a friend of Cyril's.[10] Finally, the spade has lately uncovered mosaic inscriptions of two other institutions, one dated within the lifetime of the famous hagiographer and the other later in the same century.

C.[11]

1. Ἐκτίσθι τὸ μον(αστήριον) τ(ὸ) τοῦ ἁββ[ᾶ Ἰουσ-]
2. τίν(ου) τοῦ ἀποκ(ρισιαρίου) τ(ε), ἐν χρό[(νοις) ἰνδ(ικτιῶνος)]
3. εἰ', ἔτους ϵπφ' ἐν μη(νὶ) Πανίμου κ[·' κ(αὶ) ἐν τῷ ἀ-]

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[7] Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History*, VIII, 13, *PG*, LXVII, 1549. Cf. I. Phokylides, "Ἡ Σκυθόπολις ὑπὸ τοπογραφικὴν καὶ ἱστορικὴν ἔποψιν," Νέα Σιών, XIII (1913), p. 221.

[8] Cyril's life of St. Saba, ed. J. B. Cotelier, *Ecclesiae Graecae Monumenta*, III, p. 328, Paris, 1686. Cf. F. M. Abel, *Revue Biblique*, IX (1912), p. 419. The hermit (ἡσυχαστής) Prokopios stayed in the Apostolion of St. Thomas; Life of Saba, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

[9] Augoustinos, N. Σ., XIII, p. 400.

[10] P. Thomsen, *Loca Sancta*, p. 32, Halle, 1907. Not to be confused with the other abbot of the same name in the inscription about to be mentioned, as is done by FitzGerald; see n. 12.

[11] Definitively edited by L. H. Vincent, *RB*, XLII (1933), pp. 555-61. A few typographical errors are corrected here. Orthographical changes: Ἐκτίσθη (1), Παρήμου (3), τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ (3 f.), Σεπτεμβρίου (4), Νυσίου (5).

4. υτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ ἀπεκ(ατεστάθη) ἐν μη(νὶ) Σεπ(εμβρίου) [ἰνδ (ικτιῶνος) α′]
5. Πρ(οσ)φ(ορ)ὰ Νοισίου σχο(λαστικοῦ) Κ(ύρι)ε βο(ήθησον) Ν[οισίῳ].

"The monastery of the abbot and treasurer Justin was founded in the 15th Indiction, in the year 585, on the 2. [twenty-.....] of the month of Panemos, and in the same year, in the month of September, the first Indiction, it was inaugurated. The offering of Nysius the scholastikos. O Lord, help Nysius."

The Pompeian era is employed here, and the double dating enables us to determine it as beginning in 64 B. C. Hence, our inscription is of the year 522 A. D.

The three succeeding inscriptions are from a structure which stood on *Tell Maṣṭabah*, to the northeast of *Tell el-Ḥoṣn*. The complete ground-plan and its mosaic pavements were uncovered in 1930, and it was christened by FitzGerald "The Monastery of Lady Mary," which is, however, more convenient than accurate.[12] The structure consisted of several rooms entered from the three sides of a court, measuring 15 x 9 m., to which the approach was from the south. A total of seven mosaic inscriptions was found, but the text of four of these has remained unavailable. It seems, however, that they intended to perpetuate the memory of a number of the town's most important residents. These are led in rank by one John ἐνδοξ. ἀπὸ ἐπάρχων, i. e. an ex-*archôn*, whose tomb stood at the northeast of the court. Among the others one bore the title *Comes* and another *Illoustrios*. In addition, the name of the abbot is given as George. The monastery as a whole seems to have been founded by the family or families of the laymen named, and the inscriptions which are given below refer to certain alterations.

D.[13]

(At the entrance to the small n. room.)

1. + Ἐτελιώθη σὺν θ(ε)ῷ
2. τὸ ἔργον ἐν χρόνοις

[12] *Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund*, 1931, pp. 62-70. Cf. M. Avi-Yonah, *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, V (1935), pp. 29 f.

[13] FitzGerald, *l. c.*, Pl. II. In line 4 ἐγκλείστου is intended. See on *E* (10).

3. Ἡλίου θεοφ(ιλεστάτου) πρεσβ(υτέρου)
4. [κ(αὶ) ἐν]κλ(ήστου) [ἔ(τους) ζι]χ′ ἰνδ(ικτιῶνος) β′

"The work was completed with God's help in the time of Elias, the pious priest and recluse, in the year 617, the second Indiction."

This individual is the author of the two succeeding inscriptions, of which the latter is dated 567 and is apparently the latest of all. Hence the year 553-4 A. D. is suggested as the date of the present one, which seems to refer to the laying of the mosaic pavement.

E.[14]

(In the southeast corner of the northeasternmost room, which served as a chapel.)

1. [+ Ὅποι] ἐστὶν τὸ στεφανωσταυρὶν
2. [ἐκεῖ] κῖτε τὸ πελλαϊκὸν τοῦ
3. στόματος τοῦ μνημίου, ἔχων
4. κρικεῖα καὶ ὁ βουλόμενο[ς φ]έρει τὸ
5. στεφανωσταυρίν κ(αὶ) εὑρίσκ[ι τὸ] πελλα-
6. ϊκόν κ(αὶ) θάπτει. Εἰ δὲ θελήσῃ ἡ κύρα
7. Μαρία εἰ τὸνδε ναὸν κτήσασα
8. κατατεθῆναι ἐν τῷδε τῷ μνημίῳ
9. ἢ τῆς ποτε τῆς αὐτῆς γενεᾶς, ἐγὼ
10. Ἡλίας ἐλέει θ(εο)ῦ ἔνκλησ̣τος, ἐν ὀνόματι
11. Π(α)τ(ρὸ)ς κ(αὶ) Υ(ι)οῦ κ(αὶ) Ἁγίου Πν(εύματος) εὐλογῶ κ(αὶ) ἀναθε-
12. ματίζω ἕκαστόν τινα μετ' ἐμὲ,
13. κολύοντα ἢ αὐτὴν ἤ τινα τῶν αὐτῆς
14. ἢ κ(αὶ) ἐπέροντ[α] ταῦτα μοῦ τὰ
15. + γράμματα. +

"Where the wreathed cross is, there lies the *pellaïkon* of the mouth of the tomb, having small rings. One who so desires may remove the wreathed cross, find the *pellaïkon*, and bury the dead. If Madame Mary, who founded this chapel, or some other member of her family should wish to be laid in this tomb, I, Elias, by the grace of God a recluse, in the name of the Father, the

[14] First photograph and interpretation, *l. c.*, Pl. IV, pp. 66 f. Reading given by Mouterde, *Mélanges*, XVII, p. 184, who also points out the technical sense of ἔγκλειστος. The present writer's reading differs in a number of details, since a clearer photograph has been made available in H. Peirce and R. Tyler, *L'Art byzantin*, II, Pl. 196, Paris, 1934. Orthographical changes: στεφανοσταυρίον (1, 5), ἐκεῖ κεῖται (2), μνημεῖον ἔχον (3), εὑρίσκει (5), ἡ . . . κτίσασα (7), τῷδε τῷ μνημείῳ (8), τίς (9), ἔγκλειστος (10), κωλύοντα . . . τῶν (13), ἐπαίροντα (14).

Son, and the Holy Ghost, do curse and anathematize anyone after me who shall hinder her or hers, or remove these my words." [15]

F.[16]

(Northeast corner of the same room.)

1. + Ὅποι ἐστὶν τὸ στεφανωσταυρὶν
2. ἐκῖ κῖτε τὸ πελλαϊκὸν τοῦ
3. στόματος τοῦ μνημίου
4. ἔχων κρικεῖα. Ἔνθα κατέθεικα
5. τὴν φιλόχ(ριστο)ν μοῦ ἀδελφὴν
6. Γεωργίαν, ἐγὼ Ἠλίας ἐλάχιστ[ος]
7. ἐλέει θ(εο)ῦ ἔνκλησιτο[ς]. Ἀναπά-
8. ει δὲ μηνὴ Μαιῷ
9. τετάρτῃ ἰνδικτιῶνος
10. πεντε[κ(αι)δε]κάτης.
11. Ἡμέρα δὲ ἦ[ν ἡ Μ]εσω-
12. πεντηκοστ[ή +.]

"Where the wreathed cross is, there lies the *pellaïkon* of the mouth of the tomb, having small rings. Here have I buried my Christ-loving sister, Georgia, I, Elias, by the grace of God a humble recluse. She died on the fourth of the month of May, the fifteenth Indiction. The day was the Mesopentecost."

This pair of texts alludes to an interesting mode of tomb-closure, involving two objects the designations of which add two new terms to the known Byzantine vocabulary. The *stephanostaurion* found in the room was unfortunately not found *in situ*. Moreover, the comparatively rough fleur-de-lys carved on its reverse indicates that it was reused at some later time, perhaps as part of the closure of the choir, as FitzGerald supposed. At any rate the discovery of coins of Heraclius in an adjoining room proves that the institution remained in use after the death of our Elias, when his arrangements could be disturbed without successful opposition.

The second term, *pellaïkon*, presents a more difficult problem. Mouterde has derived it from πέλλα, "milk-bowl," and takes it

[15] Cf. the parallel epigraphic anathema published by G. de Jerphanion and L. Jalabert, *Mélanges*, III (1908), p. 457, no. 23.

[16] Photograph in Peirce and Tyler, *op. cit.*, *ibid.* Orthographical changes other than those shared with *E*: ανεπάη (7 f.), μηνὶ (8), ἰνδικτιῶνος (9), Μεσοπεντηκοστή (11 f.).

to refer to a stone of that shape which covered the tomb. If that be correct, the *krikeia* may be imagined as metal rings attached to it.

The photograph of *F* shows that its last five lines, with the exception of the first two words of line 4, represent a later alteration, the traces of the smaller and earlier letters being still discernible. As for the dating, since the Mesopentecost is the twenty-fifth day after Easter Sunday,[17] the latter fell on April 10. The only year in the sixth century in which this occurred and which was at the same time the second Indiction was 567.[18]

There is another early Christian Greek inscription which is supposed to have been brought from *Beisān* to Damascus, where it was at the time of publication in 1922.[19] Considering the weight of the stone, however, it would not be surprising if its actual provenience were some point much nearer the latter city.

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[17] See M. Nilles, *Kalendarium manuale utriusque ecclesiae orientalis et occidentalis*, II, p. 346, Oeniponte, 1897.

[18] See A. Cappelli, *Cronologia, cronografia, e calendario perpetuo*, p. 74, Milan, 1930.

[19] See N. Giron, *Journal Asiatique*, 11th s., XIX, pp. 81-4.

THE NEW ELOGIUM OF JULIUS CAESAR'S FATHER.

In *Notizie d. Scavi* of 1933 Paribeni published the inscriptions recently found in the Imperial Fora. On page 459 he gives the photograph of the fragment that apparently was a part of the elogium of Caesar's father (*Pater D*[*ivi*, line 2). This he tentatively restores thus:

C(aius) Iu]lius [C. F. Caesar
P]ater D[ivi Iulii pr(aetor)
aed(ilis) cu]r(ulis) q(uaestor) tr(ibunus) [militum]
c]olonos Cerce[ios deduxit.

Paribeni makes no reference to a monument of the Augustan family (*C. I. L.*, I, pt. 1, 2nd ed., p. 199) which contains the fragments of a subsequent elogium of the same man. This other inscription, which I shall discuss presently, has been plausibly restored in part by Mommsen and Huelsen thus:

C Julius C f C n] CAESAR
Auus August] I
. . *x vir stlit jud*]IC·Q·PR
. . . . . *pro*]COS·IN·ASIA

That this inscription also refers to Caesar's father can hardly be doubted, since it was found on the same monument as one honoring Octavius *Pater Augusti* and since the proconsul C. Julius C. F. Caesar, mentioned in the inscriptions of Priene (*Inschr. von Priene*, no. 111,[1] ll. 14 and 21, and no. 117, line 49), and at Delos (Dessau, 7272), can only refer to him or to some completely unknown man of the same name. That is not likely.

The silence of Paribeni about this well-known inscription, his failure to take into account two of the offices mentioned on it (proconsulate, decemvirate), and his insertion of *Aed. Cur.* in the Forum inscription, though it is absent in the other, seem to imply that in his opinion we have all along been mistaken about the cursus of Caesar's father (e. g., *P. W.*, "Julii," no. 130). Believing that these inscriptions refer to the same man, I shall attempt a restoration of the new Forum inscription that will

[1] The editors give the end of line 14 as *καί*, but it should doubtless be ΚΑΙ[ΣΑΡ.

include the omitted items found in the other, and a corresponding restoration of the older one.

First, I should unhesitatingly omit *Aed. Cur.*, since it does not appear on the other; for there *Pr(aetor)* follows *Q(uaestor)*. The aedileship was not obligatory in the cursus in the days of C. Julius pater, and we know of a dozen important men of the time who did not hold it (see Momms., *St. R.* I., p. 541; Cic., *pro Planc.*, 51, etc.). In fact there is hardly space for six letters at the beginning of line 3. (The plinths had room for about 80 cm. of lettering where the lines were full, and the position and sizes of the known letters in lines 2, 3, and 4 indicate a varying inset of all these lines.)

We may also note that the Forum inscription employs a whole line to record an act of colonization, with the result that the official titles had to be given in briefer form here than in the other. Hence, instead of *Procos. in Asia*, which appears in the old one, we probably should have only PROC. in the new one; and, instead of *x vir stlit judic*, we probably have only XVIR. Since the sacral decemvirate had now become a quindecemvirate there was only one regular decemvirate left, and the briefer designation of the judicial office could hardly be ambiguous. It was in fact not uncommon.

Leaving for the moment a discussion of the last line, I propose to restore the whole inscription as follows:

C · IV]LIVS [C · F · CAESAR
PATER·D[IVI·IVLI·PROC
P]R · Q · TR · [MIL · XVIR
C]OLONOS · CERCE[INAM · DEDVXIT

The first line would require about 80 cm. The other lines are all shorter, but properly centered as they usually were on the elogia of the Forum. This restoration makes use of all the titles that appear on either or both inscriptions. The aedileship is omitted, as the old inscription shows that it should be.

Now a word about *Cerceinam* which I have proposed in the last line. Paribeni thinks the last line refers to a deduction of Marian soldiers to Circei by this Julius, and he proposes the reading *C]olonos Cerce[ios deduxit]*. However, one may well doubt whether either the rock of Circei or the marshy land about

it would have been attractive for a farm colony in 99 B. C.; and there is of course no evidence of colonization there after the fourth century B. C. Indeed, the proposed Marian colonies were all intended for foreign parts.

I venture to suggest that the colonists were sent to the island of Cercina, off the Syrtes of Africa. This island was friendly to Marius a few years later, so that when he had to take flight from Africa (in 87 B. C.) he found refuge there (Plut., *Mar.*, 40). At a time when the Roman praetor and the Numidian king were hostile to Marius, it would seem to be significant that Marius could find a friendly reception on this small island. The fact would readily be explained if Marian veterans had been colonized there some 10-12 years before.

The spelling *Cercenna*, found once (in *Itin. Anton. Aug.*, p. 518), proves the second syllable long. Hence the commoner classical spelling *Cercina* represents what would have been written *Cerceina* in the days of Marius. As is well known, the spellings of the fragments of the elogia found in the Forum are conservative (cf. *apsens, ieis, quei* on the original Forum fragments of the elogium of Marius).

The island, with an area of about 150 square miles, had a good harbor town. It now has a population of 9,000. Under Punic rule it had been so prosperous that in 217 B. C. the Roman admiral could exact a contribution of ten talents from its inhabitants (Livy, 22, 31, 3). During Caesar's campaign in Africa he sent Sallust to the island to seize the grain supplies that the Pompeian forces had stored there (*Bell. Afr.*, 34, 3). We need not doubt that the island could support numerous farmers.

Unfortunately we are not well informed about the results of the revolutionary *lex Appuleia*[2] of 100 B. C., which was to give land to Marius' veterans. The historians were far more concerned with the political clashes that resulted than with the details of colonization. We know of a Colonia Mariana in Corsica, and Eporedia was apparently settled at this time. The anonymous *De Viris Illustribus* (73) informs us that Appuleius Saturninus *legem tulit ut veteranis centena jugera in Africa*

[2] Cicero (*pro Balbo*, 48) says that the agrarian law was declared invalid; but so was the Rubrian law: yet colonization went on. Note that Julius Strabo was also a colonial decemvir at this time (*N. S.*, 1933, p. 458).

dividerentur and, since the African towns of Uchi Maius and Thibaris near Thugga later assumed the title of *Mariana,* I have elsewhere (*Am. Jour. Phil.,* 1926, p. 61) suggested that some of the veterans probably were sent into the upper valley of the Bagradas river. On the strength of this new elogium of the Augustan Forum, which mentions the elder Julius, a Marian partizan, as planting colonists in Cerce . . . and in view of the later friendship of Cerceina to Marius, I venture now to add that island as another area in Africa where Marian veterans were probably sent in accordance with the provisions of the *lex Appuleia.*

Finally, if both inscriptions refer to the same man, we may attempt to restore the one long known (*C. I. L.,* I, 1, p. 199) by using the items found in the new one, substituting an appropriate title like *X vir agr(is) adtr(ibuendis)* for the statement *colonos deduxit.* The inscription would then read something like this:

c. iulius c.f.l.n.] CAESAR
auus august]I
tr.mil.xvir stl.jud]IC·Q·PR
xvir.agr.adtr.pro]COS·IN·ASIA

If our restoration is correct, the order of offices would indicate that this Julius was praetor before he served as colonial decemvir on the agrarian law of 100 B. C. The main facts of his life would then be about as follows. If his praetorship came at about the age of 31 years, he was probably born about 132-1 B. C.; he served his official apprenticeship as military tribune and as *decemvir stlit. judic.,* became quaestor about 104-3, omitted the aedileship, and gained the praetorship about the time his son was born. Cicero remarks that in 100 B. C. all the Julii supported Marius (the husband of Julius' sister) and the *Senatus Consultum Ultimum* directed against Saturninus (*Pro Rabirio,* 21). The colonial decemvirate probably belongs to the year 99 B. C. Julius' proconsulship in Asia probably followed in 98 and may well have lasted more than one year. The weakness of the Marian party during the following years may account for the fact that Julius did not win the consulship. Pliny (*N. H.,* vii, 181) informs us that he died suddenly at Pisa, and Suetonius (*Julius,* 1) gives the year as 85 B. C.

TENNEY FRANK.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

E. E. SIKES. Lucretius Poet and Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, 1936. Pp. ix + 187. 7 s. 6 d. net.

This small book may well serve as an introduction to the study of Lucretius, but it has an even greater attraction for those to whom, as to Mr. Sikes himself, Lucretius has been a friend for many years. In his introduction the author states that his model has been "the old, but still invaluable study of Lucretius by Martha, whose Poème de Lucrèce gladdened my undergraduate days." Since Martha's day much work has been done on Lucretius by Giussani, Masson, Merrill and many others and the Epicurean philosophy has been further probed and examined. Mr. Sikes' footnotes show that he is abreast with all this modern work, as the last two chapters prove him also to be au fait with the researches of anthropologists and the general trend of recent scientific thinkers. But he wears his learning lightly and his writing has a grace and charm which may well be compared with Martha's.

The book is called *Lucretius Poet and Philosopher,* but though he by no means neglects the philosopher, Mr. Sikes, as he himself admits, is more particularly interested in the poet. Consequently the most original part of his work will be found in the first two chapters on the Genius and Art of Lucretius (the *ingenium* and *ars* of Cicero's famous criticism). A defence of didactic poetry in general introduces the claim that the *De Rerum Natura* is an "epic of man" (p. 10)—a fine description of Book V, but hardly of the poem as a whole. As signs of the poet's genius Mr. Sikes rightly insists on his use of metaphor (pp. 11 ff.) and the latent passion which runs through the poem; he well notes too (p. 15) that the reliance of ancient science on observation without experiment made poetic treatment of a scientific theme easier. But Mr. Sikes exaggerates (pp. 27 and 42) the poet's archaism. Lucretius intended no doubt to associate himself with the old Ennian school rather than with the new Alexandrians, but he was by no means free from Alexandrian influence, and many of the "archaic" forms he uses may well be taken as evidence that the Latin language in Lucretius' day was in a greater state of flux than Cicero's prose would lead us to imagine. The analysis of the elements of Lucretius' *ars* in chapter II gives definite substance to what critics have often left as a vague sentiment.

Two chapters follow on Epicurus—where the treatment of the history of Atomism is a little scanty and passes too soon into a discussion of the Epicurean "swerve"—and the Life of Lucretius, where modern views on the very slight evidence avail-

able are considered, but without a definite conclusion. The chapters on the General Principles, Theology and the Fear of Death are perhaps more open to criticism in detail, but there are many illuminating observations, e. g. (p. 92) the idea that science in itself had more value for Lucretius than for Epicurus, and the pertinent question (p. 102) how the heavenly bodies, seen with the Epicurean view of their size, could have appeared to Lucretius so wonderful and majestic. But the statement (p. 117) that Epicurus "devoted his prayer to the gods" is surely inconsistent with the Epicurean conception of religion, and it is startling to be told (p. 129) that "Lucretius is less concerned with Cerberus and the Styx than with the longing for immortality"; there is very little trace of this in the poem. The last two chapters which deal with Anthropology and Modern Thought are full of interest, and Mr. Sikes has been wise in not attempting to follow Masson in finding details of coincidence, but in pointing out where on broad lines Epicurean thought and modern thought show kinship and where they divide; he has not shirked discussion of electrons, space-time and relativity.

In general Mr. Sikes' book is a wise and sober survey of recent views about the *De Rerum Natura,* but it has a greater claim in that it is an expression of a life-long, but not uncritical, love of a great poet. It will provoke other lovers of Lucretius to reopen old questions and to face new problems.

Appended to the book are some very attractive experiments in translation into Lucretian hexameters, but I do not understand the scansion of *nationibus* in line 5 of the version from Wordsworth or even the use of the word.

CYRIL BAILEY.

OXFORD.

ERLAND EHNMARK. The Idea of God in Homer. Inaugural Dissertation, Uppsala, 1935. 103 pp.

The subject of this dissertation is the most important and influential idea which has ever been entertained by man, the idea of god, as it is exhibited in one of the greatest works of literature. One must feel, before beginning to read, that the implications of such a subject—metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, linguistic, literary—are so wide that it is hopelessly unwieldy for the modest scope of a dissertation. But in fact the author does not profess to give a full exposition of the nature of the gods as Homer conceived them or of their part in the artistic economy of the poems. He has kept the subject tractable by limiting himself to certain aspects of it which involve a dialectical discussion of such things as concepts and emotions, powers

and forces, the natural and the supernatural, the identity of cause and effect; and, even though this discussion is necessarily summary and compendious, it contains much shrewd criticism of prevailing views. The study is analytical and controversial, as is becoming in a dissertation, and the author has done his work with skill and judgment.

The method which he follows is not to assemble the evidence from the Homeric poems and to draw conclusions from it, but to recall certain theories concerning the origin and nature of the idea of god, as it appears both among the Greeks and in the world at large, and to apply them critically to the conditions which are found in Homer. This method is liable to the fallacy of supposing that Homer is much nearer to the beginning of things than we are ourselves. One is likely to forget that primitive conditions can be illustrated nearly, if not quite, as well by survivals in the modern world as by survivals in Homer. In so far as he is concerned with the origin and development of the idea of god, the author is not quite guiltless of this fallacy. But his analysis of certain aspects of the nature of the gods in Homer is excellent and deserves the attention of all who are concerned with this fascinating subject. Especially important are (1) his discussion of the relation between the gods with names, on the one hand, and the undefined gods and the gods in general, on the other, in which he expresses the view that too much has been made of the distinction between the conception of the gods in the poet's narrative and the conception which is expressed in the speeches of the actors; (2) his examination of the relation between the gods and fate, in which he describes fate, not as a power, but as a natural order, to which the gods ordinarily submit, but which, as agents of the supernatural, they can transgress; and (3) his demonstration that the gods, as a group, are the guardians of justice, and, as individuals, not immoral, if judged by the standards prevailing in the Homeric age. The arguments by which the author supports his original opinions are too intricate to be reproduced here, but they should not be overlooked by students of Homer or by students of Greek religion.

IVAN M. LINFORTH.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Volume XII. Rome, American Academy, 1935. Pp. 184, with 17 plates. 4°.

All through the archeological part of this fine and important volume we trace the care and learned interest of Professor A. W. Van Buren. Together with the young architect, Th. D.

Price, he has also (pp. 151-153) undertaken studies of the house of Marcus Loreius Tiburtinus at Pompeii which have yielded a very valuable plan and reconstructions, Van Buren supplying the explanatory text—to add to his Pompeiana in the previous Memoirs.

The first article in the present volume is by Dr. Philip Harsh on "The Origins of the *Insulae* at Ostia" (pp. 1-65). We note at once that the author deprecates the idea of any intrinsic development of real importance in a town like Pompeii. He refuses to accept variations like the Casa a Graticcio at Herculaneum as transitional stages in an evolution starting with the atria and ending in the Roman *Insulae*, such as we have them at Ostia and Rome. He emphasizes the fact that the large towns no doubt had a domestic architecture of quite another type than the atria (Vitruvius, II, viii, 17). What look like missing links in the small towns are obviously hybrid forms, adaptations to increase the efficiency of the old atrium houses by incorporating elements from the domestic architecture of the large towns, i. e. the *Insulae* such as we see them at Ostia which, indeed, can be traced about as far back in time as the oldest atria in Pompeii. In a recent article of mine (*Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, IV, 2 (1935), pp. 164 ff.) I have (following Calza) pointed out four important main types among the Roman *Insulae*: 1, rows of shops with added upper-stories; 2, two rows of back-to-back shops with an upper-storey (these two groups are included in Harsh's Type C without cortile); 3, fairly large courts surrounded by shop-houses of type 1 or 2 (Harsh's Type B with open cortile; pp. 56 ff.); 4, Harsh's Type A with cortile and corridors like the Casa dei Triclini, Casa di Diana, and other houses in Ostia. The main part of Professor Harsh's article is a most important attempt to explain this fourth type as, largely at any rate, an imported eastern type. Harsh exemplifies it with admirable clarity and precision by describing the Casa dei Triclini, the Casa di Diana, and the Casa del Tempio Rotondo at Ostia (which latter, however, according to my opinion shows more influence of the atrium than Harsh admits) and emphasizes very well the fundamental and striking contrast between the atrium and the cortile at Ostia with its surrounding corridors and large high-ceilinged room, sometimes with two columns supporting the lintel opposite the main entrance. In order to understand this type of house the author makes a wide and careful survey of the Roman and Greek world, drawing attention to the Greek peristyle houses such as Pompeii VII, vi, 30-38 and IX, v, 18-21. Houses of this type were indeed widespread in the Graeco-Roman world, and I think that Professor Harsh is right in saying that the *insulae* with cortili (my type IV) and corridors are a direct adaptation of this kind of Greek domestic architecture to the needs of metropolitan architecture—there being, of course, con-

tinuous amalgamation with Roman traditions. It is indeed a most important task to try to determine the part played by the Hellenistic elements in the great process of Roman architectural evolution which led to the creation of a town like imperial Ostia and Rome, as we know it from ruins, texts, and the marble plan. Professor Harsh also deals with other aspects of research into the Roman architectural achievement which was of such fundamental importance to all subsequent town development, contributing remarks on the ancient authors and the marble plan (a great field as yet unsubjected to systematic, particularized examination).

Next in the volume (pp. 67-88), follows a most suggestive account by F. E. Brown of a thorough and detailed investigation of the Regia at the Forum Romanum on the lines laid out by Miss Van Deman, Tenney Frank, and recent research on the use of the Roman cappellaccio-stone (especially Säflund, "Le Mura di Roma Repubblicana"; *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, I, 1932). Because of the Fasti which were kept in the Regia, it is important to note that Brown attributes to the first century B. C. the foundations of larger cappellaccio-blocks which Frank assigned to the regal period. Brown points out that spade work has revealed a complex of much older cappellaccio remains which give us a general plan of the oldest Regia building, still traceable on the spot. But not even this building can, according to Brown, be earlier than the fourth century B. C. Brown gives a careful plan and full description of the parts of the building and their respective periods.

Miss A. K. Lake adds (pp. 89-149) a most useful survey of the archeological evidence for the "Tuscan Temple." She discusses the triple-cella temples and describes in a critical and valuable analysis of extant remains also the temples on the so-called "Italic plan," i. e. one cella with the back wall projecting beyond its side walls, and "alae" to the right and left. Miss Lake pays great attention also to literary sources and compares with care the formula given by Vitruvius with the actual remains, stating that they approximate to the data of Vitruvius but do not absolutely tally. Under the guidance of Professor M. B. Ogle, Miss D. M. Schullian has studied the excerpts of Heiric *Ex libris Valerii Maximi Memorabilium dictorum vel factorum* and ends the present volume of the Memoirs with a reconstruction of the excerpts of Heiric (pp. 155-184).

AXEL BOËTHIUS.

GOTHENBURG.

J. W. H. Atkins. Literary Criticism in Antiquity. Cambridge University Press, 1934. Vol. I, pp. xi + 199; Vol. II, pp. xi + 363.

The author, who is Rendel Professor of English Language and Literature in the University College of Wales, dedicates this excellent sketch of the development of literary criticism "neque indoctissimis nec doctissimis sed viris bonis et non illiteratis." After the Introduction, in which Professor Atkins remarks that criticism is "an activity of a many-sided kind" which "may consist of theorising or judging, legislating or appreciating," the chapters of the first volume deal with "The Beginnings: Aristophanes," "The Attack on Poetry: Plato," "The Development of Poetic Theory: Aristotle," "The Development of Rhetorical Theory: Isocrates, Aristotle, and Theophrastus," and "The New Poetics: Neoptolemus of Parium, Callimachus, and Aristarchus." The chapters of the second volume deal with "The Critical Beginnings at Rome and the Classical Reaction: Terence, Lucilius, and Cicero," "Classicism established in Poetic Theory: Philodemus and Horace," "Classicism and Prose Style: Dionysius of Halicarnassus," "The Literary Decline and Contemporary Comments: *Tractatus Coislinianus*, the two Senecas, Persius, and Petronius," "The Critical Revival and Theories of Style: Tacitus and Demetrius," "The New Critical Outlook and Methods: 'Longinus'," "The Restatement of Classicism: Quintilian," "Critical Cross-currents: Martial, the younger Pliny, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Lucian," and a "Conclusion" in which the doctrines of imitation and of classicism are summarized and appraised. Professor Atkins stoutly maintains that the primary meaning of classicism is "the existence of certain authoritative principles based on the highest artistic ideals then known, and available as guides in literary matters," and that a larger classicism should be formulated to include the ideals implicit in the best literature, modern as well as ancient. Thus "the steadying influence of antiquity" might come to our aid to-day, "when amid the bewilderment of new aims, new methods and standards, the one point of common agreement is the revolt against all conventions in art."

The survey of this wealth of material is thoroughly and soberly carried out; lists of the relevant texts and of translations are supplied; and each volume has its own index. The great merits of Professor Atkins' work are two: he has treated ancient criticism as a unit, instead of abiding by the old artificial separation of Latin from Greek writers; and he has provided us with a statement designed not to crush the reader beneath a mere mass of facts but to stimulate him into trying to

think for himself. Wilamowitz once remarked "es ist wesentlich Schuld der Philologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, dass die Einheit des geistigen Lebens so wenig anerkannt ist." There is a great deal of force in his complaint even now; but no better discipline for erring philologians could be devised than the attempt to understand historically the birth and growth of literary criticism in Greece and Rome. The record is one long demonstration of "the unity of spiritual life"; it was impossible, throughout antiquity, to conceive poetry or literary art in general as an independent or even relatively autonomous activity, and critical theories never succeeded in shaking off political and philosophical prepossessions. The result is that in this field historical judgment, which can at best only approach certainty, must take the place of so-called scientific proof with regard to everything really important; and the few suggestions that I have to make are therefore not fault-finding, but strictly differences of opinion.

In the first place, does Aristophanes deserve, as a literary critic, to have it said of him that "he recognises the relations existing between literature and life?" Saintsbury said of the polemic against Euripides that it was "both *magnifique* and also *la guerre*"; but the war, and the spirit of propaganda which went with it and led Aristophanes to attribute much of the decay of Athenian morality to the influence of Euripides, seem to me to be merely instances of the too frequent failure to know a real friend of the state from an enemy. Again, in the chapter on Plato, Professor Atkins says that Plato's estimate of the essential virtue of art as "first and foremost an influence, not a means of instruction . . . moulding character, and not . . . imparting moral principles" is perhaps "the most adequate pronouncement on the subject." And this high praise is supported by the eloquent passages in the *Republic*, 401, 402, and 518. But if these passages are replaced in their context, they become part of Plato's demand for censorship by political authority and for the suppression of all artists except τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, which does not mean "opening men's eyes to the beauty of things," as Professor Atkins would have it, but "those who by happy endowment can follow the trail of absolute beauty and grace," in due servitude to the Platonic Forms. Similarly, the turning of the soul's eye to the light has really nothing to do with the influence of art; it refers to Plato's program of education, which began with arithmetic and culminated in dialectic and the vision of perfection (532).

Space will not permit the discussion of these vast problems; I can only refer to Luigi Stefanini's brilliant solution of the puzzle presented by Plato's partial rehabilitation of the epic, which seems to have been missed by Professor Atkins, and record once

more my conviction that literary criticism has suffered rather than profited from Plato's treatment of art as imitation and as a rival of philosophy in the search for truth. The chapter on Aristotle is particularly good and brings out a number of the excellent sayings in the latter part of the *Poetics*.

The second volume deals of course with many men of lesser genius as well as with a few of the really great; I particularly recommend the pages on Philodemus, Horace, and "Longinus."

In general, the author's command of the relevant literature is thorough. Adequate, perhaps more than adequate, attention is given to rhetorical theories. The value of the *Tractatus Coislinianus* is, I think, over-estimated; and in its definition of comedy ἀμοίρου is translated "unfortunate"; it probably means "not containing the action of destiny."

Professor Kroll once pointed out the tendency of students of literary criticism to exaggerate the influence of critical ideas upon the history of literature; the author may have yielded occasionally to this natural failing, but that does not impair the value of his work.

R. K. HACK.

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ELEUTHERIO ELORDUY. Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa (Philologus, Supplementband XXVIII, Heft 3), Leipzig, 1936.

The author of this book is obviously a man of great learning and remarkable intellectual energy, yet the book itself is not in every respect satisfactory. First of all, it is badly arranged and a torture to the reader owing to the author's habit of interrupting one argument or train of thought by another or even several others. Secondly, though it is an awkward thing to argue with a scholar about the title of his book, I should like to know exactly what Dr. Elorduy means by "Sozialphilosophie." There is much in this book that I should rather call anthropology or theory of cognition, and there is also a long discussion of the Stoic categories aiming at an elucidation of the Stoic notion of "personality." In reply to such a question Dr. Elorduy would probably refer me to the first pages of his book in which he emphasizes the close coherence and interconnection of the various parts of the Stoic system. I do not dispute this coherence; yet, if it is to serve as a justification for the combination (frequent especially in the first half of the book) of heterogeneous pieces of material towards rather questionable conclusions, we may well say that a good principle has been carried too far. I cannot admit that an examination of the Stoic categories is the only or the best approach to their notion of "Persönlichkeit." Moreover, what Elorduy gives us (pp. 62-134) is not so much an ex-

amination as a construction, and a construction that is open to serious objections. I am rather doubtful as to whether anything of importance for the categories may be elicited from Varro's notorious and almost morbid propensity for classifications and logical divisions, and the evidence adduced by von Arnim, *St. V. F.*, II, 369 ff. (which collection, by the way, should not be referred to as "A"), should stop us from including in this system anything besides ὑποκείμενα, ποιά, πῶς ἔχοντα, πρός τι πῶς ἔχοντα. The conclusion at which Dr. Elorduy arrives (p. 126) is that personality in the Stoic view is neither a being nor a non-being, but a kind of ὑπερουσία that may also be called (with the Platonic term) ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. This sounds rather frightening, and I am unable to believe that any Stoic philosopher really held such queer views. The fact is that Dr. Elorduy favours a kind of reasoning that is mathematical rather than historical or philosophical: Take Posidonius' doctrine (as reported by Stobaeus) of the ἰδίως ποιόν, combine it with Simplicius' evidence for ποιότης, and look at these doctrines in the light of some modern and mediaeval theories about substance and personality, and you will reach the conclusion mentioned above.

It is only in the second part of his book that the author actually comes to deal with social (or sociological) questions. He here discusses the Stoic view of the relation between God and man, human society, love and friendship, women, slaves, "Kollektivbewusstsein," ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα, etc. His results are interesting and valuable, though not always new; and most of his assertions are true—or, at least, roughly true, since, in these chapters he appears to lack that sense of the nuance which he so liberally displays in his treatment of purely logical questions. This criticism applies in particular to his sketches of the historical background of some of the Stoic doctrines.

It is probably inevitable that in a book like this the reader will not always agree with the author in his preference for some sources and neglect of others. Why, for instance, if the Middle Stoa was to be included, has Cicero's *De officiis* not been much more fully drawn upon? Why is next to no attention paid to the controversy between Antipater and Diogenes about the conflicting claims of legality and morality (or rather of a stricter and a laxer conception of morality) in one's behaviour towards fellow men (Cic., *De Off.*, III, 12, 50 ff.)? Barely half a page (p. 226) is given to Cleanthes' famous hymn, which Dr. Elorduy dismisses as "nicht ausschliesslich stoisch" in thought. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius should either not come in at all (for it would have been perfectly justified to confine the inquiry to the old Stoa) or come in much more frequently. I have found no mention at all of Hierocles; and I regret to see that this author, whose discovery was greeted with due enthusiasm, has so soon sunk into almost general oblivion; and yet his Ἠθικὴ

Στοιχείωσις (ed. von Arnim in *Berliner Klassikertexte* IV) throws a great deal of light on the Stoic views of man's various faculties, especially that of self perception.—If the theory of the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι is of fundamental importance for the Stoics' anthropological and sociological teachings, why is it treated just *in transcursu* on pp. 140 f., 152 f.? Dr. Elorduy's treatment of the historical and theoretical background of Stoic internationalism is also rather slight and does not stand a comparison with Professor Barker's fine paper on this subject in "Greece and Rome" (V, 13, pp. 2 ff.). Cic., *De fin.*, IV, 28, 78 might have been of help to Dr. Elorduy in his endeavour to distinguish between the older and younger Stoic schools, and Sen., *De tranq.*, I, 7 and *St. V. Fr.*, II, 694 might also have found a place in his book.

There are, to be sure, some good points in Dr. Elorduy's book. He is right, I think, in opposing the prevailing view of Stoic physics as a materialistic system (pp. 24 ff.), and there is much truth in what he says about the intellect's rôle (which, he maintains, is an active rôle) in the συγκατάθεσις (pp. 36 ff.). If there are mistakes in the book, it must be borne in mind that it is probably one of the very first contributions to classical scholarship by Spanish scholars. Dr. Elorduy deals with extremely involved questions, and he is to be congratulated on his ability to handle them.

F. SOLMSEN.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

W. S. HINMAN. Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Staten Island, 1935. Pp. 201. Columbia University Dissertation.

The object of this study has been to assemble all the literary quotations and allusions in the three treatises named, and from an examination of them to see what can be learned about Aristotle. The range of writings drawn upon by Aristotle for 686 quotations and allusions is large, the only branch of literature untouched being the Homeric Hymns. In literary illustration Aristotle's habits are economy and adherence to the point; hence his literary likes and dislikes can rarely be inferred, unless frequency of reference is a possible criterion. Homer is, of course, referred to most often, Euripides next, then Sophocles. Aeschylus, Pindar, and Sappho were "apparently of little value to Aristotle." The question of Aristotle's accuracy is handled with good sense. Where quotations can be compared with MSS of the authors' own works, any benefit of doubt has been given to

those MSS. Out of 138 testable quotations 82, 60 per cent,[1] are in this sense exact; of 197 allusions only three are incorrect.

The presentation is schematic, with some tendency to let the *schema* do the thinking. Thus the conclusions concerning Aristotle's literary preferences are more disappointing than they need to be. The writing, too, even in a schematic dissertation, ought to be better. "Bryson's statement that foul language is used even when unnecessary is contradicted in the *Rhetoric*" (p. 174), as an interpretation of *Rhet.* 1405^{b}, leaves no message with me. Misprints or misspellings occur on pp. 67, 80, 85, 97-8, 99, 107, 109, 162, 170, and 177. The work is solid, however, useful, and welcome.

JAMES HUTTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

D. DR. OTTO STÄHLIN. Clemens Alexandrinus. Vierter Band, zweiter Teil, erste Hälfte. Wort-und Sachregister. Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller etc., Band 39, 2. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1936. Pp. 197-532. Geheftet, 27 Marks.

The present fascicle contains the vocabulary (with the exception of the proper nouns) of Clement down nearly to the end of the word κύριος; another, slightly larger than this one, will complete the immense undertaking and set a fitting crown upon the labors of more than four decades.

Much the same admirable technique has been employed as in Leisegang's fine work for the Cohn-Wendland *Philo*, but with some improvements. Thus a conventional symbol expresses the essential part of the word under consideration, so that its precise grammatical form may be indicated, with a considerable saving of space, frequently, I should judge, of as much as ten per cent, which means a good deal in works of this sort. Again, a good many more words are treated by Stählin than by Leisegang, such as ἀλλά, γάρ, δέ, ἐπεί, and the like. Appropriate symbols indicate that not all the occurrences of a word are recorded, and that on certain forms it is advisable to consult the *apparatus criticus*. On the other hand, words which occur only in the *app. crit.*, as MS readings or conjectures, e. g. εὐδαίμων, Hiller's plausible supplement at II, 182, 30, seem not to be recorded, which occasionally leaves interesting and perhaps also important material quite unbooked. That is a trifle, and yet I hope and believe that in the future all the more scholarly indices, like this one, where the subject-matter also is deserving, will include this kind of information as well, since it really has considerable importance, especially for textual criticism, which constitutes, after

[1] So on p. 170, but 61 per cent on p. 173.

all, the very basis of our studies. The sagacity of classification, the fine accuracy of citation, and the beautiful printing are all worthy of the author, the scholar, and the press from which the work is issued. No serious studies in Clement of Alexandria can be made henceforth without constant use of this Index.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. W. A. OLDFATHER.

LEIV AMUNDSEN. Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection. Part I: Texts. (University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series, Volume XXXIV.) Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1935. Pp. xx + 232, with 8 plates. $3.50.

This volume will be doubly welcome to students of Roman Egypt, in that the 699 ostraca which it contains (the commentary on the texts is to follow in a separate volume) are all from the Fayum, whence ostraca have hitherto appeared sporadically and in relatively small numbers.[1] Nos. 1-97 come from various parts of the Fayum and were acquired by purchase; the remainder were found in the course of the University of Michigan's excavations at Kôm Aushîm, the site of the ancient Karanis. They come from the Roman levels of inhabitation and date (with the exception of one or two—116 and perhaps 117—which are Ptolemaic) from the reign of Augustus to that of Constantine, with the great majority falling in the period between about 270 and 330 A. D. Mr. Amundsen attributes this "predominance of texts of the late third century and the early fourth" partly "to the fact that to this period belong the series of well-preserved houses . . . uncovered by the excavations," and partly to "an increasing tendency to use potsherds instead of papyrus as writing material" (p. x).

The texts are of the types commonly found on ostraca—receipts and accounts for the most part—but contain much that is new and interesting. New names and variant spellings of names already known are extremely numerous. The words *βα[λανειοφ]ύλαξ* (102) and *λαγοπράτης* (336) are new. We hear for the first time of *κριθὴ Λιβιανή* (= *Liviana*: 387, 428; cf. 413) and of Mendesian wine (from Mendes in the Delta: 250).

Among the tax-receipts are recorded several interesting adaerated payments: for the little-known *ἀφυλισμὸς χωμάτων*[2] (12),

[1] The number of Fayum ostraca published to date, exclusive of the present collection, is about 250; Greek ostraca of Upper Egyptian provenience number well over 4,000.

[2] Cf. W. L. Westermann, *Aegyptus*, VI (1925), p. 123, who translates *ὑπὲρ ἀφυλισμοῦ χωμάτων* as "for cleaning [the Nile sediment] out of the dikes [*i. e.*, the canals]."

for *annona* (131, 132, 149), for οἶνος ἀννωνικός (16). (An οἰνοπαραλήμπτης, the liturgic official in charge of the collection of the *vinum annonicum*, is mentioned in 651.)

Nos. 52-53 and 177-233 are receipts for the delivery of chaff (ἄχυρον), which is in several cases specifically termed καύσιμον, "combustible." Owing to the scarcity of wood, chaff was an important fuel in Egypt, and was one of the products subject to the *annona militaris*. Only a few of the receipts mention the destination of the chaff, but these suffice to show us that it was carried to one of the landing places on the Nile,[3] whence it was transported by boat to the military camp at Babylon (187, 189, 196) near Memphis or sometimes, perhaps, to Alexandria (219: εἰς ὑπόκαυσιν γυ(μνασίου) Ἀλεξανδρείας).

Other texts, either singly or in groups, reflect various other aspects of the local administration and of the life and activities of the people. Among these the liturgical work on the embankments, as usual, figures prominently (266-294). But the largest, and to me most interesting, group consists of receipts for the transportation of grain from the granary to the harbor on the Nile (67-81 and 360-562). Since a few observations must suffice here,[4] they will be limited to the Karanis ostraca (70, 76, 360-562). The transport was effected ordinarily by means of donkeys, but camels were also used (401, 404). The number of animals available, however, was often insufficient (cf. 329), and additional donkeys (and camels—401) were brought not only from many of the other towns and villages of the Arsinoite nome but also from the Kynopolite (381, 425, 441, 547), Herakleopolite (365, 387, 431), Oxyrhynchite (398, 416, 446), and Panopolite (381) nomes. A point of detail may be mentioned here. In 363 and 409 should not the abbreviation which Mr. Amundsen resolves as Ἀρσινο(ίτου) be resolved rather as Ἀρσινο(ῆς) (cf. 386, where Ἀρσινοῆς occurs unabbreviated)? In all the other Karanis ostraca, when the donkeys come from somewhere within the Arsinoite nome, the town or village of provenience is specified. No. 74 cannot be invoked as contrary evidence; first, because the reading Ἀρσινοίτου in line 4 is doubtful; and secondly, because the ostracon comes from Theadelphia, where the usage may have differed somewhat in this respect.[5] The animals were laden at the granary and assembled in caravans, which

[3] ἐπὶ τὴν ὄχθην τοῦ ποταμοῦ—189, 190, 193, 194. ἐν τῇ μορῇ Ἀκανθῶνος—177; cf. Amundsen, *Ostraca Osloënsia*, pp. 62-64. Το Λευκογίου ὄρμος—179; cf. below.

[4] This class of receipts has been the subject of numerous discussions. The most recent and most detailed is that of Mr. Amundsen himself in his *Ostraca Osloënsia*, pp. 39-59, where he also introduces some of the evidence of these Michigan texts.

[5] Cf. e. g., *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten*, 1492-1517, ostraca from Theadelphia in which only the village of provenience is named, regardless of the nome in which it lies.

then made their way to the river under police escort.[6] The grain was delivered to one of two harbors, Κερκὴ ὅρμος in the Memphite or Λευκογίου ὅρμος in the Herakleopolite nome. Most of the deliveries must have been made to Kerke, which was the nearest point on the Nile to Karanis. Why the caravans sometimes went the longer distance to Leukogion, which lay some miles further south, can only be conjectured. It is interesting to note in passing that 179, which dates from 297 A. D., contains the earliest known mention of Leukogion.

Of the miscellaneous ostraca the most curious is 97, a rough pen drawing of a religious scene. Sobk, the crocodile-god of the Arsinoite nome, is shown lying on a litter which is placed on a platform under a canopy and before an altar bearing offerings. Mr. Amundsen points out in his description certain parallelisms which might place the scene in one of the many temples of Sobk. It may also be placed—and preferably, it seems to me—in one of the kiosks which were built along the *Via Sacra* of the Egyptian towns,[7] and in which religious processions halted for the performance of lustral or other rites. In one of the scenes of the Palestrina mosaic,[8] a procession is seen passing through a kiosk to which the canopied structure of the ostracon, despite the crudity of the drawing, bears a striking resemblance.

A few minor errors may be noted. ἐλ(άχιστος) (146, 1) is missing from the Index. Ἀλέκα (529, 6), Ἀντωνῖνος (530, 6), Ψενθεῷ (gen. of Ψενθεῶς: 418, 3-4), and probably Ταμέλανος (gen. of Ταμέλας ?: 434, 4) should be indexed with the personal instead of the geographical names. In 159, 1 for μεμέτρηκε (sic) ἐν θ]ησ(αυρῷ), read μεμέτρηκεν εἰς θ]ησ(αυρὸν), which is the regular formula in these receipts (cf., e. g., 164, where εἰς is preserved). But these are insignificant flaws in a publication which shows the thoroughness and accuracy of detail which are characteristic of Mr. Amundsen's work and may likewise be expected in his forthcoming commentary to these texts.

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[6] Cf. 342, a list of donkey-drivers and donkeys constituting a caravan, drawn up by the ἀρχέφοδος. Is not 615, drawn up by the ἀρχέφοδος Neâs, a similar list, with the number of donkeys of each driver either omitted or lost? In the same house as 615 were found 352, another caravan list, and 530, a receipt for transportation of grain issued to Neâs.

[7] Two such kiosks have recently been uncovered on the "Sacred Way" leading from the temple of Sobk at Tebtunis: cf. G. Bagnani, *Bolletino d'Arte*, XXVII (1933), pp. 120-121, and fig. 9; idem, *Aegyptus*, XIV (1934), p. 7.

[8] The scene is reproduced in *Monuments de l'Egypte gréco-romaine*, publiés par la Société archéologique d'Alexandrie, I (Bergamo, 1926), Plate LVI, 1.

ERNST KORNEMANN. Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1935. Pp. iv + 267.

A great deal of labor has gone into this book and all must be grateful to Kornemann for stimulating suggestions and a serious piece of work. That Kornemann has succeeded, however, in his attempted reconstruction of Ptolemy I very much doubt; and it is a little surprising to find his acquaintance with the literature so limited to the German field, valuable as that is.

Ptolemy's importance is obvious, for he was present on Alexander's expedition and, writing later as king of Egypt, could draw on various memoirs as well as his own recollections. His history has long since disappeared, but it served as a main source of Arrian's, which, though tawdry, is the best account we have of Alexander. Kornemann commences his book by an examination of the various Alexander historians. Most important for the study of the sources, he says (p. 4), is the relationship of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. He concludes that they were independent of each other, though I should think that a detailed consideration of Callisthenes or the Ephemerides should have priority.

The second chapter studies the work of Arrian. After Callisthenes' arrest (at Bactra, 327), Arrian relies more on Aristobulus than Ptolemy, and the vulgate is frequently used. From now on Arrian becomes "looser" (p. 19). Kornemann thinks that this is due to the unfamiliarity of Greek writers with this far-off world. The point is certainly important and is to be correctly explained, I believe, by the fact that ancient historians lacked not only Callisthenes here but the Ephemerides as well (cf. my *Ephemerides of Alexander's Expedition*). That Arrian's λεγόμενα do not always refer to the vulgate, but at times may be from Ptolemy is probably true; but Kornemann has hardly proved his point that this is generally the case. This calls for comment only because, in his preliminary remarks on the work of Ptolemy (chap. 3), Kornemann claims that λέγεται δή of the first sentence of Arrian is the beginning of Ptolemy's book. Indeed, Kornemann not only has the beginning but also the end of Ptolemy and claims (p. 30) to be the first person to have noticed it. The end of Ptolemy, he says, is marked by Arrian, VII, 26, 3: Οὐ πόρρω δὲ τούτων οὔτε Ἀριστοβούλῳ οὔτε Πτολεμαίῳ ἀναγέγραπται. But Robson in 1933 (Loeb edition) translated it, "Beyond this neither Ptolemaeus nor Aristobulus have recorded." Οὐ πόρρω, however, means nothing of the sort; it simply means "not different from." Kornemann has also discovered the title of Ptolemy's book.

Kornemann next discusses the restoration of Ptolemy's work.

In problems of this sort, as is well known, the difficulty is to decide where a quotation begins and ends. My own inclination is to cut it short; Kornemann's is exactly the opposite and thus, by stretching Arrian's quotations from Ptolemy as far as possible, he is able to ascribe a very respectable history to Ptolemy. I shall cite only one instance, but that of the utmost importance, for it has a vital bearing on the reputation of Alexander. Alexander is almost universally condemned for the death of Parmenio. Tarn (*Cambridge Ancient History,* VI, p. 390) says, "Alexander decided that Parmenion must die . . . Philotas' execution had been perfectly judicial; Parmenion's was plain murder, and leaves a deep stain on Alexander's reputation." Wilcken (*Alexander the Great,* p. 164) says, "If the condemnation of Philotas was a judicial murder, it is not the fault of Alexander but of the assembly of the Macedonian army. On the other hand Alexander has the sole responsibility for the sequel in the cruel execution of Parmenio. . . . It is the darkest spot in Alexander's life." From this it is only a short step to a really black picture of Alexander; for example, David M. Robinson (*Short History of Greece,* p. 177) says, "After the fall of Ecbatana and the death of Darius Alexander . . . became vain and reckless. He drank more and acted like a madman. During the next few years he even killed his closest friends, Philotas, Parmenio, the historian Callisthenes, and finally Clitus in 328." The death of Parmenio is in Arrian, III, 26, which we may summarize as follows: Ptolemy says that Philotas was brought before the Macedonians, where he defended himself against the accusations; he also says that those who had reported the plot convicted him by clear proofs. He and the other conspirators were killed by the Macedonians with their javelins, and Polydamas was sent to the generals in Media. "By them Parmenio was put to death, possibly because Alexander could not believe that Philotas should conspire against him and Parmenio not participate; or perhaps because, even though he had no share in it, Parmenio would be a danger if he survived when his own son had been put to death." Kornemann believes that the entire passage is from Ptolemy, the part in quotation showing the motive (p. 62). Certainly this is the crucial sentence; and, no matter which motive we prefer, the death of Parmenio remains a crime—provided, of course, that it is Ptolemy speaking. However, it is not Ptolemy, but Arrian, in his fumbling way, trying to understand the situation. It was the custom among the Macedonians that the relatives of a conspirator against the king were held responsible. Curtius (VI, 11, 20) says, "Meanwhile some of the officers who were related to Parmenio, hearing that Philotas was being tortured, and fearing the Macedonian law whereby relatives of conspirators against

the king were put to death, committed suicide, while others fled . . . so that Alexander revoked the law." It appears from Arrian, III, 27 that the new edict was limited in its application, for Polemo lost no time in fleeing when his brother Amyntas was arrested. Now, Arrian may have been ignorant of the Macedonian custom, but it is hardly credible that Ptolemy was. Thus, in the sentence from Arrian quoted above, it is Arrian speaking, since there could have been no doubt in Ptolemy's mind; or, to put it another way, Parmenio's death was perfectly judicial, having been ordered by the Macedonians themselves. This places Alexander in a new light.

In discussing the Ptolemy epitome in the text of Arrian (chap. 5), Kornemann refers (p. 144) to the oil spring beside the Oxus and Aristander's prophecy. This, he says, is from Ptolemy. The point is of particular importance, I believe (*A. J. P.*, L, p. 195), for it is the last of the many interesting references to Aristander, and, coming as it does just before the arrest of Callisthenes, is added proof that Callisthenes is the primary source for all histories to this point. In the next chapter Kornemann discusses the plan of Ptolemy's work, by years. It happens that I agree (*A. J. P.*, LI, p. 22; LIII, p. 353) with his statements (p. 172) about the winter of 330, the crossing of the Hindu Kush, the place and date of the Clitus and Callisthenes episodes; but I do not see how in a work of this sort the only serious chronological problem in the history of Alexander can be passed over so lightly; besides, Tom B. Jones has new and important observations in *Classical Weekly* (XXVIII, p. 124). The last two chapters discuss Ptolemy as a historian and his estimate of the Macedonians and Alexander. I doubt whether much more is going to be accomplished with the perplexing problem of the Alexander history by approaching this or that individual question. The time has come for a consideration of the problem as a whole.

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Aristotle. The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, with an English Translation by H. RACKHAM. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, The Harvard University Press, 1935. Pp. vii + 505.

This is a competent text and translation of three treatises from the Aristotelian corpus by Mr. Rackham who had previously done the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* for this series. The ticklish business of finding intelligible English equivalents for the frequently tortuous Greek is here performed

with a large measure of success, and those English passages which are not of themselves immediately intelligible do usually on closer examination fulfill their author's purpose, which was "to provide a translation primarily designed as an assistance to the reader of the text on the opposite page." Furthermore, Mr. Rackham has introduced a goodly number of original emendations which will be of interest to students of the text particularly in the *Eudemian Ethics*; the textual notes, while not intended as a complete *apparatus criticus*, are sufficient to warn the reader of the passages the interpretation of which remains dubious.

It may be of some use to challenge the rendering of the following passages. In the *Athenian Constitution*, XI, 2 (p. 34) *πάντ' ἀνάδαστα ποιήσειν* is not equivalent to "would institute universal communism of property" but merely "would redistribute all property." In XXVIII, 5 (p. 84) *τῇ πόλει πάσῃ πατρικῶς χρωμένους* does not mean "they were . . . patriotic servants of the whole state" but "they acted as father to the whole state." In the same section *πάσας προάγειν ἕως μηδὲν παρανομοῖεν* means, I think, "directed all so long as they transgressed no law" rather than "guided them all forward into a fully law-abiding course." In LXVIII, 4 (p. 178) *πιέζων τὸν αὐλίσκον τῆς ψήφου* surely does not mean "pressing the pebble against the lamp-stand" but "pressing the stem of the ballot (i. e. between two fingers)." In *Eudemian Ethics* 1214 B 18 *ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγιείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων* must mean "and of such things some are not peculiar to health or to life but are common, as it were, to all, both states and activities." Mr. Rackham translates: "and in the latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions of health and life are not peculiar to special people but common to practically all men—both some states and some actions." The neuter, *πάντων*, used instead of a feminine, seems to have confused the translator. At 1220 A 33-35 the sentence *καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα . . . διατίθησι* is translated as follows: "and its employment of the things that cause both its increase and its destruction is directed towards the things towards which it creates the best disposition." The Greek is involved but not so unintelligible as that; it should be rendered: "its activity (cf. 1219 A 16 ff.) is directed towards those things which are the agents of its increase and destruction in respect to which it creates the best disposition (i. e. in the soul that possesses it; cf. 1222 A 6 ff.)." On page 285 the marginal summary, "an act done in ignorance due to oneself is involuntary," is at least misleading; cf. 1225 B 11-16. At 1225 B 1 *λοιπὸν δὴ ὁρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν* cannot mean "it therefore remains to define it as that which is in accordance with thought." The succeeding chapter shows that not everything "which is in accordance with thought" is volun-

tary, since not every object of thought is an object of deliberative opinion and so of choice (cf. also 1226 B 34 ff.). The sentence must, then, mean: "it remains then to determine the voluntary element in thought." At 1231 B 35-36 ἐν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἴδει τὸ βέλτιστον means "and the best is specifically single for each (i. e. each range of activity)." The printed translation, "there being a single best for each kind of action, a single thing," may be a typographical confusion. Note b on page 434 is infelicitous; τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι is the benefactor who, having desired the existence of his work (the beneficiary), deserves to have the beneficiary return the feeling. The purpose of the example is to show that the claims of the benefactor are not restricted to a return of the material assistance which he has given.

On page 28 (last line) δ' should be δ', or τέτταρες. At 1219 B 17 ἀπ' ορούμενον should be ἀπορούμενον. In note c on page 284 "leave" seems to be a misprint for "have."

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CELSUS, DE MEDICINA. With an English Translation by W. G. SPENCER. Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1935 (The Loeb Classical Library).

The present volume comprises the Latin text together with a new English translation of books 1-4 of Celsus' *De Medicina*. The Latin text used is that of the latest edition, by F. Marx, in the *Corpus Medicorum Latinorum*,[1] and footnotes indicate the more important conjectures by Marx and earlier editors. It is, therefore, in the new English translation that the chief interest of this publication lies, the more since it has been badly needed for a long time. For Greive's translation,[2] by far the best of the older attempts, had become rare and its textual basis antiquated.

It seems to me that Mr. Spencer has not approached his task with an unbiased mind. As W. H. S. Jones points out in a short introduction to the volume, very little is known about Celsus' life, and the question is still disputed whether Celsus was a medical practitioner, a layman interested in medicine, or simply the Latin translator of a Greek medical text book. Mr. Spencer holds to the first view and has given on pp. xi-xii a "summary of the arguments for regarding Celsus as a medical practitioner."

[1] *Corpus Medicorum Latinorum*, Vol. 1, A. Cornelii Celsi quae supersunt, rec. Fridericus Marx, Lipsiae et Berolini, 1915.

[2] A. Cornelius Celsus, Of Medicine, translated with notes critical and explanatory by James Greive, M. D., London, 1756.

It is not necessary here to discuss Mr. Spencer's opinion. But whether he is right or wrong, he ought not to have let his translation be influenced by this thesis. Thus he translates "Asclepiades multarum rerum, quas ipsi quoque secuti sumus, auctor bonus, acetum ait quam acerrimum esse sorbendum" (pp. 386-388) by: "Asclepiades, who wisely advises many things, which we also ourselves practice, said" etc. (pp. 387-389). But Celsus only states that he has often followed Asclepiades, which leaves it undecided whether he has followed him as an authority in his book or in practical life. In another passage where Celsus says: "Neque credendum utique nostris est, qui cum in adversa valetudine vinum aut frigidam aquam concupiverunt, deliciarum patrocinium in accusatione[m] non merentis stomachi habent." (p. 74), Spencer translates: "Nor must one absolutely trust those of our patients who when very unwell have conceived a longing for wine or cold water, and in backing up their desires, lay the blame on their perfectly innocent stomach." (p. 75). Greive (l. c. p. 40) translated "nostris," correctly as I think, by "our countrymen."

It seems to me that it was the same theory which induced Mr. Spencer generally to translate "medicus" by "practitioner," instead of using the customary "physician." While this may be justified in a few instances, one of the very first passages where this occurs shows that as a general term this translation is wrong. Having stated the theoretical arguments between the dogmatists and empiricists Celsus says: "Cum haec per multa volumina perque magnas contentionis [disputationes] a medicis saepe tractata sint atque tractentur," etc. (p. 24). This Spencer translates by: "Since all these questions have been discussed often by practitioners, in many volumes and in large and contentious disputations, and the discussion continues" etc. (p. 25). Such writings, however, must have hailed from the pens of physicians interested also in philosophical principles, whereas it is doubtful whether the mere practitioner ever rose above the practice of his craft.

There are quite a few other passages where Spencer's translation leads to misunderstandings and ambiguities. On page 137, for instance, Spencer writes: "Epileptic fits again are not difficult to bring to an end, when they have commenced before puberty, and whenever the sensation of the coming fit begins in some one part of the body. It is best for it to begin from the hands or feet, next from the flanks, worst of all from the head." But this does not agree with the text which reads: "Item morbus comitialis ante pubertatem ortus non aegre finitur; et in quo ab una parte corporis venientis accessionis sensus incipit, optimum est a manibus pedibusve initium fieri, deinde a lateribus; pessimum inter haec a capite." A period ought to be made after "puberty," whereas the period after "part of the body" ought to be changed into a comma, which would give the whole

paragraph an entirely different meaning. Again, in his discussion on insanity (III, 18) Celsus deals first with "phrenesis." Since the latter term together with "phreneticus" connotes a subdivision, it is wrong to translate it as Spencer does on pp. 289, 291, 305 by "insanity" or "insane" respectively. Finally, such a clear Latin phrase as: "Quasdam autem observationes desiderant et novae res et corporum genera et sexus et aetates et tempora anni" (p. 50) Spencer translates: "but some particular notice requires to be taken of novel circumstances both as to varieties of constitution and sex and age and time of year" (p. 51). This is incorrect in so far as "corporum genera et sexus et aetates et tempora anni" are coördinated with and not subdivisions of "novae res." Besides it is not clear to what the expression "both as to" refers.

These few examples may suffice to show that this new translation is far from being perfect; for it lacks accuracy without achieving elegance.

Mr. Spencer adds an appendix to his translation in which he discusses the terms podagra and cheiragra as used in Celsus. He emphasizes that the interpretation "gout" is too limited and that these terms "were used of any pain in the feet and hand" (p. 465), a contention in which he is undoubtedly right. But in other remarks as given in some of his explanatory footnotes, Mr. Spencer is not always quite correct. Thus, it is not true, as stated on page 152, footnote b, that Galen too used "nervus" "for fibrous tissues and membranes"; on the contrary, he made a clear terminological distinction between *νεῦρα*, *τένοντες*, and *σύνδεσμοι*.[3] On page 8, footnote a, Mr. Spencer associates fire with red blood and choleric temperament, air with black bile and earth with yellow bile and sanguineous temperament. This is not correct for the time at which Celsus wrote and it is not even clearly supported by the earlier sources (Plato, *Timaeus* 82, and Hippocrates) quoted by Mr. Spencer.

The volume ends with a detailed "list of alimenta" which will prove very interesting and helpful to the medical historian.

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Jérôme Carcopino. Histoire romaine. Tome II. La république romaine de 133 à 44 avant J.-C (Histoire ancienne, troisième partie). Les presses universitaires de France, 1935. 105 fr.

This history was undertaken by Professor Bloch, but at his death in 1923 he had only partially completed the preliminary

[3] Cf. Galen, *De Ossibus ad Tirones*, ed. Kühn, II, p. 739.

survey and the work was entrusted to Professor Carcopino, who also added the citations from original sources and a bibliography. The general theme of the weakness of the Senate in the face of determined leaders of the popular party or of successful military commanders is not new, but the author has justified this survey by fresh interpretations, and his lucid exposition will be welcome not only to the general reader but also to the specialist. It will be the purpose of this review to set forth some of the outstanding features of Carcopino's study.

The first agrarian legislation was proposed by the tribune Licinius in 145 B. C. This law, falsely retrojected to 367 by later historians, was soon rendered ineffective by the landholding aristocracy. In 140 Laelius revived the project but was dissuaded by the powerful Scipionic party. The continued drop in the number of citizens led the reform party in the Senate to favor the legislation introduced by Tiberius Gracchus in 133. But Tiberius, influenced by the principles of Stoic philosophy and inspired by the model of Pericles, soon conceived the idea of following in the footsteps of the great Athenian and governing the state through the control of the popular assembly. As soon as this policy emerged he lost the support of his friends in the Senate, and he further antagonized that body by destroying their control over the tribunate in deposing Octavius and by the grant of judicial powers to the triumvirs. This provision of the land-law deprived the senatorial landholders of any control in its administration. Though the law remained on the books the census figures for 131 show that it was ineffective. The great increase in the enrolment of 126 was due either to enfranchisement by the nobles in order to increase their supporters in the tribal assembly, or else to the desires of the censors to allay discontent amongst the Allies by enrolling Italian landholders as citizens.

The aim of Gaius went far beyond that of his brother. He sought to enlarge the Roman state by extending the franchise to all Italy. By his land legislation he could control the popular assembly. The equites were to be enriched by the exploitation of the provinces. The jury courts were to be made more effective and less corrupt. The lex Acilia eliminated the practice of frequent postponements of trials, and in the following year the juries were reconstituted by a new panel which was to be made up of 600 equites and 300 senators. The power of the senate was to be limited, though this organ was retained as a moderating influence. The consuls were the titular heads of the state, but the real power was to be exercised by the tribune in control of the popular assembly. The law conferring citizenship on the Latins failed to pass, and in the ensuing turmoil the murder of Antyllus gave the opponents of Gaius an opportunity to pass the *SC. Ultimum.*

In the period following the Gracchi the triumvirs appointed for assigning land soon ceased to function. The lex Minucia abolished the Gracchan colonies, but reëstablished the triumviri coloniae deducendae to found the Livian colonies which had been authorized. The lex Baebia next authorized the sale of Gracchan allotments. The agrarian law passed in 111 B. C., still partially preserved, is identified as the lex Thoria by which the remaining assignments were made ager privatus vectigalis. By this law the legislator sought to replenish the treasury as well as to facilitate the recruiting of troops for the impending wars. He also placated the senatorial aristocracy charged with the execution of the law, and the equites who secured a new opportunity for profitable contracts in tax-farming. In 109 the lex Mamilia (Bruns 15) abolished the legal monstrosity of ager privatus vectigalis and made the assignments tax-free. The same law also provided for new colonial foundations apparently in Northern Italy. The net result of all this legislation was the elimination of the Gracchan policy of settling the urban proletariat on the land, and the increase of latifundia. Five years after the passage of the lex Mamilia, Marcius Philippus could declare, without risk of contradiction, that the number of Roman landholders did not exceed two thousand.

This in brief is the history of agrarian legislation in the second century as outlined by Carcopino. In his judgment, Caesarism might have been avoided, had Gaius lived to carry his policies into effect. While it is idle to speculate on what might have been, I believe that the Gracchan legislation was doomed to failure in so far as it was their plan to restore the urban proletariat to the soil. They were blind to the economic forces imposed by Roman imperialism. In the second century a quarter of a billion dollars had been transferred to Rome from the provinces. In addition annual tribute was imposed either in money or in kind. To meet their annual charges the provincials, themselves mostly farmers, had to sell grain and other commodities in Italy, and the small farmer in Central and Southern Italy could not survive this competition. The development of latifundia was, under these conditions, more or less inevitable. Grazing on large estates was still profitable since the armies were constantly in need of clothing, hides, and transport. The contracts for these supplies were normally let in Italy and were profitable. The cultivation of vines and olives was also profitable because these commodities could still find a market beyond the bounds of the Empire, but in most cases capital was necessary for horticulture and the small farmer was seldom able to develop this field of activity. In my judgment the encomium of Varro on Italian agriculture is to be discounted. The sober Pliny undoubtedly represents more accurately agricultural con-

ditions when he affirms that the large estates were the ruination of Italy. If proof be needed, one may point to the successive refoundations of colonies in Central and Southern Italy, which indicate their general lack of prosperity. On the other hand most of the colonies in the provinces were highly successful.

In regard to Marius, Carcopino gives an interesting interpretation of the law for the suppression of piracy in 100 B. C. (*SEG.* III, 378). This he regards as a veiled attempt of Saturninus and Glaucia to confer an extraordinary command on Marius, ostensibly to clear the seas, but actually to wage war on Nicomedes and Mithridates. The murder of the democrats and consequent discrediting of Marius prevented the law from being carried into effect.

Carcopino regards Sulla as intending to found a monarchy. His legislation was far from being an attempt to restore the senatorial aristocracy. The power of the magistrates in the cursus honorum was designedly weakened by creating a longer interval between tenures of office. The consuls were deprived of military imperium, and the tenure of proconsuls and propraetors was limited to a single year, while their imperium could not be exercised beyond the bounds of their province. The popular assemblies were muzzled by the limitations imposed on the tribunate. The equites were deprived of the right to exploit the provinces and lost their control of the juries. The senate, after the purge of hostile members, was weakened by the increase of members to 600, most of whom were Sullan adherents. However, it was this Sullan senate which disowned and abandoned the dictator; and Sulla, instead of fighting to retain the virtual monarchy which he had created, weakly abdicated and retired to private life.

The second volume deals with the last thirty-five years of the Republic, and here Pompey and Caesar necessarily play the leading part. Both had imperialistic aims; but, while Pompey was weak and vacillating in his policies, Caesar had in early life conceived the idea of establishing a monarchy based on divine right. To this goal he marched straight ahead without faltering. Far superior to all his contemporaries in political insight as well as in military genius, he never blundered. To his political reorganization, the empire, of which he was the real architect, owed long centuries of beneficent peace and prosperity.

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KRISTER HANELL. Megarische Studien. Lund, Lindstedts Univ.-Bokhandel, 1934. Pp. 226. Kr. 4:50.

This monograph was written under the direction of Professor M. P. Nilsson, which in itself guarantees the thoroughness and completeness of the work. It has two main divisions: "Zu Frühgeschichte und Kulten Megaras" (pp. 9-100) and "Megara und Seine Kolonien" (pp. 113-206). The remainder of the study is occupied by the Anhang, which lists in summary form the material relating to the cults of the colonies, and by the Bibliography and Index. The printing is done in clear type and is free of any serious typographical errors.

In the first part of his monograph Hanell presents little that is actually new but, for the most part, confirms in greater detail what has already been written by several of his predecessors. He shows that in pre-Dorian times Attica had slight influence upon Megara, whereas contacts with Boeotia were many and determining. He clearly proves that Pandion, whom Megarian tradition claimed as an early king, was originally a Megarian and only later an Athenian. He finds that the well-known Tereus legend was first localized in Megaris and concludes that in Tereus-Teres we probably are to see traces of an early settlement from Thrace. But in both of these stories contacts with Boeotia are clearly discerned. In Sciron he discovers an exclusively Megarian figure although purely a creation of myth. Sciros of Salamis, who is the colonizer and eponymous hero of that island, was closely connected with Athens. However, when Megara took Salamis from Athens it was natural for Megara to appropriate the Salaminian Sciros, and thus arose the Sciron-Sciros fusion. Hanell decides that similarity in the stem-form of the two names resulted from similarity in the rock-formations of Megaris and Salamis. Megarian Sciron, however, was originally a local destructive *daimon* and only after the capture of Salamis transformed into a hero. This transformation was carried out by the Megarian peasants and the guardians of the famous Scironian Way.

In Ajax, Hanell finds a figure that was native neither to Megara nor to Attica. For Ajax had no early prehistoric cult in Megara, and he was clearly a Salaminian figure in origin. He, too, was appropriated by the Megarians as one of their kings after they had taken Salamis.

Hanell's researches thus lead him to conclude that in pre-Dorian times Megara's outside contacts which were of an influential nature were Eleusinian and Boeotian. With Attica they were incidental, if not entirely lacking.

Throughout this section of the monograph one is impressed with the careful, scholarly analysis of each topic. The conclusions seem to be entirely acceptable.

The author next proceeds to a detailed discussion of the Ionic migration into Greece. This movement left its influence upon the language of Megara as well as upon the cults. However, Poseidon's cult in Megara is not attested earlier than Thucydides, and Hanell does not present any new evidence.

In the sections that follow (pp. 69-109) Hanell attempts to show from a study of the cults that Megara was a colony of Argos and owed its Dorian influence to that state. This is also the view of several writers. But when I published my own study of Megara[1] I felt compelled to conclude that the evidence of such Argive influence was rather slight and very uncertain. Nor do I now feel convinced that Hanell has offered any new evidence or new arguments to support the theory of Argive colonization. But his discussion is a very thorough one and it is the heart of his monograph. Hence, some detailed examination must be given to it.

Hanell first quotes Strabo, XIV, 653: *οἱ γὰρ Δωριεῖς οἱ τὰ Μέγαρα κτίσαντες μετὰ τὴν Κόδρου τελευτὴν οἱ μὲν ἔμειναν αὐτόθι, οἱ δὲ σὺν Ἀλθαιμένει τῷ Ἀργείῳ τῆς εἰς Κρήτην ἀποικίας ἐκοινώνησαν, οἱ δ' εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον καὶ τὰς λεχθείσας ἀρτίως πόλεις ἐμερίσθησαν.* Strabo names Ephorus as his source. But all this sentence says is that those Dorians who settled in Megara, in part, remained there after Codrus' death, but that some of them, accompanying the Argive Althaemenes, took a hand in colonizing Crete and Rhodes. This certainly does not make Althaemenes the *oikistes* of Megara, as Hanell maintains. Nor do the other sources which Hanell cites (Strabo, X, 479; Conon, 47; Dieuchidas, 7). In fact, the only *oikistes* who is even mentioned is the legendary or mythical Alkathoos, eponymous hero of the western acropolis and ardent follower of Apollo.

Equal importance is given to the two temples of Hera which have been uncovered by the British archaeologists since 1930 at Perachora. This site is almost due north of Old Corinth on the isthmus. Here the excavators discovered two temples: one dedicated to Hera Akraia and dating from the Geometric period, the other in honor of Hera Limnaia and built in the sixth century B. C. Vast quantities of Protocorinthian and Corinthian pottery, as well as Egyptian scarabs and imported pottery were found. This material shows strong Argive influence. But since Corinth itself was of Argive origin and in view of the proximity of Perachora to Corinth, we are led to conclude that this was Corinthian territory and not a sphere of Megarian influence. We can not be sure of the boundary lines, but on the southern coast of the isthmus Crommyon was a point of dispute between Megara and Corinth which extended back into very early times. But Crommyon was much nearer to Me-

[1] *The History and Civilization of Ancient Megara*, Baltimore, 1927.

gara than was Perachora and much more accessible. It seems to me that Perachora could never have been controlled by Megara.

Hanell finds in Zeus Aphesios and Apollo Pythios (or Pythaeus?) cults that were brought from Argos to Megara. But the temple of the former was located outside the city and along the Scironian Way. Hanell claims that the epithet Πυθαεύς is distinctively Argive and cites *I. G.* VII, 48 and 106; IV, 629 for the official designation of the games in honor of Apollo. But Pausanias, Philostratus, and the scholiasts on Pindar use the epithet Πύθιος, not Πυθαεύς, and it is clear that Pausanias (I, 42, 5; III, 10, 8 and 11, 9) knew the difference. Apollo may well have had some characteristics in Megarian worship that were likewise found at Argos. It is entirely likely that some Argives settled in Megara. But as I view the matter, the most that Hanell's evidence proves is that Argive influence is found sporadically outside Megara almost exclusively, or its appearance is relatively late. If Megara was an Argive colony, why was there no temple to Hera on either acropolis? Surely so important a deity would scarcely have been relegated to a remote point (Perachora) outside the city. If anything is made clear by the cults, it is that Apollo was the chief deity of Megara herself and of her colonies. Possibly, as Farnell thought, Hera was kept out by the strongly-entrenched worship of Demeter.

Hanell's important contribution is found on pages 116-218, a section which deals with the Megarian colonies, particularly those of the Pontic district. This is a careful study of the civil institutions, the cults, and the calendar. The evidence is all too fragmentary but it is worth collecting, and this Hanell has done with painstaking care. It is interesting to find the citizens of Heraclea enrolled in *centuries* (p. 141) and to discover the institution of the eponymous βασιλεύς and the αἰσυμνᾶται at Calchedon and Selymbria (pp. 146-152). In the cults Apollo and Artemis are the chief deities. Hanell detects much Delphic influence in the presence of the former. But of Hera worship there are only a few traces at Byzantium and Callatis. It is wholly absent in Selymbria, Mesambria, and Chersonesos. Here again, as Hanell himself shows, it is Apollo and Delphi, not Hera and Argos, that are the determining influences.

Hanell has been able to compose a complete calendar for Byzantium. For this task he was especially equipped as the result of an earlier study along this line.[2] This Byzantine calendar began with the autumnal equinox and its initial month was called Heraios. Yet (strange to say!) this month had nothing to do with the festival of Hera at Argos (pp. 194-5). Of the twelve Byzantine months nine are found in one or other of the

[2] *Das Monologium des Liber Glossarum*, Lund, 1931-1932.

Megarian colonies, thus leaving three of them unique in Byzantium. In the formation of this calendar Argive influence is seen to be strong, but there are other forces at work: Delphic, Boeotian, Thracian, and Megarian from the home-country. This is not strange since our sources indicate that these colonies were of mixed origin.

This monograph gives every indication of wide and careful reading. The reasoning is usually sound, although at times the author's enthusiasm leads him into special pleading. I can not feel that he has proved an Argive origin for Megara, for the evidence is either too limited or too late. But the monograph shows in greatest detail that Megara and the surrounding territory became the home of many popular cults and legends. From early prehistoric times this section of the isthmus must have been a center of cosmopolitan influences. Probably no site in Greece would *more abundantly* repay careful excavation than Megara.

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H. ST. L. B. Moss. The Birth of the Middle Ages, 395-814. New York, Oxford University Press, 1935. Pp. xviii + 291. $5.00.

Assuredly it is no light task to trace in its various aspects the course of European history from the death of Theodosius I to that of Charlemagne, and Mr. Moss is to be congratulated on his clear and accurate survey. He has never allowed himself to become entangled in the many threads that he has had to weave together to form his intricate pattern. Moreover, some of the most effective parts of his narrative deal precisely with those movements or events of which the shorter histories of the period generally take insufficient account; for instance, the part played by the Lombards in breaking up the political unity of Italy, the achievement of Byzantium, the spread of Islam and its influence on Western civilization, and the effect on Europe of the gradual advance of the Slavs. Inevitably in work of this kind, that treats of a vast subject in some 260 pages, there is a danger of over-simplification, and every reader will find omissions or judgments with which he disagrees. One regrets, for example, that the author who has found room for some observations on the Salic law and Germanic customs ignores the Edict of the Lombard Rothari. To say (p. 136) that Gregory the Great's "medieval reputation rests mainly on his scholarship and dogmatic learning" is to disregard the immense influence of the *Pastoral Rule* as a practical manual for those in authority. That the

relations between the Spanish Church and the Papacy were not as perfect as Mr. Moss would have us believe (p. 207) is surely suggested by the embittered Adoptionist controversy during the eighth century, a dispute that also had some repercussions in the Frankish Empire. Boniface's main work was, it is true, the organisation of the Church east of the Rhine. But in promoting the foundation of the abbey at Fulda—an event not mentioned by Mr. Moss—he gave a great stimulus to the revival of learning in that area.

The sketch maps, illustrations, and chronological tables enhance the usefulness of the volume. The Select Bibliography is judiciously compiled, but U. Moricca's great *Storia della letteratura latina christiana* (Turin, 1923-34) should have been listed. On Arabic literature Brockelmann is still indispensable, and De Lacy O'Leary's *Arabic Thought and its Place in History* deserved mention.

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JAMES WILSON POULTNEY. The Syntax of the Genitive Case in Aristophanes. Diss. The Johns Hopkins Univ. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. Pp. xv + 235. $3.50.

A very careful and judicious classification of the examples of the genitive case in Aristophanes, this book is particularly usable because of its conveniently printed and apparently complete Index of Passages. A contribution from the Rockefeller Foundation assisted in the publication of the volume.

As Dr. Poultney is very evidently aware, all exhaustive classifications of syntactical phenomena are somewhat arbitrary, and many examples of case usage admit of more than one interpretation. No two investigators of the genitive case would agree at all points. The reviewer differs from the author in the following matters.

On *Lys.* 1125 *αὐτὴ δ' ἐμαυτῆς οὐ κακῶς γνώμης ἔχω*, Poultney comments (p. 61): "*γνώμης* depends on *κακῶς* (see Kühner-Gerth I., p. 382 f.), but *ἐμαυτῆς* is more difficult. If it depends as a possessive on *γνώμης*, it should be preceded by *τῆς*. Perhaps we may construe it with *οὐ κακῶς ἔχω*, taking as a parallel Herodotus I., 102 *ἑωυτῶν εὖ ἥκοντες*." Surely the rejected interpretation is simpler and better. Poultney himself cites examples of the possessive genitive without the article; as *Eq.* 1237 (p. 13). In *Vesp.* 1510 f., which is quoted (p. 66) as *ὁ πινοτήρης οὗτός ἐστι τοῦ γένους, ὁ σμικρότατος*, it would seem more natural to shift the comma and understand *τοῦ γένους* as depending on

ὁ σμικρότατος. In *Thes.* 1168 f. (p. 36) ἃ νῦν ὑποικουρεῖτε τοῖσιν ἀνδράσιν / ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς παροῦσιν ὑμῶν διαβαλῶ, does not ὑμῶν depend on ἀνδράσιν rather than on ἃ ὑποικουρεῖτε? In *Ran.* 1244 (p. 197) Ζεύς, ὡς λέλεκται τῆς ἀληθείας ὕπο, does not the phrase with ὑπό express either agency or manner, rather than instrument?

Vesp. 650 f. Χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ δεινῆς γνώμης καὶ μείζονος ἢ 'πὶ τρυγῳδοῖς / ἰάσασθαι νόσον ἀρχαίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐντετοκυῖαν, classified as a genitive of description (p. 53), I would interpret: "... is ... the part of an able mind...." It seems to me to belong with *Ran.* 1496 ff., and the other passages which Poultney cites as Group 9 of the subjective genitive (p. 37), but to which I should apply the label, "genitive of possession or connection." Poultney does not use this convenient label but places most of the pertinent cases with examples of the "possessive" and of the "objective" types.

Another term which Poultney might well have used is "genitive of composition." *Av.* 219 θεῶν ... χορούς, which he classifies as partitive, he correctly translates, "choruses composed of gods" (p. 73).

Under the heading "genitive absolute," why is there no subdivision "causal constructions," to correspond to "concessive constructions" (p. 139)? Poultney uses "since" in his translation of *Pax* 1143, but groups the example with the "circumstantial constructions" (p. 135).

Additional points might be argued. However, in view of the bulk of this dissertation, it is surprising that occasions for disagreement are as few and as unimportant as they are.

Misprints are extremely rare: p. 38 ἔνι for ἔτι (*Pax* 1194); p. 135 ἀπόλλυτε for ἀπόλλυτε (*Lys.* 1134). Under "Addenda et Corrigenda" (p. 217) there is an error in the last reference.

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AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS with an English translation by JOHN C. ROLFE. In three volumes: I. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd., 1935. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. 1 + 583; frontispiece and maps.

Ammianus Marcellinus, the last great Roman historian, has not been translated into English since the day of modern critical text editions; Prof. Rolfe thus had an admirable opening. But he has done more, in his first volume, than merely take advantage of this opportunity; he has given us, in his Introduction, a valuable independent contribution in the most modern

summary of titles and jurisdictions in late Roman military and administrative bureaucracy. Everyone who has tried to find his way in this obscure field, will appreciate the research necessary for this chapter.

And Prof. Rolfe has also made some 150 changes in the accepted Latin text, in this volume alone. In the 20 years since the publication of my Weidmann edition, there have been numerous emendations proposed by various scholars; Prof. Rolfe's bibliography lists all these articles and monographs. The great majority of his text changes consist merely of filling in lacunas, where I had followed the MS tradition; but he has adopted a number of emendations, some of which, like Fletcher's *ramorum tenebris* for V's *quiante mumibris* (XVI, 2, 4) and his *eminentium* for V's *mentium* (XIV, 11, 26), are excellent. Rolfe's Latin text is thus the only modern text which is continuously readable and incorporates good recent emendations.

As regards the English translation, Prof. Rolfe begs indulgence in his preface. Few Latin prose authors present as great difficulty as Ammianus; his natural tendency to a turgid Asian rhetorical style is complicated by his strict observance of accentual rhythm. I speak with feeling, for I had tried my hand at this Loeb translation years ago and had nearly finished four books when pressure of other obligations forced me to send in my resignation to the editors. I had tried to incorporate as much of old Philemon Holland's noble Elizabethan translation as possible; and, as Prof. Rolfe has utilized my draft, some of Holland still lurks in his version. Unfortunately Holland had a corrupt and mutilated Latin text to work with—the fatality attending most early editions of the classics—so that his translation is inaccurate. Prof. Rolfe has kept close to the long and involved sentences of Ammianus' Latin (without the accentual rhythm!) and his version gives a good idea of the original. Volume I is thus a welcome and worthy addition to the Loeb series; we shall await II and III with impatience.

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MARTIN DE LA TORRE Y PEDRO LONGÁS. Catálogo de Códices Latinos. Primera Edición. Tomo I. Bíblicos. Patronato de la Biblioteca Nacional. Madrid, 1935. Pp. xvi + 413; numerous plates (11 colored) and cuts.

At last the devoted labors of Madrid's scholarly librarians are coming to fruition. We are already able to map out work in the Escurial from a published catalogue; now one can study in

advance the Biblical texts and commentaries in the MS collection of the Biblioteca Nacional. But the interest of this volume touches far wider circles; the handsome colored plates and the scores of black and white plates and cuts add enormously to our material for the study of medieval art—Italian as well as Spanish, thanks to the Italian possessions of the Spanish royal house. There are, e. g., a wonderful eagle's head of 988 A. D. in Plate I, and a droll Noah's Ark in Plate II. A number of the facsimiles give additional glimpses of the Visigothic hand. There are an historical introduction and adequate indices; the only misprints I noticed have been caught in the Corrigenda. More extensive bibliographies of the Visigothic MSS treated would have been welcome; but it is ungracious to pick flaws in what is a superb achievement. May the remaining volumes follow speedily, together with similar catalogues of other great Spanish collections.

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ROGER A. PACK. Studies in Libanius and Antiochene Society under Theodosius. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1935. Menasha, Wis., George Banta Publishing Co. Pp. xii + 126.

This translation and study of *Oration* XLV of Libanius, "Concerning the Prisoners," makes available in a useful form one of the orator's "reform speeches," which not only provides valuable evidence for the study of penal practice and administrative procedure in the fourth century but offers profitable material for the analysis of Libanius's complex relationships with the civic life of Antioch and of the effect of his personality upon the picture which he gives us of these relationships. This background is concisely discussed in two introductory essays ("The Spirit of Social Criticism and the Ideal Order" and "Social Forces Inimical to the Ideal Order"), which are developed in such a way as to form not the least useful part of the work. Preceding the translation is a chapter ("The Plea for Penal Reform") on the history of the conditions which Libanius discusses in the oration.

The author has dealt ably with a complicated and difficult subject. The translation is lucid, and the notes provide ample historical and illustrative material. It is unfortunate that Pack apparently has not utilized Reiske's commentary; at least he never alludes to those interpretations of the earlier editor which differ from his own. Thus the reader, in using Pack's transla-

tion and commentary, is not aware that there are alternative interpretations of some passages (in sections 7, 10, 11, 21, 22, 26, 32, 34), and Pack has no opportunity to defend those which he has adopted. The author determines that *Or.* XLV was written after *Or.* XXXIII, and that the composition of both must be limited to December, 386, and January, 387. In an appendix he shows that *Or.* XLIX precedes *Or.* XLVIII "by a fairly slight interval" and that both were written in the late summer or autumn of 388.

The study, which was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor Campbell Bonner, will be of great service not only to students of Libanius and of the history of Antioch but to scholars who deal with the administrative and social history of the fourth century.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY.

PRINCETON.

FRANZ SAUTER. Der römische Kaiserkult bei Martial und Statius. (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft XXI.) Stuttgart-Berlin, 1934. Pp. ix + 178.

Sauter's careful work is a study of the language of flattery used by two poets who were faithful mirrors of their age. The earlier chapters deal with the emperor as *soter*, as creator of peace and a golden age, as a god, often identified with Jupiter, Hercules, etc. In every case earlier parallels in Hellenistic and Roman literature are fully cited and the religious background of the ideas is treated with understanding. The author does not, perhaps, sufficiently stress the fact that the themes which were fresh when Horace used them to express his deep admiration of Augustus had, in a century of continual adulation, become empty and meaningless.

The last chapter on "Der Kaiser als Gegenstand des Kultes" is necessarily one of the slightest in the book, for Martial and Statius supply evidence rather for the length to which men went in voicing their praise of the emperor than for what was actually done in the observance of cult. Sauter is fully aware of this fact, and does not press his evidence too far. His book is a contribution not so much to the history of the imperial cult as to the interpretation of Martial and Statius.

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ALEXANDER AND THE STOICS.

(*Continued from* Vol. LVIII, 1, page 82)

IV

I believe, as Dr. Tarn once did, that the Stoics were the intellectual heirs of Alexander and that his own portrait of Alexander, past and present, is a Cynic-Stoic portrait. The evidence for these beliefs, let it be frankly said, is almost wholly circumstantial, for the *name* of Alexander is rare in the surviving fragments of the early Stoics (to the *SVF.* Index's 3, 2, 51 add 1, 434). In order to tell a reasonably clear story and to avoid repeating what is already familiar, I shall confine myself to Onesicritus, who has hardly been noticed as a link between Alexander and Zeno and as the originator of the Cynic-Stoic tradition about Alexander.[15]

Onesicritus, some twenty years the senior of Alexander, was a son of Philiscus his boyhood tutor and was (so far as we know) the only historian of Alexander who had the advantage of knowing him from his early years. Onesicritus had two sons who became pupils of Diogenes the Cynic at Athens; their father followed them there, and all three became extraordinarily enthusiastic disciples of the great Cynic. There Onesicritus would become familiar with the writings of Antisthenes, teacher of Diogenes and founder of the Cynic school; among them his four books on Cyrus and three on Heracles, besides others on kingship, law, freedom and slavery. He would also come to

[15] For the fragments of Onesicritus see Jacoby, *FGH.* nr. 134; also Berve, *Alexanderreich,* Bd. 2, nr. 583. With Jacoby's commentary I have silently disagreed at several points.

know the *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* of Antisthenes' friend Xenophon, who had been more or less adopted by the Cynics. Here, then, was a tradition already established in which Heracles and Cyrus were parallel ideals, not only of rulership but also of the Cynic way of life which professed to be derived from Socrates. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* furnished the official literary portrait of Socrates, as Diogenes (whom Plato had called "a Socrates gone mad") was his portrait in the flesh. In the *Memorabilia* Onesicritus would find a theory of kingship derived by Socratic exegesis from Homeric epithets for Agamemnon, including the line "Both a good king and a brave soldier," which was to become Alexander's favorite line from his favorite author. He would find also a discourse on the text, "The greatest blessing to states is Homonoia," and much else to his later purposes. Among the Cynics, who thought virtue a matter of deeds, there was even more emphasis on the strength and power of Socrates than on his reasonableness. In sum, as Diogenes Laertius puts it (6, 2):

> From Socrates Antisthenes learned his hardihood, emulating his disregard of feeling, and thus he inaugurated the Cynic way of life. He demonstrated that toil is a good thing by instancing the great Heracles and Cyrus, drawing the one example from the Greek world and the other from the barbarians.

The Cynics were philosophic missionaries, men with little sense of special obligation to their native cities, but with a general "philanthropy" like that of their prototype Heracles. Alexander was to share their opposition to the narrow bounds of the single city-state. They exalted the Sage above all conventional requirements and thought that those who were not Sages ought for their own good to be ruled by those who were. Both Antisthenes and Diogenes said that a man needs either reason or a halter, and Diogenes professed to be a specialist in ruling men (DL, 6, 24, 29, 74).

It must be admitted, therefore, that the stories connecting Alexander and Diogenes are at least *ben trovati*; and it is just possible that one or more real meetings lie behind them. They could have met in 338 when Alexander came to Athens with the ashes of the Athenians who had fallen at Chaeronea; or at Thebes when Alexander was a guest in the home of Diogenes' disciple Crates (DL, 6, 88); but the most likely occasion was

during Alexander's stay in Corinth in the fall and winter of 336-5 in connection with the congress of the League, to which Diogenes and Onesicritus may well have been attracted. Whether then or later, Onesicritus left the Cynic school to join Alexander and was with him throughout the Asian expedition. And whether directly or through Onesicritus, the "cosmopolitanism" of Diogenes, along with the Cynic idealization of Cyrus and Heracles, was known to Alexander.

Up to the time of the expedition, the chief intellectual influence in Alexander's life had undoubtedly been Aristotle; but there was a growing coolness between them (Plut., *Alex.* 8, probably from Onesicritus), though they corresponded to the end. Aristotle's relative and pupil Callisthenes accompanied Alexander and wrote a history of the early years of the expedition which gave the first impetus to the Alexander Romance; but later he rebelled against proskynesis and other court practices, was accused of conspiracy, and executed in India. Aristotle took no action, but, as Dr. Tarn once wrote (CAH 6, 400), his disciple Theophrastus "in a pamphlet lamented Callisthenes' death and branded Alexander as a Tyrant, and Demetrius of Phalerum presently carried the school over to Alexander's enemy Cassander"; which he seems to have forgotten when he argues in the lecture that the existence of the circle of Cassander is (positively not negatively) "very important for the subject of Alexander's ideas" (top p. 78 above).

While Callisthenes the Peripatetic was falling out of favor, Onesicritus the Cynic was being advanced; he was helmsman of Alexander's flagship on the Indus and later co-commander with Nearchus of the fleet. It would have been his idea to take along not only the *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* of Xenophon but also the books on Cyrus and Heracles by Antisthenes. If Alexander needed any encouragement in his reverence for and emulation of the Cynic saint and the Cynic soldier, or in claiming for himself the honors paid to them, Onesicritus was in a position to provide it. Probably he was already engaged on his life of Alexander, an *Alexandropaedia* in deliberate imitation of Xenophon, though not much confidence can be placed in the story in Lucian (*The Way to Write History*, 40).[16]

[16] Of course Onesicritus did ample justice to his own share in the expedition. It pleases Jacoby, following Arrian, to believe his rival

After the death of Alexander, Onesicritus may have returned to Athens to finish his book in the Cynic circle. His report of Alexander's cry in crossing the Hydaspes, "O Athenians, will you ever believe what perils I am enduring to win glory in your eyes?", seems intended for the Athenian public. Plutarch, who repeats this (*Alex.* 60, 3), is non-committal about another story of Onesicritus long afterwards reading his fourth book aloud to Lysimachus, who was then reigning. (ἤδη βασιλεύοντι). If this means that he had already assumed the title of king, the conversation might be dated 305-4; but the language need not be pressed, and in any case the book may have been finished long before. Lysimachus had been taught at first by Callisthenes and later by the gymnosophist Calanus and would be interested in Onesicritus' account of the Indian "cynics"; but, after listening to the story of the Queen of the Amazons, he "smiled gently and said: 'And where was *I* at the time?'" (Plut., *Alex.* 46).

About the time when Alexander started on his Persian campaign in 334, Zeno the Stoic was born in Citium on the island of Cyprus. Son of a trader in purple, who traveled in the one direction to Tyre and Sidon and in the other to Athens, he would have (one may plausibly guess) a cosmopolitan outlook from his childhood, and his most impressionable years would be filled with the reverberations of Alexander's conquests. In those same years he read the "Socratic books" which his father brought him from Athens. When he had come of age, bringing a cargo of purple thither, he survived shipwreck, came up from the Piraeus, stopped in a book shop, picked up Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and asked where men like Socrates were to be found. The bookseller pointed out Crates the Cynic passing by, and said, "Follow him" (DL, 7, 2 f.); and Zeno did. While a pupil of Crates, he must have made the acquaintance, if not of Onesicritus, at least of his book; and fusion of Cynic ideas and the achievement of Alexander (like the previous fusion of Socratic and Cynic ideas with the character of Cyrus) became the original impulse of Stoicism. Crates himself was a man of

Nearchus where they differ; but after reading Arrian, 8, 20 I see no reason for the preference. There is some clumsy fiction too in Nearchus' story of his reunion with Alexander (Arrian, 8, 33-5), the *Schwärmerei* of which is so much to Wilcken's liking (*Alexander*, pp. 202-5).

wealth and position and had entertained Alexander in his home at Thebes. His wife Hipparchia came of a distinguished family of Maroneia in Thrace, who had been hosts to Alexander's father Philip. She had been at the court of Lysimachus (DL, 6, 97), and may have met Onesicritus there, if it was not at Athens that he wrote his book. Zeno was to write a book of *Anecdotes* and another of *Recollections of Crates*, which may have been the primary authority for these statements and perhaps also for some of the stories connecting Diogenes and Alexander.

But Zeno's first book, written before he left Crates, was his *Republic*, patterned after the Cosmopolis of which Diogenes and Crates professed to be citizens; perhaps even after the book of the same title by Diogenes. So much is familiar enough, but I should like to suggest that it may have owed something to Onesicritus. The latter had not only pictured Alexander as the ideal Cynic soldier; he had also given lengthy accounts of various Indian peoples and communities where much that the Cynics preached was practised. Strabo (15, 1, 54) tells us that whereas a later writer Megasthenes asserts that no Indian uses slaves, "Onesicritus declares this to be the case only in the territory of Musicanus [on the lower Indus] and regards the absence of slavery as a κατόρθωμα: he finds, in fact, many other *katorthōmata* in that region and describes it as especially well-ordered." Among these other *katorthōmata* or perfections (15, 1, 34) are their common mess and simple diet in the presence of a natural abundance of food; their not using the gold and silver of their mines; their developing to a high point only medicine among the arts and sciences; and the fact that "they have no process at law except for murder and *hybris*, for *it is not in one's power* to avoid suffering these, whereas the content of contracts *is in the power* of each man himself, so that he is required to endure it if anyone breaks faith with him, and also to consider carefully who should be trusted, and not to fill the city with law-suits." Can it be an accident that we have here (a) several of the institutions of Zeno's *Republic*, (b) one of his most important technical terms, and (c) a distinction that lies at the basis of his ethical system, in his exact phraseology? Note that by calling these institutions *katorthōmata* Onesicritus means both that they are a matter of principle, not of chance or of brute necessity, and that they are successfully maintained.

This is just what Zeno means; something that is rightly *done*, and done because it is judged *right*.

There is one bit of evidence that is still more striking. In a lively satire on the Cynics (*Death of Peregrine*, 25, trans. Fowler), Lucian writes: "The Brahmans [here = gymnosophists] never jump straight into the fire: Onesicritus, Alexander's pilot, saw Calanus burn himself, and according to him, when the pyre has been got ready, they stand quietly roasting (παροπτώμενοι) in front of it, and when they do get on top, there they sit, smouldering away in a dignified manner, never budging an inch." And Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 2, 20; *SVF.* 1, 241) tells us that "Zeno said well of the Indians that he would rather see one Indian being slowly roasted (παροπτώμενον) than fill his head with the whole stock of arguments about the bearing of pain." A comparison of the various accounts of the death of Calanus shows that Zeno's saying can have been inspired only by that of Onesicritus.

Onesicritus throughout represented Alexander as giving practical effect to Diogenes' ideal of world-citizenship, spreading among the most savage peoples the philosophic culture of the Greeks. (So Strabo, to whom we owe the bulk of the remains of Onesicritus, was later to write of the civilizing mission of Rome.) From the Caspian to the Indus, he seems to have exaggerated the disparity between the customs Alexander found and those he substituted for them, in order to magnify his achievement. But in the valley of the Indus there were peoples and communities whose culture, at least from the Cynic point of view, surpassed that of the Greeks. Here, instead of having Alexander work transformations, Onesicritus has him respect their customs, while they pay tribute to the enlightenment of the Great King. This is well illustrated in his longest surviving passage, relating his interview with the gymnosophists near Taxila in the upper Indus country.[17] Recognizing in

[17] Strabo, 15, 1, 63-5. Like the American nudists who have taken the gymnosophists' name, they were reluctant at first to impart their wisdom to interviewers who would not strip; especially when it must pass through the medium of three interpreters who except for the gift of tongues were as ignorant as the masses. That "was like expecting water to flow pure through mud." (The Calanus mentioned in the preceding paragraph was one of these men, who was persuaded to accompany Alexander.)

reports of these ascetic Indian philosophers a close spiritual kinship with the Cynics, Alexander sent Onesicritus as his representative to pay them a visit. They gave him an account of their doctrines and practices and asked if any like them obtained among the Greeks. Onesicritus replied that they came to much the same thing as those of Pythagoras, Socrates, and his own master Diogenes; but it was clear to the gymnosophists that the Greeks were at best not as wholehearted as they might be in preferring nature to custom. However, they commended Alexander the King because, although busied with the government of so great an empire, he was desirous of wisdom. He was, in fact, the first philosopher in arms (ἐν ὅπλοις φιλοσοφοῦντα) that had come to their notice. And they, who were themselves advisers to the rulers of their country and had urged their king to welcome Alexander, thought there was nothing better in the world than that those should be wise who had it in their power to persuade the willing, and compel the unwilling, to practise self-control.

This whole episode gives a favorable impression of our Cynic's ability not only to tell a story but also to carry his point by indirection. For instance, (a) as in the case of the country of Musicanus, Cynic propaganda is made out of the life that is described; (b) by allowing the gymnosophists to out-dog the Cynics, Onesicritus undermines the invidious distinction between Greeks and Barbarians; and (c) most adroit of all, by allowing them to see in Alexander the Sage upon the throne, he parries the inevitable charge that he, a Cynic holding that only the Sage is the true king, cannot in good conscience be companion, representative, and panegyrist of Alexander.[18]

We may now consider the question whether there was a continuing Cynic-Stoic tradition about Alexander, of which Onesicritus was the source. It would be possible to trace the history of several items individually. Here is an example. The only surviving fragment of Antisthenes' books on Cyrus is preserved by Epictetus (4, 6, 20; cf. DL, 6, 3): "It is the lot

[18] The Cynic character of the speeches put into the mouths of the gymnosophists was noted by Eduard Schwartz, *Rhein. Mus.*, XL (1885), p. 239. My last point was made by Wilcken, *SB. d. B. A. d. W., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1923, pp. 174 ff. See both writers for details I have passed over. Cf. also the rôle of the gymnosophists in the *Aethiopica* of Heliodorus, Book X; also Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius*, VI, 6, 11.

of a king, O Cyrus, to do well, but to be ill spoken of." The Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote it down as a reminder to himself (7, 36). Now Plutarch says (*Alex.* 41) that Alexander used to comfort himself with this saying when the complaints of his "companions" became more frequent; and also (40) that he would chide them gently, saying that the most royal thing was not luxury but toil (*βασιλικώτατον τὸ πονεῖν*)—as Antisthenes (DL, 6, 2) had showed from the examples of Heracles and Cyrus that toil was a good thing. Alexander *might* have read Antisthenes for himself, but it is more likely that he got these things from Onesicritus; and perhaps just as likely that Onesicritus saved him the trouble of saying them by putting them into his mouth. From Onesicritus they pass, perhaps through Zeno or Persaeus, to Antigonos Gonatas, whose version, "Our kingship is a noble servitude" (Aelian, *var. hist.* 2, 20), is repeated by Seneca, who then proceeds to ring the changes on it (*de clem.* 1, 8, 1 ff.; *cons. ad Polyb.* 6, 1 ff.). By that time it appears to have been common enough (cf. Tiberius *ap.* Suet., *Tib.* 24, 2), and Plutarch might have picked it up anywhere and applied it to Alexander; but it is more likely that he found this already done for him by Onesicritus.

But it would be tedious to multiply instances of this kind. Instead, I shall examine a document at this end of the tradition, show its connections with Onesicritus, and indicate some of the intervening links. For this purpose I choose Plutarch's orations on "Alexander — Fortune or Virtue?", the chief authority for Dr. Tarn's lecture.

1. Plutarch cites Onesicritus six times, and refers to him once besides, in his *Life of Alexander*; always with respect, sometimes with obvious partiality. Even in the case of the Queen of the Amazons story, about which Lysimachus twitted him, Plutarch remarks judiciously that our belief or disbelief will not affect our admiration of Alexander one way or the other.

2. In the *orations* he cites Onesicritus only once (327d); but farther on (331e) he makes Alexander's advancement of him to the post of chief pilot the climax of a series of benefactions to philosophers and the point of transition to Alexander's admiration of Diogenes, for whom he could do nothing.

3. It is clear that he is following Onesicritus in describing Alexander's reform of the customs of the Sogdians and other

barbarian peoples, as a comparison of 328c with Strabo, 11, 11, 3 will show; and I think his recurrent theme of the civilizing mission of Alexander, bringing all peoples under the sway of one law and custom, and that the best, derives at least ultimately from Onesicritus. (It may be noted that this, as applied to Rome, is one of the leading motives in Strabo, who compares her work in the West to that of Alexander in the East).[19]

4. At 329c, "compelling by force of arms those who would not submit to reason" sounds like a fusion of Onesicritus's "philosopher in arms" and "persuade the willing and compel the unwilling" (p. 135 above).

5. A comparison of 1, 4 (327e-328a) with chap. 8 of the *Life* suggests that he is following Onesicritus in speaking of Homer as Alexander's viaticum in both these passages and in 1, 10 (331c). On the verse there quoted, "both a good king and a brave soldier," and on a third epithet for Agamemnon, "the shepherd of the people," which Dio (*or.* 2, 6) has Alexander quote, see Xen., *Mem.* 3, 2 for the sort of Homeric exegesis which became traditional among the Cynics and Stoics. (Cf. *SVF.*, Index nominum propriorum, *s. v.* Homerus. All this bears on the Stoic theory of kingship.)

6. The only philosophers quoted with approval in these orations are Antisthenes (336a) and Crates (336c) the Cynics, and Zeno (329a) the Stoic.

7. In illustrating Alexander's virtues by his actions, he applies to him "the Stoic dictum that the wise man exercises all the virtues in his every action, but that in any given action some one virtue is the 'protagonist,' calling the rest to her side and pressing on with them to the goal" (332d). Thus the deeds for which he is honored were all done not only "royally" but "philosophically" (332e-333a). Alexander is the Cynic-Stoic "sage upon the throne."

8. He will not, however, let this be taken to mean that Homer was merely his literary pastime and that his real viaticum was a traveling library of philosophical treatises. Alexander, great as was his debt to Aristotle, was a philosopher not in learning

[19] See esp. 1, 2, 1. Strabo in other passages noted by Capelle, *Klio*, XXV (1932), pp. 98 ff., follows the Stoic justification of Roman imperialism worked out by Panaetius and Posidonius on lines anticipated by Onesicritus.

and disputation but in action (328a, where the Loeb Classical Library injudiciously makes καταφρονοῦμεν interrogative); which brings us back again to Onesicritus and the tribute of the gymnosophists (p. 135 above).

9. There was, however, one professor of philosophy among Alexander's contemporaries who was worthy to be brought into comparison with the great "philosopher in arms," and that was Diogenes. Plutarch confronts the two in the climactic passage of the first oration (1, 10—331e ff.) and puts into Alexander's mouth an interpretation of his oft-repeated saying, "If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes." (That this interpretation is not original with Plutarch is made probable by the fact that he reproduces a very different one in *Mor.* 782ab). The substance of it is that if he were not a philosopher in deeds, he would be one in doctrine after the Cynic pattern; for it is not his power or wealth or fortune that he prefers to the wisdom of the script and staff, but the grand design that they subserve of transcending the barriers of space and custom, fusing Barbarian and Greek to the last frontier, and making justice and peace prevail among all men. If it were not for this, he would imitate the needlessness and frugality of Diogenes. But he must be forgiven if he follows the example of Heracles in his own way. Sharing in the divine mission of Diogenes to "change the stamp of the common currency," he proposes to fulfill it by imposing a new face of Grecian civility upon the barbarian metal everywhere. Moreover, there are reported to be in India certain holy men, practising an austere and "naked" philosophy, more frugal even than Diogenes, dispensing even with the scrip. "Through me, they shall come to know Diogenes, and Diogenes them." (It is obvious at once, of course, that, of all the original accounts of Alexander, this fits only that by Onesicritus.)

10. After speaking of the central principle of Zeno's *Republic*, that instead of being split up into many states and communities, with conflicting laws and customs, the race of men should be one fellowship living by the one law which is that of the cosmos, Plutarch adds that whereas Zeno did but *write* this as if in a philosopher's dream, Alexander had already fitted out the doctrine with the *deed* (τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν).[20]

[20] As Dr. Tarn puts it (145), "behind Zeno's dream lay Alexander's reality," but his interpretation of this (n. 146) is quite mistaken.

Now of course Onesicritus could not have said this with reference to Zeno, but it is clear that he did say something like this with reference to Diogenes, whose *Republic* Zeno was following, "hanging on by the dog's tail." Had anyone before Plutarch made the connection between Alexander and Zeno? The answer to this question brings us back to Dr. Tarn, who rightly (n. 25) follows Schwartz in assigning this passage in Plutarch (1, 6 *after* the reference to Zeno, which Schwartz would include) to Eratosthenes, justifying the assignment by comparison with the parallel passage in Strabo (1, 4, 9) where Erastosthenes is expressly cited, and by Plutarch's own citation of Eratosthenes farther on (330a) in the same general context. This famous scholar and scientist, whose credibility is so important for Dr. Tarn's purposes (129)—though Strabo ventures to question it on many a point (e. g. 1, 2, 2)—had studied at Athens in early youth under Zeno, in the latter's last year or so; and he was just the Stoic (see p. 64 above) to make the connection. Moreover the close-knit structure of this section in Plutarch shows no such break as would justify Dr. Tarn in excluding the Zeno reference from what is to be assigned to Eratosthenes. I follow Schwartz, therefore, in supposing the whole of 1, 6 to be from him.

But Eratosthenes was merely following the lead of Onesicritus in this matter, and I shall now venture the final suggestion that his dissent from Aristotle's advice to Alexander (pp. 65 f. above) is also from Onesicritus. I base this conjecture not merely on the context in Plutarch's oration but also on that in the *Life* (8), where after stating on the authority of Onesicritus that Alexander slept with the "Iliad of the Casket" and his dagger lying together beneath his pillow, Plutarch goes on to say that, whereas Alexander at first loved Aristotle better than his own father, his love in time was cooled by suspicion and his attentions lost their eager solicitude. The cause of the estrangement was of course (a) that Aristotle had advised him to draw a sharp line between Greeks and Barbarians in his treatment of them; (b) that Alexander, though he followed the advice at first (Plut., *Alex.* 28), had later been constrained to reject it and pursue a policy of fusion; and (c) that Aristotle's protégé Callisthenes, though previously an extravagant eulogist of Alexander, had stubbornly resisted this policy from its inception.

It would be strange, indeed, if Alexander did not have a passing suspicion at least that this resistance was inspired by Aristotle himself (cf. DL, 5, 10). At any rate, Onesicritus, in justifying his summary disposal of Callisthenes, would find it natural to say, in effect, that Alexander had advanced from Aristotelianism to Cynicism; that for the "conventional" distinction between Greek and Barbarian he had substituted the "natural" distinction between good and bad.[21] I believe, then, that behind the passage of Eratosthenes which Strabo and Plutarch quote, there lies the Cynic apologetic for Alexander's execution of Callisthenes. And Eratosthenes may have heard Zeno say in his old age that his youthful *Republic* was only a dream of what Alexander had gone far toward making real.

The execution of Callisthenes was to mark the parting of the ways in the Alexander tradition. His friend Theophrastus, who was to succeed Aristotle as head of the Peripatetic school, wrote a pamphlet called *Callisthenes, or the Assay of Grief*, lamenting his death and invoking to explain it the epigram of Chaeremon, "Fortune, and not the counsels of Wisdom, rules the affairs of men" (Cic., *Tusc.* 5, 9, 25; cf. Plut., *Mor.* 97c). Alexander, he said, though a youth of the finest mind and heart, became proud and cruel beyond all bounds when once he got the title of King (Cic., *ad Att.* 13, 28); when he was raised to the pinnacle of power and fortune, all the good counsels of his youth were overborne (Cic., *Tusc.* 3, 10, 21); his great fortune was his great misfortune—and also that of the independent Callisthenes, who ran afoul of his tyranny. Thus arose, as Dr. Tarn has remarked, the consistent Peripatetic tradition, still very much alive in Plutarch's time, of Alexander as "a despot whose achievements were due to luck and who was ruined at the end by the excess of his own fortune" (CAH 6, 400).[22]

[21] It seems probable, in fact, that, without foolishly abusing Aristotle, Onesicritus represented his influence as an interlude in a life otherwise Cynic throughout; for he is the only plausible source for Plutarch's anecdotes (5, 22, 25) about the lasting impression made upon Alexander by his austere preceptor Leonidas, who was responsible for the disciplinary regimen of his boyhood, training him to be content with little and shielding him from the excessive attentions and luxuries that his family would have heaped upon him.

[22] On Stroux's theory of an adverse Stoic tradition about Alexander, see Appendix III.

Demetrius of Phalerum, pupil and friend of Theophrastus, liked to say (DL, 5, 82) that not only Plutus was blind but his guide Fortune as well; and he wrote a book *On Fortune* in which, "wishing to give the world a distinct view of her mutability, he fixed on the period of Alexander"; a book in which Polybius (29, 21) was to find a prophecy of the downfall of Macedon a century and a half later.

These Peripatetic tributes to Fortune were severely attacked by the Stoics. Zeno's follower, Dionysius of Heraclea, later to bear the epithet "Turncoat," met Theophrastus' essay *On Grief* with one *On Apathy*, reproaching him for his resentment of Alexander's prosperity and for his approval of Chaeremon's dictum (*SVF.* 1, 434 = Cic., *Tusc.* 3, 9, 18 ff.; cf. 5, 9, 25, probably also from Dionysius).

Assigning so large a rôle to Fortune in the career of Alexander and in their philosophy of history generally, the Peripatetics were largely chroniclers and antiquarians in the field of history. The Stoics, on the other hand, talked of Providence and the force of personal character more than of Fortune; insisted on the unity of history; and thought that the record of it should first of all be useful to statesmen and a guide in the conduct of life. The ideology of universal history was Stoic, and the Stoics assumed a sort of responsibility for its development. It is possible to trace the conversion of Polybius from the Peripatetic to the Stoic point of view, under the influence of Panaetius. Posidonius professed in the title of his histories to be continuing Polybius. Diodorus drew upon both and upon other sources, aiming at a great synthesis, but was unable to sustain the eloquence of his prospectus. Strabo reworked and continued Posidonius and also led up to Polybius. He included an extended account of Alexander. Arrian wrote a full history of Alexander's expedition, and added a still longer account of what happened *After Alexander*. Strabo, like Polybius and Diodorus, thought of Alexander and Rome as expanders not merely of their own empires but of that of the historian and geographer. The Stoic conception of world-history was best expressed by Diodorus:

> However they may be divided by time and space, all men belong to the common human family; and the universal historian who aims at bringing them all under a common view is a sort of minister of divine

providence. For just as providence orders alike the stars and the natures of men, throughout the cycles of time, allotting to each its proper part; so likewise the universal historian records the transactions of the inhabited world as if it were a single community, and passes the works of Providence through the grand audit of his clearing house.[23]

These universal historians, like Eratosthenes before them, made common cause against the Peripatetic conception of Alexander.[24] In this I think they were all following Onesicritus, whose book was among other things a protest against the *Callisthenes* of Theophrastus. The tradition originated by Onesicritus swings full circle in the last of these historians, Arrian. His master Epictetus, more than any Stoic after Zeno, was an admirer of Diogenes the master of Onesicritus. Like Onesicritus, Arrian wrote in conscious emulation of Xenophon, whose *Memoirs of Socrates* he matched with his *Discourses of Epictetus*; the *Anabasis of Cyrus* with his *Anabasis of Alexander*; and so on through almost the whole series of his writings. He will not court credit for his *Alexander*, he says, by parading his own name and lineage or the offices he has held among his countrymen; rather will he set down that "this history is—and was from my youth—my country, family and offices" (1, 12, 5); a claim perhaps supported by the fact that Epictetus (2, 17, 35) twits an unnamed hearer for pluming himself on a gift for writing in the style of Xenophon. But Arrian learned from Epictetus a sobriety of judgment and a respect for common fact that turned him (as to a less extent it had Strabo) against the vein of romance in Onesicritus and into the camp of "official history" which would have been equally suspect to a more critical mind. Like Eratosthenes he thinks the labors of Heracles have been spun out to provide background for those of Alexander; he doubts, for instance, that the rock Aornos which

[23] 1, 1, 3; cf. 1, 3, 6. I have borrowed from the renderings of this passage by Bury and Toynbee. For Polybius and Stoicism, see R. v. Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios*, 1890. For Diodorus see Georg Busolt, "Diodors Verhältnis zum Stoicismus," *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik*, CXXXIX (1889), pp. 297-315.

[24] Polyb., 8, 12; Diod., 17, 1, 3 (cf. an even more emphatic statement about Philip in 16, 1, 6); Arrian, 7, 28-30. Strabo's history of Alexander has been lost, but we can be sure of its character from such passages in his *Geography* as that from Onesicritus which I have summarized on pp. 134 f. above.

Alexander captured had been assailed in vain by Heracles. But after all subtractions "for the sake of his veracity," it is still the Cynic-Stoic portrait of Alexander that emerges from his book.

Plutarch's protest is much more passionate and rhetorical than any of these, but he draws upon the arsenals of this tradition, in which the heroic virtues of Heracles and Alexander hagiography were superior to the slings and arrows of fortune, and Stoic cosmopolitanism was read into Macedonian imperialism. He was no Stoic, but he was never unready to write like one when his theme required; and since he had in the orations no scientific face to save, Onesicritus reappears in him unqualified.

Conclusion.

My position throughout this paper has been that Dr. Tarn was right in his former accounts of the relation between Alexander and the Stoics, and that he is wrong in the Academy lecture.

The lecture tacitly assumes the exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness of three views concerning Alexander, which may be formulated as follows: (a) He held the ideas attributed to him, and he was the first to hold them. (b) He held them, but they were not original with him; he took them over from the Sophists and Cynics. (c) He did not hold them at all; the attribution is an anachronism, a projection backwards into his mind of the results of Stoic reflection on the implications of his career.

Originality is not so simple as this. The tradition does not claim originality for Alexander's ideas, and furthermore it is much clearer about his aims than about his ideas. The ideas attributed to him, considered apart from his aims, were not so different from those of the Cynics and Sophists before him as Dr. Tarn would have us believe.[25] We need not on that account

[25] Here are two samples of his treatment of the evidence. (1) For the sophists (n. 6): "The oft-quoted remark of the sophist Hippias (Plato, *Protagoras*, 337c) that 'we are all kin and fellow-citizens' means only, as the context shows, the little company of Athenian [sic!] citizens gathered round the table, to whom it was addressed." But Plato says there was "a great inroad of Sophists" (314c) with their

suppose that his aims were inspired by the Sophists and Cynics. He turned from Aristotle and Isocrates to the Cynics in part because the ideas of the latter made more reasonable to him what he found himself wanting to do and be. But those ideas, appropriated to himself, given a positive content by his career, and adapted to its interpretation by Onesicritus, suffered a change toward the less negative forms they later assumed in Stoicism. The difference between Cynicism and Stoicism is a difference due as much to Alexander as to the fact that Zeno studied under Polemo and others besides Crates. Indeed, it may well have been the need for a view of the world with room for Alexander that drove Zeno on to Polemo and to the study of Heraclitus. If so, it was the Cynic and not the Peripatetic portrait of Alexander that made the need felt. The profounder philosophy that met it would also retouch the portrait. The Alexander Dr. Tarn so much admires is really the Alexander of this Cynic-Stoic portrait, and the lecture is the mark of his ingratitude.

The quest of the *historical* Alexander, if the seeker be not simple-minded, is more likely to end in a philosophy of history than in the illusion that he has found what he sought.

APPENDIX I

Some Notes on "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship," by Professor Erwin R. Goodenough, in *Yale Classical Studies* I (1928), pp. 55-102.

This important study, which has been widely praised and of which I have seen no adverse criticism, reconstructs what the author thinks will "prove to have been the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age" (102) from the following fragments in Stobaeus, all ascribed

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disciples, "of whom the greater part appeared to be foreigners" (315a), and he represents Hippias as saying to them: "Gentlemen assembled, I take it that we are all by nature, though not by convention, friends and kinsmen and fellow-citizens; for by nature like is akin to like, but convention, the tyrant of men, compels us to do many things that run counter to nature." (2) And for the Cynics (125): "When Diogenes called himself a cosmopolite . . . what he meant was, not that he was a citizen of some imaginary world-state—*a thing he never thought about*—but that he was not a citizen of any Greek city; it was pure negation" (italics mine). But Diogenes wrote a *Republic* (DL, 6, 80; cf. *SVF.* 1, 590) after which Zeno's was presumably modeled, and said "the only right state was that of the world" (*τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ*, DL, 6, 72).

to Pythagoreans. (The material has long been familiar to students of philosophy, but not hitherto regarded as a secure foundation for any large construction; see, e. g., Lewis Campbell, *Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, 1867, Intro. to the Statesman, pp. xxv ff. All of it, along with much more, was translated by Thomas Taylor in 1822 in a volume called *Political Fragments of Archytas . . . and other Ancient Pythagoreans, preserved by Stobaeus; and also, Ethical Fragments of Hierocles.* Taylor's translation is not impeccable, and he made the mistake, natural enough in his day, of identifying Hierocles the Stoic with Hierocles the Pythagorean. But he did not make the mistake of omitting the evidence which would suggest that the characteristic Pythagorean political theory remained that of the mixed constitution.)

1. Stob., 4, 1, 132, 135-8; 4, 5, 61, ascribed to Archytas of Tarentum (*fl.* 375?) *On Law and Justice.* Delatte thought the ascription genuine; Theiler thought they derived from the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition shortly before the time of Posidonius; Goodenough inclines to agree with Theiler. In any case: (a) the fragments are concerned with the place of law in society, and the passing reference to kingship is incidental to this, and was ignored by Delatte; and (b) though the notion of the king as animate law appears, law is primary; and a ruler is a king rather than tyrant only in case he *is* animate law, i. e. rules according to law. Though the relation between the king on the one hand and the written and unwritten laws on the other is not clear, the thought is completely Greek as far as it goes, and Goodenough's guess that "the conception of the true king as one who rules according to the law or laws may well have been Persian in origin" (n. 19) is not made plausible by Darius's boast that *he* did so.

2 Stob., 4, 7, 61-2, ascribed to Diotogenes (of whom nothing is known) *On Kingship.* Goodenough thinks these fragments are Hellenistic (they contain a rationalization of royal avarice! pp. 70 ff.), but does not attempt to date them. Tarn is less cautious: "Diotogenes was contemporary with Demetrius the Besieger" (p. 8). Evidence (n. 33): Demetrius was notorious for such and such qualities which Diotogenes says the king must have, and also for such and such other qualities which Diotogenes says the king must *not* have. In these rather incoherent fragments the king again differs from the non-king by being animate law; but in virtue of his being so he is to his kingdom what God is to the universe, a harmonizer and benefactor; in fact, he is a god among men; and (let him look the part!) divine virtue will pass through him to his subjects when they but behold him. A moderately clever Greek could have contrived all this at any time; and a moderately intelligent one could have given it a certain dignity (even the justification of avarice; for Plutarch, *Mor.* 333b, could say regarding Xenocrates's refusal of a gift from Alexander: "Xenocrates, because of philosophy, had no need of wealth; Alexander, because of philosophy, needed wealth that he might be generous to men like Xenocrates").

3. Stob., 4, 7, 64-6, ascribed to Ecphantus (contemporary of Archy-

tas) *On Kingship*: Pseudepigraphic, for Ecphantus wrote Attic and these are Doric. Goodenough thinks them Hellenistic. Text corrupt. Less emphasis on law and more on friendship, communion, concord, harmony (cf. Love in Zeno's *Republic*). "He who rules in accordance with virtue is called, and is, a king; having the same friendship and communion with his subjects as God has with the universe and the things in it" (p. 84). There are other tags of a Cynic-Stoic stamp, like imitating the self-sufficiency of God and being a vehicle for the divine "spermatic logos." At one point there is a striking bit of sun symbolism: the true king "is tried and proved by the dazzling light of royalty, as the eagle, mightiest of winged creatures, is tested by looking straight at the sun" (p. 77). This sets Professor Goodenough off on a search for Light from the East. But the sun shines and there are eagles and kings in Greece, too; and all the light he succeeds in focusing on the specific point (including the first-century coins of Tigranes) is Greek.

Really we know nothing whatever about the authorship or date of any of these fragments, or of the others ascribed by Stobaeus to Pythagoreans (e.g. the pseudo-Hippodamus and other pseudo-Pythagorean fragments used by Goodenough in his more recent *By Light, Light*). If they bore the names of third-rate or unknown Stoics, we should be none the wiser. Professor Goodenough thinks that the problem of the Hellenistic philosophy of kingship "has been very much confused by the generalizations of Kaerst . . . the bulk of his evidence is very late" (p. 58). The bulk of his own evidence is in a much worse case than that; but even if it could be proved (as it cannot) to be early Hellenistic, the difference between the philosophy to be reconstructed from it and that which Kaerst derived from his much better authenticated evidence is not fundamental; nor is it possible to prove that, so far as it was different, it was any more official than Kaerst's. The two Stoic doctrines on which the latter believed the official philosophy to be based, (1) "the right of the man who is superior in virtue to rule over his fellows," and (2) "the value of a world monarchy to correspond to the cosmic rulership of Zeus or of the Stoic natural law" (as Goodenough states them on p. 58), are the real substance of Goodenough's fragments too. Campbell remarked in 1867 on the ideal they crudely set forth "resembling perhaps suspiciously in some features the Stoical wise man"; and Goodenough admits a first impression of Stoicism at many points and a last impression at one. In the other cases he is careful to show that what sounds Stoic often is not, and that what is so is also Platonic; but (a) not everything in the dialogues is *ipso facto* Platonic; some of it is mock-Cynic (= palæo-Stoic); (b) there is a difference between Platonic intimations and Stoic dogmas; and (c) this is anyhow a double-edged weapon; for, by the same token, apparent Pythagoreanisms and Orientalisms are also Platonisms; and what, indeed, is not? The Pythagorean myth in the histories of ancient philosophy is a close runner-up to the Posidonius myth and the myth of the Semitic origin of Stoicism.

I should like now to illustrate the reasoning by which Goodenough attempts to establish Oriental origins for the ideas in these fragments. His most striking parallels from other Greek literature are from Plato's *Statesman*, Aristotle's *Politics* (both noted by Campbell), and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. But:

(1) He uncritically derives a "Persian tradition" (bottom p. 89 and elsewhere) from what Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus. Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* would serve the purpose almost as well. Even if the *Cyropaedia* were sober history, it could not be used as Goodenough uses it. For instance: The notion of the king as animate law is Persian in origin and "was known to the world outside as Persian teaching"; for "Xenophon has described the Persian king as personally law, law which watched his subjects" (p. 85). But what Xenophon says (8, 1, 22) is that this was Cyrus' (not the Persians') idea of a good (not a Persian) ruler. One might more plausibly construct a Spartan than a Persian tradition from Xenophon; but he is still better evidence for what his friend Antisthenes and later Cynics and Stoics thought.

(2) He goes rather far afield to find an explanation of Aristotle's absolute king, above the law of the land, a god among men (*Pol.* 1284a), and of his view of the advantage of kingship for a people that can produce a line of such men, or even a single specimen (1288a). He thinks (p. 63) that Aristotle must have had in mind "a people who actually claimed to be ruled by such supermen," and with the help of Xenophon as above, he finds this people in Persia. But the reference to the fable of Antisthenes in the first passage should have suggested to him that Aristotle (like Plato in the parallel passage in the *Statesman*) is thinking, a bit ironically, of the claims of the Cynic sage, the only true king, to be superior to law in the ordinary sense. For the sake of completeness, Aristotle is willing to entertain ideal or theoretical possibilities. As for the other passage, Aristotle himself tells us whom he had in mind, when he says (1332b) that *actual* kings "have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found among [not the Persians but] the Indians."

(3) He is "haunted by the feeling" (p. 87) that the coincidences between Pseudo-Ecphantus and Plato are due to the fact that the former was "looking steadily eastward" and the latter "furtively doing the same thing." The king as the good shepherd of his people, an idea to be found in both, "was definitely connected with Persia by Xenophon" (1, 1, 2). But (a) Xenophon makes no such connection, definite or indefinite; (b) "the shepherd of the people" was a stock epithet for Greek kings as early as Homer; (c) Xenophon knew it as such, for he has Socrates (*Mem.* 3, 2) derive a philosophy of kingship from this and other Homeric epithets for Agamemnon; (d) this philosophy, elaborated by Cynics and Stoics, passed into the Hellenistic tradition in association with Homer, not Persia; and we find writers as late as Dio (*or.* 2, 6; cf. 4, 42-5) commending the *Iliad* and

Odyssey as the proper study for him who would be "what Homer calls a 'shepherd of the people.'" (Goodenough has a similar line of reasoning about the king (i.e. queen) bee figure, which is equally Greek and likewise Stoic in its later elaboration; cf. Sen., *de clem.* 1, 19; Dio, *or.* 4, 60-4.)

I pass to the evidence that this conception (of the king as animate law, vicegerent and imitator of God, harmonizer and benefactor of his country) was known and accepted in the Hellenistic age. This evidence consists of rough parallels in the pseudo-Aristotelian "Letter to Alexander" which introduces the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*; a very dubious passage in *3 Maccabees* 6, 24; scattered passages in Justin (not the martyr, but the much later unknown writer who professes to excerpt Pompeius Trogus); a long fragment from Musonius the Stoic *Why Kings must be Philosophers* (the king must be "what the ancients call animate law"); and Plutarch's fragment *To an Unlearned Prince*. All his evidence, therefore, is either late or doubtful or both. The best of it is the Musonius fragment, which has implications embarrassing to his view of the Stoic rôle in all this. And if the Plutarch fragment "presupposes the Diotogenes-Ecphantus philosophy" (p. 97), it presupposes a decidedly Stoic version of it, in which Oriental kings are short on animate law, and in which Chrysippus' exegesis of Pindar is followed (780c, cf. *SVF.* 3, 314).

Lastly, the rather sorry evidence that it was "the official philosophy of state as well" (p. 98) is the frequency of the royal titles Savior, Epiphanes, Benefactor. The first and third are common pre-Hellenistic epithets. The second, as Professor Goodenough admits, does not occur until the second century, but "the philosophy of royalty which lies behind the word may, and normally would, be centuries older than its use as a title"! (n. 136). For the latest review of the evidence in papyri and inscriptions, see *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, XII, 1936, pp. 1-26.

Though I dissent from Professor Goodenough's conclusions, I gladly acknowledge the service he has done in retranslating and interpreting some very obscure and difficult material not considered by Kaerst. What emerges from it deserves a footnote in the next edition of the *Geschichte des Hellenismus* to this general effect: "'The philosophy of kingship' exists on various levels from serious political theory down to paid propaganda and ruler-cult cant. In the Hellenistic age, as between responsible thinkers and conscientious kings, it was, as I have described it, Stoic in substance. If one reads Professor Goodenough's fragments as further variations on the theme of the true king *vs.* the usurper or tyrant, he will see that they come to much the same thing, but on a lower level of thought and expression, and with a different emphasis. What he reconstructs from them is not an alternative theory to that of the Cynics and Stoics but a variant containing some additional elements of a quasi-philosophic sort, expressed in language approximating to that of the ruler cult. These added elements, like the ruler cult itself, are *echt griechisch*; doubtful Oriental parallels prove nothing as to origins

or influences. It is possible, however, that Professor Goodenough's dissatisfaction with my account arises partly from the fact that I have always thought more of Macedon and Greece, and he of Greek Egypt and Syria. As between Hellenistic thought on Greek soil and that same thought on Oriental soil, there may have been differences. These differences would tend to disappear on the higher levels and to become exaggerated on the lower levels. This is a matter on which we have as yet too little evidence for judgment. In the meantime Professor Goodenough would render a great service by tracing more fully the history of the *idea* of the king as animate law within Greek literature, for which purpose it may be necessary to forget the *phrase*, as he has done in his search for Oriental parallels both here and in his 'Kingship in Early Israel,' *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XLVIII (1929), pp. 169-205."

APPENDIX II

The Stoic *Oikeiōsis* Doctrine.

There is no adequate account of this in English; Zeller, *Stoics* etc., pp. 213 ff., Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, pp. 303 f., 307, and Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 78 ff., miss the main points. The best brief account is in Ueberweg-Praechter, Vol. I (ed. 12 [1926]), pp. 430 f.; for Hierocles in particular cf. p. 499, bibliography p. 164*; and add R. Philippson, "Hierokles der Stoiker," *Rheinisches Museum*, LXXXII (1933), pp. 97-114, and Paul Shorey, "Plato and the Stoic *Oikeiosis* in the Berlin *Theaetetus* Commentary," *Classical Philology*, XXIV (1929), pp. 409 f.

The Stoic technical term οἰκείωσις (cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones *s. v.*) is untranslatable; for it and the related adjective and verb Cicero and Seneca use *conciliatio*, *commendatio* and their cognates, and for its opposite ἀλλοτρίωσις, *alienatio*; probably the best that can be done in English is endearment (dear, endear). (Shorey suggests Giddings' "consciousness of kind and kindness," but this is awkward and misses the dynamic element in the Stoic concept, for which the nearest modern equivalent is Spinoza's *conatus sese conservandi*.)

Every creature is from birth endeared by nature to itself and to its own constitution (body and soul, their parts and functions). This (and not, as the Epicureans say, pleasure) is the first impulse (πρώτη ὁρμή) and the first endearment (πρώτη οἰκείωσις) and its object is the first thing according to nature (πρῶτον κατὰ φύσιν). But in the case of human beings, endearment extends itself gradually to parents and other relatives, friends, neighbors, fellow-countrymen, and finally to the whole human race. At each stage of the development, the oikeiōsis leads naturally to actions appropriate (καθήκοντα, "duties") to the relations (σχέσεις, Epictetus calls them) involved. The developmental series therefore provides a convenient scheme for the discussion of

duties, which seems to have been used more or less by Panaetius and Epictetus, and to have provided the skeleton for the paraenetic part of Hierocles' *Manual of Ethics*, from which the excerpts in Stobaeus were taken.

But the oikeiōsis not only spreads, it also deepens; that is, it becomes rational;[26] what was at first a matter of impulse becomes a matter of principle. Perfectly rational actions (*κατορθώματα*) are perfectly moral or virtuous; they exemplify all the virtues, but their virtuous character can be seen most readily by regarding them as exemplifications of Justice, the virtue (*ἀρετή*) par excellence. Only the ideal wise man is capable of katorthōmata; in ordinary mortals the strength of the oikeiōsis is likely to be in inverse proportion to the remoteness of the relationship; but in the sage all the concentric circles of oikeiōsis have been fused into one. He is a full citizen of the universal commonwealth of gods and men, in which every man is as dear to him as he is to himself. His every action is determined "by reference to the whole" and is so performed as to assign "to *every* man his own." Thus is justice derived from oikeiōsis, and so to live is the final aim (*τέλος*) of the moral life. "Moral progress" (*προκοπή*) is the name for the process of development from the first oikeiōsis to the last or telos.

The points most controverted were the first and last terms of this ideal or standard evolutionary series, and therefore many of the surviving fragments seem to be concerned only with the first oikeiōsis or with the telos; but the whole scheme is always involved. The Epicurean answer to both was pleasure. The other schools agreed with the Stoics about the first oikeiōsis, but disagreed about the content of the telos, though not about the general formula "life according to nature." The Academy also questioned the derivation of justice from oikeiōsis; on this point the reader may be referred to Shorey's article, which says about all there is to say.

APPENDIX III

Some notes on Johannes Stroux, "Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders des Grossen," *Philologus* LXXXVIII (1933), pp. 222-40 (cf. n. 22 above).

Stroux argues that, alongside the adverse Peripatetic tradition of Alexander as corrupted by power, there was an adverse Stoic tradition of him as spoiled by false education in youth. The evidence is Quintilian, 1, 1, 9 (= *SVF.* 3, 2, 51) and several passages from other authors construed in its light.

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[26] The oikeiōsis doctrine is in fact the foundation of the Stoic theory of knowledge, as well as of its psychology and ethics. No one has worked this out as yet, but it is recognized by Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa* (*Philologus, Supplementband* XXVIII, Heft 3, 1936), p. 39. (Reviewed above, p. 101.)

Cynics and Stoics, like members of other schools, were not all or always concerned with Alexander's rôle in history. As moral psychologists they picked up the floating anecdotes about him and distributed them into the pigeon-holes of casuistry, to be withdrawn as needed, without regard to their consistency with one another or with any reasoned view of Alexander in the round.

In the theory of education, for instance, the tutors of Alexander would be responsible for his later faults and virtues, and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon seems to have started something by using Leonidas as a horrible example. But we must beware of inferring from such reprobation of particular faults to a general judgment of tutor or pupil, and still more of inferring from reprobation by a single philosopher to a judgment by the school to which he belonged. Stroux's otherwise excellent study errs in both these respects. A consistent Stoic judgment in his sense cannot be made out.

For instance, Seneca, *de ira* 3, 17, 1 and Cicero, *ad Att.* 13, 28, 3 have fundamentally the same meaning; not, as Stroux maintains, two meanings, the one Stoic and the other Peripatetic. Seneca's reproach of Alexander implies none of Aristotle; and though here and elsewhere he finds much to condemn in Alexander (with an eye to Nero's Alexander-complex), he can also praise him, as in this same tract (2, 23, 2 f.) and in *ep.* 59, 12 f.; and he can even use his imperialism to illustrate the claims of philosophy.

Cicero, *de off.* 1, 26, 90, again, is probably less reliable evidence than Polybius (e. g. 5, 10; 8, 12; and 38, 4) for what Panaetius and Posidonius thought. Stroux himself (p. 235 [21, 24]), moreover, acknowledges that the point here is a comparison between Philip and Alexander in a particular respect. We are not justified in concluding to any absolute judgment of either on the part of Panaetius. (I think, by the way, that Stroux's emendation *tumidissimus* for *turpissimus* is sound.)

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THE ATHENIAN ASSESSMENT DECREE.

In the *American Journal of Philology* of last year Wade-Gery and I made a study of the relation between Kleon's campaign to Pylos and the tribute assessment of 425 B. C.[1] It was impossible at that time to take cognizance of Nesselhauf's review of *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.* which appeared in *Gnomon*, XII (1936), pp. 296-301. Nesselhauf elaborates a view held by Kolbe and published in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLIII, pp. 568-569, that the decree of assessment was passed in the prytany of Oineis (IV) and that this name should be restored in lines 3 and 34 of the inscription (*I. G.*, I², 63). He further associates the military expedition of the decree (line 34) not with Kleon's return from Pylos but with the departure of Demosthenes from Athens early in the fourth prytany of the year (*I. G.*, I², 324, lines 18-19).

The chronological difficulty of this interpretation is made clear in the text of the assessment decree itself, for the probouleuma of the Council concerning the tribute was first scheduled to be brought before the Demos when the prytany of Oineis was nearing its end,[2] while the payment of money for Demosthenes was made on the third day from its beginning.[3] Specifically, action on the tribute assessment in the ekklesia was planned for a date on or near Prytany IV, 36 (if Nesselhauf's restorations are given their logical consequences) and Demosthenes left Athens soon after Prytany IV, 3. Although Nesselhauf says that in line 34 "es ist zweifellos *ἐπει[δὰν ἀπίει hε]* στρα[τιά] zu ergänzen," with reference to Demosthenes, he must reckon with a delay of more than a month after the time when Demosthenes received his money and before his departure from Athens, or make the equally difficult assumption that the date within Oineis envisaged in the decree fell at the very beginning of the prytany —an interpretation which the text of the inscription does not allow.

The wish to see any connection between the assessment decree

[1] *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 377-394.
[2] *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), p. 387.
[3] *I. G.*, I², 324, line 19.

and Demosthenes' departure from Athens probably could not have arisen without first a belief that the name Oineis belonged in both line 3 and line 34 of the decree. This involves not only the historical inconsistency noted above but a serious technical difficulty as well. In order to make the restoration in line 3 possible Nesselhauf moves fragment 2 of *I. G.* I², 63 one letter space to the left from the position to which West and I have assigned it. This is a backward step in the interpretation of the document which could have been avoided had Nesselhauf been familiar with the stones. We are in agreement that the position of fragment 2 should be determined by the line of cleavage along its right edge and along the right edge of fragment 7 and the left edge of fragments 8 and 9. This is one of the considerations which led me to give to the fragment the position which I still consider correct and which is shown in the photograph on page 32 of *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.* Nesselhauf has ignored (or does not credit) our explicit statement (*op. cit.*, p. 31) about the continuity of the fracture as shown in the photograph, but he has made no observation of the stones themselves. It is true that the fragments are now embedded in plaster (*mea culpa*),[4] but it would be a matter of only a few moments' work to remove sufficient plaster to observe the lateral surface of the fragments in question, and I suggest this control for anyone who feels that the photograph does not tell its story without ambiguity or who wants to verify my own observations made in 1933. Nesselhauf has given to fragment 2 a position which creates in the fractured surface the very "Zickzacklinie" which we both seek to avoid.[5]

His position for the fragment also disturbs the orderly arrangement of the letters in the superscription, though he considers this unimportant. It should be noted, however, that the only letter out of place in the prescript is that which lies on fragment 2 in Nesselhauf's rearrangement. The omicron of the superscription on fragment 3 is fixed by the position of fragment 3 itself, which cannot be moved to the left without

[4] The museum authorities permitted the removal of the fragments from Lolling's reconstruction on condition that they be built into a new stele when the study was completed.

[5] The argument from Pittakys' readings of the lost fragment 6 prove nothing. It is obviously impossible now to know how the edges of this small piece were broken.

conflict with fragment 8 or to the right without rendering impossible any restoration at the end of line 5. Nesselhauf doubts the position of fragment 3 (*op. cit.*, p. 297), but the reasons for its place as now given in *The Athenian Assessment* are set forth there on page 31 and, so far as the conflict with fragment 8 is concerned, go back to determinations made by Koehler more than sixty-five years ago. This same rigid relationship of fragments 2 and 3 leaves an intervening space in line 5 which can be supplemented only by the restoration ἐ[πὶ Θράικεν δύο δ]ὲ and makes possible also an appropriate mention of the Ionic-Karic district at the beginning of the line. An insurmountable difficulty which Nesselhauf encounters with his position for fragment 2 is that he has no way of restoring in the text the names of the geographical districts of the empire—and he does not attempt to do so, though he admits that the districts were here named. Parts of two of the names appear on the stone. That the words [ἐπ' Ἰονίαν καὶ Καρίαν] must be supplied where Nesselhauf expects mention of Ionia only is a matter of spatial necessity. After all, Ionia and Karia did form one district of the empire in 425 and there is no formal reason why they should not be named together in the text of the decree.

On the function of the τάκται I believe that we are in substantial agreement. Their very name implies that they made the provisional assessment. But that they made any extensive research into the economic resources of the various cities of the empire in 425 is doubtful. There was not time. Actually they could have done little more at first than draw up a list of the cities with proposed amounts of tribute, and the restoration which West and I have given for line 9 implies just this. It may have been considered that when the provisional list was made a τάξις had been effected. It is not essential, therefore, that the aorist indicative ἐτάχθε of line 56 should refer to a date later than Prytany III.[6]

Of course, the correct position of fragment 2 makes the restoration of the name Oineis in line 3 impossible and leaves Nesselhauf's objective criticism of the first eleven lines without foundation. The sequence of prytanies within the year has been

[6] Even if the reference in line 56 was to the final τάξις by the Council it would still be possible to date the second decree in the fourth prytany. See *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 389-390.

fully discussed in *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 377-394, and reference is here made to the historical interpretation there given.

Some subjective criticisms should perhaps be clarified.

(1) Nesselhauf draws the conclusion that fragment 4 is not correctly placed from the mention of [νομο]θέται in line 16. In the absence of any suggestion for a more suitable position for fragment 4, one may still be inclined to think that we know too little about constitutional details of the fifth century to deny the possibility of the restoration.[7] The fragment as now placed gives continuous readings covering parts of nine lines of text, and stronger arguments than an objection to the νομοθέται seem to me necessary to displace it.

(2) Nesselhauf says that the restoration [ἐν τοῖι] κοινοῖι h[εκάστες τες πόλ]ιος of line 6 is "unmöglich," because κοινόν and πόλις mean the same thing. This is not necessarily true, and the text of Thucydides may be cited as evidence for the distinction here implied. When Themistokles was delaying his negotiations at Sparta after the Persian wars until the Athenians could rebuild their walls he was constantly asked by those in authority why he did not come ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν. The word (Liddell and Scott, *s. v.*) may mean the "government" or "public authorities," and so be quite different from the geographical πόλις. Themistokles, for example, was continuously in the πόλις of Sparta but he avoided an appearance before its κοινόν (Thuc. I, 90, 5). A distinction of meaning such as is implicit in Thucydides ought not to be claimed as impossible in an Athenian decree of 425 B. C.

(3) Nesselhauf deduces that the word [ἄρ]χον is not a good restoration for line 13 from the fact that Pittakys recorded only final OI. The strokes are lost and beyond our control, but they were on the edge of the stone and may have belonged to ON just as well as to OI.[8] No one now can make an exclusive decision from Pittakys' copy. Recently Oliver has given valuable confirmation for the association of archon and polemarch in cases involving tribute assessment by his new interpretation of *I. G.*, I², 22.[9]

[7] See *A. J. P.*, LVI (1935), p. 323.

[8] A correct statement of Pittakys' reading is given in *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.*, p. 10.

[9] *Trans. Amer. Phil. Ass.*, LXVI (1935), pp. 177-198, especially pp. 191-194.

(4) Nesselhauf is undoubtedly right when he objects to the phrase [καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτ]αίας ἀρχῆς in lines 17-18.[10] He offers no positive suggestion, but I believe that a return to the sense of Hiller's reading with the words [ἐπὶ τῆς νέας καὶ τῆς παλ]αιᾶς ἀρχῆς would be a step in the right direction. It was this suggestion that West and I proposed in the copy of the decree published by Tod in his *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (no. 66), but later abandoned because of a feeling that ἀρχή ought not thus to mean "empire." This misgiving was not well founded; it need only mean an empire in the sense that this was a sphere of influence or control, and an almost exact parallel is found in Thuc. IV, 128, 3.

It is more difficult to evaluate a general criticism (*op. cit.*, pp. 296, 297, 299) of the difficulty the reader experiences in distinguishing between what is certain and what is problematical, for it raises the entire question of restoration in epigraphical texts. For the sake of interpretation I still believe that a conjectural restoration of the assessment decree is desirable, if only to show that the interpretation can be translated into epigraphical language. That much of the text is doubtful, some parts much more so than others, lies, I think, inevitably in the nature of the material and the great complexity of the problem. West and I have indicated this uncertainty in our Foreword, and have suggested that every reader should for himself decide on the degree of probability inherent in the suggestions put forward. In the last analysis the absolutely certain content is on the stone, and the restorations lie between the angular brackets of the printed text or appear in red on the facsimile plates. There at least the distinction is clear, and the student will not be misled if he reads carefully. An appropriate warning, which is valid for all epigraphical work, was voiced not long ago by Hiller von Gaertringen in a comment on the first volume of the *Inscriptiones Graecae* (*ed. min.*):[11] "Ein Corpus ist nur für Erwachsene da, und diese müssen wissen, was eckige Klammern bedeuten. . . ."

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[10] This had been pointed out by Wade-Gery, *Class. Rev.*, XLIX (1935), p. 186.

[11] *Phil. Wooh.*, 1929, p. 1175.

THUCYDIDES, V, 18, 5.

Where was Skolos (Stolos)?

In the Treaty of Nicias is an article providing for the resumption of tributary status by six towns that had revolted from Athens in 432 and 424 B. C. They are Argilos, Stagiros, Akanthos, Skolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos. The location of five of them is known with more or less certainty. Beginning with Argilos a little west of the Strymon, the names are given in their geographical order along the coast to Akanthos and then westward across the base of the Chalcidic peninsula through Olynthos to Spartolos, the chief city of the Bottic region. As for Skolos, its site has never been identified and even its general location is uncertain. From the order of names in the Treaty of 421 one might conclude that Skolos lay somewhere to the east of Olynthos, between it and Akanthos; and this obvious interpretation of the passage would probably now be accepted if the Athenian quota lists had not led Boeckh and Koehler to look for its site in another direction. So Thomas Arnold, for example, had said in 1846 that Skolos was near Olynthos and probably to the east of it.[1]

Six years later August Boeckh,[2] noting that the name Stolos precedes that of Spartolos in two fragments of the quota lists and that Stolos disappeared from the quota lists about the time of the Bottiaean revolt in 432, concluded that Stolos like Spartolos was Bottiaean. He identified it at that time with the Skolos of Thucydides.[3] Ulrich Koehler,[4] however, was more precise, for he placed it "in der Nähe von Olynthos und Spartolos." Though this is noncommittal, still the fact that Spartolos was west of Olynthos makes it impossible for Skolos to be in the neighborhood of the two towns without being north of

[1] See note on the passage in his third edition of Thucydides, Oxford, 1846.

[2] *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*[3], II, pp. 732 f.

[3] Cf. Strabo, IX, 2, 23, 408.

[4] *Urkunden und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des delisch-attischen Bundes*, Abhandlungen d. K. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1869 (Berlin, 1870), p. 182.

Olynthos. This seems to be the now generally accepted opinion,[5] although some maps locate Skolos in Bottike to the west of Olynthos.[6]

The issue then is clear cut. Either Thucydides is wrong in placing Skolos between Olynthos and Akanthos [7] or Boeckh and Koehler have placed too much reliance upon the collocation of Stolos and Spartolos in two quota lists. Before examining the quota lists to discover whether they contain any evidence for the location of Stolos, we must consider first whether the order of names within one or more lists is capable of being used to determine geographical relationships. In view of the tendency found in all of these documents to put side by side the records of widely separated cities, it would be easy to deny the feasibility of using them in this fashion and to substantiate the denial with numerous and convincing data. Yet there is at the same time evidence equally good that two or more neighboring cities were frequently grouped together, not because the Athenian officials were concerned about listing neighbors together, but because the quota lists reflect the order in which the tribute payments were made. Thus, when several towns with contiguous territories are named together, it probably means that representatives of these towns had met on their way to Athens and had decided to travel in company to the Dionysiac festival. It is probable too that motives of economy sometimes led contributing states to entrust their payments to a single representative for transmission

[5] See Kirchhoff's map at the end of *C. I. A.*, I; Kiepert, *F. O. A.*, XVI; *Cambridge Ancient History*, V, map 5 (*mea culpa*); note on Skolos in the Steup-Classen edition of Thucydides (1912): "in der Nähe von Olynth im Binnenlande;" Oberhummer, *R. E.*, *s. v.* Stolos: "nördl. bei Olynthos;" cf. Bürchner, *R. E.*, *s. v.*, Chalkidike, who places Skolos in the interior between Pallene and Sithonia, following Hoffman, *Descriptio Chalcidicae Thracicae, s. Macedonicae*, Program, Bromberg, 1854. See also Busolt's note, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, p. 797: "im Binnenland in der Nähe von Olynthos . . . Neben Spartolos *C. I. A.*, I, 237, 238."

[6] Murray's Small Classical Atlas (edited by G. B. Grundy, London, 1904), map 10, illustrates the consequences of taking Boeckh's theory literally.

[7] If Stolos was really north of Olynthos, it would have been immaterial which name was mentioned first. There would then be no error, and Koehler would have been justified in ignoring the order of the treaty.

to the imperial treasury. Their names would then appear together, except when the clerk who entered the payment credited it to the city whose representative had brought the money to Athens. In this way some of the irregularities of the tribute lists can best be explained. Possibly some of the syntelies known to us from the quota lists were nothing more than safe and economical instruments for the transmission of the annual tribute to Athens; but, whatever may have been their purpose, they provide an excellent illustration of the principle that geographical proximity is frequently reflected in the official Athenian records, for the quondam members of a syntely tend to be grouped together long after the syntely has disintegrated.

Though it is therefore certain that the order of names in the quota lists is often geographical, it is difficult to devise a method by which this knowledge can be used to determine the site of a town like Stolos. One can readily illustrate the difficulty from the two fragments used by Boeckh to show that Stolos and Spartolos were neighbors.[8] In the first, the name of Sane, a town near the canal of Xerxes, precedes that of Stolos; Spartolos follows. In the second, Sane is separated from Stolos by Maroneia, an obviously intrusive element in this group.[9] Since a site not far from Sane would suit the collocation of Akanthos and Skolos in Thucydides, the evidence of the quota lists is here ambiguous. It value is further lessened by the fact that Spartolos in no other list is next to Stolos or grouped with it. In addition to Spartolos and Sane, eight other towns in the Chalcidic peninsula are listed immediately before or after Stolos in one or two lists each. They are: Mekyberna (1), Sermylia (1), Singos (1), Polichne (2),[10] Mende (1), and three not yet located, Skabla (2), Hedrolos (2), and Φηγήτιοι (2).[11] It will

[8] The fragments belong to the quota-lists of 443/2 and 442/1 (*S. E. G.*, V, 12, 13).

[9] The order Sane, Maroneia, Stolos may reproduce the actual order of payments, or it may mean only that the original order was somehow disturbed when the lists were transcribed on stone. That names were at times transposed in this way can be amply demonstrated.

[10] Polichne was παρὰ Στῶλον. See Meritt and West, *Athenian Assessment of 425*, University of Michigan Press, 1934, p. 68, lines 413 f.

[11] If the Ἐρόδιοι were also situated in the Chalcidic peninsula, their name should be added.

be noted that Stolos is found with every town between Olynthos and Akanthos except Assera, though not with Olynthos, near which it is supposed to have been situated.

Thus chance collocations from one or two lists are almost worthless as evidence for a town's location. Still, the fact that Stolos' neighbors in the quota lists are mostly confined to a limited district suggests that a slightly different approach to the problem might lead to more positive results. We can restate our problem thus. To what extent does Stolos appear in smaller or larger geographical groups comprising towns from a well defined district? Specifically, do the towns mentioned above reappear again and again with Stolos in closed sequences?

The first appearance of Stolos in the quota lists (454/3, *S. E. G.*, V, 1) is in the midst of just such a group, beginning with Olynthos and ending with Assera. Though a geographical order is not maintained within the group, not a single important tributary within the district is omitted. The names are from west to east: Olynthos, Mekyberna, Sermylia, Singos, Assera, in addition to Stolos, Skabla, and Polichne. The similarity of this list of names to that compiled above lends support to the hypothesis that the evidence of grouping is more important than that of one or more collocations. In order to test this hypothesis further I have tabulated the names which appear with Stolos in closed geographical sequences.[12] They are: Mende (1), Spartolos (2), Olynthos (1), Mekyberna (1), Sermylia (3), Singos (3), Assera (4) Sane (2), Polichne (2), Skabla (4), Hedrolos (2), Φηγήτιοι (2), and Ἐρόδιοι (1).

With the exception of Mende, which appears only once in association with Stolos, and Ἐρόδιοι, which may or may not be Chalcidic, Stolos thus is found consistently with towns located at the base of the Chalcidic peninsula from Spartolos in the west to Sane in the east. Omitting Mende and Ἐρόδιοι and all others not yet located, we can divide the rest into three geographical groups thus:

[12] The sequences are closed at each end either by lacunae or by the names of towns lying outside the Chalcidic peninsula. Stolos appears in twelve quota lists: *S. E. G.*, V, 1 (454/3); 7 (453/2); 3 (452/1); 4 (451/0); 5 (450/49); 6 (449/8-447/6); 8 (449/8-447/6); 10 (445/4); 12 (443/2); 13 (442/1); 17 (438/7); 21 (434/3). For the dates of Nos. 6-8, see Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932-3), pp. 112 f.

4 Northwest of Sithonia (Spartolos, Olynthos, Mekyberna).
6 North Sithonia (Sermylia, Singos).
6 Northeast of Sithonia (Assera, Sane).

When one notes that Stolos appears only once in a group with Olynthos, never next to it, and only once with Mekyberna,[13] whereas the easterly Chalcidic towns, Sermylia, Singos, and Assera, are ten times in association with Stolos, all reason for citing the quota lists as evidence for a site near Spartolos and Olynthos disappears. If any deductions are to be drawn from these documents, they favor rather a location for Stolos in the region from Sane to Sermylia.

We must now turn our attention to a fourth-century Epidaurian inscription (*I. G.*, IV², 1, 94) in which there is a mention of Stolos not long before 360 B. C. In it are enumerated the cities to which θεωροὶ were sent, apparently in the order of the theoric itinerary. Beginning with Pydna we can trace the route of the θεωροὶ around the Thermaic gulf to Potidaia. From Potidaia they struck inland to Olynthos via the unindentified Kalindoia[14] and thence northward to Apollonia near Lake Bolbe. Thence they journeyed along the road that later became the Egnatian way through Arethusa and Argilos to Amphipolis. After visiting the Bisaltian towns Berga and Tragila, they returned to the Chalcidic peninsula to visit the places they had missed by striking directly inland from Olynthos. Here their itinerary and the Treaty of 421 coincide, for they stopped at Stagira, Akanthos, and Stolos. From Stolos they went to Aphytis on the east coast of Pallene near Potidaia without further stops; and, if their route took them through Olynthos, the town would not be mentioned a second time.

As one analyzes the itinerary, one is struck by the absence of all towns in and about the base of Sithonia, Torone, Mekyberna, Sermylia, Singos, and Assera particularly. The reason is not

[13] In 454/3, Stolos, Polichne, and Mekyberna make a quasi-syntelic payment (*S. E. G.*, V, 1); cf. Herbert Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delisch-attischen Symmachie*, Klio, Beiheft XXX, pp. 101 f.

[14] Kalindoia was probably in southern Bottike (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 68). It seems to be identical with a town ascribed to Mygdonia (Ptol., *Geog.* III, 12, 33).

difficult to find. They had been incorporated in the Chalcidian state of which Olynthos was the head.[15] Two inferences, therefore, can be drawn from the itinerary; first that Stolos was not north of Olynthos, and second, that it lay to the east of the territory of the Chalcidian state. If it had been north of Olynthos, the θεωροὶ would have found it more convenient to visit it on their way to Apollonia. If it had been in the Bottic land west of Olynthos, they would have visited it on their journey to Potidaia, for it would have been far out of their way to return to it en route from Akanthos to Pallene. Thus there is no location available for Stolos except in the neighborhood of Akanthos, probably somewhat northwest of the town on the diagonal route across the peninsula to Saloniki. Along this road one division of Xerxes' army marched in 480 (Herod., VII, 124). Possibly it was in the upper valley of the river that flows southwestward in a broad curve and enters the Toronaic gulf below Sermylia, or near one of its tributary sources. This section of the interior needs further exploration.

One can now readily understand why Stolos was more frequently grouped in the quota lists with Sermylia, Singos, and Assera than with Olynthos and Spartolos, for the region in which we have placed it is geographically that part of the base of Sithonia which lies inland. The territory of Stolos then was either contiguous with that of Mekyberna and Assera or separated from them by the territory of some of the smaller Chalcidic towns not yet located.

There is, in fact, one ancient reference to Stolos which places it between Sithonia and the canal of Xerxes (Sane): *Torone, Siggos, Stolos, fretum quo montem Atho Xerxes Persarum rex continenti abscidit* (Pliny, *N. H.* IV, 36 f.)[16] Pliny's evidence, then, is corroborative of the conclusions we have already reached. It is true that Pliny seems to place Stolos on the coast, in the general location given to Assera; but there is apparently no place for Stolos here. Herodotos (VII, 122) does not mention Stolos in his survey of the sea-coast towns from which Xerxes

[15] Cf. Franz Hampl, *Hermes*, LXX (1935), p. 193.

[16] Though the manuscripts read *Siggos, Telos* or *Tolos*, Müller's emendation (note on Ptol., *Geog.* III, 12, 9, p. 498) is undoubtedly correct. As one can see from the spelling, Pliny was following a Greek source at this point.

drew contingents at the time of his expedition in 480, and no other geographer has listed it among the coastal settlements of the Chalcidic peninsula. It is probably better to look for its site inland.

We have yet to consider other ancient references to Stolos; from them has sprung the commonly accepted view that it was near Olynthos. Strabo (IX, 2, 23) says ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ὄλυνθον πόλεων ὁμώνυμος αὐτῇ Σκῶλος, and Eustathios (*Iliad*, B 265, note on *v.* 497) ἦν δὲ καὶ Ὀλυνθιακὴ Σκῶλος. Probably Eustathios possesses no independent value. What then is the meaning of Strabo's phrase τῶν περὶ Ὄλυνθον πόλεων? The words are general enough to include a large part of the Chalcidic peninsula, but they may possibly indicate a closer connection such as is suggested by Eustathios' adjective Ὀλυνθιακή.

The implications of Strabo's *obiter dictum* have dominated our ideas about the site and history of Stolos since Boeckh discovered that Stolos disappeared from the quota lists about the time of the revolt of Olynthos and Spartolos. Though the evidence for the revolt of Stolos in 432 is conclusive,[17] it proves nothing about the site of Stolos; for with the exception of Sane, an Andrian colony distinguished for its loyalty to Athens, Mende on Pallene, and the unknown Ἐρόδιοι, all of Stolos' associates in the quota lists as enumerated above revolted from Athens before the spring of 431.[18] This means that the revolt was bounded on the east by Sane and Akanthos, and it follows that a site north or northeast of Sithonia adjacent to Mekyberna or Assera is just as satisfactory for a rebel of 432 as one nearer Olynthos and Spartolos, the focal points of the rebellion.

If Strabo's ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ὄλυνθον πόλεων means only geographical proximity, there is no further difficulty, for the position we have assigned to Stolos is on the border of territory that was incorporated in the Chalcidic state or actually annexed to Olynthos in the fourth century, as we have seen from our analysis of the Epidaurian inscription. Stolos would then be

[17] The Thracian panels for the years 432/1 and 430/29 are complete, and that of 429/8 is nearly so (*S. E. G.*, V, 23, 28, 25). For the dates of Nos. 25 and 28, see Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 6-25.

[18] Sermylia apparently revolted soon after Aristeus ambushed a body of Sermylian loyalists in the autumn of 432 (Thuc., I, 65). It paid no tribute in 431. The Erodians had not paid tribute since 446.

literally among the immediate neighbors of Olynthos, but it could also be included among the towns situated round about the unexpanded town.

If, however, Eustathios has correctly used the adjective Ὀλυνθιακή, then we must conclude that Stolos was at some time incorporated in the Chalcidic state. Its appearance in the Treaty of 421, along with four other towns that did not merge with Olynthos at the time of their respective revolts from Athens, suggests that it did not participate in the synoecism (Thuc., I, 58) which accompanied the revolt of Olynthos and neighboring Chalcidic towns. This inference is substantiated by a further article in the treaty, about which I shall have more to say later, in which are mentioned only Chalcidic towns that lost their inhabitants at the time of the synoecism.

Before we examine this question further, we must turn to a somewhat ambiguous statement about Stolos in Stephanos of Byzantion: Στῶλος· πόλις μία τῶν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ βαρβαρικῶν, ἃς μετήνεγκαν ἐκ τῶν Ἡδωνῶν οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς εἰς τὰς αὐτῶν πόλεις. One thing is certain; Stolos was not Bottiaean. The ambiguity is this: does Stephanos refer to colonization by Chalkis or by one of the Chalcidian colonies in Sithonia or does the word Χαλκιδεῖς refer to the commonwealth of which Olynthos was the head? There is a second ambiguity in the term Edonian, for Strabo (VII, frg. 11), if the text is correct, says that the Edonians were divided into three branches, Mygdonians, Sithonians, and Edonians. If Stephanos uses the term Edonian for the undivided tribe, then Stolos may have been situated in the Sithonian area, the region occupied, as we know from Strabo (*loc. cit.*) and other sources, by the Chalcidian colonies. It might then have been a Chalcidian colony, and this seems to me the probable meaning of Stephanos. Stolos, however, may have been Edonian in the more restricted sense, for there were still Edonian towns on Akte in the fifth century (Thuc., IV, 109), although, to be sure, most of the Edonians had then been driven from their original homes in Mygdonia and Sithonia (Thuc., II, 99; Strabo, *loc. cit.*) to the left bank of the Strymon. Both interpretations are possible, for a site northward of Sithonia might either have been once inhabited by Sithonians or it may have sheltered an isolated remnant of the Edonian branch of the tribe like that which remained on Akte.

Since certainty is impossible, we must fall back upon conjecture and counter-conjecture. Stolos may have belonged to the original area of Chalcidic colonization. If it did, then Stephanos refers to colonization and not to political union with Olynthos, though this may have followed. If Strabo and Eustathios are evidence for the absorption of Stolos by Olynthos, then the union probably must be dated in one of the two periods of Olynthian expansion during the fourth century, for there is no reason to think that it antedates 421.

If arguments *ex silentio* are of any value, the fact that Stolos was not named with Akanthos in the Chalcidian treaty with Amyntas about 389 (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[3], 135) as one of the cities then hostile to the signatories may be significant. A few years later, when the expulsion of Amyntas from Macedonia had left Mygdonia defenceless against the rapidly expanding Chalcidic state, Apollonia and Akanthos petitioned Sparta to save them from being swallowed up (Xen., *Hell.* V, 2, 11-20). Though they did not mention Stolos, they gave the impression that there were no cities still autonomous between them and Olynthos. Their turn was next, for the ultimatum had been sent. Now Stolos lay, if we have located it correctly, on the route between Apollonia and Akanthos; if it were then Chalcidian, Apollonia and Akanthos were isolated and their lines of communication had been cut. Thus the political situation in the Chalcidic peninsula before 382 was not inconsistent with the fusion of Stolos in the Chalcidic state. We cannot be more definite than that. If Stolos was actually Chalcidic, or Olynthiac, at that time, it must have been liberated after the defeat of Olynthos in 379, for it was free shortly before Philip came to the throne. If Stolos had not yet become Chalcidic, its incorporation can still be placed in the period when Philip's friendship to Olynthos gave it new opportunities for expansion.

Thus all the evidence bearing on the location of Stolos is consistent, though the relations between it and its Chalcidic neighbors are still conjectural. Originally inhabited by Edonians, it appears in the quota lists with a group of towns mostly Chalcidic in the north Sithonian area bordering on the Andrian colonies, Sane and Akanthos, toward the east. Thucydides names it between Akanthos and Olynthos, Pliny places it between Singos and the canal of Xerxes, and the Epidaurian inscription

locates it between Akanthos and Pallene. The inscription shows also that it was independent shortly before 360. Since all of the other towns of the north Sithonian district were then incorporated in the Chalcidic state, Stolos must be placed on the periphery, just as Strabo says; and as the Chalcidians had control of the coastal towns, we are driven back into the interior to a spot westward of Akanthos.

II

THUCYDIDES, V, 18, 6.

Sane or Gale

In Part I of this paper we began with an apparent opposition between Thucydides and the quota lists, but as we progressed in our investigation we learned that the literary and epigraphic sources were in complete agreement. We learned also that Stolos and its five associates were named in their geographical order. Finally, we concluded that Stolos had not merged in the enlarged Olynthos at the time of the revolt in 432.

These are all important points to remember as we turn our attention to the next article of the Treaty of 421 (Thuc., V, 18, 6): *Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Στγαγέους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι.* There is no geographical order here; racial relationships are apparently ignored; and no one has been able to discover a common factor applicable to the three towns which would explain their association in the treaty or clarify the intent and meaning of article itself. These peculiarities have been the occasion for much fruitless speculation in which I have participated.[1] It is idle here to discuss the theories that have been put forward, but a brief enumeration of some of the contradictory conclusions that have been drawn from this

[1] *History of the Chalcidic League*, Madison, 1918, pp. 69-80; A. Kirchhoff, *Thukydides und sein Urkundenmaterial*, Berlin, 1895, pp. 46 ff.; Julius Steup, *Thukydideische Studien*, Freiburg and Tübingen, 1881, pp. 40 ff.; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, IV, p. 415; Julius Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II², 1, 342; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 1194; Mabel Gude, *History of Olynthus*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1933, pp. 14 ff.; Lenk, *R. E.*, Supplementband VI, *s. v.* Mekyberna; Stahl-Poppo, Leipzig, 1879, note on Thuc., V, 18; Steup-Classen, ed. tert. 1912, note on Thuc., V, 18.

article may serve to emphasize the extreme difficulty of the problem, and to warrant the belief that it is insoluble unless approached from an entirely fresh point of view. These then are some of the interpretations placed upon this article. The three towns had remained loyal to Athens. They had revolted and had been recovered. They had removed their inhabitants to Olynthos. They had not participated in the synoecism. Singos was Chalcidian. Singos was Andrian. Sane was in Pallene. It was near Akanthos. The article was pregnant with meaning. It was simply an afterthought clumsily inserted after the treaty had been drafted. It was designed to guarantee the autonomy of loyal states; to punish disloyal states; to weaken Olynthos and Akanthos; to promote particularism; and to protect the interests of Sparta's allies.

Analysis of this hotchpotch of irreconcilable hypotheses shows that Sane is the chief difficulty. Its presence in the treaty is inexplicable, for it had been distinguished for loyalty to Athens at a time when its neighbors were welcoming Brasidas with open arms (Thuc., IV, 109). Sane was Andrian, whereas Mekyberna and Singos were presumably Chalcidian, or would have gone unchallenged as Chalcidian if they had not been associated with Sane in this article. Finally, Sane's position in the treaty violates the geographical order. In short, if one interprets the article with Sane in the foreground, then one must conclude that it is concerned with loyal cities; or if one disregards Sane and lays emphasis upon the fact that Mekyberna and Singos ceased to pay their tribute upon the outbreak of rebellion in the Chalcidic peninsula, then one must inevitably conclude that Sane had revolted too. Our premises seem therefore to be themselves irreconcilable with the evidence, for there is as little reason for believing that Sane revolted as there is for whitewashing the record of Mekyberna and Singos.

Since it must now be obvious that this much debated article not only has colored our views about the history of the three towns in question but has closed our eyes to this or that bit of the scanty evidence we possess, we shall do well to survey the field with eyes unprejudiced by preconceived ideas about its meaning.

Mekyberna was close to Olynthos and at one time it was its harbor (Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 29). It was a regular tributary

member of the Athenian Empire until 432.[3] At that time its name disappears from the quota lists and nothing more is heard of it until 425.[3] That it was inhabited by Chalcidians as was Olynthos after 480 is nowhere stated, but it is quite likely. It undoubtedly revolted in 432 with its Chalcidian neighbors.[4]

When we next hear of Mekyberna its status had altered. Before the war it had been paying tribute to the amount of a talent annually. By the assessment of 425, however, Mekyberna's obligation was reduced to ten drachmas,[5] a ridiculously small sum for even a nominal payment. At the time of the next assessment in 421, no change was made in Mekyberna's nominal tribute (*I. G.*, I², 64, l. 113). When we search for an explanation for the special treatment given to Mekyberna in 425 and again in 421, it is ready at hand. Thucydides (I, 58) tells us that the population of the Chalcidic sea-coast towns moved to Olynthos at the outbreak of the war. As Mekyberna was the nearest port to Olynthos, one would normally infer that it was one of the first to be evacuated. The assessment lists provide proof for this assumption.[6] Since the Chalcidians obviously had no intention of defending their coast against the Athenian fleet, there was nothing to prevent Athens from establishing a

[2] *S. E. G.*, V, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22.

[3] This is no argument *ex silentio*. Mekyberna's name does not appear in the complete Thracian panels of *S. E. G.*, V, 23, 28, nor in the nearly complete panels of No. 25; cf. note 17 above.

[4] Both Lenk (*loc. cit.*) and Hampl (*Hermes*, LXX (1935), p. 187), to mention the two scholars who have most recently dealt with the history of Mekyberna, deny that it revolted in 432, but they have disregarded the evidence of the quota lists and have cited evidence from a later period as proof of Mekyberna's loyalty. The Treaty of Nicias was apparently to them decisive.

[5] For the most recent edition of the assessment list of 425, see Meritt and West, *Athenian Assessment of 425*, University of Michigan Press, 1934, pp. 64-69. The restoration of Mekyberna's name in line 470 (*I. G.*, I², 63 frg. *e*, line 127) was proposed by Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), pp. 26-28. It is certain and was accepted by Kolbe, *Sits.-ber. Ak. Berlin, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, XXII (1930), pp. 345 ff.; cf. West, *Metropolitan Museum Studies*, III, pp. 174-193. The restoration is based upon *I. G.*, I², 64, line 113, which can be assigned to the assessment of 421 (West and Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), pp. 59-69; cf. references cited immediately above).

[6] Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), pp. 26-28.

garrison there. This was done, probably before 425, though the garrison is first mentioned in 421 (Thuc., V, 39).[7]

The proof that Mekyberna was actually occupied by Athens, Meritt states,[8] is to be deduced from Mekyberna's assessment; but the reasoning is not obvious and Hampl's twisting of Meritt's conclusions apparently shows that he did not realize the bearing of the argument. The proof does not lie in the appearance of Mekyberna's name on the assessment list, for the names of rebels like Olynthos and Spartolos are also included, to say nothing of Melos and other towns that had never been tributary to Athens. If anywhere, it lies in the amount of the assessment. At a time when the total for the empire was raised almost to 1500 talents and when exploitation was the order of the day, the reduction of Mekyberna's tribute from 6000 to 10 drachmas cannot be regarded either as a bribe to win back a rebellious Mekyberna or as a reward to a loyal populace. It was rather recognition of the accomplished fact that the handful of loyalists left behind, or repatriated, in Mekyberna could pay no tribute worthy of the name. Had the place not been occupied by Athens, its tribute would have been computed on the basis of the town's wealth and population before 432. The argument is somewhat strengthened by the fact that the nominal tribute of ten drachmas remained in force in 421 when Mekyberna is known to have had a garrison (Thuc., V, 39).

This survey of Mekyberna's relations with Olynthos and Athens leaves no possible doubt as to the meaning of the much discussed article in the Treaty of Nicias. Mekyberna had lost its inhabitants. They were to return to their homes and to reconstitute their government as an independent city-state, subject, of course, to the obligation of paying tribute. The fusion of Mekyberna with Olynthos was to be nullified, and the old polity was to be restored: *οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν.*

Though this interpretation is by no means new, the evidence for the status of Mekyberna between 432 and 421 has never been fully presented. Hitherto, conjecture has played a large part in the discussion. Now that we have to a large degree

[7] For an Athenian attempt to establish a garrison at Eion in 425, see Thuc., IV, 7.

[8] See note 6.

eliminated conjecture and have shown that Mekyberna's history and status before the Peace of Nicias was in exact agreement with the only logical interpretation of the treaty, we can now turn our attention to Singos.

Since Singos' history up to 421 is in every respect like that of Mekyberna—a Greek town in territory settled by Chalcidians,[9] tributary to Athens up to 432,[10] absent from the tribute lists after 432, assessed in 425 and 421 the purely nominal sum of ten drachmas,[11] and treated like Mekyberna in the Treaty of 421,[12]—it would be unnecessary to say more; except that Hampl, following Steup, has denied that Singos could have participated in the synoecism of 432.[13] His exclusion of northern Sithonia from this movement is based partly upon the erroneous hypothesis that Singos did not revolt and partly on Thucydides' use of the word *ἀνοικίσασθαι*. Hampl argues that the word is applicable only to the coast in the immediate neighborhood of Olynthos and that it therefore cannot apply to more distant communities separated from Olynthos by mountains and alien territory. I cannot believe, however, that it means anything more than to leave the coast to take up residence inland. The word could be used as appropriately for the evacuation of Singos as for the abandonment of Mekyberna, and the assessment lists, which Hampl cites for the constancy and loyalty of Singos as well as of Mekyberna, furnish convincing proof that the mass of the population had deserted to Olynthos.

While we are discussing the extent of the evacuation, it is worth noting that Gale's record parallels that of Mekyberna and

[9] No one would have denied that Singos was Chalcidian, if it had not been named with Sane in the Treaty of 421.

[10] Its tribute averaged two talents a year in the decade before the revolt. For its record, see *S. E. G.*, V, 1, 3-13, 15, 20-22.

[11] Assessment of 425, l. 469; *I. G.*, I², 64, l. 112.

[12] The only real difference between Singos and Mekyberna is that we have no evidence for a garrison at Singos. Still it is probable.

[13] *Op. cit.*, pp. 187 f. Hampl goes far beyond the evidence when he restricts the area evacuated to a few sea-coast villages in Olynthian territory between Mekyberna and Sermylia. Aside from the fact that he has to presuppose the existence of an Olynthian coast-line in a locality where one would normally presume Mekyberna and Sermylia to have been dominant, his exclusion of Mekyberna, as we have seen, is contradicted by unequivocal evidence and inherent probability.

Singos after the revolt of 432.[14] Gale was situated upon the west coast of Sithonia between Torone and Sermylia.[15] It appears in the assessment lists of 425 (line 471) and 421 (*I. G.*, I², 64, line 114) with the same nominal tribute of ten drachmas. Its evacuation may therefore be assumed.

Between Gale and Mekyberna was Sermylia. That it revolted before the spring of 431 is certain.[16] There is nothing, however, to indicate that it participated in the Olynthian synoecism, and its inclusion in the Treaty of Nicias with Skione and Torone as a town actually or prospectively held by Athens, with which the Athenians might do as they chose, is a clear indication that its status was not that of Mekyberna and Singos.

There are then three classes of rebellious communities in the Treaty of Nicias: (a) autonomous towns that had never been recovered, (b) towns that had been evacuated and were to be reconstituted under the protection of Athenian garrisons, and (c) those that had been subdued by force of arms. To the first class was granted a qualified independence; upon the second was imposed the obligation of reëstablishing themselves as city-states, possibly, though not at all certainly, under guarantees such as applied to Olynthos; the third class were handed over to the mercy of their Athenian captors.

We may now return to Sane. It was an Andrian colony outside the original area of revolt. It was as loyal to Athens as Singos, Gale, Sermylia, and Mekyberna had been disloyal. It paid tribute when they did not, and as a reward for its loyalty, Sane's tribute was reduced from 6000 to 1000 drachmas in 430.[17] When Brasidas incited its neighbors to rebellion in 424/3, Sane and Dion alone resisted (Thuc., IV, 109). Did it then revolt in the interval before Cleon reconquered Torone and the towns on Akte in the autumn of 422? It seems most un-

[14] Up to 435/4 Gale was attached to some syntely. In 435/4, 434/3, and 433/2 it paid tribute in its own name (*S. E. G.*, V, 20-22). Its revolt in 432 is denied by Hampl, but it was not in the quota list of 432/1 (*S. E. G.*, V, 23).

[15] Herodotos calls it Galepsos (VII, 122; cf. Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXIX (1925), p. 27).

[16] See note 18 above. Sermylia's revolt is denied by Hampl.

[17] *S. E. G.*, V, 28. Sane paid tribute both in 432/1 and 429/8 (*S. E. G.*, V, 23, 25).

likely. Was it seized by force during this time? That is possible, though there is no evidence to support such a thesis. Even if it had been taken, its consistent loyalty to Athens would have entitled it to special consideration. Its status would have been analogous. Thus unless one assumes that its population had been removed by force, perhaps to Akanthos, and kept virtually prisoners there, a hypothesis quite unsupported by evidence, Sane's position in the article we have been discussing is anomalous.

Our investigation has now returned to the point from which it started. The chief obstacle to a consistent and logical interpretation of the article is the presence of loyal, Andrian Sane between two Chalcidian rebels. Before cutting the Gordian knot —no other solution of our problem will now avail us—let me remind the reader that geographical considerations alone would warrant the conclusion that the text is not sound at this point. We have seen that the preceding article named the towns in their geographical order, and it has long been recognized that a geographical order is followed in the article which provides for the surrender by Athens of Koryphasion, Kythera, Methana, Pteleon, and Atalante.[18] With geography so obviously determining the order in which names are enumerated in each of these articles, the violation of geographical considerations in the case of Sane is highly suspicious.

I am not the first to suggest that the text of this article is corrupt. Kirchhoff (*op. cit.*, p. 38) noted that the ethnic of Singos (Σιγγαίους) was incorrectly given. In the quota lists only Σίγγιοι, or Σίνγιοι, is used. Though the error may have been original with Thucydides,[19] still the fact that the two preceding ethnics ended in -αίους suggests careless copying.

Assuming then that our difficulties have all been caused by the careless substitution of Σαναίους for the name of some Chalcidic sea-coast town lying between Singos and Mekyberna, a town that had revolted in 432 and had moved the majority of its inhabitants to Olynthos, a town whose record was identical with

[18] There has been some doubt about Pteleon.

[19] It is true that Stephanos of Byzantion gives both forms of the ethnic; but, as his source for the incorrect ethnic was undoubtedly Thucydides, Stephanos can be cited only as evidence that his text of Thucydides was like our own.

that of Singos and Mekyberna, we need look no further, for the Γαλαῖοι suit our every need.[20]

Textually the change from Γαλαίους to Σαναίους is not difficult to make, and it is readily explicable. The name Gale appears nowhere else in Thucydides and in no other extant ancient source.[21] It would therefore be unfamiliar to an ordinary copyist, whereas Sane was mentioned by Thucydides at the end of the preceding book (IV, 109) and was known to every schoolboy because of its proximity to the canal of Xerxes (Herod., VII, 22). One might also argue that the mistake was facilitated by the inclusion of the Akanthians in the final clause of the article, since Sane and Akanthos were neighbors and Andrian colonies too, except that the words καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι may be a correction of some learned scribe who was perplexed, as modern scholars have been, by the inclusion of Sane in a group distinctly Chalcidic in character.

Whatever may be the source of the errors in our present text, I am confident that the treaty itself read: Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Γαλαίους καὶ Σιγγίους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν. Even though we place the blame upon Thucydides and print his text without alterations, it is clear that Gale, not Sane, was the second Chalcidian town mentioned in the much abused article.

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[20] At my suggestion Mabel Gude (*op. cit.*, p. 14) tentatively proposed this correction. See also Kolbe, *op. cit.*, p. 347, note.

[21] Herodotos (VII, 122) calls it Galepsos.

Allen West, who has contributed many excellent articles to our journal, died on September 18, 1936. Dr. M. F. McGregor of Cincinnati has revised these proofs.—ED.

THE VATOPEDI MANUSCRIPT OF PTOLEMY AND STRABO.

The codex is of the 14th cent. and contains (1) Ptolemy's *Geography*, copied from Urb. 82, (2) a corpus of Minor Geographers, copied from Pal. 398, and (3) Strabo's *Geography*, copied from a lost archetype. Stray leaves are preserved in Br. Mus. add. 19391 and Paris. suppl. grec 443A. The MS is important for a part of the corpus, now lost from Pal. 398 and not preserved elsewhere, and for the Strabo, for which it is one of the best-preserved sources. Marc. 377 of Strabo and Cambr. Univ. Gg. II. 33 of the corpus were copied from it.

One of the most valuable classical manuscripts still preserved in Greece is the codex of Ptolemy and Strabo in the monastery of Vatopedi on Mt. Athos. It is known chiefly for the maps accompanying the Ptolemy, which have received even more attention than they deserve, as will appear. The more valuable part, however, is the Strabo, which has been entirely neglected. In May, 1936 I visited Mt. Athos especially to study this codex, and for four days I enjoyed the hospitality and liberality of the venerable institution in which it resides. I now submit a report of my investigations.[1]

Codex Vatopedinus 655 is a parchment MS of 299 leaves, 25 x 35 cm., numbered 1-296, with a fly leaf in front, folio 66 *bis*, and a blank leaf at the end. It is a composite codex, consisting of four structurally separate sections:

I. fol. 1- 54, the *Geography* of Ptolemy
II. fol. 55- 69, *Chrestomathies* from Strabo
III. fol. 70-186, Strabo, Bks. I-IX
IV. fol. 187-297, Strabo, Bks. X-XVII

[1] The most important previous bibliography is as follows: Yates, *Trans. Royal Soc. of Lit., New Series*, VIII (1864), pp. 13-34; Sewastianoff and Langlois, *Géographie de Ptolémée* (Paris 1867); Wescher, *Dionysii Byzantii de Bospori navigatione* (Paris 1874); Müller, *Archives des Missions, 2e Série*, IV (1867), pp. 284, 298; *Frag. hist. graec.*, V (1870), pp. xvi-xxii; *Philologischer Anzeiger*, VIII (1877), pp. 127-132; Lambros, *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, XVI (1922), pp. 431-435; Cuntz, *Die Geographie des Ptolemaeus* (Berlin 1923), pp. 31-33; Eustratiades, *Cat. of the Greek MSS. in . . . Vatopedi* (Cambridge, Mass. 1924); Güngerich, *Dionysii Byzantii Anaplus Bospori* (Berlin 1927); Fischer, *De Cl. Ptolemaei vita operibus* (Leiden 1932), pp. 210, 234-243.

The sections were written by two different hands, one doing the first two and another the last two. The latter is more calligraphic than the former. It is large, round, and cursive, with a tendency toward the *Schnörkelschrift*. The hand in the first two sections is slightly smaller, stiff, and much less cursive. Both are probably of the 14th century. The first few quires in each section are ruled to 43 lines a page (written space about 19 x 27 cm.), but in the later quires the ruling is discontinued. Without the ruling, the hand in the first two sections tends to exceed 43 lines, while the hand in the Strabo tends to fall below that number. In the first two sections the writing follows the ruled lines irregularly, often straddling them, while in the Strabo it always hangs beneath. In general external appearance also the last two sections are more handsome than the first two. It is a question whether the two halves were originally intended to form a single codex. Both have the same format and the quires are signed in one grand series throughout. But in the last two sections at least the signatures are secondary, being superimposed on two separate original series. Moreover the early external history is different for the two halves (see below).

Before passing to a detailed description of the codex it will be necessary to mention three important points in its later history. In 1841, Minoides Mynas, traveling on a commission from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, visited Vatopedi and catalogued its MSS. Among his posthumous papers were found some apographs and seven original leaves of this codex. These are now in the Bibl. Nat. (suppl. grec 443A).[2] In 1853 the British Museum acquired 21 more leaves from the notorious Constantine Simonides. These are now Add. MS. 19391.[3] I have seen both of these volumes and have photographs of all 28 leaves. In 1858 Peter von Sebastianov made a scientific tour of Mt. Athos and photographed the remaining part of Ptolemy's *Geography*. Complete facsimiles were published from these photographs by Victor Langlois in 1867 and have been the chief basis for our previous knowledge of the MS.

I. Fol. 1-54, *The Geography of Ptolemy.* The text continues

[2] Omont, "Minoide Mynas et ses missions en Orient," *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres*, XL (1916), pp. 337-419.

[3] Madden in *The Athenaeum*, 8 March 1856, p. 299; Stewart, *Biogr. Memoir of Const. Simonides* (London 1859).

without disturbance through four perfect quaternions (fol. 1-32), with the parchment arranged in the usual fashion, flesh and hair-sides alternating throughout. The fifth quire presents complications. Fol. 33-34 are a bifolium and between them there is a large gap in the text, which is filled exactly by fol. 14-21 in Br. Mus. add. 19391. The result of this combination is a quinternion instead of the usual quaternion, since the eight leaves in London are a quaternion by themselves. The reason for this irregularity can be perceived. The four outside sheets of the quire are a regular quaternion, beginning with a flesh-side (Vatop. 33^r) and alternating. The inside sheet (Lond. 17-18) contains the irregularity. The hair-side is 17^r-18^v (16^v-19^r is flesh), and 17^r is crowded with 48 lines to contain the end of Ptol., *Geogr.* VII. The reason is that the whole flesh-side 17^v-18^r was destined for the large map of the world preceding Bk. VIII. It was drawn beforehand and now stands upside down in relation to the writing on the back (17^r-18^v).—The sixth quire (Vatop. 35-41) is a quaternion, but lacks its last leaf, though nothing is missing in the text. The seventh quire (42-49) is a perfect quarternion. The eighth and last quire in this section (50-54) is a quaternion that has lost its second and last two leaves. The last map (Taprobane) stands on 54^v. Since the scribe had omitted the text on the last three maps, he probably also omitted the spurious material that follows the maps in other MSS (VIII, 29-30). The last two leaves of the quaternion, thus left blank, were later cut out. As often happens, their removal endangered the other halves of their bifolia, and the second leaf (between 50 and 51) was actually lost. In the maps the east part of Arabia Felix and the west part of Hyrcania are missing.

The publication of this Athos MS of Ptolemy in complete photographic facsimiles in 1867 was remarkable. The importance attached to the MS was due to its colored maps, which would by themselves be a document worthy of such attention. But as Ptolemaic studies have progressed, the importance of this MS has diminished. Cuntz believed it was a mere apograph, and degenerate at that, of the great Urbinas 82 (12th cent.). Fischer strangely rejects this view after adding what seems to me convincing proof of it. There is an omission on fol. 24^r which coincides exactly with a column in Urb. (IV, pp. 755, 5-766, 10 Müller = Urb. fol. 36^v II). In the face of this evi-

dence the attention bestowed on the first section of the Vatopedi codex at the expense of the other sections was somewhat unfortunate. The maps still divert the attention of tourists in Vatopedi, to whom the codex is regularly exhibited, and are at present deteriorating rapidly from hard use, while the later sections still seem as fresh as when they were written.

II. *The Minor Geographers.* The second section is more mutilated than the first, and the leaves now in London and Paris outnumber and still more outweigh those remaining in the codex at Vatopedi. An attempt, successful in the main, to reconstruct this section was made by Güngerich on the basis of the text. The points he left open are now settled by the external evidence. The table shows the result. The structure of the first quaternion is assured by the signatures $\overline{\theta}$ on Paris. 10^{r} and Lond. 4^{v}, and also by a flesh mark now divided between Lond. 2 and Paris. 3. The bifolia in the other quires are almost all intact. I did not find any signatures $\overline{\iota\alpha}$, $\overline{\iota\beta}$, $\overline{\iota\gamma}$, although in the next section the series continues with $\overline{\iota\delta}$. The structure of this section as now revealed has one important complication. In the first quaternion the first two sheets both have the flesh-side out. The three interior sheets are ruled to 43 lines, as in the first section, whereas the outside sheet is unruled, as in the following quires. The scribe gradually broke away from the ruling by adding one or two extra lines of writing, and he continued to increase the size of his pages in the following unruled quires, where there are sometimes as many as 50 lines. However, on the first ruled leaf, the second in the section, he still followed the ruling. These facts suggest that the three interior sheets of the first quaternion, and especially the second leaf, are more primitive than the outside sheet. But the latter is more primitive than the writing on the fifth leaf, which, by continuing the fourth, makes the quire a quaternion. Apparently the scribe ruled and began writing with the intention that the present second sheet should be the first, but, soon changing his mind, added another sheet outside and removed one inside, still blank, to keep the volume of the quaternion.

There is a corresponding disturbance in the text. Paris. 10 is complete in itself, and Lond. 1 begins with a table of contents

Vatop. 655, Br. Mus. add. 19391, Bibl. Nat. suppl. gr. 443A

$\overline{\theta}$	1. Par. 10, flesh recto, unruled, recto 52 lines, verso 42 lines.	rδιάγρωσις (*Geogr. Graec. Min.*, II, pp. 488-493)
	2. Lond. 1, f., rul., 41, 43.	rπίναξ (Güngerich, p. ix f.) rὑποτύπωσις (*Geogr. Graec. Min.*, II, pp. 494-509)
	3. Lond. 2, h., " 45, 44.	
	4. Lond. 3, f., " 45, 45.	rAgathemerus (*Geogr. Graec. Min.*, II, pp. 471-487)
	5. Par. 2, h., " 45, 45.	rAristotle, *Names of Winds* (fr. 250, Rose) rDionysius Byz., *Bosporus* (ed. Güngerich, 1927)
	6. Par. 3, f., " 45, 45.	
	7. lost	
	8. Lond. 4, h., unr., 46, 47.	r*Periplus Euxine Sea* (*Geogr. Gr. Min.*, I, pp. 402-423; *Frag. Hist. Graec.*, V, pp. 174-184)
$\overline{\iota}$	9. " 5, f., " 46, 46.	
	10. " 6, h., " 48, 48.	
	11. " 7, f., " 50, 49.	vArrian, *Epistle* (*Geogr. Gr. Min.*, I, pp. 370-401)
	12. " 8, h., " 50, 50.	
	13. " 9, f., " 45, 50.	r*Periplus Erythraean Sea* (*Geogr. Gr. Min.*, I, pp. 257-305)
	14. " 10, h., " 48, 47.	
	15. " 11, f., " 46, 47.	
	16. " 12, h., " 47, 47.	rHanno (*Geogr. Graec. Min.*, I, pp. 1-14) vPhilo Byz., *Seven Wonders* (ed. Hercher, 1858)
$\langle\overline{\iota\alpha}\rangle$	17. " 13, f., "	v*Ohrest.* from Strabo (*Geogr. Gr. Min.*, II, pp. 529-636)
	18-24. Vat. 55-61.	
$\langle\overline{\iota\beta}\rangle$	25-32. Vat. 62-68 (66 *bis*)	
$\langle\overline{\iota\gamma}\rangle$	33. Vat. 69, f.	
	34. Par. 6, h.	vPlutarch, *Names of Rivers* (*Geogr. Gr. Min.*, II, pp. 637-665)
	35. " 7, f.	
	36. " 8, h.	
	37. " 9, f.	vends abruptly, supplement by later hand
	38. lost	

for the rest of the section. This table is one of the most remarkable features of the codex. After listing the eleven titles that follow in this section it continues with eleven more that do not occur at all in our codex and are foreign to its geographical contents. There is no doubt that they never were included, since the codex as represented by the secondary quire-signatures has every appearance of being complete. The table must represent the codex from which this section (except the first leaf) was copied. Very fortunately the archetype is preserved. As soon as the London leaves became known Müller recognized them as an apograph of the well-known codex Pal. gr. 398 (9th cent.). The additional titles in the table occur in the later portions of Pal., but in no other ancient MS, and the abrupt end of Philo in both MSS is due to loss of leaves in Pal. This codex has also lost its first five quaternions and now begins abruptly in the *Periplus of the Euxine Sea*. The Vatopedi codex was copied before this loss and thus preserves alone the first part of the corpus of geographers, although it in turn has lost one leaf in Dionysius, leaving an irreparable gap in the text.[4]

The little treatise in Paris. 10^{rv} did not come from Pal. 398, as is plain from the external evidence and from the table on Lond. 1^{r}, in which it is not included. It deals with the Ptolemaic system of geography, but it does not occur in Urb. 82 or any other MS of Ptolemy. In fact it does not occur in any other independent MS; and, since its origin is unknown, it may be contemporary with the Vatopedi codex itself.[5]

III. IV. *The Geography of Strabo.* The last two sections of the codex are almost intact and present no structural complications. The third section, containing Bks. I-IX, consists of fol. 70-186, in 15 quaternions, originally signed $\overline{\alpha}$-$\overline{\iota\varepsilon}$ and later resigned $\overline{\iota\delta}$-$\overline{\kappa\eta}$. The text ends on 186^{v}, the fifth leaf of the last

[4] The contents of the missing text can be gleaned in part from the quotations by Pierre Gilles (*De Bosporo Thracio, De topographia Constantinopoleos*, Lyons 1562, Leiden 1632, etc.), who drew heavily on Dionysius' treatise. Güngerich maintains that Gilles' MS was independent of both Vatop. and Pal. 398, a view which seems *a priori* very improbable. Aly suggests that it may have been the five missing quires of Pal. 398 (*Hermes*, LXII [1927], p. 321).

[5] Fischer's discussion (pp. 436-442) is greatly vitiated by the wretched state of the published text.

quaternion. The remaining leaves were blank and hence were cut out, leaving three jagged stubs. The fourth section, containing Bks. X-XVII, consists of fol. 187-296, with one blank unnumbered leaf at the end, in 14 quaternions, the last lacking its last leaf, originally signed *ᾱ-δώδεκα*, later re-signed *κθ̄-μ̄*. (I found no signatures for the last two quaternions.) The text ends on 296^{r}, line 7, and was followed by a colophon, but the whole lower part of this folio has been cut away and only the tips of the letters of the colophon remain.

The text of Strabo presented in these sections is similar to that of Paris. 1393 (*C*, 13th cent.) and Ambr. 418 (*v*, 15th cent.) as opposed to that of Paris. 1397 (*A*, 10th cent.). Bk. VII ends abruptly with the words *κινέας δέ τι μυθωδέστερον* (p. 71, 20, Kramer). Bks. I-VII have simple titles *στράβωνος γεωγραφικῶν πρῶτον*, etc. Bks. VIII and IX are entitled *Ἐκ τοῦ η̄(θ̄) τῶν στράβωνος γεωγραφικῶν*, and their text is accordingly in the form of excerpts. There are frequent omissions, new paragraphs often begin with *ὅτι*, the thought is often given in indirect discourse, etc. Yet the text is nearly complete and cannot fairly be described as excerpts. Paris. 1393 gives only the beginning of this abridged text (to VIII, p. 104, 4) in a separate quire. Ambros. 418 and Vatop. not only continue to the end of IX, but add a fragment of X (to 331, 14), still similarly abridged, which Vatop. entitles *Ἐκ τοῦ δεκάτου τῶν στράβωνος*. There are no externalia, such as arguments, scholia, variants, indices, on Bks. I-IX, except a short argument for VII. The absence of externalia and the abridgment of VIII-IX are the chief features that distinguish the first nine books in these three MSS from Paris. 1397.

The text in Bks. X-XVII is entirely different in these respects and assumes the characteristics of Paris. 1397 in I-IX (it contains no more). Each book has an ornamental headpiece and two titles, *τῶν στράβωνος γεωγραφικῶν τοῦ δεκάτου βιβλίου κεφάλαια*, followed by an argument, and again *στράβωνος γεωγραφικῶν δέκατον*. There are also scholia, variants, and indices in the margins throughout these books, very similar in character and even wording to marginalia on I-IX in Paris. 1397. The numbers of the books are frequently added at the end of the text (*ιᾱ*, *ιβ̄*, etc.). This detail is found in all three MSS in X-XVII, but never in I-IX. It occurs, however, in I-IX in Paris. 1397. X-XVII are structurally separate in Paris. 1393 and

Vatop., and in Ambr. IX has a colophon ἐτελειώθη τὸ πρῶτον τμῆμα τῶν βιβλίων τοῦ στράβωνος, although X begins on the same page.

It is evident from the above facts that the text of Strabo in Paris. 1393, Vatop. and Ambr. falls into three parts: the plain text of I-VII (= β), the abridged text of VIII-IX (= γ), and the annotated text of X-XVII (= ϕ). In Paris. 1393 all three are structurally separate, and $\beta\gamma$ and ϕ are so in Vatop. and apparently in the archetype of Ambr. The three parts obviously came from different sources. β was a codex mutilated at the end and ϕ was a complementary volume to Paris. 1397. γ served only to splice between β and ϕ, and probably contained much more of the whole work than it represents in our three MSS.

In the Vatopedi MS a later hand has collated the text of Strabo from the end of Bk. XIV on with another MS, which can, I think, be identified. The common archetype (ϕ) of X-XVII in all the MSS except one had a series of seven lacunae, at XV, 194, 17; 245, 12; 251, 12; XVI, 286, 24; 301, 12; 321, 20; XVII, 414, 17. They were discovered and supplied by Kramer from Vatic. 1329 (*F*, 13th cent.), which he was the first to use. In Vatop. these same lacunae occur, but all except two (245, 12; 321, 20) are supplied by the second hand. Vatic. 1329 is the only MS known from which they could have been supplied. That it was the very one used by the collator of Vatop. seems probable from some of his other readings: 199, 12 ἀέρων; 210, 24 πρόοδον; 225, 3 ἰατροὺς; 225, 16 λογιωτέρους; 333, 10 ἐμπορείας; 352, 9 ἐκτρεπομένους. All are unique readings of Vatic. 1329, and most of them are corrupt and hence less likely to have occurred in another MS. This is especially true at the first place, where ἀέρων is in the text of Vatic., but the correct reading ἀνέμων is in the margin. If this is a self-correction, the corruption originates in Vatic. itself and is thus peculiar to it.

An apograph of the Vatopedi MS exists in Marc. 377 (*l*, 15th cent.), which contains Bks. I-XII of Strabo and has ranked as an important source of the text. The first part of it is derived from Paris. 1397; but at II, 191, 22, where an entire quaternion is lost in this codex, there is a slight change of writing in Marc. 377 and from this point on it follows Vatop. The omissions in Marc. 377 noted by Kramer at II, 225, 21; V, 331, 27; 333, 9; IX, 215, 22; 234, 1; X, 339, 7; 343, 11; 349, 11; 354, 2; 360, 16; XI, 433, 13 and doubtless many others, occur in Vatop also.

At IV, 293, 10 Marc. omits *θεὸν . . . βίον ὡς* (now supplied by a second hand), and these words occupy exactly one line in Vatop. At X, 353, 4 Marc. omits *τετραμμένην . . . ἄνευθε*, again exactly one line in Vatop. At X, 350, 18-351, 1 Marc. repeats *τε σάμῃ . . . δουλιχίῳ*, which occupy exactly three lines in Vatop. And finally at II, 202, 5 after *αὐτοῦ* Marc. has *περιέχεσθαι καὶ ἀεὶ φαίνεσθαι* from line 3, but the first hand has deleted those words and continued correctly from *αὐτοῦ*. The words *περιέχεσθαι . . . αὐτοῦ* occupy exactly a single line in Vatop., which the scribe of Marc. started to repeat. Moreover he would scarcely have been able to make the correction unless he had Vatop. itself before his eyes. I infer from this instance, therefore, that Marc. 377 was copied directly from Vatop.[6]

While the second half of the Vatopedi codex was thus active in the 15th century, the first half, in spite of its unique contents, lay untouched a century longer. Conrad Gesner, in his *Bibliotheca universalis* (Zurich 1545), mentions three of the opuscula in the second section, as follows: fol. 15^{v}, *Agathemeri orthonis hypotyposin Geographiae alicubi manuscriptam extare ex erudito quodam viro Venetiis cognovi*; 211^{v}, *Dionysii Byzantii . . . navigationem per Bosphorum . . . nescio ubi adhuc extare audivisse mihi videor Venetiis ex Nicolao Sophiano homine Graeco*; 559^{v}, *Philonis Byzantii libellus Graecus de septem spectaculis: extat etiamnum in Italia, ut Venetiis cognovi ex Nicolao Sophiano docto homine Greco.* Nicolaos Sophianos was a well-known contemporary savant, whom Gesner (523^{v}) says he had met in Venice a year and a half before. He had just returned from a journey in Greece to procure manuscripts for the Spanish ambassador in Venice, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza.[7]

[6] Marc. 377 (*l*) is very erroneously reported in Kramer's apparatus, many readings being attributed to it which occur instead in Eton. 141 (*n*).—Bks. I-XII in Marc. 378 (*m*) are in turn copied from Marc. 377, as has long been recognized. Moreover Bk. X in Laur. 28. 5 (*B*) is copied from Marc. 377, since it shares all the omissions both of Vatop. and Marc. See Rölligs collation, *Diss. phil. Hal.* VII (1886), 385-396. The small open lacunae in Laur. usually correspond to unintelligible suspensions at the ends of lines in Marc. The double points in the margins of Laur. also occur in Marc.

[7] Graux, *Essai sur les origines du fonds grec de l'Escurial* (Paris 1880), pp. 172-174; Legrand, *Bibliographie Hellénique . . . aux xv^{e} et xvi^{e} siècles*, I (Paris 1885), CLXXXVII-CXCIV; Vogel and Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber* (Leipzig 1909), pp. 356 f.

The Vatopedi codex is the only one known to have contained all three of these opuscula in the 16th century, and it is doubtless the very one from which Sophianos knew them. A codex in the Cambridge University Library (Gg. II. 33) contains a number of matematical texts in Sophianos' handwriting.[8] One separate quinternion (fol. 122-131) contains Agathemerus, the διάγνωσις, the ὑποτύπωσις, and the first few lines of Dionysius. A couple of incipient repetitions, which seem to arise from the positions of recurring words in the long lines of Vatop., suggest that it is a direct apograph.[9] Moreover Sophianos has left his mark in the Vatopedi codex itself. The margins of the second section bear a series of notes in his hand. On Paris. 2^{r} is written opposite the title of Dionysius *ση. τὸ τοῦ διονυσίου συγγραμμάτιον*; on Lond. 4^{r} opposite the title of the *Periplus of the Euxine Sea* *ση. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ συγγραμμάτιον* and on Lond. 7^{v} at the end of the same treatise *ἕως ὧδε*; on Lond. 12^{v} again opposite the title of Philo *καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ φίλωνος* and on Lond. 13^{v} at the end again *ἕως ὧδε*. On Paris. 9^{v} the same hand has supplied the last four lines of Plutarch, which originally stood on the last leaf of this section, now lost. It has also twice (Lond. 2^{r}, Vatop. 62^{v}) noted a mention in the text of Mt. Athos, where the codex was probably then found. These notes carefully signalize certain portions of the contents of the second section. There was a method in the selection. The greater part of these opuscula (Arrian's *Epistle, Periplus of the Erythraean Sea,* Hanno, *Chrest.* from Strabo, Plutarch) had been published by Froben at Basle in 1533 from Pal. 398. Three more are in the Cambridge apograph. The remainder (except the fragment of Aristotle) is what is signalized in the margins of Vatop. Sophianos had probably intended to copy all the unpublished material but was interrupted just after he had begun the Dionysius. He therefore left those

[8] I based my identification of the writing on the specimen in Omont's *Fac-similés de mss grecs des XV^{e} et XVI^{e} siècles* (Paris 1887), pl. 40.

[9] The numerous 16th century MSS of Agathemerus are doubtless all derived from the Cambridge MS. I have examined most of them, and aside from being inferior, they all show their dependence on Sophianos' apograph in the reproduction of abbreviations, alterations, slips of the pen, etc. They are as follows: Bodl. D'Orville 1, Br. Mus. Old Royal 16. C. IV, Paris. 1405, 1406, 2554, 2857, Vindob. hist. gr. 122, Taurin. 245 Pasini (destroyed in 1904), Ambr. 545, 903, Vat. 1415, Pal. 62., Matrit. N-138, Scor. Ω. I. 11.

notes to call the attention of future workers to the parts he was leaving.

The Vatopedi codex was not discovered again until 1838. When Carlyle and Hunt visited the monastery in 1801 they found the library in neglect and confusion. They took an "accurate catalogue," now preserved in Br. Mus. add. MS. 27234, but the codex of Ptolemy and Strabo is not mentioned in it. Didron in 1839 found the volumes neatly ranged on shelves. In the meantime Zachariä had visited Vatopedi in 1838 and seen the codex of Ptolemy and Strabo.[10] Not long after occurred the thefts by Mynas and Simonides mentioned above. Mynas also compiled a full catalogue of the library, now preserved in Paris. suppl. grec 675, fol. 10-48, and 754, fol. 162-192, including a detailed description of our codex (fol. 186-192). The leaves now in Paris and the two missing leaves in Ptolemy and Dionysius were already lacking when Mynas described the codex. When Sebastianov photographed the Ptolemy in 1858 the London leaves were of course lacking also. At this time the remaining leaves received their present numbering, according to a notice on the fly-leaf in front. The codex is now in a red leather binding, made some thirty years ago, as I was told by the librarian. Since Sebastianov, various scholars and travelers have examined the codex or taken specimen photographs. I myself, in addition to examining the structure and collating the secondary annotations in the last part, also photographed the whole of the Strabo (fol. 70-296) with a Leica camera.

I wish to express again my appreciation of the courtesies offered me on Mt. Athos and especially at Vatopedi. On the long itinerary I have undertaken to study manuscripts of Greek geographers, the visit to this famous place, with its magnificent scenery and strange ways of life, has been one of the richest experiences.

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[10] Walpole, *Mémoirs relating to . . . Turkey* (London 1817), p. 202; Didron, "Le Mont Athos," *Annales archéologiques*, V (1846), p. 159; Zachariä, *Reise in den Orient* (Heidelberg 1840), pp. 269 f.

TIBERIUS' *OVATIO* AND THE *ARA NUMINIS AUGUSTI.*

The day of the long-postponed triumph for his Pannonian victories which Tiberius celebrated toward the end of the reign of Augustus is fixed by a recently discovered fragment of the *Fasti Praenestini* which has the entry: TI. CAESAR TRIUMPHAVIT EX ILURICO.[1] As Huelsen has shown, the fragment belongs to October 23.[2] Before the discovery of this fragment, the triumph was thought to have taken place on January 16 because of the following entry in the *Fasti Praenestini* for the day:

TI CAESAR EX PAN.. (ca. 20 letters) ..AVIT

It is now evident that this entry records an earlier Pannonian victory of Tiberius, and Marucchi and Wissowa associated it with the entrance which Tiberius made into Rome *praetextatus et laureatus* in the winter of 9-10 A. D., a time when, according to Suetonius (*Tib.* 17, 2), he had postponed his triumph because of the defeat of Varus. Rau,[3] however, argues that Suetonius is in error in dating this event after the defeat of Varus. He would place it early in the year 9 A. D. when Dio (LVI, 1, 1) describes a ceremonial return of Tiberius which has some correspondence with the entrance mentioned by Suetonius. This is, Rau thinks, the celebration referred to in the *Fasti Praenestini* under January 16th.

But, as Pippidi notes in his valuable observations on the *Fasti Praenestini,* there is not room on the stone for the restorations which have been proposed.[4] The most satisfactory, that of

[1] Marucchi, *Notizie degli Scavi,* 1921, pp. 277-283; Wissowa, *Hermes,* LVIII (1923), pp. 375 ff.; O. Leuze, *Bursian's Jahresbericht,* CCXXVII (1930), pp. 99 f.

[2] *Diss. Pont. Acad. Rom. di Arch.* XV (1921), pp. 324-336. As Wissowa (*l. c.*) has shown, the establishment of Oct. 23 for the triumph makes it probable that the year, which had been much disputed, was 12 rather than 13 A. D.

[3] *Klio* XIX (1925), pp. 344 ff. In this view Rau is followed by Pippidi, "La Date del'Ara Numinis Augusti de Rome," *Rev. Et. Lat.* XI (1933), pp. 435-456.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 454, n. 1. My measurements show 7.5 cm. for the 13 letters in Ti. Caesar ex Pan., 11.5 cm. in the break, and 21 cm. in the entire line.

Wissowa, Ti. Caesar ex Pan[*nonia laureatus urbem intr*]avit, places twenty-three letters in a space which should contain nineteen or twenty. Pippidi proposes two abbreviations: Ti. Caesar ex Pan[*n(onia) laureatus urbem intr*]avit, or, with more doubt: Ti. Caesar ex Pan[*nonia laur(eatus) urbem intr*]avit. But these abbreviations, both unusual, seem improbable because such compression was not required by lack of space.

It is curious that no one has suggested that this note, added like the note of October 23 by a second hand which inserted in the calendar a number of important days in Tiberius' career, records one of the two previous triumphs which Tiberius had celebrated. While it is doubtful whether his return of 9 or 10 A. D. would have been inserted in the *Fasti*, it is practically certain that all the triumphs would have been. The note cannot belong to the triumph of 7 B. C. for that was celebrated for German victories on January first.[5] But it may well be his first triumph, the *ovatio* of 9 B. C. which was held for Pannonian successes.[6] This ovation took place at some time before the death of Drusus on September 14 of that year. The entry could be completed as follows: Ti Caesar ex Pan[*nonia ovans urbem intr*]avit. This restoration of nineteen letters is thus more satisfactory than the others proposed not only because it relates the note to one of Tiberius' three triumphs but also because it exactly fills the space. If the explanation is correct, the second hand did not follow a chronological order; for just above the note about the Pannonian success is a record, apparently from the same later hand, of the dedication of the temple of Concord which took place in 10 A. D. But the important thing in these notes is the anniversary and not the sequence of the events recorded.[7]

In the *Fasti Praenestini* for January 17 there is a notice which has often been thought to have some connection with Tiberius' celebration of January 16. I quote it with Mommsen's restorations:

[5] Verrius Flaccus' crowded notes on that day left no space for the insertion of this triumph in the *Fasti Praenestini*.

[6] Hieronymus on 2008/9: Tiberius Caesar de captis Pannoniis triumphavit. Dio, LV, 2, 4. Cf. LIV, 34, 3.

[7] There would be a similar disregard of chronology if Tiberius' celebration were placed in 9 A. D., a fact which Rau and Pippidi recognized.

PONTIFICES *Augures xxviri s. f. viii*VIR.EPVLONVM.VICTVMAS.IN
Mol ANT . *Numini augusti ad aram q*VAM . DEDICAVIT . TI . CAESAR
FE*licitati* Q*uod ti . caesar aram* AVG PATRI . DEDICAVIT

The restoration, considerable as it is, seems substantially sure for the first two lines. The divinity to whom victims were sacrificed by members of the four great priesthoods was, as the third line shows, some sort of an equivalent of Augustus himself, and the Numen Augusti or, as Mommsen also suggested, Augustum, is the only possibility which begins with N. The restoration of the third line presents greater difficulty. Mommsen's reconstruction is too short for the space required by the small letters of the line. The connection of Felicitas with the rites is moreover hard to explain. My observations on the stone confirm what Pippidi was the first to note, namely that the line seems to be a later addition. It apparently belongs to the notices added to the calendar after it was originally inscribed between 4 and 10 A. D.[8] As in others of these notices, the letters of this one, except for the F which begins the line, are smaller and apparently cut in a different way. I cannot detect the traces of the I of Felicitati and the Q of quod which Huelsen noted, but I do find the first stroke of what seems to be a V.[9] The restoration Fe[*licitati q*]u[*od* is thus possible. But equally possible is the reading Fe[*riae ex s. c. q*]u[*od eo die* (or *e. d.*) which Mommsen thought of but rejected because the notes about *feriae* regularly come first under each day and because the day is marked, not NP as *feriae publicae* always are, but C(*omitialis*). The first of these objections to this restoration no longer applies, for two fragments of the *Fasti Praenestini* subsequently discovered have notes on *feriae* which do not come in the first place under the days.[10] In any case neither objection is valid if the

[8] Cf. *C.I.L.* I, 1², p. 206.

[9] On this reading and on the lack of all traces of the I and Q detected by Huelsen I have subsequently received the confirmation of Professor Attilio De Grassi who is preparing for the *Inscriptiones Italiae* the publication of the *Fasti triumphales* and *consulares* and of the calendars. He says that the entire V is clearly recognizable on a squeeze which he made with tin-foil.

[10] The space from the initial F of this line through this V is 7.5 cm. Aug patri. dedicavit occupies 10.5 cm.; the whole line, 32 cm. The restorations FE[*licitati q*]V or FE[*riae ex s. c. q*]V, both of nine letters,

third line is a later addition. At some time after the consecration of the altar, the dedication day of the *Ara Numinis Augusti* was made a *dies feriatus*,[11] and the addition in the *Fasti Praenestini* notes the change without any alteration in the letter which marks the character of the day. Similarly March 10, the day when Tiberius was made *pontifex maximus*, is marked C in these *Fasti*, though there is a later note indicating its new character as a public holiday.

As a matter of fact January 17 is marked NP in the post-Augustan calendar of Verulae.[12] There we find a different explanation for the holiday: Feriae ex s. c. quod eo die Augusta nupsit divo Aug[*us*]t[*o*. This notice, our first information for the day of the marriage of Augustus and Livia, shows that Tiberius consecrated the altar on the wedding anniversary of his mother, the day which first brought Livia and Tiberius himself into relation with the house of Augustus. The identity of date can hardly have been an accident. When, probably after the death of Augustus, the day was made a public festival, there were two related reasons for the holiday. January 17 was the day on which Augustus married Livia, who as Julia Augusta

are proposed for a space of 5 cm. for which my estimate would be eight letters. The lacuna following the V (14 cm.) should have had 22 or 23 letters.

[11] Other examples of dedication days which became public holidays in the early empire are Jan. 30 (*Ara Pacis*), April 28 (*Aedicula Vestae*), Aug. 28 (*Ara Victoriae in Curia*). The dedication day of the *Ara Fortunae Reducis*, Dec. 15, was already a holiday. In addition the anniversaries of the *constitutio* of the *Ara Pacis* (July 4), the *Aree Cereris matris et Opis Augustae* (Aug. 10), and the *Ara Fortunae Reducis* (Oct. 12) were made public holidays. From the calendar of Verulae we now know that the dedication day of the temple of Concordia, Jan. 16, became a holiday at some time later than the dedication of the temple in 10 A. D. See note 12 below.

[12] *N. S.* 1923, pp. 194 ff. Because of the inadequate publication of this important inscription I examined it at Veroli where it is to be found in the court of the house of Sig. Luigi Reali. The entries for Jan. 16 and 17 read as follows:

H. XVII. NP. FER. EX. S. C. QUOD. EO. DIE. AEDIS
*co*NCORDIAE. INFORO. DEDIC. EST
A. XVI NP. FERIAE EX. S. C. QUOD. EO. DIE
AUGUSTA. NUPSIT. DIVO. AUG*us*To

On this reading too I have the confirmation of Professor De Grassi.

came into special honor after the death of Augustus, and it also belonged to the series of dedication days of imperial religious monuments which were turned into *dies feriati*. The decree may have read something like this: Feriae ex s. c. q. e. d. Augusta nupsit divo Augusto et quod ara numinis Augusti dedicata est.[13] One of these explanations we find in the calendar of Verulae, the other, I think, in the calendar of Praeneste. The following restoration of the third line under January 17 would fill the space: Fe[*riae ex s. c. q*]u[*od eo die Ti. Caesar aram divo*] Aug. patri dedicavit.

Perhaps the altar was dedicated not to the Numen Augusti but to the Numen Augustum. Numen Augusti, as we know it from various records, including the altar erected at Narbo in 11 A. D., seems to have been a variant of Genius Augusti;[14] while Numen Augustum was apparently a collective divinity which included the Genii of the emperor and the prospective heir to the succession and perhaps too the Juno of the empress. The regulations for the *Ara Numinis Augusti* from Forum Clodi provide for sacrifices to the Genii of Augustus and Tiberius and for statues and celebrations of the birthdays of Augustus, Tiberius, and Livia.[15] There is no actual reference to the Juno of Livia, but we know from other sources that it was an object of cult.[16] Just as the Arval Brethren later sacrificed to the Juno of the empresses along with the Genius of the emperors,[17] so the four great priesthoods probably made their official sacrifices at this altar to the Juno of Livia as well as to the Genius of Augustus.

The altar was dedicated at some time before the first addition made by the second hand in the *Fasti Praenestini*, the note on the dedication of the temple of Concordia which took place in 10 A. D. Whether it is later than Tiberius' adoption in June of

[13] Compare the two reasons given for the public holiday on October 12 in the *Fast. Amit*: Fer. [e]x s. c. q. e. d. imp. Caes. Aug. ex transmarin. provinc. urbem intravit araq. Fort. reduci constit.

[14] *C. I. L.* XII, 4333 (Dessau 112). Cf. Pippidi, *Rev. Et. Lat.* IX (1931), pp. 83 ff.

[15] *C. I. L.* XI, 3303 (Dessau 154).

[16] For a dedication to the Genii of Augustus and Tiberius and the Juno of Livia see *C. I. L.* XI, 3076 (Dessau 116).

[17] Poppaea is the earliest instance. See Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, pp. 85, 86, 122.

4 A. D. is uncertain. The form of Tiberius' name (Ti. Caesar) proves nothing more than that the *Fasti* themselves were set up after Tiberius' adoption. Even the statement of the third line about the dedication to Aug(*usto*) patri may be simply a projection into the past of later conditions, though perhaps the probabilities are not in favor of this view. The dedication could hardly have taken place before Tiberius came into special prominence after the death of Agrippa, nor could it have occurred in the years from 6 B. C. to 4 A. D. when Tiberius was living in retirement first in Rhodes and then in Rome. The altar seems to have been dedicated between 11 and 6 B. C. or between 5 and 9 A. D.

Since it was customary for a triumphing general to consecrate a public monument immediately after his triumph, the dedication of this altar has usually been associated with the triumph recorded on the previous day.[18] The year of Tiberius' *ovatio*, 9 B. C., is a possible date. Tiberius, who dedicated the *porticus Liviae* after his triumph of 7 B. C., may have signalized his *ovatio* two years earlier by the consecration of an altar at which his mother's Juno shared in official cult with the Genius of Augustus, which was at that time coming into great prominence.[19] But 9 B. C. was also the year when the *Ara Pacis Augustae* was dedicated on Livia's birthday.[20] Whether two

[18] Thus various scholars, who before the real date of Tiberius' Pannonian triumph was ascertained dated that triumph on Jan. 16, put the dedication of the altar in 12 or 13 A. D. (See Pippidi's summary of their views, *Rev. Et. Lat.* XI, p. 437, n. 3). But in any case it is impossible to date the altar so late in the reign of Augustus, for the note on its dedication belongs to the first version of the *Fasti Praenestini* and therefore was inscribed before 10 A. D. This fact was fully recognized by Mommsen (*C. I. L.* I, 1², p. 206) who found in the form of Tiberius' name (Ti. Caesar) a *terminus post quem* for the inscription of these *Fasti*. I was mistaken (*Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, p. 227) in dating the altar toward the end of the reign of Augustus and probably too in suggesting its identity with the *Ara Gentis Iuliae* on the Capitol.

[19] At this time Julia and Livia entertained the women at a banquet while Tiberius gave a banquet for the male citizens on the Capitol. See Dio, LV, 2, 4.

[20] In this case too the correspondence in date is probably not an accident. Perhaps Livia was popularly identified with Pax Augusta as she was with many other deified abstractions. On the celebration of

important altars would have been dedicated in the same month that year is doubtful.

In determining the year when the *Ara Numinis Augusti* was erected, the identity of date between the consecration of the altar and the wedding anniversary of Augustus and Livia is of more importance than the fact that the dedication day immediately follows a day on which Tiberius celebrated a victory. The period after Tiberius' adoption seems the most likely time for the consecration of such a monument. January of 6 B. C. is improbable for it was then that Tiberius dedicated the temple of Castor. It is uncertain whether he returned to Rome in the stress of the Pannonian wars during the winters of 6-7 and 7-8. The most probable years seem to be 5 A. D., the year following his adoption, when after the end of his German campaign in December he returned to Rome,[21] and 9 A. D. when he made the ceremonial entrance into the city with which Rau associates both the note on his celebration of January 16 and the dedication of the altar.

The later evidence for the celebration of January 17 may give some clue to the location of the *Ara Numinis Augusti.* Immediately after Augustus' death Livia instituted in his honor scenic games, the *ludi Palatini,* which were celebrated in a theatre constructed each year for the occasion close to the palace. January 17 is recorded in the fourth century calendars as the first day of these games.[22] Before the games began the emperor

Livia's birthday see *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* for 38 A. D., *C. I. L.* VI, 2028; Tac., *Ann.* VI, 5.

[21] One might perhaps fancy a reference to the dedication of the altar in Velleius' words about Tiberius' return (II, 105): pietas sua Caesarem paene obstructis hieme Alpibus in urbem traxit. But if, as seems possible, the altar was not planned until Tiberius' adoption (June 26, 4 A. D.) there would have been very little time for its construction.

[22] On the confusing question of the date of these games see Mommsen's comments, *C. I. L.* I, 1^2, *comm. diurn.* for Jan. 17. The games were originally of three days' duration (Dio, LVI, 46, 5) but were eventually extended. Caligula was killed during this celebration to which he had, according to Josephus (*Ant.* XIX, 77), added one day to the original three. According to Dio (LIX, 29, a passage where we are dependent on Zonaras) the games at this time lasted five days and Caligula had added three additional days. From the passage it is not clear on which one of the extra days the murder took place, but Suetonius, *Gaius* 58, gives the date of Caligula's death as January 24, that is the

made a public sacrifice to Augustus.[23] I would suggest that it was at the *Ara Numinis Augusti* that the sacrifice took place. The altar would then have been on the west side of the Palatine near the temple of Apollo and the house of Augustus.[24] Perhaps it was on the occasion of the first celebration of the *ludi Palatini* in 15 A. D. that January 17 was made a public holiday. The altar of the Numen Augustum instituted at Forum Clodi three years later may have been modelled directly on the Roman altar which, as I have already suggested, was perhaps dedicated not to Numen Augusti but to Numen Augustum.

If Henzen's reconstruction of a Claudian fragment of the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* is correct, January 17 may also have been the date of the apotheosis of Livia. But the fragment, known only from inadequate manuscript authority, is uncertain in meaning.[25] The [*dedi*]*cationem* or [*consecr*]*ationem* mentioned in it may refer to the *Ara Numinis Augusti* where the sacrifices recorded, the ox for divus Augustus and the cow for diva Augusta, might properly have been made.

My purpose in this paper has been to propose restorations for the *Fasti Praenestini* as follows:

1) for the third line of the note on January 16, a later addition to the *Fasti*: TI CAESAR EX PAN[*nonia ovans urbem intr*]AVIT. The reference is, I believe, to the *ovatio* which Tiberius celebrated over the Pannonians in 9 B. C.

2) for the entries of January 17, the first two lines of which belong to the original version and the third to a later addition, the following modification of Mommsen's reconstruction:

PONTIFICES A*ugures xxviri s.f.viii*VIR . EPVLONVM . VICTVMAS . IN
Mol*ANT* . N*umini augusto ad aram q*VAM . DEDICAVIT . TI . CAESAR
FE*riae ex s . c . q*V*od eo die ti . caesar aram divo* AVG PATRI . DEDICAVIT

The *Ara Numinis Augusti*, dedicated, as we now know from the calendar of Verulae, on the wedding anniversary of Augustus

last of the added days of the festival as Dio describes its duration. See Carcopino's discussion, *Compt. Rend. Acad. Insor.*, 1923, p. 71.

[23] Josephus, *Ant.* XIX, 87.

[24] On the topography of the region see Richmond, "The Augustan Palatium," *Journal of Roman Studies* IV (1914), pp. 193 ff.

[25] *C. I. L.* VI, 2032; Henzen, *op. cit.*, LV. It is known only from the versions of Smetius and Morillon taken from Pontanus.

and Livia, may have had no connection with the *ovatio* of Tiberius. It was consecrated before 10 A. D. and probably after Tiberius' adoption in 4 A. D.: 5 and 9 A. D. seem to be the most likely years. It was perhaps identical with the altar on the Palatine where sacrifice was made to Augustus before the *ludi Palatini*, instituted by Livia in Augustus' honor in 15 A. D. Its dedication day, the anniversary of the entry of Livia into the house of Augustus, was, perhaps in that year, made the occasion of *feriae publicae*.

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THE PATHETIC FALLACY IN EARLY GREEK POETRY.

The essence of the pathetic fallacy is an illusion, more or less real, that the inanimate world is possessed of human feeling. Such an illusion may take several different forms, the most common of which is the everyday experience of mankind that certain familiar objects, such as books, ships, weapons, etc., seem to have a life of their own which is objectively impossible but yet intensely real. This phenomenon, which I have called the fallacy of "natural subjectivity," is scarcely poetic. Its chief importance is its demonstration of the facility and natural ease with which men take a subjective rather than an objective view of the world around them.

The pathetic fallacy proper, a poetic form of thought, was separated by Ruskin, who first propounded it,[1] from another phenomenon which he called the Imagination Contemplative.[2] But a careful study of his discussion of these two figures and especially of the examples he gives of each makes it apparent that they differ not in kind but only in degree. They are both fallacies of thought; the pathetic fallacy being an illusion induced by a strong emotion, the fallacy of the Imagination Contemplative being rather the product of mood. Since "mood" and "emotion" are relative terms and cannot be decisively divided one from the other, it is just, I believe, to consider the two fallacies as one, and to use the term "pathetic fallacy" for both.[3] It may be defined as the expression in poetic terms of a more or less vivid illusion induced by mood or emotion in the mind of the poet or of the character he is depicting that the inanimate world is sentient. The pathetic fallacy may appear as a single epithet or may be extended over a long passage. The

[1] In his essay "Of the Pathetic Fallacy," *Modern Painters*, Part IV, Chap. XII.

[2] "Of the Imagination Contemplative," *Modern Painters*, Part III, Sec. II, Chap. IV.

[3] In the course of this study I have used the term "fallacy of the imagination contemplative" rather than "pathetic fallacy" only when it has seemed advantageous to point out the contemplative nature of the poet's thought.

emotions with which it endows the inanimate may be simple or complex. It is to be carefully differentiated from types of expression which remove an inanimate object from its ordinary sphere and fictitiously endow it with a personality, human or supernatural, through which the poet proceeds to view it. Personified, magical, miraculous, or mystical objects have a special character which raises them to a plane on which their sentience becomes objectively real to the person who observes them. The pathetic fallacy may be applied only to inanimate things as such, things which the poet would not ordinarily conceive as sentient but which appear for the moment to be so. It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate the existence of this essentially subjective view of the world as early as Homer, to trace its development through the early Greek poets, and to show how even in the sixth century it had progressed by a process of expansion and elaboration to a point where it clearly foreshadowed the sentimental pathetic fallacies of the romantic poets.[4]

It is but rarely that any attribution of feeling to the inanimate world can be discovered in the poems of Homer. The great proportion of such ascriptions are applied to weapons, and there is little variety in the type of emotion with which they are invested. Numerically largest are the examples of the fallacy of natural subjectivity: the brave spear,[5] the ruthless stone,[6] the ship that joys in the breeze.[7] Even the more extended descriptions of these things, the spear that is "eager to sate itself with man's flesh," and all the changes that are rung on this idea, although they have the characteristics of true pathetic fallacy, never depart far from the unconscious subjective reaction which men exhibit toward the objects with which they are

[4] The extant writings of the ancient critics, e. g., Longinus, Demetrius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Aristotle, do not reveal them as recognizing any special figure in the pathetic fallacy. Aristotle mentions a form of the "analogical metaphor" (*μεταφορὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν*) which he says "makes lifeless things alive," but he does not distinguish between simple metaphor (e. g. the *flying* arrow) and true ascription of human emotion: *Rhetoric*, 3, 10-11.

[5] *ἄλκιμον ἔγχος*, *Il.*, 3, 338 *et pass.*

[6] *λᾶας ἀναιδής*, *Il.*, 4, 521, with Leaf's note; *Od.*, 11, 598; cf. *ἀναιδέος ἔχματα πέτρης*, *Il.*, 13, 139.

[7] *νῆες εἶσαι . . . ἀγαλλόμεναι Διὸς οὔρῳ*, *Od.*, 5, 175-176; cf. *Od.*, 10, 131; *Hym. Ap.*, 427.

in more or less constant association.[8] All these poetic figures are the peculiar property of the war-epic. They are not at all sentimental and remain in later literatures much what they are in Homer.

It is in the other examples, those in which Homer ascribes feeling to nature, that a type of thought is to be found that points the way to the sentimental pathetic fallacies of later ages. In spite of the exigencies of the epic, which by its very nature is ill adapted to the expression of the subjective and contemplative, Homer does occasionally give a glimpse of that sense of intimacy with his natural surroundings which the romantic poets exhibit in such extreme form. The difference between the two schools of thought is of course great in this respect as in all others. Homer limits his use of the pathetic fallacy very strictly, not only in its frequency and in the variety of emotions which he permits himself to imagine in nature, but also in the extent to which he develops any single fallacy of thought. Often it is no more than a passing hint expressed in a word or two or a brief phrase. Never does a pathetic fallacy take the main place in the thought, even for a moment. Never is it elaborate or excessive.[9] It is always kept within the due measure which an heroic theme imposes on it. Homer shows a true Hellenic desire to fit theme, form, and expression into a carefully executed pattern.[10]

On the whole Homer's use of the pathetic fallacy is limited to the depiction of the effect of contemplative mood rather than of violent emotion. Of such character is the sea that joys before Poseidon:

[8] ἐγχείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νώτου ἐνὶ γαίῃ ἔστη ἰεμένη χροὸς ἆσαι ἀνδρομέοιο, *Il.*, 21, 69-70. Cf. *Il.*, 5, 660-662; 11, 569-574; 15, 314-317, 542-543; 20, 279-280. Of the bow and arrow, *Il.*, 4, 125-126. For the "rage" of fire cf. *Il.*, 14, 394-400; 15, 605-606; 17, 736-739; 20, 490-492; 21, 12-14.

[9] Cf. A. Biese, *Das Naturgefühl im Wandel der Zeiten*, Leipzig, 1926, p. 10.

[10] If the breakdown of this Hellenic tradition may be interpreted as decadence, the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes will stand as an example of the decadent epic. One of his greatest weaknesses is the injection of the sentimental into the main theme of the poem, e. g. the farewells between Jason and his mother, *Arg.*, 1, 260-305, and the long description of Medea's passion, *Arg.*, 3, 616 ff. The passages are excellent of their kind, but they tend to disrupt the unity of the poem by introducing ideas that are more properly the province of lyric or drama than of epic.

βῆ δ' ἐλάαν ἐπὶ κύματ'· ἄταλλε δὲ κήτε' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
πάντοθεν ἐκ κευθμῶν, οὐδ' ἠγνοίησεν ἄνακτα·
γηθοσύνῃ δὲ θάλασσα διίστατο.[11]

Butcher [12] claims this as the only clear case in Homer of the endowment of inanimate nature with human emotion. And Hardie [13] has made the distinction that it is a *god*, not a *man*, to whom nature responds. This is no doubt important, for mankind has ever been willing to permit nature to leave its normal path at the behest of a god. Yet this sort of thing is comparatively rare in Homer. There are portents, like the bloody dew;[14] but the joy of the sea at Poseidon's coming is the only case in which the god does not display his might by miracles but is figured as being acclaimed by nature of its own will. Somewhat similar is the passage in which the sea surges up to the camp of the Achaeans as Poseidon leads the warriors forth.[15] The waves also part for Thetis and the nymphs,[16] and the earth sends up grass and flowers to make a couch for Zeus and Hera.[17] But in none of these cases does the inanimate world show emotion; there is nothing here but the simplest sort of divine miracle, the expression of the pious feeling that all the world, animate and inanimate, serves the gods and is utterly subject to their will. It is one thing to record miracles, and another to ascribe active feeling to nature. That the joy of the sea before Poseidon is to some extent linked with pious belief in the power of the god there can be no doubt, but only subjective imagination can come to the concept of the sea's *rejoicing* under any circumstances, even for a god. It is only the mind which has contemplated the sea in its sunlit beauty, and seen in the play of its waves a reflection of human joy, that can ascribe such an emotion to it.

In an even bolder metaphor, Homer once attributes to the waves of the sea *foreboding:*

ὡς δ' ὅτε πορφύρῃ πέλαγος μέγα κύματι κωφῷ,
ὀσσόμενον λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα

[11] *Il.*, 13, 27-29.

[12] S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*, London, 1929, p. 275, n. 1.

[13] W. R. Hardie, *Lectures on Greek Subjects*, London, 1903, p. 13. Cf. A. Biese, *Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls bei den Griechen*, Kiel, 1882, p. 18.

[14] *Il.*, 11, 52-55.

[15] *Il.*, 14, 392.

[16] *Il.*, 18, 66-67.

[17] *Il.*, 14, 347-349.

αὖτως, οὐδ' ἄρα τε προκυλίνδεται οὐδετέρωσε
πρίν τινα κεκριμένον καταβήμεναι ἐκ Διὸς οὖρον,
ὣς ὁ γέρων ὤρμαινε δαΐζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν
διχθάδι'[18]

The ascription of feeling here is clearly the result of imagination and mood. The observer watches the heavy, smooth heaving of the sea, and his foreboding of the coming storm is transferred to the sea itself, which in its strange hush and uncertain movement seems to share his feeling. This is exactly the thought-process which caused Coleridge to imagine that his grate-fire had "dim sympathies" with himself.[19]

If this passage be compared with the previous one, a significant difference will be discovered. In speaking of the sea's "rejoicing" the poet has for his starting-point an inanimate thing which he considers devoid of feeling. As he imagines the scene, the inanimate takes on, for the moment, a human quality. In the second passage, the poet enters on his comparison with a preconceived pathetic fallacy, the hesitant foreboding of the waves, which he proceeds to liken to the same feeling in Nestor. The poet has arrived at so clear a conception of emotion in the inanimate that he is able to make it the point of departure for his simile. He has already begun to feel without conscious effort that responsive spirit in nature which is so ever-present to the romantic poet.

The similes of the drooping poppy[20] and of the olive-sapling bursting into bloom[21] show that Homer was keenly aware of the loveliness of plants and flowers. He views them neither with the unimaginative objectivity of the farmer nor yet with the sentimentality of the weary city dweller. Only once in the *Iliad* does he ascribe human feeling to plants, and that in one of his most exquisite similes:

[18] *Il.*, 14, 16-21. For the meaning of *δσσόμενον* = *foreboding* we have the authority of Eustathius and Suidas, who explain it by *προσημαίνον*, *προμαντευόμενον*. Cf. also *Il.*, 1, 105; 18, 224. For the *sleep* of the waves cf. *Od.*, 12, 168-169: *αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο ἠδὲ γαλήνη ἔπλετο νηνεμίη, κοίμησε δὲ κύματα δαίμων.*

[19] In *Frost at Midnight*, quoted by Ruskin in the essay "Of the Imagination Contemplative," paragraph 6.

[20] *Il.*, 8, 306-308.

[21] *Il.*, 17, 53-58; cf. in the *Odyssey* the palm-tree, 6, 162-167; the hyacinth, 6, 231 and 23, 158; and the thistle-down, 5, 328-329.

ἦ ῥα, καὶ ἵππον ἄγων μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱὸς
ἐν χείρεσσι τίθει Μενελάου· τοῖο δὲ θυμὸς
ἰάνθη ὡς εἴ τε περὶ σταχύεσσιν ἐέρσῃ
λῃΐου ἀλδήσκοντος, ὅτε φρίσσουσιν ἄρουραι.[22]

If the *Odyssey* affords no exact parallel to this, there is an example which is not entirely dissimilar in the idyllic description of Calypso's grotto:

ἡ δ' αὐτοῦ τετάνυστο περὶ σπείους γλαφυροῖο
ἡμερὶς ἠβώωσα, τεθήλει δὲ σταφυλῇσι.[23]

The reference is obviously to the luxurious foliage of the vine; it is in the prime of its vigor. But the verb ἠβάω is not used of any but human subjects in Homer except at this one place. It means, of course, *to be in the vigor of youth*,[24] and the emphasis is distinctly on the *strength* of youth rather than its beauty; but it contains in it all the qualities of the strong young man.[25] The corresponding quality in the plant is indicated by the adjective ἐριθηλές[26] or the verb θάλλω (θηλέω). The use of ἠβάω with a vine may be merely objective: as the man is young, strong, and beautiful, so the plant is young, strong, and beautiful. However, the verb is so strongly human in all its connotations that I am inclined to believe that its application to a plant is distinctly subjective. With its rich and luxuriant growth the vine seems to feel its youth and strength as a young man does. It is "in the pride of its prime," as A. T. Murray has aptly translated.[27] If this be true, then the vine has been endowed with human feeling. The joy of the observer of the lovely scene has found a sympathetic response in the scene itself. It is a fleeting metaphor on which the poet does not dwell; indeed, he changes over immediately to the word more usual for plants: τεθήλει δὲ σταφυλῇσι.

Ideas like these do not occur to anyone who has not looked thoughtfully on nature and gained from that observation a feel-

[22] *Il.*, 23, 596-599.

[23] *Od.*, 5, 68-69.

[24] Cf. *Il.*, 7, 157: εἰθ' ὣς ἠβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη. Cf. *Od.*, 14, 468.

[25] Cf. the line describing Hermes, *Il.*, 24, 348 and *Od.*, 10, 279: κούρῳ . . . ἐοικὼς πρῶτον ὑπηνήτῃ, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἥβη.

[26] *Il.*, 17, 53, ἔρνος ἀνὴρ ἐριθηλὲς ἐλαίης.

[27] In his Loeb Library translation.

ing, however slight or rudimentary, of intimacy with what he beheld. Homer approaches these things with pleasure and affection, and very definitely sees in them a reflection of his own emotions. That the resulting "fallacies of the imagination contemplative" are clear, limpid, and sincere instead of melancholy or sentimental, is not to be traced to a lack of the type of thought which characterizes a city-sick Theocritus or Wordsworth, but to the fact that it is exercised by a steady, clear mind rather than by a morbid one. Any poet who deals with nature is bound to see there the mirror of himself, to succumb to the pathetic fallacy. The mirror in each case reflects only the image that is cast on it. The sentimental poet differs from Homer not in having a deeper sense of intimacy with nature but in feeling compelled to seek that intimacy rather than simply to accept it. Homer feels that the grain joys in the dew and allows us to see that he does so, but he does not feel impelled to rush out in a happy moment to share his delight with the dewy field. These examples exhibit more than a mere beginning[28] of a subjective attitude toward the inanimate world. But the field in which this attitude finds its expression is extremely narrow, and in this respect Homer's pathetic fallacies may be rightly considered a beginning. In the few features of nature which Homer knew well, he could and did see a response to human emotion. The poets whose province was the depiction of thought rather than of action search farther than sea and growing grain. And the turgid imagination of the sentimental poet constructs in all the world around himself a refuge of sympathy from unfeeling mankind. The thought that characterizes Homer undergoes not a change in kind but an increase in quantity and a loss in clarity.

The poems of Hesiod add nothing to the Homeric picture. The *Works and Days* and the *Theogony* are even less concerned with the contemplation of nature as such than are the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. An all-embracing mythology has endowed nature with a host of living spirits, through which Hesiod views any beauty or sympathy he may see there. The few examples of pathetic fallacy in his works exhibit a far shallower and more elementary sense of intimacy with the inanimate world than do those of

[28] Cf. Biese, *Das Naturgefühl*, pp. 1-2, 10, 34; Hardie, *Lectures*, p. 34; Butcher, *Greek Genius*, p. 250.

Homer.[29] Hesiod is less the poet than the industrious farmer and serious teacher.

In the *Homeric Hymns* external nature is almost completely absorbed by mythology. But the single example of the pathetic fallacy in the *Hymn to Demeter* is of great significance. When Persephone is carried off by Pluto she cries for help, but no one hears her:

> οὐδέ τις ἀθανάτων οὐδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
> ἤκουσεν φωνῆς, οὐδ' ἀγλαόκαρποι ἐλαῖαι·[30]

The word ἐλαῖαι has been held corrupt by many editors, but has been well defended by Sikes and Allen.[31] They point out the error of attempting to supplant the word by the name of a person or god, since all such have been excluded by the preceding line, with the express exception of Helios and Hecate.[32] In view of the examples of the pathetic fallacy cited from Homer,[33] it is certainly wrong to exclude the word on the grounds that such an idea is contrary to Greek poetical taste. The olive-trees that ought to have heard the maiden's cries but did not are a true example of the pathetic fallacy.[34]

Yet this passage carries us farther than do the Homeric examples. Homer has shown us a nature that seemed to know emotional responses to natural phenomena, to react to its own good or bad fortune. He has even imagined that the sea could show joy before some more or less external event, the passage of Poseidon over its surface. But Poseidon is after all the god of the sea. Persephone has no specific connection with olive-trees; they seem to stand here for nature in general, which is figured as being able to react emotionally to a circumstance quite outside its own vicissitudes. Here is a nature tacitly reproached because

[29] Cf. *Theog.*, 40-43; 252-254; 847-849. In the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield* occurs a single example, and that borrowed from Homer, *Asp.*, 437-440; cf. *Il.*, 13, 136-142.

[30] *Hym. Dem.*, 22-23.

[31] On v. 23.

[32] v. 24-26. Nymphs are excluded as well: *ibid.*

[33] *Il.*, 13, 27-29; 23, 596-599; *Od.*, 5, 68-69.

[34] Strictly speaking, the "antipathetic" fallacy, that is, the thought that nature is not responding when she should. The distinction is made by A. S. Pease, in his article "Notes on the Pathetic Fallacy in Latin Poetry," *C. J.*, XXII (1926-27), pp. 651-652.

it did not show pity for an unfortunate girl. This is sentimental pathetic fallacy of the type which so seized on the imagination of the romantic poet. It is to be noticed that the example occurs in conjunction with a sentimental love-tale.[85] The lack of such themes in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* probably explains the absence in those poems of any figures of this kind. It would be distinctly dangerous to infer that because Homer *did* not picture a nature that sympathized with human beings, he therefore *could* not have done so, had his subject called for treatment of this kind. The appearance in the *Hymn to Demeter* of sentimental pathetic fallacy, restrained and brief though it is, is but one more proof of the existence of a subjective, contemplative view of nature among the early Greeks.

In the case of Empedocles and Parmenides, the examples which seem to depict a nature endowed with human feeling are of little importance for the history of the pathetic fallacy. They represent a side-development which is not productive of new forms or uses of the ascription of emotion to the inanimate world. Chiefly significant is the fact that they show how easily the human imagination, under the influence of any subjective thought—in their case, mysticism—will slip into the belief that the external world is in some way capable of showing characteristically human reactions. Possibly worth mentioning is the *gentle moon* (ἰλάειρα σελήνη, Emped. frg. 40, Diels), which is contrasted with the *sharp-rayed sun* (ἥλιος ὀξυβέλης, *ibid.*), and has a certain resemblance to Vergil's *amica silentia lunae* (*Aen.*, 2, 255).

On the whole it may be said that the earliest period of Greek poetry manifests in a somewhat circumscribed field the essential forms of the pathetic fallacy. The two chief ideas, that nature feels emotion within herself and that nature is aware of and may sympathize with the vicissitudes of those external to herself, are both present. The examples are few in number, simple, and clear in expression, and remain a mere substratum of thought which appears briefly to make vivid an emotional moment and then is lost again.

The individualistic seventh and sixth centuries carry the

[85] This type of story, together with great exaggeration of its sentimental expression, became the stock-in-trade of the Alexandrians. Cf. E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*, Leipzig, 1914³, p. 36.

pathetic fallacy much farther in a poetry which deals intimately with men's thoughts and feelings. Although the subjective Mimnermus shows no interest in nature, the objective Solon seizes on it and brilliantly turns its fancied emotions to poetic use. The fragments of his poems betray no deep love of nature but only a keen eye for it.[36] Solon's great contribution is his use of the pathetic fallacy as a symbol of human feeling. The sea to him is the mirror of the state: if it be not stirred up, it is most law-abiding:

> ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράσσεται· ἢν δέ τις αὐτὴν
> μὴ κίνῃ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτη.[37]

Symbolism of this type, in which the emotion of nature is accepted as poetic fact and used independently to picture the feeling of men, represents a high stage in the development of the pathetic fallacy. When such passages are detached from the human, and the poet's personality is completely withdrawn,[38] they represent the highest possible point to which the ascription of feeling to the inanimate world can go.[39] The poet views himself and his emotions through the emotions of nature, as in Heine's poem:

> Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam
> Im Norden auf kahler Höh'.
> Ihn schläfert; mit weisser Decke
> Umhüllen ihn Eis und Schnee.
>
> Er träumt von einer Palme,
> Die fern im Morgenland
> Einsam und schweigend trauert
> Auf brennender Felsenwand.

Solon is still very far from such extravagance, both in the character of his thought, which is clear and simple, and in the extent of his development of such modes of expression. But he is pointing the way, showing the beginnings from which a symbolism of the type seen in Heine's poem is to develop.

[36] Cf. frg. 1, 17-25, Diehl.

[37] frg. 11, Diehl. Cf. I. M. Linforth on this fragment (19 in his *Solon the Athenian*, Berkeley, 1919).

[38] The fragment quoted above was doubtless connected with some longer passage in which the precise point of the symbolism was clearly demonstrated: cp. Linforth's note, *ibid.*

[39] Cp. Biese, *Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls*, p. 21.

Aside from this new turn, the pathetic fallacy shows no remarkable traits in Solon. It is naturally more prominent in the short poem than in the epic, but it does not betray the contemplative affection that could cause Homer to fancy that the grain joyed in the dew.

Archilochus and Semonides are of the same school as Solon, so far as the pathetic fallacy is concerned. Archilochus has left us the earliest example of the apostrophe to nature,[40] a form of the pathetic fallacy destined to receive great elaboration at the hands of the tragedians. But the epitaph in which this occurs is distinctly restrained in tone, and there is present no more than a vague hint that the earth might share in the poet's sadness. As an example of the illusion of sentience in the inanimate world this apostrophe is on no higher level than the Homeric instances. It cannot be said of the group of elegiac and iambic poets that they were more aware than their predecessors of a world of emotion in inanimate things; one can only say that their use of this thought was more striking and prominent.[41]

Of the Melic poets, Alcaeus is on the same plane as the elegiac and iambic writers. His pathetic fallacies are of precisely the same type as those of Solon, brilliant and picturesque, but betraying the keen rather than the pensive imagination. To the winds he ascribes quarrelsomeness,[42] but aside from that never in the extant fragments endows nature with emotion. He, too, pictures the inanimate as the symbol of the human in the figure of the ship of state,[43] but it is doubtful if there is in these passages any deeply felt ascription of feeling to the ship.[44]

But with Sappho the pathetic fallacy moves on to new development. In the quiet tone of contemplation that pervades her

[40] 16, Diehl. A good example of the pathetic fallacy occurs in Semonides' *Satire on Women* (7, Diehl), vss. 37-40.

[41] The omission of the exordium to Theognis' gnomic elegies may excite some comment, especially in view of Biese's almost ecstatic praise of the passage in his article "Die poetische Naturbeseelung bei den Griechen," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, XX (1890), pp. 249-250. But a comparison of Theognis' lines with the *Hymn to Apollo*, vss. 116-118, shows that Theognis is doing no more than repeating mythological tradition.

[42] *τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν*, frg. 30, 1, Diehl.

[43] frgs. 30, 46. 3-5, Diehl.

[44] Cf. Horace, *Odes*, I, 14.

nature-pictures she returns to the type of thought that underlay the pathetic fallacies of Homer. But where he had been content with glimpses and hints of his feeling, Sappho raises it to far higher prominence. Nature is continually revealing to her the reflection of her own moods; there is a sense of intimacy between herself and her surroundings such as no other poet as yet had achieved. Where her predecessors saw a sentient nature here and there, she searches for that sentience with affection and sincerity; not, like the sentimental poet, because she is weary of mankind, but because she feels the harmony of life and believes that it must be expressed in all parts of the world. Exquisite is the following picture of the lonely hour of midnight:

δέδυκε μὲν ἀ σελάννα
καὶ πληίαδες· μέσαι δὲ
νύκτες, παρὰ δ' ἔρχετ' ὤρα·
ἐγὼ δὲ μόνα κατεύδω.[45]

Biese says of this that it is "schlicht wie ein Volkslied"[46] and in another place compares it to Mörike's *Die Verlassene*.[47] Loneliness pervades the scene; it is not a mere pretty way of saying that it is late. If we keep in mind the importance of this pervading mood in the poetry of Sappho we shall be the better able to detect the delicacy with which she ascribes emotions and moods to the inanimate world.

Full of the peace of the countryside is the following fragment:

ἀμφὶ δ' ὕδωρ
⟨ἴψοθεν⟩ ψῦχρον κελάδει δι' ὔσδων
μαλίνων, αἰθυσσομένων δὲ φύλλων
κῶμα κατάρρει.[48]

If we need verbal proof that Sappho has extended her own mood to the quiet drip of the water and the rustling leaves, we may find it in the phrase κῶμα κατάρρει. The scene is pervaded with a drowsy peace, and it is surely out of place to call such delicate subjectivity an objective description of water and leaves, simply because Sappho does not say, "I am drowsy; the rustling leaves, from which the rain softly drips, are drowsy, too."

[45] frg. 94, Diehl.
[46] *Das Naturgefühl*, p. 17.
[47] *Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls*, p. 29.
[48] frg. 5, Diehl.

With a clear reflection of human feeling the stars hide their shining faces when the full moon appears:

ἄστερες μὲν ἀμφὶ κάλαν σελάνναν
αἶψ' ἀπυκρύπτοισι φάεννον εἶδος,
ὅππότα πλήθουσα μάλιστα λάμπῃ
γᾶν ⟨ἐπὶ παῖσαν⟩[49]

The passage probably served as a symbol for the retirement of modest maidens when the one of superlative beauty appeared.[50] Such delicate symbolism seems clearly to indicate a deep feeling of intimacy with nature, a thoughtful, almost melancholy contemplation of the beauties of night. But the clarity of Sappho's thought is still in strong contrast to Heine's cloudy sentimentality.[51]

The pathetic fallacy in the delicate form which Sappho gave it became of real significance for its own sake, and was no longer merely an illustration or simile. One final step she never took: nature's sympathy never supplanted for her the companionship of human beings. It served only as a beautiful background and complement to human life. In this she differs from the truly sentimental poet, and in this lies the clarity and purity of her thought, which is never tinged with morbidness or the ineffectual longing for what is not.

The single extant example of the pathetic fallacy in the poems of Alcman is of the Sapphic type:

εὕδουσιν δ' ὀρέων κορυφαί τε καὶ φάραγγες,
πρώονές τε καὶ χαράδραι,
φῦλά τ' ἑρπετὰ ⟨τ⟩όσ⟨σ⟩α τρέφει μέλαινα γαῖα,
θῆρές τ' ὀρεσκῷοι καὶ γένος μελισσᾶν
καὶ κνώδαλ' ἐν βένθεσ⟨σ⟩ι πορφυρέας ἁλός·
εὕδουσιν δ' οἰωνῶν φῦλα τανυπτερύγων.[52]

This "fallacy of the imagination contemplative" inevitably calls to mind Goethe's "Über allen Gipfeln ist Ruh'." The

[49] frg. 4, Diehl.

[50] Cf. Biese, *Die Entwicklung*, p. 29.

[51] Other possible examples: frgs. 116, 117, Diehl.

[52] frg. 58, Diehl; cf. Statius, *Silv.*, 5, 4, 3-6: tacet omne pecus volucresque feraeque et simulant fessos curvata cacumina somnos, nec trucibus fluviis idem sonus; occidit horror aequoris, et terris maria inclinata quiescunt, and Verg., *Aen.*, 4, 522-527.

mood which enfolds all things, nature and man alike, we have already seen exemplified in Sappho. "The ancient poet," says Butcher, "merely strikes the keynote which asserts the harmony between creation in all its parts, and leaves the rest to the suggestion of the hearer." [53] This is certainly true, as far as can be judged from the extant fragments, of the lyricists of the seventh and sixth centuries. But it is wrong to assume that no ancient poet has looked on a scene, which to him was filled with the reflection of his own feelings, and then turned to tell how the contemplation of that sympathy makes him feel. Passages of this sort are to be found in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*,[54] and examples can be quoted from Roman literature.[55] The sleep of nature reveals the same affectionate searching of nature that has been seen in Sappho's lyrics. Alcman, however, has elaborated the pathetic fallacy and brought it into still greater prominence. It is carried over several lines and has for the moment, at least, taken the place of prime interest instead of being subordinated to some other idea. The fragment does not reveal in what connection Alcman used it, and for the purposes of this study it makes no difference what the whole poem may have had for its subject. There is a soft melancholy about the lines, which taken in conjunction with truly sentimental fragments like the "Halcyon," [56] makes it a probable assumption that the poem was sentimental in tone and the pathetic fallacy a sentimental one.

The fragments of Ibycus reveal nothing new,[57] but Simonides of Ceos again raises the pathetic fallacy to prominence in the Danaë-fragment:

ὅτε
λάρνακι ἐν δαιδαλέᾳ
ἄνεμός τέ μιν πνέων
κινηθεῖσά τε λίμνα
δείματι ἤρειπεν οὔ τ' ἀδιάντοισι παρειαῖς,
ἀμφί τε Περσεῖ βάλεν φίλαν χέρ' εἰπέ τ'· ὦ τέκος,
οἷον ἔχω πόνον·
σὺ δ' ἀωτεῖς· γαλαθηνῷ τ'

[53] *Greek Genius*, p. 276.

[54] e. g. 1452-1468.

[55] e. g. Catullus, 31; Lucr., 2, 552-559; 4, 168-173; Verg., *Georg.*, 2, 136-176; Tib., 1, 1, 45-48; Prop., 1, 18, 1-4, 19-22.

[56] frg. 94, Diehl.

[57] frg. 6, Diehl, is a pretty example of the "antipathetic" fallacy.

ἤτορι κνώσσεις ἐν ἀτερπεῖ δούρατι,
χαλκεογόμφῳ δὲ νυκτί
λάμπεις κυανέῳ τε δνόφῳ ταθείς.
ἄλμαν δ' ὕπερθεν τεᾶν κομᾶν βαθεῖαν
παριόντος κύματος οὐκ
ἀλέγεις οὐδ' ἀνέμου φθόγγον πορφυρέᾳ κείμενος
ἐν χλανίδι καλὸν πρόσωπον.
εἰ δέ τοι δεινὸν τό γε δεινὸν ἦν, καί κεν
ἐμῶν ῥημάτων λεπτὸν ὑπεῖχες οὖας.
κέλομ', εὕδε, βρέφος, εὑδέτω δὲ πόντος, εὑδέτω
ἄμετρον κακόν· μεταιβολία δέ τις φανείη,
Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἐκ σέο.
ὅτι δὴ θαρσαλέον ἔπος
εὔχομαι καὶ νόσφι δίκας, σύγγνωθί μοι.[58]

The stormy sea reflects the unrest and fear in Danaë's heart and is contrasted with the sleep of the child Perseus. In this the passage is remarkably like the lines of Theocritus to which both Butcher [59] and Biese [60] have compared it:

ἡνίδε σιγᾷ μὲν πόντος, σιγῶντι δ' ἀῆται,
ἃ δ' ἐμὰ οὐ σιγᾷ στέρνων ἔντοσθεν ἀνία.[61]

Simonides is, however, more subtle in his attribution of feeling to the sea; like Sappho, he allows the pervading mood of the passage to suggest to the reader the reflection of human feeling which he sees in nature, and does not feel the need to say in so many words that the restlessness of the sea is like the restlessness of Danaë. And he goes still farther. Danaë, in an outburst of distress, calls to the waves for sympathy and begs them to show it by sleeping, thus in effect expressing a double pathetic fallacy. The emotion is clear and strong, and includes the child, the waves, and the abstraction sorrow in an all-embracing ascription of feeling.[62] This is perhaps the clearest example of pathetic fallacy in all early Greek literature, and is very close indeed, if not exactly parallel, to Kingsley's

They rowed her in across the foam,
The cruel, crawling foam.[63]

[58] frg. 13, Diehl.
[59] *Greek Genius*, p. 276.
[60] "Die poetische Naturbeseelung," p. 255.
[61] *Idyll* 2, 38-39.
[62] Cf. Biese, *Die Entwicklung*, p. 32.
[63] From *Alton Locke*, quoted by Ruskin in his essay "Of the Pathetic Fallacy," paragraph 5. For another example of the pathetic fallacy in Simonides, cp. 80, Diehl (*Anth. Pal.*, 7, 496).

If the earliest Greek poetry laid down the essential forms of the pathetic fallacy, it was the lyric of the seventh and sixth centuries that widened its field and elaborated its forms. All nature, not just a few of her best-known features, has been brought into the circle, especially by Sappho. The pathetic fallacy of this period, as of the earlier one, is for the most part the result of contemplative mood rather than of violent emotion. Through affection and a delicate sense of harmony the poets have come to the feeling that nature is akin to them and that its sympathies can be found and experienced. Through their work the pathetic fallacy has assumed nearly all the forms to be seen in modern poetry. Three steps alone remain to be taken: the sympathies of nature have yet to be sought in preference to those of men, man has yet to find real consolation in them, and the pathetic fallacy has yet to become the subject of a complete poem. The subjective attitude toward the inanimate world is as old as Homer and perhaps even older, and existed concurrently with that objectivity which is the great salient characteristic of Hellenic thought. Later ages have added little to the essential spirit of the thing; it has been their contribution—or their fault—to seize upon it as the more significant and more satisfying view of the world and to dwell upon it and elaborate it to the point where objectivity was overwhelmed in a tide of exaggerated sentimentality.[64]

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AN ORDINANCE OF THE SALT MERCHANTS.

The papyrus (P. Mich. Inv. 657; 47 A. D.; 12.9 × 26.7 cm.) is badly broken along the lower part of a crease which coincided roughly with the beginning of the lines of the text; other breaks occur along the course of a second crease down the center of the sheet; the bottom is frayed away, although the original length does not seem to have been greater than the longest portions still remaining. The hand is a small upright cursive written with a fine pen and, except in the damaged portions, the ink is well preserved.

The text is an agreement entered into by the salt merchants of Tebtunis for the conduct of their business during the coming eighth year of Claudius (47-48 A. D.).[1] It is expressed in the form of a *νόμος*, like similar ordinances drawn up by the members of religious gilds and occupational associations,[2] and offers a close parallel of that of the association of the *ἀπολύσιμοι* of an estate of Claudius.[3] The names and signalments of the persons concerned were appended to the document. Traces of five of these still remain and this seems to have been the original number. Whether or not they were organized as a gild is uncertain, but the fact that one of them is styled *ἡγούμενος* (l. 43) certainly suggests that this was the case. At any rate it would accord with the practice in vogue among other groups of tradesmen.[4]

The nomos embodies the following resolutions. (1) The election of one of the salt merchants, Apunchis son of Orseus, to act as their superintendent (*ἐπιμελητής*) and as collector of the public revenues (*εἴσακτος τῶν δημοσίων*) for the eighth year (ll. 2-7). Some of the duties of the superintendentship are given below (ll. 37-42), but the title implies a general oversight over the actions of his fellow merchants in the conduct of their trade and the enforcement of the terms of the nomos. Although the title

[1] This is a preliminary report of a papyrus that will be published in Part II of the Michigan *Papyri from Tebtunis*.

[2] C. Roberts, T. Skeat and A. D. Nock, "The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXIX (1936), p. 44, n. 1; *νόμος πυμένων*, P. Mich. II, 126, recto; XVI, 12; *νόμος οἰκοδόμων*, *id.* XVII, 39.

[3] P. Mich. Inv. 1277.

[4] San Nicolò, *Aegyptisches Vereinswesen*, I, pp. 129-142.

εἴσακτος is hitherto unattested; its meaning is perfectly obvious from the εἰσάγοντος τὰ δημόσια of l. 8. The eisaktos has to collect the revenues due to the state from the ἁλοπῶλαι. These revenues are defined as τῆς αὐτῆς ἐργασίας (l. 8) and must have been the dues which the salt merchants paid for the right to exercise their trade, that is, the sum for which they bought from the state the control of the salt traffic in Tebtunis and certain adjacent villages. There is nothing here to imply any reference to the ἁλική or salt tax collected by the state on a *per capita* basis in the Fayûm,[5] since the dues are said to be from the trade (ἐργασία) itself.

(2) The agreement that all of the salt merchants concerned shall have the right to sell salt in Tebtunis itself (ll. 9-10). This precludes any single merchant from enjoying a monopoly of the largest market under the control of the concessionaires. We do not know whether the salt merchants at Tebtunis had their shops in the same quarter, but such was the case at Arsinoe, at least in Byzantine times,[6] and possibly at other places in the Fayûm.[7]

(3) The assignment to Orseus of the sole right to sell gypsum in Tebtunis and the adjacent villages, in consideration of a special payment of 66 drachmas, over and above his share of the public dues (ll. 11-15). Orseus is said to have obtained this concession by lot (κεκληρῶσθαι), but we may assume that certain other factors were taken into consideration, such as the financial responsibility of the individual and due rotation of opportunity within the group. This is the first intimation that we have had that the sale of gypsum was in the hands of the salt merchants and subject to state supervision. What villages were included under the term συνκυροῦσαι κῶμαι (l. 13) cannot be determined from this document. Apparently Kerkesis was, since no specific mention is made of the gypsum concession there, although the salt concession is recorded (ll. 15-16); but Tristomou was not (ll. 18-19). Likewise Ibion Eikosipentarouron and Tali, although they had the same grapheion as Tebtunis, do not come into

[5] Cf. A. C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt*, p. 326; P. Oslo, p. 6, n. 4.

[6] Cf. the ἁλοπωλίων ἄμφοδον of SB. 5273, 3, 475 A. D.

[7] Stud. Pal. X, 125, 2, V-VI cent.

question here since each of these had its own group of salt merchants.[8]

(4) The assignment to the same Orseus of the sole right to sell salt in Kerkesis, in consideration of a further additional payment of eight drachmas (ll. 15-17).

(5) The assignment to Harmiusis also called Belles, son of Harmiusis, of the sole right to sell both salt and gypsum in the village of Tristomou, in consideration of a payment of five drachmas in addition to his share of the state dues (ll. 17-21). The *κώμη Τριστόμου τοῦ καὶ* Βουκόλου is obviously identical with the Βουκόλ(ων) *τοῦ καὶ Τριστόμου* of P. Lond. 1219, 2.[9] As regards the latter name, the editors of P. Tebt. II (p. 405) state that they are uncertain whether the nominative is *Τρίστομος* or *Τρίστομον*. I venture to suggest that the genitive *Τριστόμου* was the regular form with *κώμη* either expressed or understood. Perhaps the Βουκόλ(ων) of P. Lond. 1219, 2 should be read Βουκόλ(ου).

(6) The fixing of the price for the several grades of salt (ll. 21-24). There were three grades: *καλός*, *λεπτός*, and *λεπτότερος*, of which the first sold for 2½ obols, the second for 2 obols, and the third for 1½ obols for a *μέτρον*. The *μέτρον* was 1/10 of an artab or 4 choinikes.[10] The only other reference to the price of salt in Egypt up to the time of Diocletian is found in P. Lond. 1170 verso, an account of expenses on a large estate from the year 258-259 A. D. There (l. 124) a metron of salt was valued at 1 drachma. However, nothing is said about the grade of the salt, and the higher price is easily explained by the depreciation of the coinage in the third century.[11] The metron in question here is defined as that of the salt merchants themselves or that of the warehouse (ll. 23-24), which implies that both were of the same standard. Another implication is that the warehouse (*θησαυρός*) did not belong to the salt merchants but was the place from which they secured their salt. If this inference is correct, we have to suppose that the salt was brought to Tebtunis by a wholesale dealer or dealers who pro-

[8] P. Tebt. II, recto; XXI, 40; XXII, 27.
[9] Cf. P. Tebt. II, p. 374.
[10] Segré, *Metrologia*, p. 31.
[11] Johnson, *Roman Egypt*, pp. 436-437.

cured it from the producers. The salt merchants, accordingly, had control of local distribution only. That a salt warehouse existed at Tebtunis in Ptolemaic times is revealed by P. Tebt. III, 732, of about 142 B. C., which refers to the sale of the retail monopoly of salt held at the warehouse at the dromos. It is noteworthy that there was no fixed price for gypsum.

(7) The specification of the penalty to be paid by anyone who sold at a price lower than those stipulated (ll. 24-26). This was fixed at a fine of eight drachmas to be paid to the common fund of the salt dealers and a like amount to the state. This provision was to prevent price cutting among the merchants themselves. Apparently no penalty was provided for selling at a higher price than agreed upon, but this may have been an unlikely occurrence in view of other factors unknown to us.

(8) A prohibition for any single dealer to sell more than a stater's worth of salt to an ἔμπορος, under penalty of a fine, and a provision that such sales should be participated in jointly by all the salt merchants (ll. 26-31). The phrase πλύωι στατῆρος ἁλ{λ}ὸς (ll. 27-28) might be translated "more than a stater of salt" rather than "more than a stater's worth of salt," but in view of the fact that the weight of a stater (= 4 drachmas) was only about half an ounce,[12] the former interpretation seems to be ruled out here. In spite of a certain confusion in the use of the terms ἔμπορος and κάπηλος, in general the former refers to traders and wholesale merchants, whereas the latter applies to petty shopkeepers.[13] But here, apparently, ἔμπορος refers to any trader at all. The fine assessed upon the dealer who violated this restriction upon his right of sale was 8 drachmas for the common fund and a like sum for the public treasury. Apparently this rule was laid down in order to assure to all alike an equal share in the profits of a large transaction.

(9) A provision that if anyone brings in gypsum to Tebtunis with the intention of selling it outside the village (ἐπὶ ξένης) he must store it on the premises of Orseus, son of Harmiusis, until he takes it away to sell it (ll. 31-34). This restriction might apply equally well to the salt merchants themselves or to

[12] Or 14.5 metric grams; cf. Segré, *Metrologia e circolazione monetaria*, p. 49.

[13] Cf. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, ss. vv.

any others who might be engaged in the gypsum trade. Storage under the supervision of Orseus, son of Harmiusis, is specified probably because he was the Orseus who had the concession to sell gypsum in Tebtunis (ll. 11-12).

(10) A provision that each of the associates shall drink a chous of beer every month on the 25th, coupled with the regulation of some fines, the purport of which is dubious owing to the condition of the text but which seem to be penalties for failure to observe the obligation aforesaid (ll. 34-37). The interpretation of this clause which suggests itself most readily is that we have here regulations governing a monthly meeting of the associates, which took the form of a symposium, on the date of the voting of the nomos (cf. l. 2), such as is stipulated also in the nomos of the ἀπολύσιμοι of the Claudian estate.[14] Apparently failure to attend the meeting was punished by a fine which varied under different circumstances.[15]

(11) An authorization to the superintendent, Apunchis, to take into custody any of the associates who fail to render their accounts or to fulfill any obligations towards the state or satisfy any claims that may be made against them, wherever they may be, and to turn them over to the proper official (ll. 37-42). This was a provision necessary to give Apunchis the authority to exercise in an effective fashion his functions as superintendent. The epimelites of the Claudian ἀπολύσιμοι had similar powers.[16]

From the foregoing analysis of our document we may present a general picture of the local operation of the salt monopoly in the Fayûm shortly before the middle of the first century A. D., although there are many aspects of the system that still remain obscure. At that time the salt merchants of Tebtunis formed an association (σύνοδος?) and collectively enjoyed a monopolistic concession of the right to sell both salt and gypsum in Tebtunis itself and a number of adjacent villages. It is obvious that such a monopoly could only be secured from the representatives of the state, but the terms of this contract are not specified. The concessionaries are, however, under obligation to make payments to the state (τὰ δημόσια), towards which each contributes his share,

[14] Inv. 1277, 14-15.
[15] Cf. the parallel scale of fines in Inv. 1277, 7-9.
[16] Inv. 1277, 18-20.

although they doubtless have assumed collective responsibility. It is an open question whether these dues represent a definite sum offered as the purchase price of the monopoly or a percentage on the returns from the sale of salt and gypsum with a guaranteed minimum. We know that the salt merchants of Ibion Eikosipentarouron in 46 B. C. filed a report (*ἀναφόρια*) of their sales which amounted to 576 dr.,[17] and that apparently those of Tali and another village,[18] as well as the *ἁλοπῶλαι* of Tebtunis itself in the same or the following year,[19] drew up similar records. It would seem unnecessary to present such reports unless they had some reference to the amounts due to the state. We also find that the salt merchants of Tebtunis reported a phoros of 208 dr. in 46 A. D.,[20] which one may reasonably interpret as the price paid for their [21] concession and as identical with the *δημόσια* referred to above. Since one of the duties of the superintendent of the association was to collect the *δημόσια* from his associates and since the several members were required to file accounts, the evidence seems to be in favor of the *φόρος* being based on the amounts of the sales. Although the salt merchants apparently bought their supplies from an importer or a government warehouse, they enjoyed full control over its distribution. They chose their own superintendent, sublet local concessions to members of their own group, fixed prices, and laid down other regulations for their own conduct which they enforced by various penalties. Besides selling to private individuals, they also sold salt to traders who probably retailed it in very small quantities.

ἔτους ἑβδόμου Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ
αὐτοκράτορος μηνὸς Καισαρήου κε. ἐλθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὼ ὑ ὑπο-
γεγραμμένω ἄνδρες ἁλοπόλυ τῶν ἀπὸ Τεβτύνεος ἔδοξαν{σαν}
ἑαυτῦς κυνῆ γνώμῃ προχιρίσαι τινὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
τὸν καὶ ἐπιμελιτὴν καὶ εἰσάκτον τῶν δημοσίων Ἀπύνχιν
Ὀρσεῦτος τοῦ ἰσιόντος ὀγδώου ἔτους Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου
Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, τοῦ αὐτοῦ
Ἀπύνχεος εἰσάγοντος τὰ δημόσια τῆς αὐτῆς ἐργασίας
ἅπαντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἰσιόντος ἔτους, καὶ πάντας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐ-

[17] P. Mich. 123, recto, XXII, 27.
[18] *Id.* XXI, 40.
[19] *Id.* 128, III, 10.
[20] *Id.* VII, 27.
[21] Cf. the *φόρος ὀρβιοπώλιος* of P. Bouriant 13, 4.

τὸ πολῖν τό ται ἄλα ἐν τῇ προκιμένῃ κώμῃ Τεβτῦνι καὶ κεκληρῶσθαι τὸν μὲν Ὀρσεῦν μόνον πολῖν τὸ γύπσος {μόνος} ἐν τῇ προκιμένῃ κώμῃ Τεβτῦνι καὶ ἐν ταῖς συνκυροῦσι κώμαις, ὑπὲρ οὗ διαγράψι χορὶς τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος αὐτῷ μέρους τῶν δημοσίων ἄλλας ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς ἑξήκοντα ἕξ, καὶ ὁμοίως ὁ αὐτὸς Ὀρσεῦς κεκληρῶσθαι τὴν Κερκῆσιν τοῦ πολῖν ἐν αὐτῇ μόνος ἄλ{λ}α, ὑπὲρ οὗ διαγράψι ὁμοίως {ὑπὲρ τούτων} ἄλλας ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς ὀκτώι, καὶ κεκληρῶσθαι Ἀρμῦσιν τὸν καὶ Βελλῆν Ἀρμύσιος μόνος τοῦ πολῖν ἄλα καὶ γύψος ἐν κώμῃ Τριστόμου τοῦ καὶ Βουκόλου, ὑπὲρ οὗ τελέσι χορὶς τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος αὐτῷ μέρους δημοσίων ἄλλας ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς πέντε, ἐφ' ᾧ πωλήσουσι τὸ ἄλα τὸ καλὸν ἐξ ὀβολῶν δύο ἡμίσους καὶ τὸ λεπ{π}τὸν ὀβολῶν δύο καὶ τοὐπεὶ τὸ λεπ{π}τότερον ὀβολοῦ ἑνὸς ἡμίσους τῷ τε ἡ[μ]ῶν μέτρῳ ἢ τῷ τοῦ θησαυροῦ. ὡς ἂν τις πολήσι ἐλάττῳ τούτω[ν] ζημούσθω ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰς τὸ κυνὸν ἀργυρί[ου] δραχμὰς ὀκτὼ καὶ ἰς τὸ δημόσιον τὰς ἴσας, καὶ ἐὰν [δέ] τις αὐτῶν εὑρηθῇ πεπρακὼς ἐμπόρῳ πλύωι στατῆρος ἀλ{λ}ὸς ζημούσθω ὁ τυοῦτος εἰς τὸ κυνὸν ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς ὀκτὼ καὶ ἰς τὸ δημόσιον τὰς ἴσας. ἐὰν δὲ {ω πλυ ωι} μέλλῃ ὁ ἔμπορος πλύω ἀγωράζιν (δραχμῶν) δ ἐπάνανκον πάντος πολήσιν αὐτῷ κυνῶς. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐνίνκῃ γύπσος καὶ μέλλῃ πολῖν ἐπὶ ξένης ἐπάνανκον ⟨π⟩αραθήσετε ἐν τῦς τοῦ Ὀρσεῦτος Ἀρμύσιος μέχρι οὗ λάβῃ ἐπὶ ξένης καὶ πολήσῃ. ἐφ' ᾧ πίονται κατὰ μῆνας ἀεὶ τῇ κε ἕ[κ]αστος ζύτου χοῦν ἕνα, ἐάν τε πλερετιν, ἐάν τε λι-

.[.].στάσεος, ἐπὶ μὲν κώμης (δραχμὴν) α, ἐπὶ δὲ ξένης (δραχμὰς) δ, ἐπὶ

δ[ὲ τῆς] μητροπόλεος (δραχμὰς) η. τὸν δὲ ἀδωσιτικοῦντα [καὶ μ]ὴ [ἀ]ναπλεροῦντά τι τῶν δημοσίων ἢ καὶ τῶν [προσε]γκληθησομένων αὐτῦς ἐξῖναι τῷ αὐτῷ Ἀπ[ύνχι ἐνε]χυράσζιν αὐτοὺς ἔν τε τῇ πλατέᾳ καὶ ἐν [ταῖς οἰκί]αις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγρῶι καὶ παραδιδαίναι αὐτοὺς [τῷ προστ]άντι.

[.....]. ἡγο[ύ]μενο(ς) (ὡς ἐτῶν)λβ οὐλὴ[ὸ]φρύει ἀρ[ι]στερᾷ

[ ] (ἐτῶν) λᾳ οὐλὴ χιρεὶ ἀρ[ισ]τερᾷ

[.....]γτ. (ὡς ἐτῶν) νε [οὐ]λὴ ποδ[ὶ ....]...

] (ὡς ἐτῶν) .[.....].....[

] (ὡς ἐτῶν) [

1. The date is August 18, 47 A. D.
2. ἐλθόντος: read ἐλθόντες.
   αὐτώ: read αὐτό.
   ὑ: read οἱ. The confusions of ο and ω, ι and ει, υ and οι, are found throughout the text.
3. ἁλοπόλυ: read ἁλοπῶλοι, for ἁλοπῶλαι.
   ἔδοξαν. Cf. B. G. U. 1137, 12: ἔδοξε κοινῇ γνώμῃ; P. Mich. Inv. 1277, 4-5: ἔδοξαν αὐτοῖς κυρῇ γνώμῃ.
4. ἀγαθόν: corrected by the scribe from ἀγαθά.
5. τόν: corrected from τάν.
   ἐπιμελιτήν: a title apparently identical with that of ἡγούμενος, cf. Inv. 1277, 4; 21; 34, where the same person bears both titles. Unfortunately the subscription of the ἡγούμενος in l. 43 below is so damaged that the name is illegible, but there is room for that of Apunchis.
6. ὀγδώου: corrected from ὀδδώου.
7. αὐτοκράτορος: corrected from αὐτοκράτοσος.
8. εἰσάγοντος τὰ δημόσια τῆς αὐτῆς ἐργασίας: cf. Inv. 1277, 6: εἰσάγοντος τὰ δημόσια τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολυσίμων λαογραφίας.
10. πολῖν: read πολεῖν. Cf. the note on l. 3.
    τό ται ἅλα: for τόν τε ἅλα.
11. κεκληρῶσθαι: θ corrected from τ.
    γύπσος: so here and in ll. 31-32, but elsewhere γύψος.
15. καί: κ corrected from ε.
16. μόνος: for μόνον.
18. μόνος: for μόνον.
21. τὸ ἅλα τό: for τὸν ἅλα τόν.
22. ἐξ ὀβολῶν κτλ.: on this use of ἐκ, "at the rate of," see Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, s. v.
23. τούπεί: = τούπί for τὸ ἐπί, "in regard to."
24. ὥς: read ὅς.
    πολήσι: read πολήσει, for πολήσῃ.
24-25. ἐλάττω: perhaps ἔλαττον; in either case for ἐλάττονος, "for less."
25. τὸ κυνὸν: for τὸ κοινόν, the common fund or treasury of the association.
26. ἰς: so also before τὸ δημόσιον in l. 29; but εἰς before τὸ κυνόν in ll. 25 and 28.
27. πλύωι: read πλείω.
27-28. στατῆρος: "a stater's worth," cf. the introduction and the (δραχμῶν) δ of l. 30.
28. τυοῦτος: read τοιοῦτος.
    ἀργυρίου: pap. ἀργυριῦ.
29. δημόσιον: pap. δημοσιον.
29-30. {ω πλυωι}: apparently for ὁ πλείω, with ἔμπορος omitted. When the scribe rewrote the passage correctly he forgot to cancel his previous effort.
31. πάντος: read πάντας.
    ἐνίνκῃ: read ἐνέγκῃ.

32-33. ⟨π⟩αραθήσετε: for ⟨π⟩αραθήσεται. The ρ is written with a single long stroke like an ι. The addition of π is imperative.

34. ἐφ' ᾧ πίονται: cf. ἐφ' ᾧ πωλήσουσι in l. 21. These phrases introduce general obligations resting on all the associates alike. On the special significance of this requirement see the introduction.

35. ἕ[κ]ᾳστος: final ς corrected from ν.

35-36. ἐάν τε πλ̣ερ̣ετιν, ἐάν τε λι.[.]. ̣στάσεος. This passage offers considerable difficulty, and I cannot propose a satisfactory solution. However, taken in conjunction with the rest of the sentence it offers a parallel to Inv. 1277, 7-9: ἐὰν δὲ συνταγὴν δῦ (= δῷ) ὁ ἡγούμενος ἐ[πὶ] μὲν κώμης καὶ μὴ παραγένηταί τις, ζημιούσθω εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς δύο πλὴν ἀνατ[λ]ε̣ω̣ς̣ ἥ̣π̣ου δραχμὴν μίαν, ἐπὶ ξένης δραχμὰς τέσσα[ρα]ς, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς μητροπόλεως δραχμὰς ὀκτωι. Here we have a scale of fines imposed for failure to attend meetings of a σύνοδος, varying according to the place of meeting. Since the fines listed in ll. 36-37 correspond to those just quoted, it seems that the preceding clauses must specify the conditions under which they became applicable and that these conditions would have to do with absence from the monthly gatherings.

37. μητροπόλεος: the last ο (= ω) corrected from λ.

40. ἐνε]χυράσζιν: for ἐνε]χυράζειν, usually "to take something as surety from some one," but here applying to the persons "to take them into custody."

41. [ταῖς οἰκί]α̣ι̣ς̣: restored from Inv. 1277, 12.

42. [τῷ προστ]ά̣ρ̣τ̣ι̣: not too certain but probably correct. The term is an indefinite one, used of the administrative head of an organization or a community, cf. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, III, 149, s. v. προίστημι.

Translation.

The seventh year of Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus Imperator, the twenty-fifth of the month Kaisareios. The undersigned men, salt merchants of Tebtunis, meeting together have decided by common consent to elect one of their number, a good man, Apunchis son of Orseus, both as the supervisor and the collector of the public taxes for the coming eighth year of Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus Imperator, the same Apunchis to collect all the public taxes for the same trade for the same coming year; and (they have decided) that all alike shall sell salt in the aforesaid village of Tebtunis, and that Orseus alone has obtained by lot the sole right to sell gypsum in the aforesaid village of Tebtunis and in the adjacent villages, for which he shall pay, apart from the share of the public taxes which falls to him, an additional sixty-six drachmas

in silver; and that the same Orseus has likewise obtained by lot Kerkesis, alone to sell salt therein, for which he shall likewise pay an additional eight drachmas in silver. And that Harmiusis who is also called Belles, son of Harmiusis, has obtained by lot the sole right to sell salt and gypsum in the village of Tristomou which is also called Boukolou, for which he shall contribute, apart from the share of the public taxes which falls to him, five additional drachmas in silver; upon condition that they shall sell the good salt at the rate of two and one-half obols, the light salt at two obols, and the lighter salt at one and one-half obols, both by our measure and that of the warehouse. And if anyone shall sell at a lower price than these, let such a one be fined eight drachmas in silver for the common fund and the same for the public treasury; and if any of them shall be found to have sold more than a stater's worth of salt to a trader, let such a one be fined eight drachmas in silver for the common fund and the same for the public treasury; but if the trader shall wish to buy more than four drachmas' worth, all must sell to him jointly. And if anyone shall bring in gypsum and shall wish to sell it outside, it will be necessary for him to deposit it in the premises of Orseus, son of Harmiusis, until he takes it outside and sells it. It is a condition that they shall drink regularly on the 25th of each month each one a chous of beer . . . in the village one drachma, outside four drachmas, and in the metropolis eight drachmas. But if anyone fails to render his accounts or to satisfy any of the public obligations, or of the claims that shall be made against them, it shall be permissible for the same Apunchis to arrest them in the main street or in the houses or in the field, and to hand them over to the prostas.

Parts of the ages and signalments of five signatories, whose names are lost.

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NOTE ON THE ATTIC YEAR 307/6.

A solution for the calendar of the difficult year 307/6, the archonship of Anaxicrates, has not yet been attained.[1] One additional piece of evidence is offered below.

That the decree published as *I. G.*, II², 466 was passed while the Council of Five Hundred was still in power is known from lines 44-45:

[μον· ἐπιμε]λ[εῖσ]θα[ι δὲ αὐτῶ]ν καὶ τοὺς [στ]ρατηγ-
[οὺς καὶ τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς] : ⌜Π⌝ : καλέσαι δὲ [α]ὐτο[ὺ]-

A similar restoration for the Council in the *epimelia* formula in *I. G.*, II², 456b, lines 15-17 would be expected because of the word τοὺ[ς after τὴν βουλήν and is now confirmed by letters which may be read from a squeeze of the inscription. The *epimelia* formula is to be restored as follows:

I. G., II², 456b — Στοιχ. 41

15 [ἐπιμελεῖσθαι]
δ' αὐτῶν τὴν βουλὴν τοὺ[ς : ⌜Π⌝ : καὶ] το[ὺς] στρ[ατηγοὺς κα]-
ὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς·

The letters το of the second τούς and the vertical stroke with the left half of the horizontal bar of the tau of στρατηγούς are clearly discernible; the sigma less so. The curved top of the rho is badly corroded, but is nevertheless visible; the vertical stroke is lost. There is no reason for doubt as to the reading of the upsilon of the first τούς in line 16. In *I. G.*, II², 466, line 45, the two dots before ⌜Π⌝ are on the stone, and the marks of punctuation both before and after the figure occupy full letter spaces.[2]

An analogous example of entrusting the persons honored to the care of ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες may be found in *I. G.*, II², 218, lines 17-20. Also compare *I. G.*, I³, 108, lines

[1] Bibliography for this year is listed by Dinsmoor in *Hesperia*, IV (1935), p. 303, note 3. More recently, the following items have been added: Dinsmoor, *Hesperia*, IV (1935), pp. 303-10; Meritt, *ibid.*, pp. 536-44; Meritt, *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 201-05; West, *Classical Studies Presented to Edward Capps*, pp. 356-63.

[2] These readings are confirmed by Dr. B. D. Meritt.

43-46; I², 118 lines 16-20; and the examples listed in Larfeld, *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik*, vol. II, pp. 791-94.

The foregoing observation establishes the fact that *I. G.*, II², 456, dated in the twenties of the fifth prytany (or fourth, if we follow Dinsmoor's suggestion that the scribe wrote "fifth" when he should have written "fourth") and in the month "Maimakterion," was passed before the creation of the two new tribes. Accordingly, Broneer's restoration for the inscription published by him in *Hesperia*, II (1933), p. 398 (*ἐπὶ Ἀναξικ[ράτους ἄρχ-οντος ἐπὶ τῆ]ς Δημητρι[άδος τρίτης πρυτανείας | ἧ]ι Δυσία[ς Νοθίππου Διομεὺς ἐγραμ|μά]τευεν [Βοηδρομιῶνος − − −] κτλ.*) is eliminated from consideration because the tribe Demetrias was not yet in existence in the third prytany.

Furthermore, the distinguishing mention of the Council by the scribe as *ἡ βουλὴ οἱ* ⌈[H] suggests that the increase in the number of the members of the Council was already planned in this prytany. This interpretation is corroborated by a scribe's similar elaborate designation of the Council in a decree of the year 410/09. Ferguson has rightly stated that "in the decree of the first prytany of 410-409 B. C. quoted by Andocides i, 96, the designation of the Council as *ἡ βουλὴ οἱ πεντακόσιοι λαχόντες τῷ κυάμῳ* implies, not only that the preceding Council was not elected by lot (Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, IV, 600; cf. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, II, 2, 314), but equally that its number was not five hundred."[3] The fact that there was a period of time in which the Council of Five Hundred functioned, although it was known that a new Council was created, may be explained in one of two ways: (1) in accord with Dinsmoor's scheme, we might assume that the addition of the two new tribes was awaiting the entry into Athens of Demetrius Poliorcetes, which would thus be dated later than Maemacterion, the month in which *I. G.*, II², 456 was passed; (2) in accord with Meritt's scheme, the changes entailed by the restoration of the democracy and the creation of the two new tribes may have required considerable time and the new machinery of government had not become operative in Maemacterion, although Demetrius had already made his entry in the earlier part of the year. The acceptance of one or the

[3] W. S. Ferguson, "The Constitution of Theramenes," *Cl. Phil.*, XXI (1926), p. 75. Cf. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 107.

other of these views will rest principally upon our interpretation of Demetrius' movements (including the fall of Megara and Munychia) as recorded by Plutarch (*Demetrius*, 8-10) before his mention of the addition of the two new tribes.[4]

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THE IMAGINATION IN PLATO AND MR. M. W. BUNDY.

There are several distinctions with regard to Plato's theory of the imagination which are usually overlooked. The terms *φαντασία*, *εἰκασία* and their derivative forms, as used by Plato, have three systems of meaning: first, the external object and the perception thereof either as pure sensation or as sensation combined with judgment; second, the mental image and the act of imagination which produces it; third, the artificial production of images, i. e. material copies made in imitation either of Ideas or of external objects. Of these three meanings it is only the second which constitutes, properly speaking, the psychological problem of the imagination; the first may be described as the philosophical problem of appearance *versus* reality, whereas the third deals with the technique of the creation of objects of art. These distinctions are blurred in the chapter on Plato in Mr. M. W. Bundy's "The Theory of the Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought."[1] Since Mr. Bundy's account is, so far as I know, the only extended one in English of Plato's theory of the imagination, it would seem useful to point out some confusions which pervade his treatment of the subject.

For modern students imagination is a psychological concept defined in broadest terms as the power of constructing out of sense-impressions the image of something not present.[2] While there is an intimation of this theory in Plato (*Philebus* 39B), it

[4] Dinsmoor's interpretation of this literary evidence may be found in *Hesperia*, IV (1935), pp. 303-05; Meritt's in *Hesperia*, V (1936), p. 204.

[1] *University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XII (1927), nos. 2-3.

[2] See, for instance, the definition of "imagination" in H. C. Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology* (1934).

represents only the second of the three meanings enumerated above in which he uses the terms φαντασία, εἰκασία and their derivatives. It is Aristotle to whose influence the modern restrictive use of the term "imagination" can be traced. Although he uses these Greek terms in the several meanings employed by Plato, he clearly marks out for special emphasis the psychological meaning, i. e. the second meaning we have distinguished. Confirmation on this point, and indeed of my basic criticism of Mr. Bundy's treatment, is to be found in J. Freudenthal's classic monograph on the term φαντασία in Aristotle. He says: "Of the three meanings of the word φαντασία which are traceable in Aristotle, external appearance (äussere Erscheinung), illusion or false appearance (Schein), and internal representation (innere Erscheinung, Vorstellung), the last was the one most useful to psychology, the one which Plato had confused with perception and opinion (Meinung) to the detriment of his system." [3]

In Plato, the first of the three meanings we have distinguished above, namely that dealing with appearance, occurs most frequently. The material world, which for him was the "image," or imitation, of the world of Ideas, is referred to by him as φάντασμα.[4] Similarly the objects of the lowest kind of knowledge he denotes by the term εἰκασία, i. e. the images of real things.[5] In the *Sophist* Plato speaks of φαντασία as judgment by means of perception or as a combination of judgment and perception.[6] The same view is set forth in *Philebus* 38A ff. and in *Theaetetus* 193B and 195D. R. D. Hicks has succinctly described φαντασία in these passages as "a judgment on present sensibles." [7] In still another place φαντασία is identified with αἴσθησις [8] and in this use φαντασία has been called the "presentative faculty." [9] In none of these cases, however, is Plato concerned with the second system of meaning which, properly speaking, is that of

[3] J. Freudenthal, *Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles*, Göttingen, 1863, p. 58.

[4] E. g. *Republic* 510A, 532C, 598B; *Timaeus* 71A; etc.

[5] *Republic* 510E, 511E.

[6] *Sophist* 264A and 264B.

[7] R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima*, p. 460.

[8] *Theaetetus* 152B.

[9] See J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, p. 263.

imagination. An example of the use of this second system of meaning is to be found in *Philebus* 39B-C, where he says that imagination is a process following upon perception. It is this notion which Aristotle discusses in *De Anima* and which is the source of the modern view.

The failure of Mr. Bundy to take cognizance of this indispensable set of distinctions is due, perhaps, to the fact that similarities in the meanings of the terms *εἰκασία, φάντασμα, εἴδωλον*, "image," "phantasm," "likeness," have led him to regard all of them as referring to the imagination. Following are a few examples of his confusion of the first and second systems of meaning. In his discussion of the Protagorean relativity of knowledge and of the image (*εἰκών*) in *Cratylus* 386A and 430B, Mr. Bundy speaks of Plato's "definite attitude towards phantasies and images," adding that Plato's attitude in these passages could not lead to "constructive theories of fancy and imagination" (p. 22). It is quite evident that he takes these passages in the *Cratylus* to be theories of the imagination of some kind, for he goes on to say: "In the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic* one finds conceptions of 'phantasy' and 'imagination' much in advance of the earlier views" (p. 23) just referred to. My contention is that Plato is not at all expounding a theory of the imagination in the *Cratylus*, but is using "image" in the sense of external appearance rather than in that of mental image. The same criticism can be applied to his discussion of the terms *διάνοια* and *εἰκασία* in *Republic* VI, 511E, in which he says (p. 25): "For each of the two realms of Being and Becoming Plato has a theory of imagination." The fact is, the images in these cases are not mental, but copies of some existential object or of an Idea. Furthermore, when on pages 46-47 Mr. Bundy does come to discuss what is perhaps the most important treatment by Plato of the imagination, the passage in *Philebus* 39B, he fails to indicate its prime significance for the psychological theory of the imagination.

Mr. Bundy also confuses the second system of meaning with the third, namely imagination and artistic technique. In his discussion of "image-making" in the *Republic* and the *Sophist* he writes: "If the copying of the world of phenomena could be thought an act of the 'imagination,' and if the Protagorean relativists were accustomed to speak of the producing of objects

from one's own point of view as 'phantasy,' then Plato must attack 'imagination' and 'phantasy' as so conceived" (p. 33). He adds that this view is supported by *Sophist* 233C ff. He then goes on to discuss the famous distinction in the *Sophist* 235 ff. between the two types of "likeness-making" as expressed by the terms εἰκαστική and φαντασική. None of these passages of Plato referred to deals with imagination in the strict sense of the term, since they signify the artistic technique expressed by the word μίμησις, which is far from identical with imagination although related to it. In his comments on the bed-making passage in *Republic* x, 596E ff. (p. 29), Mr. Bundy has fallen into the same confusion of technique and imagination. The imitations of the painter and the poet who create at a third remove from reality, he further says, "constitute image-making of the most material type, 'imagination' in the most literal sense. The plastic artists in general are thus depreciated as imitative or imaginative" (p. 29). In this statement, too, there is a confusion of imitation and imagination, and this confusion can be found throughout his discussion of image-making.

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CURIATIUS MATERNUS AND HIS TRAGEDIES.

In Tacitus' *Dialogus* we have a slight sketch of the cultured and courageous Curiatius Maternus who, at the time of the dialogue (74 or 75 A. D.), had already written and recited several closet tragedies—a *Domitius*, a *Medea*, and a *Cato*—and was at work on a *Thyestes*. Each of these plays apparently had a definite political purpose. Direct and open criticism of the government had of course been impossible under Nero and was still thought to be so in 74; and yet these plays contained so many hidden allusions to political persons and events that they awakened among his friends a strong fear that Maternus' life might be in danger. So much may be inferred from Tacitus, *Dialogus*, 2: *Nam postero die quam Curiatius Maternus Catonem recitaverat, cum offendisse potentium animos diceretur. . . . eaque de re per urbem frequens sermo haberetur.* See also 4, 3: *offensas Catonis tui.* Furthermore, when Aper accused Maternus

of abandoning state affairs for literature, the latter calls attention to the fact that it was by one of these plays that he had broken the influence and power of Vatinius, the buffoon of Nero (*Dial.*, 11). Why and how such plays on old themes could be dangerous to his safety has not been explained, but of course it must have been by the use of carefully aimed allusions to contemporaneous characters and events that might reflect upon the Emperor. If Maternus composed a play on Cato in the year 74 (or 75), it was probably to cast a partly hidden rebuke at Vespasian for his banishment of Helvidius Priscus that very year. Hence *offendisse potentium animos diceretur.*

More involved questions arise regarding the play entitled *Domitius*, the play by which, in my opinion, he "crushed" Nero's favorite, Vatinius. When we recall that Nero's ancestor L. Domitius (cos. 54 B. C.) was a bitter enemy of the wretched Vatinius of that day and that Nero made a favorite of a worse Vatinius of his own day, one sees at once what a dramatic opportunity Maternus would have found in writing a play on Domitius. Nero's Vatinius was a deformed, saucy, and witty shoemaker's apprentice who somehow managed to become Nero's *scurra.* Then by his flattery of Nero and his bold jokes at Nero's enemies he earned lavish rewards and immense power, and in time so ingratiated himself in court that he dared entertain Nero with gladiatorial games. This was in the year 64 A. D. (Tac., *Ann.*, 15, 34). It was probably some three years later that Maternus succeeded in destroying his influence by writing and reciting the play in question.

The earlier Vatinius, whom Domitius had heartily opposed, was the notorious subject of Cicero's invective *In Vatinium.* He was Caesar's tool, and he was thoroughly hated and feared by the Senate at a time when Domitius was somewhat ineffectively attempting with the aid of Cato to assume leadership of the Senate against Caesar and Vatinius. It is in the year of Caesar's consulship, during the trial of Vettius, that we first hear of Vatinius' attempt to endanger the life of Domitius by having Vettius name him as one of the plotters against the triumvirs (Cicero, *In Vat.*, 25; *Ad Att.*, 2, 24, 3). Vettius' charge was of course preposterous, but it was dangerous and Domitius could hardly have forgiven Vatinius for suborning the witness. During his praetorship Domitius labored incessantly,

though with no success, to annul the Caesarian laws which Vatinius had passed the year before. For three days a bitter debate continued (Suet., *Jul.*, 23), and the three speeches which Caesar delivered *Contra Domitium et Memmium* (*Schol. Bob.* on *In Vat.*, 15) were later published. Perhaps those of Domitius were also published, for Cicero takes notice of him as an orator in *Brutus*, 267. Two years later Domitius stood for the consulship on the program of annulling the Vatinian laws. The result was Caesar's conference at Luca which nominated Pompey and Crassus to stand in opposition to Domitius (Suet., *Jul.*, 24). Domitius stubbornly continued to stand with the support of Cato. On the election day it came to blows; one man was killed and many were wounded. Domitius was driven to his house and besieged by the supporters of Clodius and Vatinius till the election was over (Dio, 39, 27; Plut., *Pomp.*, 52; App., *B. C.*, 2, 17; Sallust, *Ad Caesarem*, II, 4 2, where he blames Cato and Domitius for the bloodshed). Meanwhile Cicero had delivered his terrible invective against Vatinius in 56. Many of the biting phrases of this speech might well have been incorporated in Maternus' tragedy with telling allusions to Nero's favorite. The facial deformity of both was notorious (on the earlier Vatinius see Cic., *In Vat.*, 4; Velleius, 2, 69; Sen., *De Const.*, 17; on the Neronian Vatinius see Martial, 10, 34; Juvenal, 5, 46). Both excited contempt by their gladiatorial games (Cic., *In Vat.*, 37; *Pro Sestio*, 135, with *Schol. Bob.*; cf. Tac., *Ann.*, 15, 34). Both earned the epithet *scurra*, both attacked the nobility (see Dio, 63, 15 for the *scurra Neronis*), both were accused of low birth and boyhood crimes (Cic., *In Vat.*, 11: "the vices of your youth may lie hidden in their own foul obscurity"; compare Tacitus, *Annales*, 15, 34 for the later Vatinius). Both enriched themselves by servility (Cic., *In Vat.*, 29; Calvus, *In Vat.*, ed. Malc., III, *frag.* 26; cf. Tac., *Ann.*, 15, 34). If Maternus also used the invectives of Calvus and of Domitius, which unfortunately we do not have, it must have been easy for him to apply to Nero's favorite the actual phrases used against the earlier Vatinius in such a way as to make him a laughing stock without making himself amenable to a charge of libel. There is little doubt in my mind that it was by dramatizing the ancestor of Nero in the *Domitius* that Maternus wrecked the evil career of the later Vatinius.

Schöll (*Comm. Woelff.*, p. 391) held that this Domitius could hardly be the hero of a praetexta, since his career seemed uneventful. Schöll (followed by Hosius) preferred to accept his son for that rôle. In that he quite misses the point. The career, even if ineffectual, was full of intense and passionate contests with Vatinius and these gave the opportunity Maternus desired of suggesting a contrast between Domitius and Nero by comparing the two Vatinii. Furthermore the rhetorical drama of Seneca's day looked not so much for action as for chances to compose vigorous speeches. Besides, posterity looked upon Domitius as the foremost of the Pompeians. Lucan, not without flattery of Nero, perhaps also with a sly suggestion of contrast, selected Domitius for a splendid laudation for his part at Pharsalia (*Phar.*, 7, 600 ff.). Can there be any doubt that Domitius, consul of 54 B. C., was the subject of the play and that it was this play which, by skillful use of half-concealed parallels, completely wrecked the influence of Nero's *scurra*?

We should add a word about the much emended passage in the *Dialogus* (11) which gives the main facts. The MS reads: *Cum quidem in Neronem improbam et studiorum quoque sacra profanantem Vaticini* (Vatinii, *Gronov.*) *potentiam fregi.* Editors usually change to *in Nerone* (i. e. a play called Nero), *imperante Nerone*, or *sub Nerone*. Gudeman almost alone keeps the text, and rightly. The meaning is: "I wrecked Vatinius, whose power was baneful over Nero, and dangerous even to letters." At any rate the putative drama of "Nero" (*in Nerone*) need not hereafter be considered.

It was of course not surprising that Maternus, who was a senator and had spoken effectively on political questions, should have written plays of political and social import. We have remarked that a play on "Cato" could not but have had peculiar and immediate significance in the year when Vespasian banished Helvidius, the devotee of Cato. In fact Tacitus says that the play aroused enemies. That the *Thyestes* had political significance becomes clear when we hear from Maternus that he not only would not withdraw his *Cato* but would continue in the same vein in the *Thyestes*. Clearly this play, as we might expect from its name, would be an attack upon tyranny, the tyranny that Maternus expected from Vespasian in 75 after the banishment of Helvidius Priscus. Finally it would hardly be unrea-

sonable to conjecture that the *Medea* would, like the other plays, contain allusions to passing events. All we know about it is the phrase of Aper referring to the "speeches of Jason" which it contained. Perhaps Jason's repudiation of Medea in order to marry Creusa was presented in a despicable light so that the audience could not but think of Nero's repudiation of Octavia in order to marry Poppaea. That would be in character. Finally, after noting the peculiar significance of the dramas of Maternus, it might not be out of place to give more consideration than we have to Ritter's old suggestion that Maternus may well have been the author of the *Octavia* which we still have. If he was, we must assume that it was a play written after Nero's death, presenting directly the point of view that he may well have suggested guardedly in the *Medea*.

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REVIEWS.

C. M. Bowra. Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935. Pp. xii + 288.

No editor of Pindar could satisfy, or would try to satisfy, all of his readers. The most he can do is to use his best judgment as he threads his way through the perplexing maze of textual variants, explanations of scholiasts, and conjectures and comments of modern scholars. This Mr. Bowra has done, and done with very gratifying results. One may shake one's head at times over some detail, as the choice of *οἷον* in *Ol.* I, 57, or of *ἀφροσύνας* in *Ol.* II, 52, or of *προσέλκει* in *Ol.* VI, 83. But no edition of Pindar meets with universal approval, and in the case of this one the copious critical notes at the foot of each page—the most generous since Schroeder's editions of 1908 and 1914—point the way at a glance to other possible readings, if one feel inclined to question the editor's selection.

The text of the odes is based chiefly upon seven manuscripts: A B C D E G V, of which codex C proscribed by Turyn (*De codicibus Pindaricis,* 1932) has been restored to a position of honor. All of these were examined anew and with assiduous care in the preparation of this volume. Occasionally a reading preserved in one or more of ten other manuscripts or the papyri has been placed in the text or included in the notes, while the liberal citation and the frequent adoption of readings proposed by modern scholars give evidence of a complete mastery of Pindaric literature. It is hardly necessary to add that the fragments, including the doubtful or spurious fragments and those of uncertain authorship, have been studied and are here presented with the same exacting thoroughness.

Of the editor's own conjectures only four appear in the text. This is commendable restraint, though it does not quite rise to the standard set by Gildersleeve, who stated in his edition of the Olympian and Pythian Odes that his best judgment had excluded all emendations of his own. These four are as follows:

1) *Pyth.* VI, 50: *ἄρχεις* for the corrupt *ὀργαῖς πάσαις.* This combined with a conjecture of Schroeder makes a neat reading: *ἄρχεις ὃς ἱππιᾶν ἐσόδων,* but is probably not what Pindar wrote. Christ's *ὀργᾷς* is preferable. The passage is a *locus conclamatus.*

2) *Pyth.* XI, 56: *ὄγ'* for the *δ'ἀν'* of the majority of the best manuscripts: *μέλανος ὄγ' ἐσχατιὰν καλλίονα θανάτοι'* (so Shackle) *ἔσχεν.* None of the numerous attempts to restore the original can be received with confidence. We may note in passing, however, that the editors of the new Liddell

and Scott have wrongly retained ἀν' ἐσχατιάν with the old interpretation "at last."

3) *Pyth.* XII, 29: ἦ καὶ for the troublesome ἤτοι. A parallel may be found in Arist., *Lys.* 1226. See Denniston, *Greek Particles,* pp. 285 and 554.

4) *Nem.* X, 5: Αἰγύπτοιο κατέκτιθεν for Αἰγύπτῳ κατῴκισθεν of the MSS: πολλὰ δ' Αἰγύπτοιο κατέκτιθεν ἄστη. This and the ἦ καὶ in *Pyth.* XII, 29 are Mr. Bowra's best contributions to the text of Pindar.

In addition one should perhaps mention *Ol.* II, 52, to which reference has already been made. Here the editor adopts ἀφροσύνας from the scholia and the papyrus. The latter has ἀφροσυν[. This reading of the scholia Farnell (*The Works of Pindar,* 1932) condemns as a "bad reading," and most editors agree with him. Yet Mommsen read ἀφροσυνᾶν. It is not at all unlikely that this or Bowra's ἀφροσύνας is right in spite of the manuscripts and the almost universal opposition of the critics. If so, the prevailing interpretation of this passage misses Pindar's meaning.

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T. B. L. WEBSTER. An Introduction to Sophocles. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936. Pp. 202. $4.50.

Any new, serious study of Sophocles is welcome. Euripides, master playwright, without whom it is hard to imagine the modern theatre, has been the subject of numerous books, articles, and translations. Aeschylus has recently been admirably portrayed by Professor H. Weir Smyth. Sophocles, however, has been comparatively neglected in works in the English language when we consider that in him and in his plays we have the very incarnation of the Greek genius.

The publishers of Professor Webster's book announce, on the "jacket," that the volume "as a fresh and stimulating study will be useful to scholars and to the general reader." This promise is destined, I think, to be fulfilled only in part. Scholars who examine Professor Webster's book will find a serious, thoughtful investigation based on long study of the plays of the great dramatist. The "general reader," who is, I fear, often a phantom figure conjured forth from the hopeful imagination of publisher and author, would probably not read far in this technical study written by a scholar-specialist who takes for granted an intimate acquaintance with the plays of Sophocles and who presupposes a scholar's knowledge of the Greek lan-

guage and of Greek civilization. I am sure that the author himself would not expect the general reader to be interested in the chapters on song and on style.

Professor Webster arranges his material in eight chapters as follows: I Life (pp. 1-17), II Thought (18-54), III Characters (55-82), IV Character-Drawing (83-100), V Plot Construction (101-125), VI Song (126-142), VII Style (143-162), VIII Conclusion (163-171). Following the formal chapters are Notes on the chronology of the fragments, etc., an *Index Locorum*, and a *General Index*, which is too brief.

Chapter I, which bears the caption *Life*, dwells on the chronology of the plays and on Sophocles, the aristocrat. For only three of Sophocles' extant plays (*Antigone*, *Philoctetes*, and *Oedipus Coloneus*) have we fairly certain dates. As the evidence is scanty, assumption must often serve as proof. For example, the *Oedipus Tyrannus* may be dated 429 B. C., *if* we believe that "the description of the Theban plague must be inspired by the Athenian plague at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War" (p. 4), and that "Euripides appears to have borrowed from the *Tyrannus* for the *Hippolytus*, 428 B. C." (p. 5).

The *Electra* must have been produced after 418 B. C. because "Aristophanes in the parabasis of the *Clouds* writes 'This comedy came seeking like that Electra ['Electra in the play'—Rogers] . . . for she will know her brother's lock.' 'That Electra' is the Electra of the *Choephori*, and the reference would be obscure if Sophocles had already produced his play" (p. 5). Why the reference should necessarily be obscure, I fail to see.

The "Life" of Sophocles refers to a "Company of the Educated" (θίασος ἐκ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων) which Sophocles formed in honor of the Muses. Professor Webster thinks (p. 7) that "'the Company' was probably a society of educated Athenians which was founded by Sophocles to discuss problems of literature and drama; such a society would begin their meetings by sacrifice to the Muses." But what is the evidence for this statement? Suidas *s. v.* Sophocles tells us that he wrote a book "on the Chorus"; Professor Webster asserts (p. 8) "Sophocles may well have written it for and read it to the 'Company of the educated'." Perhaps, but the assumption seems gratuitous. Is it not more probable that the θίασος was the forerunner of the later guilds of the τεχνῖται?

Inferences, often tenuous, are numerous in Chapter I, such as (p. 8) the argument that "Sophocles was one of Cimon's friends or . . . Cimon was a patron of Sophocles" because Plutarch tells us that Cimon and his brother generals gave the victory to Sophocles in preference to Aeschylus.

On page 15 we read "Dionysus in the *Frogs*, which was produced in the year that Sophocles died, refuses to summon

Sophocles from the dead, because he wants to see what Iophon can do without his father. This proves that father and son were working happily together till the end." Perhaps they were, but how this general and humorous reference is proof of the assertion I am unable to understand. Furthermore, while the ancient evidence that Sophocles had a happy temperament and charm of character may be unreservedly accepted, I fail to see with Professor Webster that the dramatist's humorous satyr plays necessarily reflect this, inasmuch as the satyr-play was required of all the dramatic contestants and was by convention and tradition inevitably serio-comic and sportive.

The second chapter on the Thought of Sophocles is sound and rightly emphasizes the poet's religious nature, his essential reverence, his belief in the fulfillment of oracles, and his purification of the Homeric mythology and popular religion. In his plays are to be found the traditional religion tempered by philosophy, the ideal of doing good, *sophrosyne* and *apragmosyne*, and the belief in personality and breed (p. 54). In this chapter, as in others, certain statements are open to question: *e. g.* p. 27, "It is surprising to find this belief (that the gods got their sustenance from the savour of the sacrifice) still surviving in Aeschylus"; p. 31, "Sophocles inherited the *hybris* theory from Aeschylus."

The chapters on Sophocles' characters and character-drawing are brief, although well done. The treatment of Clytemnestra, however, is inadequate. On p. 92, we read, "In some situations silence is as significant as words." This is true, and I regret that the two most effective examples in Sophocles (*Ant.* 1244 ff. and *O. T.* 1071-75) are not cited.

Professor Webster's comparison of the technique of plot construction in the three great dramatists is good (pp. 124-5):

> If we may sum up briefly the difference in technique of plot construction between the three tragedians, the difference is ultimately one of ends. Aeschylus' story is represented as an exemplification of the divine law, which is gorgeously enunciated in the choruses and its majesty sustained by music and spectacle. Euripides, in his later plays at least, shows the unpredictable workings of chance, and is always more interested in the elaboration of the particular scene, whether lyrical, emotional, or rhetorical, than in the structure of the play as a whole. Sophocles' careful craftsmanship, his choice of scenes, his construction of the plot, his use of music, spectacle, and dramatic irony are primarily directed to the presentation of character and the identification of the audience with the characters thus presented.

The discussion of Sophocles' style in Chapter VII is vitiated by the author's too great zeal to determine the poet's vocabulary as "early" or "late." We have, of course, only seven of the 123 (?) plays and the chronology of the extant seven is uncertain. Safe conclusions, therefore, are extremely hazardous, *e. g.* (p. 146) that Sophocles *borrows* certain words from Aeschy-

lus, and (p. 146-7), "A considerable number of the distinctive words of this later period are also found in Euripides and may therefore have been borrowed from him." It would seem more reasonable to suppose a common poetic source from which all the tragedians may have drawn.

The attempt to give a date to plays surviving only in scanty fragments necessitates extremely far-fetched assumptions. For example, (p. 173) "ACRISIUS. Danae is the first of the parallels which the chorus adduce in the consolation song of the *Antigone* (944), and Sophocles may be referring to his own *Danae* with which the *Acrisius* should be identified." Again (p. 175) on the date of the *Niobe*, he states that *Antigone* (825) and *Electra* (150) refer to Niobe: "In both he is probably recalling his own *Niobe*, which in that case will be earlier than the *Antigone*." Again (p. 180): In *Ajax* (156 f.) "the chorus sing that it is impossible to teach fools the need for co-operation between great and small in the state. Their jealousy will not leave the great man alone. Sophocles may be referring to some great man who has suffered from the jealousy of foolish small men. He may be thinking of the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias, in 443."

The author's own very literal translations of short illustrative passages seem infelicitous: *e. g.* (p. 19) *Antigone* (1350): "The great words of the proud pay a price of great blows." P. 27: "In the *Tyrannus* the chorus sing of laws which are 'set forth high footed, . . . nor did the mortal growth of men bear them'." P. 36: "You cannot tell the life of men until one dies whether it is good or bad in anything" (*Trach.* 2). P. 105: "When the chorus of the *Antigone* (599) sing of the light over the last root in the house of Oedipus. . . ." Furthermore, repeatedly to translate *sophrosyne* "modesty" and to refer to the first, second, and third "acts" of the Greek plays seem questionable.

Professor Webster's book gives evidence of long and devoted study. The result should be entitled, in my opinion, not *An Introduction to Sophocles*, but rather *Studies in the Plays of Sophocles*. He comments, in a worth-while, although uninspiring fashion, on many important matters, but he fails to give the reader an adequate idea why the dramatist of Colonus is universally regarded as the very embodiment of the Greek genius. Perhaps the author has drunk too deeply of Teutonic rather than of Grecian springs, as repeated acknowledgements in *Preface* and *Notes* would suggest.

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JOSEF KROLL. Theognisinterpretationen (*Philologus, Supplementband* XXIX, Heft 1). Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936. Pp. v + 319.

External evidence for Theognis and his writings is scarce and confusing, but much more bewildering is the situation which a scholar has to face when dealing with the work itself. The collection of less than 700 distichs, mostly didactic in nature, is incongruous in many respects. In the first place the two books of "Theognidean" poetry doubtless contain many later additions, and more than one speaker raises his voice. Sometimes the elegies appear in the form of a dialogue, one elegy presenting a view and the following opposing it. We have even an instance where a distich (1161 f.) gives a witty parody of another distich (409 f.). In the later parts of the collection passages from the earlier poems recur in a more or less altered form, and some verses are repeated with but slight variations. The result is that these parts of the collection look like a carelessly arranged scrap-book. The earlier parts of the collection make a more favorable impression, and it is generally acknowledged that they have preserved the original material more nearly in its authentic form. Even here, however, serious doubts may arise about particular points. A further element of uncertainty is caused by the fact that Theognis himself seems to have lacked unity of thought and consistency of ideas. Not only did he live in a period of transition in which all values and standards were subject to transformation, but evidently he was himself a vacillating personality. He pretends to be a stern aristocrat stubbornly and proudly sticking to the old traditions and conventions, and in the beginning very impressively warns his pupil not to have the slightest intercourse with "bad" people. Other verses, however, which can hardly be denied to have been written by the same author, recommend a supple adaptation to the prevailing circumstances and lip-friendship with "bad" people. Moreover, the circumstances themselves as they are described or implied in the different elegies differ widely, and we are constantly at a loss to decide whether or not it is permissible to ascribe this or that individual passage to Theognis himself and his original work. A certain amount of contradiction is always to be expected in a book containing various suggestions for the conduct of life; but how much exactly, in the way of inconsistency, can be tolerated is hard to determine.

The same difficulty prevails in the question of the mutual connection between the single elegies. We do not look for a very close and rigidly constant connection in an archaic book of this type; but again it is not easy to determine how much or how little connection Theognis and his public would have thought

indispensable. Under conditions of this nature it is very hard to make general statements about the whole work. The first prerequisite in dealing with it is a careful interpretation of the text, distich by distich and word for word.

All the prominent investigators have tried to take this path, but they have found it obstructed by embarrassing obstacles. The single elegies are partly so topical that they are unintelligible to us who are ignorant of the facts to which they refer. But again they are often too general, since the key words such as ἀγαθός, ἀρετή, ὄλβος, may mean different things according to special authors and special cases. The greater part of the elegies are too short to be clear, and we are not allowed to have recourse to the usual expedient of comparing other parts of the same work, as we are not reasonably sure that the author is always the same and that the views are identical and consistent. The greatest difficulty of all, perhaps, is caused by the fact that the elegies frequently are not well written and the words do not convey the writer's ideas in an adequate way. And finally we are not certain of the tradition; the text may have undergone substantial changes.

It is not likely that any sagacity and learning could overcome such heavy odds and reach a really satisfactory result, either in the interpretation of the text from the first distich to the last or in judging of the relation of the whole collection to Theognis' original work. The problem, accordingly, is desperately complex. The solutions hitherto proposed have been marked chiefly by cautious restraint.

Recently a radical solution was proposed by Jacoby in the very learned and interesting paper "Theognis" in *Berliner Sitzungsberichte*, 1931, X. Jacoby tried to prove for one of the crucial passages, the σφραγίς (19-26), an interpretation which would, if correct, allow us to single out with a high degree of certainty the original elegies of Theognis. But this attempt was soon refuted in an excellent review by Pohlenz (*Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1932, p. 410).

Kroll, in the book under review, to this extent reproduces Pohlenz's arguments, but in his general views he turns to an extreme skepticism and negativism. For him there is almost no trace left of the original book: he believes that very few elegies may be claimed as Theognis' own and that nothing of the original arrangement has been preserved. If Kroll is right, we shall not be able to form any conception of Theognis and his work, for the scanty fragments which pass through the ardent fire of Kroll's critical doubts are insufficient to evoke a literary personality, and we lose the standard by which to measure other elements of the collection.

Now what exactly is the book which we possess, if it is not

the more or less modified original book of Theognis of Megara? Kroll's answer is that it is just an agglomeration, made by some late editor, from a disparate and amorphous material. The bulk of this material, according to him, is younger (and in part much younger) than Theognis, and almost all of it is of bad quality. It is anonymous popular poetry and, accordingly, amateurish and imitative; for it was not written by able, creative, and ingenious poets but by mediocre verse-makers who took their thoughts from the common stock of current ideas and expressed them by using to excess, and misapplying, ready-made formulae. Consequently Kroll treats the text by means of the devices which have been developed for the study of collected folklore. He is not so much interested in an intensive interpretation of the individual elegy or distich as in a collective study of groups of them. He assembles passages or expressions which seem akin to one another. He compares, or at least gathers, elegies which deal more or less with the same subject, and adds passages from without the "Theognidean" collection. If the same idea or subject recurs frequently in the collection—necessarily things which were fundamental for the social life of the period were treated often and amply—then Kroll calls it a "Topos." The implication seems to be that topoi were usually treated in a conventional and general way without much personal feeling and without great variety, and that the writers in general confined themselves to repeating what other people had said and, presumably, had expressed more aptly and vigorously. In some cases Kroll thinks that he can show how a certain original passage of an early poet is echoed by later writers, becoming more and more indistinct and denatured with every new reflection. Thus Kroll draws many lines of connection leading from one element to others; but as these lines run in a thousand directions, they are necessarily unable to be combined into a substantial fabric. This, to be sure, is in harmony with his thesis that the collection has no fabric of its own but consists of stray material which had been accumulated and put into some loose arrangement.

It is evident to Kroll himself that his method cannot yield any spectacular results. At the end there is no summing up of positive results which he would claim to have obtained by his interpretation but a programme of what ought to be done in the future—viz. that the same analytical and comparative method should be applied to the Theognis collection to a fuller extent: "Wir müssen die ganze Welt dieser Hypothekai und Elegien zu greifen suchen, schon vom Sprachgebrauche her, von den stereotypen Wendungen, den Floskeln und Phrasen, den häufig vorkommenden Worten und Lieblingsbegriffen her. Und dann müssen die kleinen Gruppen, muss die Nestbildung, muss

die Behandlung des Stoffes mit all seinen verschiedenen Brechungen und Varianten, müssen die verschiedenen ethischen Strata in ihrem Verhältnis zur sonstigen Ethik der Griechen untersucht werden. Man müsste das Corpus überhaupt einmal nach Stoffgruppen aufteilen und diese Gruppen für sich untersuchen" (p. 282).

It is not easy to condense Kroll's book into a short résumé, but I hope that I have shown how consistent his main views are. There is little in his book of that spirit of compromise which is usually found in studies on the Theognidean poetry. But before attempting a critical examination, it is only fair to state that Kroll, though pugnacious in his opinions, is very conscientious in examining the views which he opposes.

I am not competent to judge in questions of folklore, but I feel that the theory on which Kroll's work is based is beginning to lose ground rapidly, viz. the theory that folk poetry can simply be defined as individual poetry which had been corrupted ("zersungen") in the course of oral transmission. It seems certain to me, however, that the method which Kroll applies to the Theognis books does not work there, for it does not aid in an understanding of the text. He operates with some abstract but vague notions, strangely remote from the realities of ancient Greek life.[1]

Kroll is convinced that his thesis and views are based on a thorough and unbiased interpretation of the text. But his interpretation, though very verbose, is neither the one nor the other. His own unconscious bias is evident from the fact that the burden of proof, which should at least be equally distributed on the two sides of the alternative, is constantly put by him on the shoulders of those alone who are inclined to consider some particular elegy as genuine. In fact, Kroll repeats and defends his one-sided views with such intensity and fervor that his work is filled with passionate arguing rather than, as the title suggests, with interpretation. The reason is obvious. Interpretation seeks the meaning of a text and is based on the belief that there is some meaning and some sense in the words. This belief provides also the only test for the quality of a text, which cannot be determined before all possible credit has tentatively been accorded it. Only then can it be ascertained how far this credit was deserved. But Kroll's thesis maintains that the bulk of the Theognidean

[1] I give an instance from Kroll's argument against the authenticity of the prooemium. The second elegy (vv. 5-10) consists of 3 distichs apostrophizing Apollo and reminding him how Earth and Sea rejoiced when he was born at Delos. Kroll insists that this is by no means "ein richtiger kleiner Götterhymnus" but "eine durch Anrede verlebendigte Schilderung," "eine durch Gottesanrufung verlebendigte, schildernde Aussage" (p. 10). This clumsy inappropriate definition is repeated many times in the following pages (23, 26, 32, 33, 35).

collection is a worthless, anonymous patchwork rather than individual and personal poetry. It is true that the Theognidean poetry is not particularly good; but this should not release us from listening seriously to what the writers wanted to say. Kroll's most frequent verdict is that thought and expression are "floskelhaft" and "formelhaft" (who would not expect Greek elegiac writers to avail themselves of the precious treasures offered them by tradition?) and that the lines are "breit," "umständlich," "ungeschickt," "keine erstklassige Ware" (p. 184, n. 40), and so on. There is little variety in the objections Kroll makes. His criticism is monotonous and often misses the point. The lack of accuracy and the author's preoccupation with his main thesis prevent him from making real progress in the explanation of what we have, be it genuine or not, good or bad, early or late.[2] Parallel passages, which he quotes in large

[2] I quote a few instances, taken at random for illustration. Kroll finds fault with the innocent but impressive and appropriate repetition of τοῖσι in vv. 33 f. The context is:

κακοῖσι δὲ μὴ προσομίλει
ἀνδράσιν ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔχεο,
καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἀνδανε τοῖσ' ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.

Now Kroll says (p. 101): "Vers 33 bringt zweimal den Ausdruck μετὰ τοῖσι, ohne dass die Wiederholung sachlich, etwa als Steigerung, bedingt wäre; im Gegenteil, das begrifflich weniger scharfe ἵζε klappt hinter πῖνε und ἔσθιε nach" and so on for four more lines. Kroll says (p. 112) that ἔχεσθαι cum gen. (v. 32, cf. *supra*) is never used metaphorically before the age of Attic tragedy; but in Homer, *Il.*, 9, 102 occurs a much bolder, much more abstract use of the phrase. Trying to prove that the prooemium of our collection could never have served the same purpose in the original book of Theognis, Kroll says that the two precepts 29-30 and 31-37 (partly quoted *supra*), being special ("konkrete Einzelmahnungen") could not have had a place in Theognis' prooemium (p. 107); but on p. 130, in a different argument, he very correctly calls the former of the two "entirely general" ("eine ganz allgemein gehaltene Lebensregel," "eine generell verpflichtende Lebensregel"). Again he deals at length with the "topical" utterances on wealth and poverty but fails to do justice to one of the rare gems of the Theognis books, the elegy 373-92. He completely ignores the fact that the latter part raises, and in a very pathetic appeal to God, the question of morality under the pressure of need and distress—a question which, if we listen to Kroll, should not have been raised before the age of the Sophists. Now we have in 384-92 a rondo composition, truly archaic and admirably finished, but impossible in classical style. The date therefore is roughly before 450, or rather before 500. If in addition we accept the suggestion that one continuous poem, 373-92, is split into two parts by the later insertion of 381 f. (a suggestion which seems to me convincing, but which Kroll does not even mention), then vv. 373 ff. are also written before 450 or rather 500. Kroll puts them in the time of Euripides (p. 185, n. 42 combined with p. 187, n. 51). Especially unfortunate is Kroll in his treatment of the second prooemium 757 ff. (p. 231 ff.); I do not think that any reader will follow him here. The interpretation which he proposes for 757-68 seems to me entirely out of the question. V. 1058 (Kroll, p. 236) has

quantities, are really useful in many respects, but they cannot make up for the want of intimacy with archaic style[8] and archaic thought and with its peculiar system of notions and expressions. For there is such a system. Archaism can never be rightly understood when considered only as a preliminary stage to classicism with the inevitable shortcomings of immaturity. Archaism has its own ideals and these it is able to realize perfectly. No doubt the classical level is higher and its world richer and better organized; but it is a different world and in the difficult process of so-called development not only improvements, discoveries, and inventions had to be made but also precious values, incompatible with the new ways and methods, had to be discarded.

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WILHELM BRANDENSTEIN. Die erste "indogermanische" Wanderung. (Vol. III of *Klotho*.) Wien, Verlag Gerold und Co., 1936. Pp. 88. RM 7.00.

From a survey of the prehistory of the Indo-European peoples it seemed to Brandenstein inherently unlikely that the separation of the different branches occurred at one and the same time. In his search for indications of relative timing he examined the primitive vocabulary attributed to the Indo-Europeans in their unitary period (essentially as set forth in the *Indogermanisches Wörterbuch* of Walde and Pokorny) and discovered that it could be divided into two portions. The first portion consisted of words shared by all the main Indo-Europaen branches; the other, of words entirely lacking in Indo-Iranian

nothing whatsoever to do with Callinus, *frag.* 1, except that both use the word ἀμφιτερικτίονες; the verse (written with <μελέ>μεν or <μέλο>μεν) means: "the Muses made us popular among the neighbors for our singing."

[3] Kroll frequently repeats the argument that "ein wirklicher Dichter," "ein aus dem Frischen schaffender und komponierender Dichter" (p. 143) could never have produced an accumulation of slightly connected or disconnected single adages with changing points of view and unstable presuppositions. Kroll may be right, but nobody can prove that Theognis was a real poet in Kroll's sense. Theognis did not claim creative power; he says only that he is handing down to his pupil the tradition which he had accepted from his elders. In 1913 (*Hermes*, XLVIII) Friedländer had, with the best positive results, compared other similar archaic collections of moral precepts, of which the most important is Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Kroll could have proved his thesis if he had been able to show that the Theognidean collection is much worse than the *Works and Days* in regard to the question of connection and unity. But he does not attempt a comparison. and so he has no historical standard on which to test his requirement for an archaic didactic poet, no standard indeed but his own conception of a real poet.

or found there without the derived meanings which appeared among the western peoples.

From this he inferred that, since the Indo-Iranians were the first to depart from the common homeland, the nature of this homeland might be revealed in the vocabulary of the older period. The later vocabulary might then betray change in environment and indicate the migration of the Indo-Europeans before further divisions. And these inferences were upheld by his findings.

The early vocabulary indicates a land that was hilly or mountainous, with many rocks, a steppe rather than a swampy land; a land containing caves and rushing streams, but no great rivers flowing slowly. Here were deserts of dust and sand, wide open spaces, but also some small lakes; here walking was largely climbing, though wheeled vehicles also were in use. It was a land where rivers were the chief obstacle to travel and had to be crossed by fording or by a boat carried by the current, since oars and bridges were unknown. This land was one with a snowy and icy winter, a cool spring, a hot dry summer, a mild autumn, with thin fogs and light clouds and only moderate rainfall.

The vocabulary of the later Indo-European period indicates a land of still waters and swampy stretches. Here oars were used for rowing the boats on rivers and lakes, and bridges had been made for vehicles. The old words for climbing now meant merely going. Rainfall was heavier, summers were hotter and more oppressive, and the climate had become less favorable to health.

With such data in mind Brandenstein read the accounts of travellers and found (to his own surprise, pp. 80-81) that there was one, and only one, region which met his reconstruction of the earlier home of the Indo-Europeans: the southern foothills of the Ural mountains and the adjacent Kirghiz steppes extending to the east, south, and west but not reaching the Aral or the Caspian. For the later home he again found only one territory that fulfilled the conditions: the Pripet marshlands of eastern Poland, with extension northwestward to the Baltic and southwestward to Lemberg and the Dniester.

He then examined the fauna and flora of the Indo-Europeans and found that the earlier vocabulary testifies to knowledge of the elk, the otter, the squirrel, the wolf, the fox, the bear, the hare, the beaver, the mouse, the marmot, wild swine, possibly one or two others; that the later vocabulary adds hedgehog, stag, deer, domestic swine. These lists accord with the distribution of the animals geographically, and the same is true of the birds, fishes, reptiles, insects, trees, and plants. It is of particular interest that the words for bee and honey are lacking in Indo-Iranian, though widespread in other branches of Indo-European;

the bee is not found in the steppes, but it is native to Poland. The word for honey was **melit*; while **medhu* (also in Indo-Iranian) denoted a pressed mass of berries or fruits, and their juice, unfermented or fermented.

What shall we say of all this? In the first place Brandenstein's method is sound; he specifically mentions all objections to his procedure as he goes along and shows that he has avoided the pitfalls. Perhaps he goes too far in accepting at face value the reconstructed Indo-European words, possibly also in fixing their precise meanings; but the number of words handled is such that likelihood of error along these lines is minimized. Although he mentions the factor of loss of words by taboo, he might have given more serious consideration to it, especially in connection with the absence of certain words from the Indo-Iranian vocabulary. I doubt, however, if this would in any way alter his conclusions.

Another point, which troubles me more, is the question where the Hittites branched off from the parent stock. Is Brandenstein's theory reconciliable with Sturtevant's view that the Hittites were the first to break away from the pre-Indo-Europeans? The wide phonetic variation of Hittite from the original, despite the early date of the documents, favors Sturtevant's view. Did the Hittites then leave the home south of the Urals before the departure of the Indo-Iranians? The Hittite vocabulary known to us does not seem to include words which might give decisive evidence; but Brandenstein should have considered the Hittites in his investigation.

There are other points of interest in his study: the identification of many late primitive Indo-European words as borrowings after the departure of the Indo-Iranians and the determination of the time of the domestication of the various animals, etc. In the later period, he says, the Indo-Europeans, having learned to use the plow, were agricultural as well as pastoral; in the earlier period they had been pastoral nomads, with dogs, cattle, sheep, and horses. In an addendum (page 79) he states that in another study, shortly to be published, he expects to show that at a still earlier stage they lived on plants and were probably located somewhat farther to the east, north of Turkestan. We await this study with eagerness, although I believe that Brandenstein himself would admit that the farther back we go the less certain become the results of our investigation.

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EMMA EDELSTEIN. Xenophontisches und Platonisches Bild des Sokrates. Emil Ebering, Berlin, 1935. Pp. 153.

This treatise consists of three parts which have no very direct relation to each other, except in so far as they all contribute something to the solution of the Socratic question. The first and longest (pp. 7-77) gives its title to the whole: it is a comparative study of the Xenophontic and the Platonic Socrates; the second is an analysis of the plan and structure of the *Memorabilia* (pp. 78-137); the third part (pp. 138-150) is a similar analysis of Xenophon's *Apology*.

Dr. Edelstein does not profess to solve the problem as to which is the historical Socrates, but restricts herself to giving us first what Xenophon says, then what is found in Plato, and finally a statement of how far they agree, with suggestions as to the reason for the difference. There is nothing here that is very new, but it is a useful account of the subject and a useful summary of what is found in both authors. Especially when treating of Xenophon, the account is full and complete, in so far as that is possible without transcribing all that Xenophon says. As regards Plato, however, there are two difficulties: the mass of the material compels selection, however unwillingly; and the Platonic Socrates is so inextricably fused with Platonic philosophy that it is impossible to disentangle them. Dr. Edelstein has overcome the first difficulty with a good measure of success, especially in the general picture of Socrates with which she begins the Platonic account, although (perhaps this is inevitable in so compressed a picture) she is inclined to take at their face value statements about Socrates' character and personality which are clearly to be taken ironically when read in context (see especially p. 25). Then, as she clearly perceives and indicates the differences of attitude which a developing philosophy forces upon the Platonic Socrates, she is apt to interpret as differences in character what are in fact differences of doctrine, and goes so far as to deny to the Platonic Socrates any true unity. With this I cannot agree, right though she is to insist upon these differences of attitude in different dialogues.

The comparison between the two pictures shows a substantial agreement on externals, and the differences are, as is rightly said, due to the different character of the authors, Xenophon being more moralistic and matter of fact, Plato more intellectual and inspired. But I doubt whether either of them, and especially Plato, was as much concerned with historical accuracy as is here implied. The importance attached to the manner of introduction of individual Platonic dialogues seems to me overdone.

Dr. Edelstein's discussion of the *Memorabilia* does, I think, establish the general plan which Xenophon had in mind, i. e.,

after a general defence against the indictment as a whole, he groups the reported conversations under the different charges one after the other. But in detail, especially in the third book, there seems to be much less of a rigid system than Dr. Edelstein tries to force upon the work. The general plan, however, is sound and worth pointing out.

As regards the *Apology*, on the other hand, Dr. Edelstein does not contribute very much, the general purpose of it being generally admitted and recognized. At most does she vindicate Xenophon as being rather less sloppy in his method than he is often said to be. There are two errors of detail: the accusative and infinitive in sec. 27 (εἰπεῖν αὐτόν) makes this definitely part of what Hermogenes said, and I can see no reason to exclude the second part of sec. 31, which is just the sort of thing Xenophon would say, even if it does not make very good sense.

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ALBAN DEWES WINSPEAR and LEONORE KRAMP GEWEKE. Augustus and the Reconstruction of Roman Government and Society. Madison, University of Wisconsin, 1935. Pp. 317.

Professor Winspear, assisted by Dr. Geweke, does not present any startlingly new material or novel interpretations in this study of Augustus' political and social reconstruction of the Roman world. Gardthausen long ago covered the subject in the same topical arrangement and the Cambridge Ancient History, vol. X, has recently presented it in a series of expert chapters. Nevertheless, Professor Winspear's book is a useful contribution to the field. As against Gardthausen, he includes the results of fresh discoveries and studies. As against the Cambridge Ancient History, he not only has the greater forcefulness of unified authorship but also supports his presentation with full citation of the source material. Finally, as against the numerous biographies of Augustus, he is not bound by a chronological scheme but can trace the development of the various departments separately and continuously.

The general standpoint of the book is orthodox. Augustus appears as the master, not the creature, of his times, who almost single-handed shaped the new course which the ship of state should take. This course he meant to be a monarchy disguised as a "Restored Republic," since, though the author accepts Meyer's thesis that Augustus drew his chief inspiration from Cicero and Pompey rather than from Caesar, he agrees with the general opinion that Augustus' outward subordination of the

princeps to the *Senatus Populusque Romanus* cloaked a real autocracy. The first part deals with the Republican decline, and here he emphasizes the economic factors at the expense of the politico-military, e. g., self-seeking generals and armies. In discussing the reconstruction of government, he admirably analyzes the way in which Augustus found a place for all elements of the community in the service of the state, though he perhaps attributes too great importance to emperor-worship as a successful unifying bond. The treatment of the reforms in finance, religion, etc., brings out more clearly than do most books the problem of paying the army. The fourth part summarizes the administration of Italy and the provinces while a short final chapter gives an estimate of Augustus himself.

The usefulness of the book, however, is seriously marred by three faults. Some inaccuracies of statement might be forgiven, as that on p. 88, where *the lex Papia Poppaea* is said to have been passed in 8 A. D., though the correct date, 9 A. D., appears on pp. 179, 183-5. But there are confusing inconsistencies in the references, which careful proof-reading should have smoothed out, as in the use of A. C., A. D., and B. C. with dates: e. g. on p. 182, Horace's fourth book of Odes is dated in 13 A. C., and on p. 126, 5 A. D. and 6 A. C. seem to be successive years. Most serious, however, is the complete unreliability of the quotations from the sources. A casual examination will show minor inaccuracies on almost every page; but for extreme cases, the texts of Horace's Odes IV, 4, 17-18 and IV, 14, 9-16, mistakenly given on p. 254 as one, IV, 4, 14, and of the inscriptions from Dessau on pp. 99-100 should be compared with the originals. It is a great pity that a book which otherwise would be valuable for teachers and scholars should be thus disfigured.

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ELIZABETH HAZELTON HAIGHT. Essays on Ancient Fiction. New York, Longmans Green and Co., 1936. Pp. xi + 207.

This book consists of five separate essays as follows: I Oriental Stories in Classical Prose Literature, II Little Stories in Latin Elegiac Inscriptions, III Satire and the Latin Novel, IV Prose Fiction in the Augustan Age: Seneca's *Controversiae*, V Apuleius' Art of Story-Telling. The volume concludes with a bibliography and index.

The purpose of these essays is not to explain the origin and literary history of the various types of ancient romance—although questions of this kind are often intruded and lightly dismissed—but rather to interest the general reader in the field

of ancient fiction by introducing him, largely by means of paraphrase, to the novels of Petronius and Apuleius and to a wide variety of short stories scattered throughout ancient literature, especially in the historians and in Parthenius, Plutarch, and Apuleius. The Greek romances, properly so-called, receive only brief and incidental mention. The chapter on the elegiac epitaphs, though it has little to do with fiction in the ordinary sense of the term, is nevertheless welcome as a popular introduction to the subject and significant as an index to the middle-class culture that fostered romance in spite of the formal academic traditions. Miss Haight writes with enthusiasm for her subject and with a lively sense for the artistic and human values inherent in the stories that she recounts. Incidentally, I doubt that the Parthian Surena was really "horrified" at finding the licentious Milesian tales in the baggage of Crassus' officer Roscius; the discovery merely afforded him another means of insulting the defeated Romans, and Plutarch makes it plain that Surena's jibes were patently inconsistent with his own licentious character.

The first, second and fourth chapters will probably be more useful to classical students than the others, since they bring together material that is less familiar and less easily consulted than the writings of Petronius and Apuleius.

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EDWARD K. RAND. Les Esprits Souverains dans la Littérature Romaine. Paris, Ancienne Libraire Furne, Boivin & Cie, 1936. Pp. 78.

It is only right that Professor Rand's legion of friends should be informed of this reprinting from the *Revue des Cours et Conférences* of six lectures delivered at the Sorbonne under an exchange professorship in 1933-1934. The occasion did not call for the fruits of minute research and the titles themselves bespeak a purely humanistic treatment: *Térence et l'esprit comique*; *Lucrèce et son cosmos parfait*; *Horace et l'indépendance*; *Ovide et le monde des métamorphoses*; *Tacite, maître du jugement souverain*; *La Rome de Boëce et de Dante*. The interest of Latinists on this side of the Atlantic will be to scan the judgments of a mature scholar when framed under circumstances unusually honorific, and they will be gratified that the learning of this continent was represented with such dignity, sincerity, and discrimination in a foreign university.

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JEAN GAGÉ. Res Gestae Divi Augusti. Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1935. Pp. 210. 25 fr.

Since the publication by Sir William Ramsay in 1916 of fragments of a newly discovered copy of Augustus' *Res Gestae* at Antioch in Galatia and of the much more complete collection of remains of the same copy edited by David M. Robinson in this Journal in 1926, the study of the document has received great impetus. And this interest has been heightened by the recent discovery of two extensive sections of the Greek translation at Apollonia, published 1933 in vol. IV of the *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua* by Buckler, Calder, and Guthrie. Moved by these developments and by the fact that no French edition of the *Res Gestae* has appeared for many years, Jean Gagé of Strasbourg has produced the present volume, which offers generous studies of the various phases of the historical and textual problems.

The introduction of sixty some pages gives the origin of the *Res Gestae*, the plan and genesis of the work, Augustus' purpose in producing it, the literary type, the historical value and influence. All this is followed by a bibliography and by the texts, both Latin and Greek, accompanied by textual notes and historical notes in full detail. An Appendix offers Le Calendrier d'Auguste, based largely on the epigraphical fasti and on Ovid and giving datable events relating to Caesar, Augustus, and the imperial house of the time. The purpose of this section is to give in convenient chronological arrangement data which may bear on statements in the *Res Gestae*. The book is concluded by some supplementary textual notes given the editor by Wilhelm Weber and by an index in several parts, including a list of Latin words, but none of the Greek. In a category which includes persons to whom reference was made by Augustus, though their names were purposely omitted, Gagé has not mentioned Lepidus. Four plates of the Greek and Latin texts at Ancyra are reproduced from the many excellent photographs taken by Martin Schede.

Professsor Gagé gives very fairly the various views of scholars who have attempted to solve the problems of the *Res Gestae* and does not fail to present his own conclusions, which are in general very sane. He insists, because we now have goodly parts of four texts, two Greek and two Latin, that the document should no longer be called *Monumentum Ancyranum*, but only *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, as it appears on the stone, a title which has the support of Suetonius' phrase, *Index rerum a se gestarum*. He thinks that the *Appendix* was probably written in the province for the provincials and that its Greek text may well be the original. It cannot be said that the problem is one of importance; but it is still a problem. And it is difficult to understand why

information almost exclusively concerned with Rome and the Romans should be so interesting to provincials that a special addendum should be composed in Galatia for them. (Buckler and his colleagues give a reconstruction of the monument which contained the Greek text at Apollonia. Their central column of text is wider than it ought to be. They state (p. 50) that "the *'post-script'* " is assumed to have been omitted. But on page 54 they suggest that, while it was not on the face of the monument, it may have been "engraved on the end of our pedestal to the right of the main document." Accepting their distribution of the text, it still appears that there was room enough for the *Appendix* in the column with the last chapters.)

On the date at which the epigraphical copies of the *Res Gestae* were set up in the province, Gagé apparently does not express himself directly. However, he does note that the Greek copy at Apollonia may be placed between 14 and 19 A. D. This information comes from Buckler, Calder, and Guthrie, who have proved that the Greek copy was on a monument erected to honor not only the deified Augustus, but other, and living, members of the imperial house, including Germanicus. Since Germanicus died in 19, it is suggested with reason that the monument was erected before that date. This consideration, if correct, gives us for the first time a fairly definite *ante quem* for the basic copy, the *Monumentum Ancyranum*.

In the Bibliography I notice the omission of several recent studies, although they have been properly utilized in the Introduction.

Gagé has based his texts, Greek and Latin, on Mommsen's second edition, but has included all fragments found later and also later editions of other scholars, together with a study of Schede's photographs and the emendations supplied by Weber. He has printed the texts in such a way as to indicate the source of readings, whether from Ancyra or Antioch or Apollonia. He has also made some emendations of his own. He does not attempt to unify the variations in spelling found in either or both the Latin texts but prefers to represent the stones as they are.

It is not possible here to take account of all items involved in the textual questions. Some passages will be noticed. In the Latin text 1, 2, Gagé suggests *sententiae ferendae tribuens* in place of several phrases of similar meaning given by others. In 6, 2 he accepts a long passage largely from the Ramsay-von Premerstein edition, but would read *summa potestate* for *maxima potestate*, and *per me geri* for *per me fieri*. In 9, 1 he gives *collegia* from the Ancyran text; but neither his text nor his critical notes indicate that the text of Antioch has *conlegia*. In 12, 1 Gagé supplies, as has long been done, *plebi* after *tribunorum*, though it might seem better to supply *plebei* or *plebis*, on the authority of readings in chapter 15 and elsewhere.

Cap. 20, 5 is one of the most interesting passages. Gagé reads: *consul septimum uiam Flaminiam ab urbe Ariminum refeci pontesque omnes praeter Muluium et Minucium.* He has supplied *refeci,* and not the more common *feci,* on the advice of Weber. Since in this and in other chapters there seems to be a clear distinction kept by Augustus between *facio, reficio,* and *perficio,* I agree that *feci* here is probably wrong, although it is based on ἐπόησα of the Greek version, while ἐπεσκεύασα is regularly used for *refeci.* The Latin ought not to read *feci,* for Augustus did not construct, but reconstruct the Flaminian Way. I want to revive the suggestion of Sandys in his *Latin Epigraphy,* p. 269, that the Greek translator, having written γεφύρας τε τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ πάσας ἔξω δυεῖν τῶν μὴ ἐπιδεομένων ἐπισκευῆς, did not like to add to this the proper ἐπεσκεύασα, and so varied here with ἐπόησα to translate *refeci.* I suggest, however (with Hoeing, as Sandys gives it), that the verb may well be *muniui,* which is found in Suetonius, *Augustus* 30, and in the inscription on the arch at Ariminum at the end of the Flaminian Way (*C. I. L.* XI, 365) dealing with this work of repair. It can, of course, be put in the position now taken by *refeci,* for which, it seems to me, there is plenty of room on the stone, even though the Ramsay-von Premerstein edition (p. 86) says there is not. We are here dealing with the last words in a line of the stone at Ancyra, where the marginal spaces between the columns of writing are adequate to permit quite a variation in line-length. And of this the stone-cutter regularly took full advantage. To be specific, from Schede's photographs, col. IV, line 22 (cap. 21) shows, by measurement of a space equal to that with which we are concerned in line 19 (cap. 20), that 23 or 24 letters and spaces were given; and line 26 shows 23. The restorations suggested for line 19 need room for only 22 letters and spaces. I would read: *Ari(minum muniui pontesque).* Schede's plates are very clear, though one must take care in using them for measurements because the same scale has not always been maintained in photographing the various columns. This passage involves too an interesting bit of translation from the Latin to the Greek which gives, as an equivalent for *praeter Muluium et Minucium,* "except two not needing repair." I suggest that this failure to name the bridges may point to a provincial, rather than a Roman origin for the translation.

In 22, 2 *S. C. et lege* is a very good addition to the fragmentary Latin text of the section and is based on the newly discovered text of Apollonia. The subjunctive *militauerint,* in 25, 3, is probably justified by the stone, though it is badly weathered; but it is also probably an error for *militauerunt,* which I would read. Gagé has *regibus ea,* in 27, 3, probably by oversight, since the stone shows clearly the proper *eas.* In *Appendix* 2, *Matris*

Magnae is properly suggested as the equivalent for Μητρὸς θεῶν, the reading being based on the same names given in cap. 19.

For the Greek text alone a few passages may be mentioned. In 16, 2 Gagé prints ἐγγὺς as if it appeared in the Ancyran and Apollonian texts; the latter certainly gives ἐγγὺς. In 20, 3 καὶ τοῦ Κρόνου appears in Gagé's text, as if from Apollonia, which does not have the τοῦ, and the entire expression is missing from the Ancyran text. Gagé has correctly restored αἷς near the end of cap. 22, not accepting the οἷς suggested to Buckler by von Premerstein. The word, governed by the preposition ἐν which is extant, corresponds to the *quibus* of the Latin text, in which the reference is clearly to the *venationes* and not to the places where they were held. Buckler reads ἐπὶ πλάτος from the new portion of cap. 23, for which Gagé retains the εἰς, formerly supplied, and prints it as if the sigma were certain on the stone; but the photograph of the stone will hardly justify it. (In the examination of Gagé's text, Mr. A. I. Suskin, Instructor in Latin, has given valuable assistance).

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A. Y. Campbell. The Agamemnon of Aeschylus, London, Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1936. Pp. xxi + 126.

This edition of Aeschylus' play is to be followed shortly by a translation, and eventually by an exhaustive commentary. The text is intended for the amateur of Aeschylus rather than for the scholar, and the author has, effectively, taken pains to make it readable. A preface gives us Campbell's view of his task. He finds the text of the *Agamemnon*, as previously edited, in many places incomprehensible, in many others, "either vague, or flat, or feeble, or grossly inelegant." He describes Aeschylus as profound, subtle, and a master of his medium, and therefore will not accept as Aeschylean any phraseology which seems unworthy of such a master. An objective emendation of Campbell's view may be made on the basis of *Frogs*, lines 1119-1176. One must not, of course, take humor seriously; but surely Aristophanes' treatment of the prologue to the *Choephoroi* shows that, in the opinion of a highly competent and sympathetic critic, Aeschylus could and did write lines which were impressionistic, obscure, and would not bear analysis. The critical principles stated by Campbell are not unlike those of other boldly able scholars. The reviewer grants that, in this edition, the text should at all costs be made readable—that is, that lacunae should be filled and no obelized gibberish left untidied. On the other hand, he does not believe that Aeschylus should be made easy nor that a modern critic may justly reject what does not appeal to his taste.

The multifarious emendations used in this edition deserve close and thoughtful attention. The reviewer has sought a first impression of Campbell's own emendations, about 200 in number; he has, however, had access to only one of the articles defending many of these.[1] As a result of this skimming process, the reviewer would classify Campbell's own emendations, omitting a few minimal changes involving word-order, or particles, as follows: changes to a reading worse than the MS, 15; unnecessary changes, 72; changes unnecessary but improving—i. e., making the expression either clearer or more striking, 48; possibly desirable, 23; advantageous, 21; additions of one or more lines, 10, five of which are advantageous. The principal readings which seem worse than the MS are the following: 70, *οὔτ' οὖν προχοαῖς* for *οὔτε δακρύων*, together with the added line 70a, *Πρίαμος μακάρων*—the insertion of Priam makes the phrase clear, but the ominous ambiguity of the MS is better; 104, *τάφος* for *κράτος* in the face of the *Frogs'* MS tradition; 186, *μῆτιν οὐκ ἔτλα ψέγειν* for *μάντιν οὔτινα ψέγων*, a mediocre phrase for a highly significant one; 287, *ἰχθῦς χορευτοὺς* for *ἰσχὺς πορευτοῦ*—very ingenious, but too romantic for Aeschylus; 455, *ἁλόντας* for *ἔχοντας*—wrecks the oxymoron; 494-5, *βάσις, τηλοῦ ξύνουρος διψίᾳ κόνει, στόλου* for *κάσις πηλοῦ ξύνουρος διψία κόνις τάδε*—reduces to plain tragic language a striking metaphor, of which our editor no doubt disapproves; there are similar emendations of lines 962 and 1435; 568, *τοῖς ἐκεῖ κεκμηκόσιν* for *τοῖσι μὲν τεθνηκόσιν*—the new word is more striking, but the *μέν*, which Campbell regards as useless, contrasts with the *δέ* of 573; 1343, *δρομίτης* for *πλητὴν*—too specific for such an emergency; 1612, *οὔ σ'ἐρῶ* for *οὐ σέβω*—plain statement seems more in character for the chorus than ironical ellipsis.

As particularly striking examples of the emendations considered unnecessary by the reviewer, the following may be cited: 175, *τοπᾷ* for *τὸ πᾶν*—this word is a favorite of Campbell's (cf. lines 682, 983, 992), though he admits its ancient existence is doubtful; 215, *ὁλκᾷ περιοργεῖς* for *ὀργᾷ* or *αὐδᾷ περιόργως*—this involves inventing a new meaning for *ὁλκᾷ*; 571, *τ'. . . τυπῆς* for *δ'. . . τύχης*—our editor has no patience with *τύχη*, cf. 465, 640, 1165, 1427.

Unnecessary emendations resulting in a text either simpler, or, on the other hand, more striking than the MS are these, and the like: 140, *δὸς δ', ὥσπερ* for *τοσόνπερ* or *τόσσωνπερ* (simpler); 247, *παιᾶν' ἀφελῶς* for *αἰῶνα φίλως* (simpler; *ἀφελῶς* is a favored word, cf. 805); 576, *ποτ' ἠγμένα* for *ποτωμένοις* (attractively striking); 1092, *παιδολυμαντήριον* for *καὶ πέδον ῥαντήριον* (obviously striking, instead of slightly obscure); 1227, *λέων τάγαρχος δ'* for *νεῶν τ'ἄπαρχος*—(brilliant, but still unnecessary).

Of the emendations which seem perhaps desirable, the following

[1] *Class. Rev.*, L (1936), pp. 51-54.

are typical: 7,—Campbell's salvaging of this line is commendable; he reads *τηρῶ θ' ὅταν φθίνωσιν ἀντολὰς τ' ἐγώ*, but *ἐγώ* is otiose; 49-50, *ἐκπαταγεῖς ἄλγει κινάδων ἀπάταις τεκέων* for *ἐκπατίοις ἄλγεσι παίδων ὕπατοι λεχέων*—the importation of the foxes (from Archilochus) is ingenious, but the first word of the emendation is an invention, and the construction of *κινάδων* requires study; the MS is not very readable, but is the emendation an improvement?; 412-3, *κοίτας ἀθύμους ἀλοιδόρους ἀσίτους* for *σιγᾶς ἄτιμος ἀλοίδορος ἄδιστος*—emendation is necessary, but is it not better to limit substantial change to the obviously wrong *ἄδιστος*, as in Smyth's text?[2]

The principal advantageous emendations are the following: 38, *κλήομαι* for *λήθομαι*—the reading justifies the immediately preceding dative, though no example of the required sense ("I lock myself up") is given in Liddell-Scott-Jones; 145, *φάσματ' ἀκύρον* for *φάσματα στρουθῶν*—an illuminating replacement for the impossible "sparrows"; 366, *σκήψῃ βέλος ἠλιθωθέν* for *βέλος ἠλίθιον σκήψειεν*—the optative of the MS is unmotivated; 485, *ὄχλος· ἐπινέμεται ταχύπορον* for *ὄρος ἐπινέμεται ταχύπορος*—makes clear an almost impossible line; 557, *λύζοντες* for *λάχοντες*; 1041, *δουλίας μάζης φαγεῖν*, based on the reading of F, *δουλείας μάζης βία*; 1206, *γε πελάτης* for *παλαιστὴς*; 1219, *παῖδας σφαγέντας ὥσπερ οἷς πρὸς τῶν φίλων* for *παῖδες θανόντες ὡσπερεὶ πρὸς τῶν φίλων*—though the necessity of *σφαγέντας* is not as clear to the reviewer as to the editor; 1264, *στολήν* for *τάδε*; 1269, *οὐνδύων* for *ἐκδύων*; 1313, *δαμεῖσι* for *δομοῖσι* (but the transposition to follow 1305 is hardly necessary); 1459-61, *ἐπηνύσω* for *ἐπηνθίσω*, *μίασμ'* for *δι' αἷμ'*, *ἄλαστος οἰζὺς ἐρηρεισμένα* for *ἔρις ἐρίδματος ἀνδρὸς οἰζύς*—drastic, but ingeniously defended; 1664, *κρατοῦντ' ἀτιμάσας* for *κρατοῦντα* (*vac.*); the transposition to follow 1649 helps the stichomythia.

Of the lines added by the editor to fill lacunae, the reviewer would consider desirable lines 301a, 323a, 972a, 1554a and b, 1594a-c, but would reject as unnecessary clarification lines 555a and b, 794a, 1276a, 1317a.

The above citations may show, as the complete series clearly does, that Campbell follows palaeographical procedure, provided he can get results by it which seem adequate to him; when it seems necessary, however, he will, in accordance with his first critical principle, be thoroughly drastic. One should note with approval his energy in resurrecting striking words from lexicographers. Many of the nearly 600 emendations adopted from 110 other critics are, of course, highly necessary and desirable; some might also be reckoned as unnecessary or worse.

The stage directions, an excellent feature of this edition, are

[2] Campbell's minor emendations, not specifically included in this survey, should probably be placed in this category.

to a large extent clearly correct; five induce discussion. At 39 Campbell has, besides other business which would make good spectacle, Clytemestra enter, and remain silently till her speech at 264. This early entrance of the Queen has always seemed to the reviewer a very desirable bit of stage-management, but he cannot find definite evidence for it; if the Chorus' words to the Queen, 83-103, are direct address, not apostrophe, some transition is needed to explain their plunging into contemplation of the past. At line 488, Campbell notes "an interval of a few days"; this is exactly and unquestionably right, but the reviewer would place it after 474—the doubts of the Chorus are then the natural result of second thoughts, and the cooling down of rejoicing. As Agamemnon steps from his chariot, our editor has Clytemestra raise the victory-cry; the assembled company is astonished but then takes it as a demonstration in honor of the conquest of Troy; Cassandra alone understands. Clytemestra's speech, lines 958-72, is transposed to follow line 929; an added line makes the transition to 930; Agamemnon thus proceeds to the palace without verbal accompaniment. This arrangement is certainly good theatre, but is ἐπωλολύξατο (1236) sufficient evidence? Line 1061 is interpreted as being addressed to an attendant, who then beckons imperiously to Cassandra; this ingenious interpretation gives a thoroughly satisfactory sense to a line, the ordinary interpretation of which perilously skirts the ridiculous; but it must be said that the interpretation of φράζε καρβάνῳ χερί—"sign with your hand to the foreigner"—is not to be seen at a glance. When Clytemestra is revealed standing over the bodies of the victims, Campbell's stage-direction calls for the corpse of Agamemnon to be lying in a silver bath-tub, wrapped in a purple cloth, while over it lies Cassandra's body, with blood dripping into Agamemnon's mouth. The last gory detail is derived from a perversely ingenious interpretation of 1398—Agamemnon has drained to the dregs a cup he has mixed; so far one can agree; but Campbell adds that the dregs of this cup is the blood of Cassandra! He also interprets Clytemestra's third blow (1386) as the killing of the Trojan paramour; this is more possible, but still doubtful. That the corpses were shown thus artfully arranged is most unlikely, and that the audience could have seen exactly what the arrangement meant is still more so. The bath-tub is also a piece of over-realism. In real life, the Chorus would have entered the palace; therefore, in the play, theoretically, they find Clytemestra at the scene of her crime; actually, because of stage necessity, she comes out to meet them, and the reviewer cannot believe that she brought the plumbing with her. By the time Aegisthus enters, the scene is, of course, theoretically as well as actually, outdoors again.

In conclusion, one must recognize with hearty praise Campbell's affection for Aeschylus, his unflagging industry, and his

brilliance. In some respects he has attained his objective, a good edition for the amateur of Aeschylus. One feels, however, that this, like Shaw's *Odyssey*, though to a lesser extent, is not the ancient author so much as a brilliant modern impression of the ancient author. It would be better, then, to reserve this *Agamemnon* for the close student of Aeschylus. One cannot disregard Professor Campbell; neither can one defer to him.

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ALEXANDER OLIVIERI. Aetii Amideni Libri Medicinales I-IV (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum VIII, 1). Leipzig and Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1935. Pp. xiv + 408. RM 21.75.

Aetius of Amida on the Tigris lived in the sixth century and had a position as court physician under Justinian and succeeding emperors. His great work survives in sixteen books, and hitherto no complete edition of the Greek text has been published, although the first eight books were published by Aldus in 1534. Several of the later books have appeared in special editions, and there has been a Latin translation of the whole by Cornarius, Leyden, 1549. We are now to have in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* a complete critical edition, the first quarter of which now appears under the editorship of Olivieri. Since the work of Aetius is an epitome of earlier works, chiefly of Galen and Oribasius, as well as numerous other earlier medical writers, it is obvious that the critical apparatus is bound to be rather complicated, as it must take account not only of the manuscripts of Aetius but also of the manuscripts of the authors from whom he made the extracts. The result is unavoidably somewhat confusing. In the preface to the present edition we are informed that the critical apparatus of Olivieri was simplified and abbreviated by Deichgraeber. It is still rather formidable. So far as I have been able to test it here and there, the text and the critical apparatus have been prepared with the same exemplary care and precision which we have learned to expect from the editors of the new Medical Corpus. It is a matter for congratulation that the great undertaking of the Medical Corpus is proceeding so steadily. No one who has not made a similar study of a complex manuscript tradition can appreciate the self-denial required of an editor of one of these late Greek medical compendia. There is every reason to thank Olivieri and his associates, and to express the hope that the remainder of the work may in due time be published with the same care.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but every item of interest is listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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THE HIGHER CRITICISM ON OLYMPUS.

Anyone who wishes to study Homer's portrayal of the gods, or the religious implications of the Homeric text, must begin by considering the relation in which the Olympian scenes stand to other parts of the poems. Much has been written about these scenes, for they concern the historian of religion and of philosophy as well as the student of literature. I do not now propose to explore this whole mass of disputation, but only to examine one type of hypothesis, in which the Olympian scenes are assumed to be (1) consciously satirical or doctrinal, (2) connected with the skepticism of Ionian philosophy, (3) distinguishable from other, earlier parts of the text in which the gods are objects of reverent faith, (4) useful to the higher critic in his attempts to identify the work of different poets in different periods.

For several reasons, the studies of Finsler, Wilamowitz, and Murray particularly invite examination. They are outstanding examples of the criticism which seeks to connect the analysis of the poems with hypothetical stages in the evolution of religious thought. The interpretations they offer of the Olympian scenes are bound up with elaborate theories of composition; and these theories, coming from men so distinguished, have been received by Hellenists with a respect which I think they do not merit. Even in a field in which subjectivity has long held sway, they are notable examples of subjective reasoning, impressive warnings of the mental myopia that our preconceptions may induce even in those of us who are most acute and most sincere.

The views of Finsler and of Wilamowitz are rejected by Nilsson[1] on the general grounds that the Olympian scenes,

[1] *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley, 1932), pp. 223-228; *Homer and Mycenae* (London, 1933), p. 267.

which *ex hypothesi* are relatively late, "fill a very large part" of E, which *ex hypothesi* is early, and that we may well doubt the validity of theories leading to conclusions so diverse. For others than devotees of the higher criticism, this will suffice.[2] But Nilsson's objection regarding E is met, formally, both by Finsler's contention that the Olympian scenes in "early" books were inserted by the *Iliasdichter* and, in a very different way, by Wilamowitz' flat assertion that the gods of E are quite unlike the gods of the later books. And the higher critics are entirely justified, from their own point of view, in declining to entertain the objection that no two of them agree, for, on the day on which they shall agree, the higher criticism will have ceased to be. We must therefore test these theories by examining the Homeric passages on which they are based. In so doing we shall perhaps find out why three so eminent critics, starting from identical data, come to conclusions so dissimilar.

I have elsewhere pointed out how certain preconceptions in regard to Homeric style and composition tend to vitiate inquiries into the genesis of the poems.[3] The critic assumes an "early" period of perfection in style and artistic economy, in which, usually, "Homer" is put, and later periods of bad taste, faulty construction, feeble imitation, in which the diaskeuast, imitator, interpolator, continuator, is everywhere rampant. He further assumes that we are again in an era of faultless taste and unerring critical sagacity, and ends by attributing to "Homer" what he himself finds good. Now the prevailing theories in regard to the Homeric portrayal of the gods will be found to involve, quite often, assumptions of very much this type. We assume an "early" period of simple faith and sincere religious feeling in which poets sing of the gods with reverence or exalt them as benevolent rulers of the cosmos, and subsequent periods of iconoclastic skepticism—usually a concomitant of the Ionian philosophy—in which "later" poets scoff and jeer at the deities

[2] Cf. James Duffy, "Leaf's Theory of the Gods in the *Menis* and Expansions of the *Iliad*," *Class. Jour.*, XXXII (1936), pp. 6 f.

[3] "Homeric Repetitions," *U. of Calif. Publ. Class. Phil.*, XII, 1 (1933), p. 23. Cf. Nilsson, *Homer and Mycenae*, p. 52: "Some scholars seem to have the idea that the poets of the earliest poems were the only geniuses and that poetry was continually deteriorating. This identifying of old and good, of recent and inferior, is, of course, questionable."

of earlier generations, until finally we come to times when religious feeling and the power of song have sunk to their lowest ebb.[4] Here is a sort of Saturn complex, which sees everywhere progressive deterioration from a Golden Age.

Finsler believes he finds in the Iliad two distinct stages. In the earlier, the Olympian state does not exist and the gods act independently; they are regarded with reverence and with faith in their goodness and justice toward mankind. In the later stage, "Homer" has created the *Götterstaat* and introduced the typical Olympian scenes; he hates and fears the cruel and selfish gods, and loves and pities humanity; the Olympians are not burlesqued, but rather represented as grim and terrible, though there are occasional touches of humor.[5] Homer is "der erste griechische Philosoph mit durchdachter Weltanschauung";[6] in the portions of the Iliad he composed, "an Stelle eines gänzlich undogmatischen Glaubens ist ein pessimistisches philosophisches System getreten."[7]

Using this hypothetical difference between earlier and later conceptions of the gods as a primary criterion, Finsler proceeds to identify the work of "Homer," the *Iliasdichter*, and to elaborate his own theories of composition. His method includes the usual futilities of the higher criticism; it starts from the postulate that

[4] This hypothetical progress is traced by W. Nestle, "Die Anfänge einer Götterburleske bei Homer," *N. Jahrb. kl. Alt.*, XV (1905), pp. 161-182. Here will be found in general outline ideas later developed by Wilamowitz. Nestle's warning that what seems comic or grotesque to us may not have seemed so to the poet's contemporaries (p. 163) has been too little heeded. In an interesting study by Paul Meyer, *Die Götterwelt Homers* (Göttingen, 1907), is found the same general idea, though the aspects of the gods are differently conceived; from objects of superstitious terror, of which there is little trace in Homer, they become in the later parts of the Iliad and the Odyssey (i. e., the Olympian scenes) little more than men and women, virtually *Romanfiguren*. Meyer does not go farther in theories of composition than the assumption that the Olympian scenes are "late"; his ideas are diametrically opposed to Finsler's belief that the later parts show fear and hatred of cruel and powerful gods.

[5] *Die olympischen Szenen der Ilias* (Bern, 1906) *passim*, and especially pp. 54, 18-22, 26 f., 36 f. Finsler has summed up his position in *Homer* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 447-456. See also ed. 2 (1918), II, p. 59; ed. 3 (1924), I[1], pp. 168 f.

[6] *Homer* (1908), p. 456. [7] *Szenen*, p. 54.

differences are *ipso facto* the work of different hands, and facts which do not suit the general theory of composition are brought into conformity by the familiar devices of *Ueberarbeitung, Interpolationen, Ueberreste, usw.*[8] At times Finsler is so obsessed by his theories that he simply fails to see what stands in his text. For example, in his discussion of N-O, all passages that seem to him to imply the wrath of Achilles, the promise to Thetis, or the command to the gods in Θ to keep out of the battle are got out of the way by pronouncing them additions made by the *Iliasdichter* to an original "einfache und schöne Erzählung" in which Poseidon made no particular effort to conceal his movements from Zeus, but went about helping the Achaeans in the independent manner characteristic of the earlier stage (*Szenen*, pp. 15-23). After noting in N 8 f. an allusion to the command in Θ (evidently intercalated by the *Iliasdichter*), Finsler goes on (p. 15), "Aber dieses Verbotes wird im folgenden nicht gedacht. Poseidon entsteigt dem Meere, offenbar ganz unbekümmert darum, ob Zeus ihn sehe oder nicht." In this assertion he is simply flatly contradicting the statement of the Homeric text. The poet's account of Poseidon's coming starts with the formula οὐδ' ἀλαοσκοπιὴν εἶχε, which is always used in Homer of alertness to grasp an opportunity (cf. θ 285; K 515; Ξ 135). This is followed almost immediately by the explicit statement that Poseidon, from where he sat, had a clear view of Ida (ἔνθεν γὰρ ἐφαίνετο πᾶσα μὲν Ἴδη) as well as of the Trojan plain. In such a context the words αὐτίκα δ' ἐξ ὄρεος κατεβήσετο seem to say quite plainly that the god, in an access of rage (κρατερῶς ἐνεμέσσα), started for the battle just as soon as he saw that Zeus was looking the other way and the coast was clear. I think it would not occur to anyone, reading these lines without preconceptions,

[8] Finsler disapproves (*Szenen*, p. 8) of the way in which "Unitarier und andere" get rid of difficulties by calling them interpolations; his own method is to say that lines which do not accord with his scheme are "insertions" (e. g., *loc. cit.*, "Also sind die Verse 60-62, die sich auf die Gesandtschaft beziehen, in einen früheren Zusammenhang eingesetzt, der nichts von ihr wusste."), or, conversely, survivals (e. g., pp. 20 f., "In dieser Partie ist die alte Fassung durch den Dichter der Apate überarbeitet. Denn der Rechtsstandpunkt . . . stammen aus einem ganz andern Gedankenkreis, als die Apate ihn bietet."), or (p. 28) "Spuren einer tiefgehenden Ueberarbeitung . . . über dessen Urheber ich jedoch nichts aussagen kann."

to understand them otherwise. But they will need to be rewritten in very different language—or attributed to the *Ueberarbeitung* of the *Iliasdichter* along with 8 f., 352 f., 356 f., etc.—before we can accept the view that we have here an early stratum in which the command of Θ is unknown.

To take another example, not immediately related to the Olympian scenes, Finsler's theory of an independent *Patrocleia* (*Szenen*, pp. 5-11) starts from the remarkable (auffallend) circumstance that Patroclus, on returning from the visit to Nestor, says not a word about the desperate plight of the Achaeans. Here again, he is simply disregarding or overlooking what the poet has told us repeatedly, that Achilles had been standing by the stern of his ship watching the course of the battle (Λ 600 f.) and knew perfectly well, even before he sent Patroclus to ask after Machaon, that the Achaeans were in a desperate situation. In fact, Finsler's words, "Die Not ist also ausserordentlich gross," are so closely paralleled by Achilles's words to Patroclus in Λ 610, *χρειὼ γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτός*, that a higher critic would be tempted to credit the latter to an *Ueberarbeiter* who had read *Olympische Szenen*. In short, what Finsler found so remarkable that it could be explained only on the theory of an independent *Patrocleia*, is that Patroclus does not begin by telling Achilles precisely what Achilles had just told Patroclus when he sent him on the errand to Nestor. And when Finsler goes on "Erst Π 124 sieht Achilleus das Schiff des Protesilaos aufflammen," again implying, as his theory demands, that Achilles is unaware of the desperate situation, he is ignoring not only Λ 600-610 but also Π 17 f., 65-79, which make it abundantly clear that Achilles continued to look and listen to the turmoil and the din of battle during the absence of Patroclus. If he saw the flame "erst Π 124," it is because the ship was not set afire until line 122. Finsler's theories keep him even from seeing that *τοῖον γὰρ ἄχος βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς* (22), almost the first words Patroclus utters, are precisely what he is so astonished not to find. They sum up well enough the desperate plight of the Achaeans and are followed, very properly, by an account of what Achilles had not been able to see for himself, that is, the wounding of the major champions in the fighting on the plain. What he had just seen going on before his eyes, what he had heard for himself (Π 76-79), the final assault on the camp which brings

Hector to the ship of Protesilaus (O 379-746), is omitted, and very properly. Had the poet inserted at this point what Finsler demands, namely, a recapitulation of the closing scenes in O, the higher critics would have lost no time in striking it out, with gleeful ferocity, as the work of the awkward interpolator. Finsler's argument on these two passages is, I believe, a fair example of his method, which consistently neglects plain statements in the text. The value of such exercises I leave to the reader.

We may note here, for future reference, that Finsler puts the work of the *Iliasdichter*, that is, the composition of the Iliad, at about 700 B. C., and the composition of the Odyssey a century later.[9]

Murray has already three stages of religion before he has come to the "latest" parts of the Iliad, and his discussion of the collapse of "Homeric theology" under the assaults of "the Milesian spirit" illustrates very well the sort of conclusion to which the critic ultimately will come if he starts from the general assumption of early faith and later skepticism.[10] Murray thinks "one can notice three distinct stages": the primitive stage of uncritical belief, a middle stage of expurgation and humanizing, and, thirdly, "the late Ionian stage." This last is imbued with "the Milesian spirit," with "a kind of half-licentious humour," . . . "a mocking, half-licentious, Boccaccio-like spirit, already at work in the later, and not the very latest, parts of the *Iliad*." As typical instances he selects the Theomachy and the Διὸς ἀπάτη. His theory of composition is nearer to Lachmann's than to the "kernel" hypotheses; he holds (p. 307) that various songs or lays already in existence were stitched together by rhapsodes. He is thus under no necessity of fitting portions of the text into a progressive scheme of composition, as do Finsler and Wilamowitz. It is his belief that the poems were "worked up" into their present shape in the latter part of the sixth century, probably by Cynaethus.[11]

The theories of Wilamowitz, as expounded in *Die Ilias und Homer*, are somewhat complicated. For him "Homer" is preeminently the poet of A and the Διὸς ἀπάτη—"Durchweg eigene

[9] *Homer*, I[1] (1924), p. 66.

[10] G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (ed. 4, Oxford, 1934), pp. 262-279.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 308; cf. p. 262.

Erfindung oder doch Gestaltung geben A, die Götterszenen NΞO, ΦXΨ."[12] "Homer" incorporated with more or less modification a series of earlier poems, including a short epic ΓΔE, the nucleus of which is the *aristeia* of Diomede; numerous later additions to the Homeric poem by different hands brought the Iliad gradually to its present proportions. In distinguishing these various strata, Wilamowitz constantly relies upon differences which he thinks he detects in the presentation of the gods. These he regards as a most valuable criterion. He traces a process of development from an earlier Ionian viewpoint in E[13] to the fully perfected Olympian phantasy of "Homer," and again a progressive degeneration which eventuates in the "plumpe Erhabenheit" of the Theomachy—"vom Θ gar nicht zu reden."[14] We note that E is attributed to the early eighth century, the work of Homer to about 750 B. C., and Θ—the latest stratum and the worst—to a rhapsode of the seventh century, probably a younger contemporary of Archilochus and Terpander.[15]

For Wilamowitz the differences on which he based his theories of composition were real. They will be real for all who accept his premises, and for others not; each critic will have to form his own opinion as to their validity. The fundamental weakness of his method, in my own opinion, lies in the arbitrary selection of minor differences, which often are quite incidental, or even trivial, and the arbitrary adoption of the explanations that accord with his theories of composition, without any consideration of others at least equally tenable. I have chosen as illustrations two arguments sufficiently typical and sufficiently important in the theories of composition advanced in *Die Ilias und Homer* to be specially noted by Tièche in his favorable summary of the book.[16]

[12] U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin, 1920), p. 514; cf. pp. 316 ff.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 285: "Wir müssen unsern Standpunkt in dem Ionien des frühen achten Jahrhunderts nehmen."

[14] These conclusions are developed in Chapter 14 (pp. 284-293) and summed up with additional observations at the start of Chapter 16 (pp. 316 f.).

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 57 f.

[16] In Finsler's *Homer*, I[1] (1924), p. 186.

In attempting to distinguish between the work of the *Iliasdichter* and that of the poet of ΣΤ, Wilamowitz relies upon the difference he sees between the portrayal of Hephaestus in A, where he is "komische Figur," and in Σ, where he "humpelt nicht, sondern hat sich zauberhafte Stützen verfertigt. Die Charis hat er wohl zur Frau bekommen, weil dem Hypnos im Ξ eine solche Frau versprochen wird."[17] Now, one might take these statements at their face value and yet might very properly ask whether they have anything at all to do with the problem of authorship, for we cannot expect the poet to tell everything he knows about Hephaestus every time the god is mentioned. However, their value goes down with startling rapidity as we read the text to which they relate. They are found to be in part a simple blunder, in part mere conjecture, and the rest trivial enough; none of them can be taken as indicating a difference of authorship without disregarding certain rather obvious considerations that are highly pertinent. The touch of comedy so felicitous in A would unquestionably be out of place in Σ, in the prelude to the forging of the arms. The magic attendants, like the marvelous tripods, are part of the emphasis upon Hephaestus' supernatural power and divine skill of which the artistic purpose should be clear to anyone.[18] Charis enters naturally enough into the reception of Thetis in the abode of Hephaestus, but I can conceive of no reason why she should have been mentioned in A; the guess that she was suggested by Ξ 267 ff. involves a favorite fallacy of the higher criticism, the assumption that the poet here has nothing upon which to draw for his scene except what has appeared in "earlier" parts of the Iliad. There is left Hephaestus' limp, the assertion that in Σ "Hephaistos humpelt nicht," which clearly is felt to be quite important. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that such a difference would be highly significant; the fatal flaw is that it does not exist. The statement that Hephaestus does not limp in Σ is Wilamowitz', not the poet's, and what the poet says is the exact reverse.

[17] *Die Ilias und Homer*, pp. 317 f.

[18] Σ 373-379. The scene, with its dignified portrayal of Hephaestus and the insistence on his superhuman skill, is a prelude to the forging of the armor and contributes to the general effect of magnificence; this would have been sadly marred by the "schalkhafter Unterton" which for Wilamowitz is the peculiar mark of the *Iliasdichter*.

He says, as plainly as words can say, not once, but twice, Hephaestus "got up limping" (Σ 410 f., *ἀνέστη / χωλεύων*) and "came out limping" (Σ 416 f., *βῆ δὲ θύραζε / χωλεύων*). This may seem to be, and in a way is, a trivial point, not worthy to be so labored. But it is the sort of thing that is too often found in this type of criticism to be always passed over without remark. Here Wilamowitz has made it a pivotal point in an argument which the weight of his authority is likely to erect into a conclusive demonstration.

Again, Wilamowitz stresses the difference he feels between the Hera of the little epic ΓΔΕ, "die wildeste Feindin der Troer" (p. 285), in whom "der Grimm, mit dem sie die Troer verfolgt, ist derselbe in der Heraklessage" (p. 287), and the gentler Hera portrayed by the poet of A and the *ἀπάτη*, that is, by "Homer." "Seinen Olympiern, selbst der Hera, kann man das Gelüste, Priamos und die Troer roh zu verschlingen (Δ 35), nicht mehr zutrauen" (p. 317). All this elaborate contrast is constructed out of the one bit of playful banter with which Zeus nags Hera,

> *εἰ δὲ σύ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ*
> *ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας*
> *ἄλλους τε Τρῶας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξακέσαιο.* [Δ 34-36]

It is as if, in a work of modern fiction, someone should say to a girl, "You'ld like to scratch her eyes out, wouldn't you?" and we should solemnly infer that the person addressed was conceived as a savage and furious character. Or as if we should argue from Xenophon's *καὶ ὠμοὺς δεῖ καταφαγεῖν* (*Anab.* iv. 8. 14) that his soldiers were cannibals. And Wilamowitz' lively interest in Hera's "Wildheit" in Δ seems to have blinded him to the singular likeness which this Zeus who amuses himself by stirring up Hera and Athena bears to the Zeus of A and the *ἀπάτη* and, I should say, to the Zeus of episodes which Wilamowitz regards as among the latest and the worst, the Zeus who challenges the other gods to a tug of war (Θ 18-27), who taunts and threatens Hera and Athena after their fruitless sally (Θ 446-456), who ends the battle of the gods on a note of merriment (Φ 508).

The two points I have discussed are not mere lapses in detail, unfairly chosen to discredit an argument otherwise sound and weighty, but are organic and fairly representative. Here we

have typical higher criticism, and the mildest judgment that can be passed is that it is largely subjective, the form only of criticism, devoid of the substance.

The inconsistencies and reciprocal contradictions of these attempts at analysis are obvious and show how precarious are subjective criteria.[19] We may for example glance again at the judgments of these three critics on the Διὸς ἀπάτη. For Wilamowitz this is the type and essence of "Homer's" most characteristic work; the glaring difference between its gods and the archaic gods of ΓΔΕ or the later conception of divinity found in ΞΤ, to say nothing of Θ and the unspeakable Theomachy, is the keystone of the edifice of theory he rears in *Die Ilias und Homer*. Finsler, starting from suggestions originally made by Wilamowitz, judges very differently: "Dass der Dichter der Apate mit dem des Göttergesprächs in Δ identisch sei, kann keinem Zweifel mehr unterliegen" (*Szenen*, p. 21); "Wenden wir uns nunmehr zum Beginn des Θ und der Ausfahrt der Göttinnen, so leuchtet die Ähnlichkeit mit den bereits behandelten olympischen Szenen von selbst ein" (*ib.*, p. 30); "Ihr (Thetis') Besuch bei Hephaistos (Σ) atmet Stil und Geist der übrigen olympischen Szenen" (*ib.*, p. 54). In other words, Finsler finds the authentic handiwork of the *Dichter der Apate* in parts of the Iliad that for Wilamowitz are either early and archaic or among the latest and worst. When Murray couples the ἀπάτη, that gem from the hand of the *Iliasdichter*, with the Theomachy as typical of the Ionian or Milesian spirit, it seems that diversity of judgment has reached its limit.

Hard as it is to reconcile the various analytical theories with one another, it is still harder to bring them into accord with what has been learned from the study of mythologies other than the Greek. In those instances in which the cultural background of mythology or religion is definitely known we find uniformly that naive, grotesque elements appear at a very primitive level

[19] Finsler and Wilamowitz agree in calling the *Iliasdichter* "Homer," but they do not agree in regard to the portions of the text which are "Homer's" work, the stage he represents in the development of the poem, the time in which he flourished, or his attitude toward the immortals. Their theories and Murray's have little in common except the fundamental assumption of Ionian influence.

and are in no way incompatible with devout religious feeling.[20] This offers no difficulty if we regard the Olympian scenes as made up in part of primitive myth and folk-tale, retold with a certain humor and sense of the ridiculous, primarily for the entertainment of the listener. But we are confronted by a very different problem when we adopt the view that they are introduced for the express purpose of satirizing the gods. No one, I believe, maintains that the motifs of these episodes were newly invented by the "Ionian minstrels" who are held to have introduced them into the poems, or denies that the portrayal of the gods is in large part that of primitive myth and folk-tale. Yet, if these tales were not a part of the poems in their hypothetical earlier, purer form, how shall we account for their absence? They existed, and must have been generally known, since so much of their content bears the stamp of popular story; we have no recourse other than to assume that the earlier poets suppressed them, that the naive, grotesque elements of myth were intentionally excluded from the poems until a generation of rationalizing skeptics introduced them deliberately with satirical intent. But this will involve a further assumption—to my thinking very dubious—that recitation of the poems was restricted to audiences of the élite, who in the earlier period felt somewhat as Mr. Murray and we about divinity. Thus the poems become the expression of an enlightened minority which first keeps the gods inviolate from any grotesquerie of popular belief or tale and afterwards attacks them on the score of just this popular belief. All this seems to me very improbable, but it is implied in the theories we are discussing. Unless some such assumptions as these can be established, or it can be shown that the content of the Olympian scenes was newly invented by

[20] For a general summary of the facts with references to special studies, see the article "Mythology" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, ed. 11, by Andrew Lang; for a fuller discussion, *Myth, Ritual and Religion* (London, 1887) by the same author. More recent studies have made additions to the data without materially altering their general character or impairing the value of Lang's conclusions in regard to the conflict between religion and myth, between the mood of "earnest contemplation and submission" and the mood of "playful and erratic fancy," both of them "present, and in conflict, through the whole religious history of the human race."

the "Ionian minstrels," the evidence for the belief that the poems once existed without these scenes is exactly nil.

There is also a matter of chronology to be considered. We have no evidence for anything that can be thought of as philosophy or science before Thales, early in the sixth century, and even Thales is a somewhat dim figure. The first definite evidence of a skeptical and rationalistic attitude toward the gods relates to Xenophanes and brings us to the late sixth and early fifth centuries.[21] This would fit Murray's theories well enough, but Wilamowitz puts his "Homer," author of the typical Olympian scenes, in the middle of the eighth century;[22] Finsler, at its end. That means we are asked to believe that "der ionische Geist der künftigen Wissenschaft, aber auch der Freigeisterei," dominated epic poetry a century or a century and a half before it left any record even in tradition. This is of course theoretically possible and it may be the true explanation, but we are not justified in adopting it uncritically. We must consider whether it accords with our primary data—the Homeric text and the fragments of the early philosophers—better than other hypotheses.

We have fortunately in Xenophanes a first-hand witness to the relations between the Ionian philosophy and the epic at a comparatively early time. Gods, myths, and poetry are his subject in two passages:

> *πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε,*
> *ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,*
> *κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.*
>
> [Diels, fr. 11; H-Cr. 16, 1-3].

> *χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὐφρονας ἄνδρας*
> *εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις·*
>
> . . . . . .

[21] In the opinion of Burnet (*Greek Philosophy, Part 1, Thales to Plato* [London, 1914], pp. 34 f.) Xenophanes was moved to criticism of the Homeric theology mainly by his interest in social and moral reform.

[22] Since E is held to represent the standpoint of the early eighth century (*supra*, n. 13), less than half a century is allowed for the change from "die hocharchaische Stilisierung im E" to the fully developed phantasy of the "Iliasdichter" over which "liegt der Glanz der vollsten, freisten praxitelischen Charis." (*Ilias und Homer*, p. 318).

ἀνδρῶν αἰνεῖν τοῦτον, ὃς ἐσθλὰ πιὼν ἀναφαίνει,
ὥς οἱ μνημοσύνη καὶ τόνος ἀμφ' ἀρετῆς.
οὔτι μάχας διέπειν Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων,
οὐδ' (αὖ) Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων,
ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς· τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι·
θεῶν (δὲ) προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν.

[Diels, H-Cr. fr. 1, 13-14, 19-24].

The same line of thought runs through both passages. Curiously enough, the lines to which Xenophanes owes much of his fame, the attack upon "Homeric theology," seem to be directed against the very episodes in Homer which are assumed to be the expression of Ionian philosophy.[28] Nothing stands out more clearly in these fragments than the author's feeling that he is assailing an ancient, traditional way of thinking, typical of vulgar legend and popular belief. To his mind, the convivial should hymn the deity with reverent words and pure; the conversation, even *inter pocula,* should be kept to nobler themes than the "antiquated fictions" of the epic poets. If such passages as these mean anything, they mean that Xenophanes thought of the gods of myth in Homer or in Hesiod, and of such matters as make up a large part of the Olympian scenes, as hoary survivals. The last line of the quotation suggests that the more reverent attitude, which for our theorists is the earlier, would have seemed to him worthy of his own times. His testi-

[28] In the familiar reference to Homer and Hesiod (Diels, fr. 11) the general delinquency of the gods is exemplified by thievery, adultery, and deceit. Deceit suggests at once the ἀπάτη, and adultery the lay of Ares and Aphrodite; thievery is one of the chief accomplishments of Hermes, who twice is spoken of in Olympian scenes in connections which suggest the familiar folk tale motif of the Master Thief (E 390; Ω 24). Of course Xenophanes had in mind much besides the Iliad and Odyssey (e. g., the Hymn to Hermes), and probably much not now extant; but it is significant that the apposite illustrations of his statements, insofar as they are found in the Homeric text, are found in the Olympian scenes or in the characterizations of the gods which these scenes imply. The "violent discords" (στάσιας σφεδανάς) of fr. 1, 23, also, may be illustrated from the Olympian scenes as well as from Hesiod (Diels can hardly be right in interpreting "tobenden Bürgerzwist," since the passage as a whole evidently refers to ancient myths.). In short, the lines which drew the Ionian skeptic's fire are plainly just the lines which modern critics attribute to Ionian skepticism.

mony is quite incompatible, in my opinion, with the theories we are discussing.

Another significant fact is the complete absence from the Homeric poems of that speculative curiosity regarding origins, sources, causes, that apparently was the breath of life to the Ionian philosopher. The urge to know whence, why, and how speaks out repeatedly in even the few lines that have survived from Xenophanes, and Xenophanes is believed to have been less interested in physical speculation than his predecessors.[24] In all the Homeric text there is scarcely a hint of any such curiosity; for all we are told, the poet simply accepted man and the universe as he found them, and portrayed them as he saw them, without inquiring whence and why they were.[25] It is not our task at present to ask why this is so; we have only to note the implications for our problem. If late Ionian poets, imbued with the spirit of natural science and rationalistic philosophies, had so great a part in producing the poems that they inserted long episodes and many briefer allusions in which the gods are consciously held up to the scorn of the enlightened listener, it is truly remarkable that they did not allow a single one of these absorbing queries, not the faintest hint of their intellectual curiosity, to creep in among the hundreds of lines with which

[24] Although Xenophanes was perhaps less of a scientist than the Milesians and more of a social reformer, as Burnet maintains (*op. cit.*, p. 36), there can be no doubt of his restless curiosity regarding the nature and origins of deity and of the physical world. For examples of his speculations on physical problems, cf. Diels, frs. 27-30, 32, 33.

[25] On this point the testimony of T. D. Seymour is the more valuable from being quite objective. See *Life in the Homeric Age* (New York, 1907), p. 45: "The Homeric poems contain no cosmogony or theogony. The poet gives no indication of his beliefs with regard to the creation of the world or about previous races of men and gods." *Ibid.*, p. 394: "The poems assume and report them (the gods) as simply existing, without any question as to the past. The poems show little interest in the origin or even the early history of either men or gods." The contrast between Homer and Xenophanes may be illustrated by fr. 30, cited by *Schol. Genav.* on Φ 195 ff. In Φ 196 f. the poet is merely telling us in the grand manner that Oceanus is the first and greatest of rivers and even so is immeasurably inferior to Zeus; in fr. 30 Xenophanes is attempting an explanation of physical phenomena. The difference reminds us of Aristotle's remark, *Poetics* 1447 b 16 *οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον.*

they are thus credited. It is equally remarkable that there is not in Homer even a trace of the rationalizing explanations of various divinities that were apparently a particular predilection of Xenophanes.[26] These anomalies must be reasonably accounted for before we can entertain the theory that the Olympian scenes are the work of irreligious Ionian minstrels.

Still another difficulty is the juxtaposition or even fusing of passages we are asked to regard as Ionian scoffing and those which clearly express a simple faith in the existence and supreme power of the gods. For example, the thunderstorm at the close of H is separated by only a few lines from the colloquy between Zeus and Poseidon regarding the wall, and immediately precedes the gathering of the gods in Θ. These are typical Olympian scenes and have been under suspicion since first the higher criticism began; they present the fussy Poseidon, the blustering Zeus, the pert Athena, all conceived in what Gilbert Murray rather sadly calls "the Milesian spirit." Now are we to believe that a skeptical Ionian minstrel went to the trouble of working these episodes into the poem, in order to satirize the gods, and yet did not take the trouble to modify or remove the trifling bit of earlier, more devout feeling that intervenes? The lines are

> παννύχιος δέ σφιν κακὰ μήδετο μητίετα Ζεὺς
> σμερδαλέα κτυπέων· τοὺς δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ἶρει·
> οἶνον δ' ἐκ δεπάων χαμάδις χέον, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη
> πρὶν πιέειν, πρὶν λεῖψαι ὑπερμενέι Κρονίωνι [H 478-481].

These certainly mar the "Ionian" effect,[27] and nothing would have been simpler than to leave them out, or, if the irreligious minstrel must have a thunderstorm at this point, to edit them into accord with more enlightened notions of meteorology. The Theomachy, we are told, is one of the latest and worst of the episodes introduced for the purpose of making the gods appear ridiculous, and Murray takes it as one of the two best examples of the irreligious spirit. The minstrel who inserted it presum-

[26] Cf. Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Diels, fr. 32 and A39 = Aetius, ii, 18, 1. This rationalizing and allegorizing of the Homeric gods, for which Theagenes was particularly known, seems to be the earliest reaction of philosophy.

[27] This resembles the passages in which Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 24) sees traces of primitive fear of the gods (*supra*, n. 4).

ably composed the lines which are its introduction, the sonorous lines acclaimed in the treatise *On the Sublime*. Whatever may be the impression they make on us as poetry, it is difficult to believe that they were composed or inserted by a scoffer whose principal motive was the desire to ridicule the gods. Are we further to account for the tone of the five lines which conclude the lay of Ares and Aphrodite by pronouncing them a figment of Murray's fourth stage, a last touch added by way of palinode to save the trouble of expurgation, a drop of holy water to exorcise the Milesian spirit? The attempt to assign the reverent and the ridiculous to different strata will lead us into the full tide of a Heraclitean flux.[28]

In general, the attempts to peel off a layer of the poems distinguished by its skeptical Ionian color are a flagrant example of *petitio principii*. Like so many similar attempts, they assume the truth of what they have to prove; they adopt the one explanation that suits the thesis and ignore others, equally tenable and often far simpler. By their postulates, they deny to a poet the right to vary his mood even while he ranges over the whole vast field of life and feeling; they would require him to reshape all the diverse material that he drew from various sources into dull conformity with a single guiding idea. Their premises would make a Chaucer or a Shakespeare into a schizophrenic, and would demand two or three authors for the *Earthly Paradise*. They are about as intelligent as would be the assumption that in a mosaic the tesserae of different colors must have been set by different hands.

Sincere adherence of supposedly competent Hellenists to this sort of pseudo-criticism would be quite inexplicable did we not know that through many academic generations the first article of faith instilled into the incipient Homerist has been that the poems are conglomerate, heterogeneous masses which must be analyzed into their component parts—and can be, since it is

[28] In a study of "The Literary Necessity of Anthropomorphism," *Class. Jour.* XXXII (1936), p. 25, A. C. Schlesinger pertinently remarks that "humorous anthropomorphism" depends for its effect upon the contrast between the greatness of the gods as they were conceived in religion and "the humanity of their remarks and actions" in the Olympian scenes.

assumed, in simple faith and without inquiry, that differences between parts of the poems must be the work of different poets.

The urge to dissect is accentuated, I believe, in the particular instances under consideration, by a fundamental divergence of ancient and modern feeling which throws into unduly high relief those aspects of the Olympians that are grotesque or ridiculous; it is as if a carving designed for the half-light of an ancient temple should be viewed under the glare of a modern arc. The preconceptions that flow from our own inherited notions of divinity lead us to look upon the higher and nobler aspects of the gods as fundamental; we are offended by anything that is not in harmony with these aspects, and hence are inclined to give it an importance it could not possibly have had for Homeric audiences. Could we fully divest ourselves of these preconceptions and put ourselves in the place of the poet's audience, we should, I believe, take the naive and grotesque very much as a matter of course; this, rather than the higher conception, is the natural, typical, fundamental element. We cannot believe that the Hellenes who looked upon Praxiteles' noble portrayal of Hermes in the fourth century were at all disturbed by the rude herms that stood at every doorway and crossroad. Yet were we to apply here the sort of a priori reasoning that seems to govern the study of Homer's gods, we should regard the Hermes of Olympia as an original noble conception and explain the herms as satirical expressions of a later, rationalizing spirit.

Critics who hold that the Olympian scenes are an expression of Ionian irreligion may properly be required to explain: (1) how and why this admittedly primitive material was suppressed in hypothetical early versions of the poems; (2) why tradition made Thales the first philosopher if rationalism and skepticism were in fact so advanced in the eighth century as to invade the epic in the form of elaborate conscious satire; (3) the curious anomaly that Xenophanes attacks just those passages that are ascribed to Ionian skepticism; (4) the complete absence from the Olympian scenes of the rationalistic curiosity that is typical of early Ionian philosophy; (5) the presence in these scenes or in their immediate contexts of passages which imply a simple faith and reverence. Until these explanations shall be forthcoming, we shall be well advised to adhere to the simpler view

that in these episodes as in other parts of the text the poet's purpose is to entertain and amuse, not to instruct or to convert, and his attitude purely that of the artist and storyteller.[29] If the absurd or ridiculous situations in which the gods of ancient myth occasionally find themselves appeal to his sense of humor, there is really no reason why he should dissemble—he is not composing a solemn ritual or an evangelical tract.

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[29] This eminently sane view has been held by a few critics in every generation since Eratosthenes remarked, apropos of some Homeric problems, *ποιητὴς πᾶς στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας.*

SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY.

A preliminary study of Aristotle's metaphysical and physical writings has revealed certain presuppositions about methodology and the constitution of natural changes which appear again in the psychology.[1] For brevity's sake we shall omit most of them here. There are, however, one or two general methodological assumptions which are of the greatest importance in molding his psychological theory.

1. *The polarity of change.*

   ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἢ τὸ μεταξύ. *De anima,* 416 a 33.

Change in all things is towards the opposite or the intermediate.

2. *The extreme opposition of contraries.*

   τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἔσχατα. *De sensu* 445 b 24.

The contraries are extremes.

3. *The polarity of passion.*

   πάσχειν γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ ὑγρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. *De sensu* 441 b 8.

The moist, like everything else, is naturally acted upon by its contrary.

These three assertions would make it appear that there is in any change simply a passage from one state to its opposite, which opposites are fundamentally the last terms in a series of degrees. In general the opposites are terms like black and white, moist and dry, up and down, motion and rest, of which one is simply the absence of the other, or in Aristotle's language, a *στέρησις,* usually translated "privation." Thus the physical elements in the *De generatione et corruptione* are compounded of the two pairs of contraries, the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry. But the loss of a quality is instantaneous and thus

[1] See *A. J. P.,* LV (1934), pp. 36-48 and *A. J. P.,* LVII (1936), pp. 24-32.

there is no middle point between its presence and its absence (*De sensu* 447 a 1). It is either present or not.

But in biological events one has the phenomenon of growth to account for; processes, which obviously take time, are the rule, not the exception. Hence those changes which are of interest to a psychologist must, to be sure, have opposite termini but must also have a middle point. Further assumptions are necessary to explain their occurrence. Hence we have the following:

4. *The common nature of the agent and the patient.*

ἤ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. *De anima* 429 b 25.

In so far as something common inheres in two things, the one seems to act, the other to be acted upon.

Because of this Aristotle maintains that the mind—the νοῦς—is potentially all things and thus can know all things. For he assumes—and this ought perhaps to be listed as an additional presupposition—that all things can be known, since they are all either sensory or noetic objects (*De anima* 431 b 21). Since there must be a common nature between agent and patient, nothing can enter into human consciousness which is not to some degree like human consciousness. Curiously enough this does not commit Aristotle to a doctrine which nowadays would be called one of the forms of Idealism.

5. *The ontological status of the subject-attribute logic.*

This of course appears throughout Aristotle's works, but nowhere more clearly than in the psychological writings. The soul, for instance, has been defined as the final cause of the body; hence one ought to be able to translate this into the words, "The soul is what the body is for." This would imply that some human beings have no soul, not having achieved their natural purpose of being rational animals. And indeed children and idiots are occasionally spoken of by Aristotle in a way that suggests such a conclusion. But he is so used to hypostatising logical subjects that he speaks frequently of the soul not as an ideal to be achieved, the final cause, but as the source from which change proceeds, or the efficient cause (See *De anima* 415 b 8 ff.). Thus he argues (*Id.* 410 b 16 ff.) against those who believe the soul to cause motion, that plants have souls and yet do not move.

But why must they be said to have souls? Because they live. Living, in other words, necessitates a subject ontologically as it does grammatically. (It must be added that shortly afterwards he seems to have qualms about this, since he says that "It is likely also that the *arche* in plants is *some sort of soul* [ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή τις εἶναι, *De anima* 411 b 27].)

These are perhaps the most important assumptions influencing method which appear in the psychological writings.[2] We may now turn to those concerning the subject matter proper of psychology.

6. *The alterative nature of sensation.*

ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ. *De anima* 415 b 24 (cf. *Id.* 416 b 34).

Sensation appears to be a sort of alteration.

Alteration is one of the four kinds of change and always moves from one extreme to the other. But where there is alteration there is also passivity, and indeed Aristotle is willing to assert that to perceive is to be acted upon (*De anima* 424 a 1). But he also believes that sensation is a kind of actualization: "the sensitive faculty (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) potentially is what the sensory object (τὸ αἰσθητόν) is actually" (*De anima* 418 a 3). So that when one sees the color Red, for instance, the sense of sight becomes red. Aside from the difficulty of the meaning of this assertion, there is an inherent logical difficulty. That is the conflict between the notions of alteration and actualization. Actualization is not alteration (*De anima* 417 b 5), or is a special kind of alteration. If sensation is alteration, it is the appearance and disappearance of opposing floating qualities—the sensible species of the Scholastics. And when Aristotle is interested in

[2] The others, which have been for the most part discussed in previous papers are: (1) the similarity of cause and effect, *De anima* 407 a 18; (2) the threefold nature of change, *Id.* 433 b 13 (cf. 409 a 15); (3) the actualization of the incomplete in motion, *Id.* 431 a 6; (4) the impossibility of autogenesis, *Id.* 416 b 16; (5) the teleological basis of definition, *Id.* 416 b 23; (6) the appeal to observation, *Id.* 418 b 23—cf. 421 b 19; (7) the distinction between essence and existence, *Id.* 429 b 10—but see 430 a 3; (8) scientific procedure from the sensibly clear but logically obscure to the logically clear but sensibly obscure, *Id.* 413 a 10; (9) the separation between theory and practice, *Id.* 432 b 27; (10) the principle of parsimony, *Id.* 425 b 17.

the objective basis of sensation, the passive side of sensing, he emphasizes its alterative nature. But when he is interested in the functional side of sensing, he naturally emphasizes what he would call its "energetic" nature.

The shift from sensation as alteration to sensation as actualization has an important theoretical interest. For Aristotle believes that the objects of actual sensation are always particulars.

7. *The particularity of sensory objects.*

τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις. ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. *De anima* 417 b 22.

Sensation in actuality is of particulars, understanding of universals.

But if sensation be an actualization, it cannot be of particulars, for only universals, or forms, can be actualized. This difficulty is fundamental to the Aristotelian system. The particularization of forms is brought about by their incorporation, and, strictly speaking, the only difference between John Doe and Richard Roe is their matter. Yet the individual and the universal have identical properties in logic; and Aristotle frequently transfers some of them to metaphysics, for he speaks as if individuals had forms distinct from the form of the nearest species to which they belong. But if he means that a given sensory faculty is actualization as the actualization of John Doe's eyesight, then his science of psychology disintegrates, for, according to his own principles, we can have science only of universals.

As a matter of fact, he wobbles on the question of the particularity of its objects. When he is not distinguishing sensation from understanding or from knowledge, he says that sensation is the receptacle of the "sensible forms without their matter" (*De anima* 424 a 18; 427 a 9). But how can a form without matter be a particular? Yet note that unless it is a particular, sensation cannot be alteration. And if he means that a given sensory faculty is actualization as the actualization of that faculty in general—that is of seeing, of hearing, and so on—then it cannot be of particulars.

8. *The truth of sensation.*

ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής. *De anima* 427 b 12 (cf. *Id.* 428 a 11; 418 a 15).[3]

[3] Cf. the facility of simple perceptions, *De sensu* 447 a 17.

The sensation of the things proper to each sense is always true.

This means that when one sees a color, one cannot be mistaken as to whether it is red or green or yellow. Errors enter when one tries to identify the particular thing which is red or green or yellow (*De anima* 428 b 21). How can one reconcile this with the axiom of the particularity of sensory objects?

There is in Aristotle's psychology a parallelism between sensation and thought which is well known and need not detain us. But there is one special presupposition about thought which is of interest.

We have seen that thought is distinguished from sensation by the universality of its objects. And yet in another passage both sensation and thought are said to be identical with being acted upon by the forms (*De anima* 427 a 8), which really means "receiving the forms." Since thought is the receptacle of forms, it follows that there is an identity of subject and object in thought (*De anima* 407 a 7). This leads to the conclusion that both understanding (ἐπιστήμη) and intellect (νοῦς) are infallible (*De anima* 428 a 17). For if the form is directly present, how could one be in error about it? Falsehood, according to Aristotle, always arises in synthesis, that is, in combining two or more intelligibles.

9. τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί. *De anima* 430 b 2.

The combination, however, cannot be made by thought, for thought is direct contemplation of the intelligible forms; it cannot be made by sensation, for sensation is the direct contemplation of the sensible forms. It must therefore be made by the processes of reasoning (διάνοια) through the use of the categories, though why reasoning should make the wrong syntheses is left a mystery.[4] For if the floating qualities are perceived in combination, there could be no error, and if a complex intelligible is contemplated by the mind, there could be none.

10. *The affective basis of desire.*

ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία. *De anima* 413 b 23. (Cf. *Id.* 434 a 3).

[4] It might be that the synthesizing power is the imagination, for Aristotle notes the capacity we have of constructing one image out of several, *De anima* 434 a 9.

Where there is sensation, there too is pain and pleasure, and where these are, there must be necessarily desire as well.

It is not clear whether Aristotle believes that pleasure and pain are found in all sensation or whether they are not found apart from sensation. But it is certain that he believes desire to be a kind of appetite (*De anima* 433 a 26) and to be an appetite for pleasure and pain. The significance of this is that it becomes the opposite of reason (λόγος) and thus is a source of error in action. For if we were to follow reason, we should never leave the realm of the good—evil being a privation (*De anima* 430 b 22)—; but, following desire, we hit either good or evil (*De anima* 433 a 28). We should therefore so arrange our lives that we may live in accordance with reason. But this is impossible in Aristotle. For the intellect (νοῦς) does not cause motion without appetite (*De anima* 433 a 23) even though it be the practical as distinguished from the theoretical intellect. Aristotle's own account of the matter is as follows, "All appetite is for the sake of something. For that of which there is desire is itself the beginning of the practical intellect. And the last term is the beginning of the act." (*De anima* 433 a 15 ff.) But this would imply that, if one has a desire for a given pleasure, that very pleasure which is the goal of the desire becomes the source of the practical reason. This results in the conclusion admitted by Aristotle that "there is only one cause of motion, the appetitive faculty" (*De anima* 433 a 21). If one were indulging in thinking exclusively, one would not act at all, but would live a life of contemplation. It can then be only an accident if a man's desires happen to be of something which Aristotle would have called really good, for even the practical reason could not create the desire. Hence the basis of his ethics is undermined.

11. *The purposiveness of animal motion.*

ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντος ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστιν. *De anima* 432 b 28.

Motion is always due to flight from or pursuit of something.

This is in keeping with the natural teleology of the whole Aristotelian system. One would imagine, however, that since nature does nothing in vain, the apparent goods of appetite would be real animal goods. But Aristotle had no sentimental

regard for beasts, children, or savages; and, forgetting his natural teleology, is willing to admit that our instincts may be wrong. This is, to be sure, sound common sense on his part, but it introduces a curious problem. If our acts are purposive and our reason cannot influence them, what control over our behaviour is possible? Should not Aristotle have concluded to the melancholy picture of man as an animal which sees the good and can only attain it by accident?

. . . . . .

The assumptions of Aristotle, if systematized, would make a philosophic system of their own underlying the system which appears overtly in his writings. One finds the same principles about method and "nature" in all his works; assertions of value as well as of fact appear clearly as premises of arguments and stated in such a fashion that their author may fairly be said to have considered them self-evident. It is as a contribution to that self-evident philosophy that this brief study is presented.

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CERTAIN FEATURES OF TECHNIQUE FOUND IN BOTH GREEK AND ROMAN DRAMA.

Among the criteria that have been suggested for determining Roman originality in Plautus and Terence, those of Fraenkel, based on various modes of expression in Plautus, have found considerable favor among scholars.[1] Haffter has employed these criteria with confidence in his recent interesting study,[2] and Conrad in his report on Plautine literature in *Bursian's Jahresbericht* expresses the opinion that an important advance has been made as a result of Fraenkel's work.[3] But the incisive criti-

[1] Throughout this paper the following works are cited merely by the name of the author and the page.

Hans Drexler, *Die Komposition von Terens' Adelphen und Plautus' Rudens* (*Philologus*, Suppbd. XXVI, no. 2 [1934]).

Eduard Fraenkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus*, Berlin, Weidmann, 1922.

Heinz Haffter, *Untersuchungen zur altlateinischen Dichtersprache* (*Problemata*, 10), Berlin, Weidmann, 1934.

P. W. Harsh, *Studies in Dramatic "Preparation" in Roman Comedy*, The University of Chicago Press, 1935.

Günther Jachmann, *Plautinisches und Attisches* (*Problemata*, 3), Berlin, Weidmann, 1931.

Max Knorr, *Das griechische Vorbild der Mostellaria des Plautus*, Coburg, A. Rossteutscher, 1934 (Diss. München).

A. Thierfelder, review of Jachmann's *Plautinisches und Attisches*, *Gnomon* XI (1935), pp. 113-152.

[2] Cf. Haffter, p. 121. Passages in which mythological or other comparisons occur are frequently considered Plautine additions by Haffter, following Fraenkel (p. 12), who says that nowhere in the remains of Attic comedy is there a passage comparable to *Cas.* 759 ff., *Persa* 1 ff., etc. But the long fragment of Anaxilas (22 K) in trochaic tetrameters, probably a monologue, appears certainly to constitute a parallel passage. Again, Haffter's whole consideration of the *Figura Etymologica* seems to take insufficient account of the thorough naturalness of this phenomenon in both Greek and Latin. Hundreds of cases could be cited from Greek drama, and a phrase such as *cenam cenavi*, in which Haffter (p. 24) finds "grotesque pathos," might have been a literal translation of the Greek. Cf. Menander, *Epit.* 393 (Jensen); Lycophron, fr. 1 (Nauck[2]). The present writer has incidentally observed twenty-three cases of this figure in the *Birds* and *Clouds* of Aristophanes, in twelve of which the words are juxtaposed. Twelve cases occur in trimeters, three in lyrics, and eight in other meters.

[3] Fritz Conrad, *Jahresb. über die Fortschritte der klass. Altertumswissenschaft*, CCXLVII (1935), p. 63. Besides the article of Prescott other

cism of Prescott, which both Haffter and Conrad ignore, would seem to vitiate these criteria.[4] Another approach to the problem is that of Jachmann[5] and Drexler,[6] among others, who assume that certain features are inartistic or otherwise objectionable and that these were impossible in "attische Technik." It is with this method that the present paper is concerned.[7] All extant Greek plays and most of the fragments have been examined for many of the features that have been considered objectionable in Roman comedy. If a parallel for a given peculiarity is found in Greek drama, especially in Menander or Euripides, the contention that it must be Roman immediately falls to the ground and our knowledge of ancient dramatic technique becomes more precise.[8]

I

Several scholars now assume that all monologues in Greek comedy presented an essential unity of thought.[9] Unity, of course, is a concept that is somewhat at the mercy of subjective opinion, and there seems to be no obvious reason why a monologue should be strictly unified. In fact it would appear more natural if it followed the psychological processes, in which one thought suggests another and various ideas occur. Thus each thought has some connection with its predecessor (not neces-

important items are omitted in this report, such as Enk's edition of the *Mercator*.

[4] H. W. Prescott, *T.A.P.A.*, LXIII (1932), pp. 103-125. Cf. P. W. Harsh, *Class. Phil.*, XXXI (1936), pp. 62-68.

[5] Thierfelder and Harsh have independently made precisely the same criticisms of many of Jachmann's conclusions. Cf. *Rud.* 1191-1204 (Thierfelder, pp. 115-117; Harsh, p. 29, note 5, p. 34, note 11); *Rud.* 897-901 (Thierfelder, p. 139; Harsh, p. 34, note 11); *Cas.* 437 (Thierfelder, pp. 143-144; Harsh, p. 28, note 5).

[6] Drexler seems occasionally to draw conclusions on a questionable interpretation of the Latin; e. g. *apud me*, *Rud.* 1358 (Drexler, pp. 96-97), does not mean "in my house" but simply "in my possession."

[7] Cf. A. Körte, *Gött. gel. Anz.*, 1933, pp. 364; Drexler, p. 86, note 76.

[8] Papyri have proved that certain features, formerly considered Roman, were not foreign to Greek drama. Cf. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*[2] (Berlin, Weidmann, 1896), p. 220, note 6; O. Schroeder, *Novae Comoediae Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta* (Bonn, Marcus and Weber, 1915), p. 13.

[9] Cf. Fraenkel, p. 201; Hans Oppermann, *Hermes*, LXIX (1934), pp. 264-265.

sarily a very logical one), but the first thought may have absolutely no direct or logical connection with the last.[10]

The monologue of Demipho in the *Mercator* (225-271), in which Demipho reports and interprets his dream, is attacked by Fraenkel (p. 202):

> Trotz alledem treten die beiden Teile auch jetzt noch scharf auseinander unde die Szene II 1 ist als Ganzes für attische Begriffe ein Monstrum. . . . das Beispiel des Rudens-Traumes zeigt, wie der attische Dichter das Interesse auf den einen Punkt konzentriert.

Whether this monologue in the *Mercator* really lacks unity might, in my opinion, be disputed. The latter part tells the events by which Demipho has been able to interpret certain features of the dream. Be that as it may, the monologue (expository prologue) which opens the *Iphigenia Taurica* of Euripides presents a greater diversity of subject matter than that in the *Mercator*. Iphigenia begins in the typical Euripidean fashion by explaining her historical background (1-41); she then reports her dream, which might more naturally have been described first of all, and then her interpretation of the dream (42-60). She proceeds to reveal her intention of pouring a sacrifice to her brother as a result of the dream (61-66). Even though this speech is an expository prologue, there is no evident reason why it does not form a valid example of the type of thing which Fraenkel says is a *monstrum* for Attic technique. The monologue of Moschio in Menander's *Periciromene* (276-300, incomplete) is sharply divided into two parts: the first contains an indignant defiance of Polemon and his followers (276-281), the second a report of what has taken place off-stage (282-300). The first lines of the second part, however, might be called the real beginning of this monologue; at least we note that these lines contain a good example of "*komparativische Gesprächsanfänge*," which Fraenkel (pp. 8-22) considered a criterion of Plautine originality.[11]

Oppermann has attacked the monologue of Davus in the *Andria* of Terence (206-227) on various grounds, but especially

[10] Cf. Euripides, *Heroules* 1340-1393 (not a monologue); Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1926), p. 184. Cf. Aristophanes, *Eco.* 1-29.

[11] The existence of this phenomenon in Greek, however, is apparently not altogether denied by Fraenkel (p. 20). Cf. note 2 above.

because, in his opinion, it lacks unity.[12] Here Davus first ponders which side he is to take in the present crisis and speculates on the risks (206-214). He then analyzes the predicament of Pamphilus, revealing the fact that Glycerium is about to give birth to a child, which they have decided to acknowledge, and that they are pretending that Glycerium is an Attic citizen (215-225). Finally, Davus notes the arrival of Mysis and makes his exit (226-227). But the monologue of Onesimus in Menander's *Epitrepontes* (340-365, Jensen) appears to be constructed in much the same manner. He begins by remarking on the cleverness of Habrotonon and his own stupidity with regard to gaining freedom. He rebukes himself for even hoping that she will aid him if she is successful in the present instance (340-349). He then considers the situation briefly (349-354) and resolves never to indulge in meddling (355-359). Finally, he sees Smicrines approaching and determines to avoid him (359-365).

From his consideration of this passage in the *Andria* Oppermann concludes that lines 215-225 were inserted into this monologue by Terence in order to set forth certain facts which were originally stated in the prologue of the play.[13] But in drawing this conclusion Oppermann apparently overlooks one of the most characteristic peculiarities of dramatic construction as regularly practiced by Euripides and the poets of New Comedy; the fact that essential exposition in the formal expository prologue is often repeated within the body of the play. Such repetition, besides fixing the facts in the minds of the audience, often serves the purpose of characterization.[14]

II

The presence of indecent jests and of crude and indelicate actions or emotions in Plautus and Terence has sometimes been

[12] On the changes of meter within this monologue cf. *Adel.* 610-635, *And.* 254, 261. A change of meter is frequently found when another character is entering; cf. *And.* 234, etc. On *And.* 220-225 cf. Com. Anon. Pap. Ghoran I, 34-37 (Schroeder); Euripides, *Bac.* 367-369.

[13] Somewhat similar is the contention of Schadewaldt concerning *Heoyra* 572-574 (*Hermes*, LXVI [1931], pp. 17-23).

[14] Cf. Walter H. Juniper, "Character Portrayal in Plautus," *Class. Journ.*, XXXI (1936), pp. 280-282, 287. From Euripides one may cite *Bac.* 31 and 245, 32-36 and 217-220; *Hec.* 37-41 (Ghost of Polydorus) and 92-95 (Hecuba) and 109-115 (Chorus).

taken as an indication of Roman workmanship. Thus condemnation has been pronounced upon the sharing of a sweetheart as suggested in the *Eunuchus*[15] and in the *Asinaria*,[16] the disgraceful but very amusing downfall of the old men in the *Bacchides*, and the invitation to dinner given the leno in the *Rudens*.[17] But in the *Rudens* itself we learn that Charmides had had a dinner with the leno (*Rud.* 508-509) and that Plesidippus had been invited to lunch by the leno—an arrangement which, Drexler (pp. 111-113) says, must go back to the Attic original. The fact that the leno has just been caught in his dastardly attempt to run away with the girls is of little account, since a general amnesty is declared at the end of the play. Nothing is better authenticated as good Attic procedure than the sharing of a sweetheart by young bloods in real life, although this was doubtless unusual and scandalous. For instance Pythionica had as her lovers two sons of Chaerephilus, a dealer in smoked fish.[18] Again, Plangon and Bacchis loved one young man in common and yet remained good friends (Athenaeus, 594 c). Phrynion and Stephanus the orator moreover used to have Neaera in turn, each having her every other day, since their friends had so arbitrated the matter for them (Athenaeus, 593 f, bracketed by Kaibel). Modesty forbids a detailed account of the involved relations which ancient gossip accredited to the family of Demosthenes (Athenaeus, 593 a) and the even more scandalous affair involving Alcibiades, Axiochus, Medontis, and the daughter of Medontis,[19] an affair which illustrates the most elaborate application of the old principle of *κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων*. As for indecent jests there are several good examples in Menander, often expurgated in school editions and in translations.[20] Certain passages in Euripides are indelicate, and some

[15] Cf. Gilbert Norwood, *The Art of Terence* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1923), p. 154; Ph. Legrand, *Daos* (Lyon, A. Rey; Paris, A. Fontemoing, 1910), p. 353. A subtle and appreciative explanation of this feature of the *Eunuchus* has been suggested by Rand, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIII (1932), p. 70.

[16] Cf. J. N. Hough, *P. A. P. A.*, LXIV (1933), p. lxiv; *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 22-3.

[17] Cf. Jachmann, p. 39; Drexler, p. 106; Harsh, p. 30, note 6.

[18] Timocles, 14 K, 17 K (Athenaeus, 339 d-e).

[19] Lysias, page 346, Thalheim (Athenaeus, 534 f-535 a).

[20] *Peri.* 226-235 (Jensen), *Perinthia* 16-18, *Phasma* 40-43. In the light

editors feel constrained to bracket them.[21] In short, any attempt to ascribe alleged crudities of this sort exclusively to the Romans is obviously based on a misconception of Greek tastes.

III

The phenomenon of repetition of lines or phrases is an interesting one not only in Plautus but also in other authors, both ancient and modern. This is a complex problem and demands separate treatment. Suffice it here to say that, of all the various types of repetition, perhaps the one which grates most unpleasantly upon the sensitive modern critic is that wherein the author, wishing to describe the same object or circumstance twice, does so both times in precisely the same words, apparently from sheer reluctance to rephrase the thought, since there seems to be nothing extraordinarily striking or effective in the phrasing. A repetition of this type occurs in Plautus' *Rudens,* where a complete line is spoken first by Trachalio (1109) and later by Palaestra (1133):

Cistellam isti inesse oportet caudeam in isto vidulo . . .

Concerning this repetition, Jachmann (p. 50) states: "*Dass der attische Dichter schon diese Wiederholung als solche nicht vorgenommen hätte, das würde ich von vornherein für selbstverständlich halten.*"[22] This assumption in the light of numerous repetitions which, according to the MSS tradition, occur in Euripides and Aristophanes is not a convincing one. Editors of course usually reject repeated lines; but, as the present writer hopes to show in a subsequent paper, such rejection is not always justified,

of these passages it is obviously a mistake to use "purity" as a criterion for the work of Menander. Cf. Knorr, p. 23; Leo, *Hermes,* XLIV (1909), p. 146, cited by Jensen, *Menandri Reliquiae* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1929), p. lix; Wilamowitz, *Gött. gel. Anz.,* 1898, p. 695.

[21] Cf. Euripides, *Tro.* 665-672, *Hecuba* 831-832, rejected by Murray and others (cf. D. L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934, p. 67). Cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1301-1303; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4, 33, 71. See also Neophron(?), *Medea* (Milne, *Cat. of the Literary Papyri in the British Museum* [London, British Museum, 1927], no. 77).

[22] Jachmann (pp. 50-51) cites other considerations which, in his opinion, strengthen his contention that Plautus originated one of these passages.

and even the most radical editors find it difficult or impossible to elminate many repeated lines in Euripides and in Aristophanes. We may further note that there is nothing objectionable from the psychological point of view about the repeated line in the *Rudens*, since Palaestra was on stage when Trachalio first spoke the line. A similar repetition (with two words changed from plural to singular) is found in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (44 and 219). In Euripides' *Medea* the heroine uses the same line twice to describe the bridal gifts which she is preparing (786, 949).[23]

The repetition of phrases by a single character is not unnatural and is used very effectively at times by Menander, especially in the *Epitrepontes*.[24] In Plautus nevertheless Jachmann (p. 50, note; p. 40) is offended at such repetitions as those of *dudum dixi* (*Rud.* 1079, 1104) and *mi patrone* (*Rud.* 1266, 1280).[25] Further, Leo observed that a phrase sometimes occurs before and after a passage which he considered a Plautine addition,[26] and this observation is accepted as valid by Fraenkel (p. 111) and apparently by Thierfelder (pp. 125, 128). Knorr (pp. 52-53), also, seems to be influenced somewhat by repetition in discovering a Plautine addition in *Most.* 515-524. But similar repetition of phrases often occurs in Aristophanes,[27] sometimes with an amusing effect.

Just as repetition may be used by Menander to achieve a desired effect, so it is occasionally used by Plautus, where its subtlety may be overlooked or misinterpreted by modern commentators. A case in point perhaps is a passage in the *Trinummus* of Plautus (48-66), where *edepol* is used twice and *hercle* five times. Haffter (p. 139) cites this repetition of expletives as an example of Plautus' distinct inferiority to Terence in the use of expletives, though he seems to recognize the comic effect produced. But the repetition of *hercle* at least, which is used

[23] Murray accepts both 786 and 949. Bothe and Prinz-Wecklein reject 949. Cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 803 and 843 (not identical).

[24] Cf. *Epit.* 5, 20; 141-155 (Jensen).

[25] Cf. *Rud.* 784-785 and 796-797 (Jachmann, p. 94).

[26] E.g. *Capt.* 152, 167; *Stich.* 417, 435. Cf. F. Leo, *Nachr. Gött. Gesellsch.*, 1902, p. 386.

[27] Cf. Aristophanes, *Plutus* 188 and 193, *Eco.* 1005 and 1013 and 1028 (cf. 1074 and 1084); 1006 and 1012 and 1029, *Ach.* 598 and 607. Cf. Page, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-128.

twice by one character and three times by the other in *Trinummus* 52-62, appears to be a deliberate one and can easily be paralleled in Greek comedy. For instance, when Sosias in Menander's *Epitrepontes* swears by Apollo and the gods (179, Jensen), Onesimus answers him, swearing by Apollo and the gods (183). The device is more obvious in a fragment of Antiphanes (159 K), where an oath by Zeus is employed twice by each of the two speakers.[28]

Not only has the repetition of lines and phrases been criticized as un-Attic, but also other, less literal repetition. Thus in the *Curculio* Phaedromus twice identifies the house of the leno (Plautus, *Cur.* 33, 39), the second time evidently in order that Palinurus may introduce a witticism. Jachmann (p. 53, n.) intimates that such repetition could not have occurred in the original Greek. Incidentally we may note that Phaedromus is not in a very sober or logical mood. Though of an entirely different nature, the essential repetition in Euripides' *Phoenissae* 388-389 and 406-407 seems hardly less awkward, where the idea that exile is a great curse is emphasized by repeating it in different words. Again Jachmann (p. 52) thinks that the essential repetition of the proposition concerning the disposition of the chest and its contents in *Rudens* 1085-1089 and 1119-1121 was probably not in the Greek original. Such repetition is easily paralleled in Euripides, if the MSS tradition is accepted.[29] Fault is also found with the repetition of a witticism in slightly changed form [30] and with the repetition of an idea by the same person, especially by different similes.[31] In Euripides repetitions of idea are not infrequent, sometimes with the use of more than one simile.[32]

[28] This statement is based on the line assignment adopted by Kaibel, *Athenaei Dipnosophistae* (Teubner, 1887), 226 d. This assignment is accepted by Gulick (*Athenaeus*, Loeb Library, 1927—).

[29] Cf. Euripides, *Orest.* 536-537 and 625-626, all accepted by Murray; 537 rejected by Hermann and others, 625 rejected by Kayser and others. Cf. *Hel.* 315-320 and 324-326 (rejected by Goguel and others).

[30] Cf. Jachmann (pp. 82-83) on *Rud.* 986 and 1003, Drexler (pp. 77-78) on *Rud.* 973-974 and 977 ff.

[31] Jachmann (p. 90, note) on *Rud.* 359, 372-375.

[32] Euripides, *Phoe.* 850-851 and 859.

IV

It remains to consider a number of unrelated phenomena. For instance the introduction of a witticism by an awkward or inconsistent remark is taken as evidence of a Roman insertion.[33] Perhaps it is not unfair to cite as a somewhat similar phenomenon in Euripides the awkward introduction of a speech desired for its rhetorical effect. Thus, in the *Helena*, when Menelaus and Helen finally are restored to each other Helen asks her husband how long he has been wandering over the sea (773-774). To this dull and unromantic question she already knows the answer, for she has learned from Teucer (111-114) that the siege lasted ten years, that the city fell seven years before the action of the play, and also that Menelaus has never returned home (131-132). These considerations seem to make it definitely certain that Helen's question (773-774) is introduced for the brilliant rhetorical effect of the following lines (777-778). A possible parallel is found in the *Bacchae* (506-508), where Dionysus declares that Pentheus does not know who he (Pentheus) is in order that an ironic and pathetic pun upon the name may be introduced (for the second time; cf. 367).

Objection has been raised to the unnatural silence of Palaestra and Ampelisca in the *Rudens* and the witticism introduced on this subject (*Rud.* 1113-1114) [34] and to the fact that Plesidippus (*Rud.* 839-891) takes very little notice of the girls, although they have been saved from shipwreck.[35] An unnatural silence, however, is often found in Greek tragedy, even when the part is quite evidently being taken by a speaking actor. Thus in Euripides' *Iphigenia Taurica* Pylades does not answer even the formal greeting of Iphigenia (922), and in the *Helena* Theoclymenus engages in a long conversation, first exclusively with Helen (1186-1249), addressing questions to her that might more naturally be addressed to the stranger himself (e. g. 1208); then later he turns exclusively to the stranger (1250-1293).[36]

[33] Cf. Jachmann, pp. 35-37; Jachmann, *Philologus*, LXXXVIII (1934), p. 451. Cf. Knorr, p. 22.

[34] Jachmann, pp. 44-47. Cf. Thierfelder, pp. 135-136; Harsh, p. 35, note.

[35] Drexler, p. 61.

[36] Several of these passages in Euripides however are stichomythia. Compare also Euripides, *Iph. Aul.* 1122-1123 (where the assignment of

With regard to the vacant stage, *Rudens* 184, Jachmann (p. 99, n.) remarks that we have no sure example of a vacant stage before the first Χορου̃, doubtless having New Comedy in mind and ignoring the vacant stages which often occur after the formal expository prologues when delivered by a divinity or semi-divinity. Sometimes vacant stages occur both before the prologue (when the prologue does not begin the play) and after the prologue. These vacant stages would appear as objectional as any others. Still, vacant stages occasionally occur in Greek tragedy, such as that in Euripides' *Electra* 81, which forms a good parallel to *Rudens* 184. There is no valid reason for assuming that such vacant stages did not occur in Attic comedy.

The unexplained knowledge of a detail of which a character is supposedly ignorant is another item taken as an indication of Roman originality.[37] But Körte has pointed out that in the *Epitrepontes* Smicrines probably should be assigned the beginning of verse 53 (Jensen).[38] This seems very plausible; but, if it is assigned to Smicrines, then he addresses Syriscus by name, although, as Körte points out, he should have no knowledge of the name of this character. Such minor inconsistencies are not uncommon in Greek drama. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 1035 Clytaemestra addresses Cassandra by name, though her knowledge of the name is unexplained. In the *Ajax* of Sophocles Ajax commands the chorus to pass on his instructions to Teucer (567-570; cf. 688-689), but the chorus does so in a very careless fashion (990-991), omitting some of the requests. Again, in the *Electra* of Euripides the pedagogue says that Aegisthus' attendants have never seen Orestes (631), but later Orestes is recognized by one of these attendants (cf. 853). In Aristophanes' *Wasps* Philocleon is said to be toothless (165) in order to introduce an amusing effect, but later he bites through a net (371).

the following lines is not certain), *Herc.* 1123. Contrast Sophocles, *Eleo.* 673-679. The fondness of the Greek dramatists for simple orderly conversations, usually between only two persons at any given time, perhaps reflects the custom in ordinary life. Cf. Euripides, *Aeolus*, fr. 29 (Nauck²).

[37] Jachmann, pp. 50-51; Jachmann, *Philologus*, LXXXVIII (1934), p. 446 (on *Pseud.* 1052 *ff.*).

[38] Körte (see note 7, above), p. 364, note 3. Cf. Plautus, *Miles Glor.* 900; *Rud.* 1177.

Other examples could be cited, but such small matters do not mar the effectiveness of a play and doubtless were often entirely overlooked by the audience.

When Jachmann (p. 182) finds Plautine originality in passages in which a slave refers to his ancestors (e. g. *Miles Glor.* 372-373), is he not overlooking a delicate humor which is quite worthy of the Greek poets? We need hardly point out that servile relationships are occasionally mentioned in Greek writers and that the assumption that a slave was *nullis maioribus ortus* was a legal fiction not consistently maintained in Roman Law itself.[39]

Many scholars have been puzzled by the fact that in the prologue of the *Miles Gloriosus* (145-153) Palaestrio tells what later he does not know.[40] This however appears to be merely a lapse in the dramatic illusion and, although it cannot be paralleled precisely, still one is hardly justified in claiming that it must be a Plautine blunder. The prologue of the *Captivi* may be recalled, where the prologue speaker points out Tyndarus and Philocrates and explains everything, though it is boldly assumed that these characters hear nothing or, more probably, it is assumed that the play has not really begun.[41] A similar violation of the dramatic illusion in epilogues is more common.[42]

Another puzzling inconsistency concerns the entrance of a character from a wing when his last exit was made into a house on stage, or vice versa, as the entrance of Pleusicles in the *Miles* 1284 (cf. 1196).[43] A parallel for such action is apparently found in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, where Hyllus exits into the palace (820) but later (971) seems to enter from a wing along with Heracles and the old man. The alternative, that he enters

[39] Gaius, *Inst.* 1, 39; Justinian, *Inst.* 1, 6, 5; 1, 10, 10; 3, 6, 10; *Digest* 28, 8, 1, 2; 23, 2, 14, 2; 40, 2, 11-13. Cf. [Lucian], *Lucius vel Asinus* 613.

[40] Cf. G. E. Duckworth, *C. P.*, XXX (1935), p. 233; Jachmann, pp. 171-172.

[41] Cf. Euripides, *Tro.* 36-44. Here the character may reasonably appear to be unconscious of what is going on.

[42] Cf. Plautus, *Cas.* 1012-1018, *Cist.* 782-787; cf. Euripides, *Med.* 1378-1388, *Heracl.* 1026-1044.

[43] Cf. Mary Johnston, *Exits and Entrances in Roman Comedy*, Geneva, New York, W. F. Humphrey Press, 1933, pp. 137-143 (Columbia U. Dissertation).

from the palace without expressed motivation just as Heracles is brought on stage, would be equally objectionable from the standpoint of dramatic technique and would be distinctly less effective staging. Likewise in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* Blepyrus apparently exits to the forum at 727, but later (1130), it seems, he is discovered at home.[44]

The absence of expressed motivation for an entrance or exit has often been seized upon as Roman botchwork in both Plautus and Terence. This seems strange, since the phenomenon is not unknown in Greek drama. The most glaring examples are found in Sophocles' *Philoctetes,* where Odysseus twice enters very abruptly and vanishes in the same manner (974, 1293). Of course Odysseus has an obvious reason for entering, but there are other entrances in Greek tragedy where no such reason can be discovered.[45]

It appears clear from this study that the method of distinguishing Roman workmanship from Greek by means of logical analysis and theoretical standards of dramatic technique must definitely and finally be abandoned. The many years devoted to the problem by scholars have proved fruitful mainly in respect to the incidental results produced and to the stimulus given general studies in the field. Doubtless it would be advisable to relegate to the background consideration of contamination and Roman originality in future studies of Plautus and Terence.

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[44] Eduard Fraenkel ("Dramaturgical Problems in the *Ecclesiazusae*," *Greek Poetry and Life* [Oxford U. Press, 1936], pp. 270-276) thinks that the man concerned here, unnamed in the MSS, is Chremes. Even if this assumption should be accepted, the same technical difficulty would remain if it is also assumed that Chremes is the person who exits at 871.

[45] Cf. Sophocles, *Antig.* 386; Euripides, *Hipp.* 1156; Aristophanes, *Peace* 362; *Lys.* 982. Cf. Thierfelder, p. 123; Knorr, pp. 47-48.

IDENTIFICATION OF PARODIES IN ARISTOPHANES.

Does Aristophanes warn his audience that a parody is coming? When and how are such hints given? These are the questions which this paper attempts to answer for three plays: the *Birds*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, and *Lysistrata*.[1]

Aristophanes indicates the presence of a parody in several ways. The most definite marker is the name of the poet parodied, with or without the title of the work concerned. At other times, the situation at the given point leads us to be ready for a borrowing. Less definite hints can sometimes be gathered from choice of words or change of metre. Finally, there is the possibility that the existence of parody can be ascertained only by scholarly methods plus good fortune; in this case the effect on an audience must have been nil, and we may suspect that the resemblance is due to accident, not parody.

In this paper I follow the example of the scholiasts in grouping together quotation, direct parody, or quotation with variations, and paratragedy, or general parody, not of a particular passage but of a manner or choice of words. Each example, however, will be assigned to its proper class. Where possible, the date of the work parodied will be noted.

Naming the author and his work is the most definite form of information about a parody. In only one play of our three, the *Thesmophoriazusae*, does Aristophanes go so far. In lines 136-7 we find the quotation, "Whence comes this effeminate? What is his homeland, what his garb?" This is from the Lycurgus tetralogy of Aeschylus.[2] There is no obvious reason for stating

[1] References are to the following editions: of Aristophanes, Hall and Geldart, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1906-7; for certain notes, B. B. Rogers, *Birds*, London, G. Bell and Sons, 1906; *Thesm.*, same, 1904; *Lysis.*, same, 1911; of Aeschylus, A. Sidgwick, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902; of Sophocles, Jebb and Pearson, Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1902-17; of Euripides, G. Murray, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901-13; for the fragments, A. Nauck, *Fragmenta Tragicorum Graecorum*, 2nd ed., Teubner, Leipzig, 1926; for the lyric fragments, T. Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, 4th ed., Teubner, Leipzig, 1878-1914; E. Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, Teubner, Leipzig, 1925.

[2] ll. 134-5 = fr. 61 of the *Edoni*. Cf. schol. *Thesm.*, where the following phrase, τίς ἡ παράξις τοῦ βίου; is regarded as part of the quotation.

the source of this parody, but for what follows there is a clear cause. The elaborate parodies of the *Helen* and *Andromeda* need the introduction which the poet gives to assure appreciation by the audience.

We hear about the *Helen* in line 850, where it is called "new"; it had been produced the previous year. After that, we are treated to numerous quotations from the prologue and from the meeting of Menelaus and Helen, and to their recognition-scene;[3] these are interspersed with protests and apt retorts by the woman on guard and with some lines by the Kinsman (as Helen) and Euripides (as Menelaus) which epitomize the slower progress of the original. Quotation and paratragedy are thus scrambled together in the scene, with the Old Woman's remarks almost as unnoticed as those of the usual clown-rôle.

The *Andromeda* is similarly treated. It is named for us in lines 1011-2. There follows a parody of scenes between Andromeda and Echo, as well as between Andromeda and Perseus, but we cannot judge exactly how closely the original is followed.[4] We may discern well enough, however, that certain maidenly

[3] For the date of the *Helen* cf. scholia, ll. 850, 1012, and 1060. The lines are as follows, the first figures being for the *Thesm.*, the second for the *Helen*: 855-7 = 1-3, the last line changed, cf. Aesch., fr. 370; 859-60 = 16-17, with ἐμοί for ἡμῖν in the first line, a slip of Aristophanes' memory; 862 = 22 (half-line); 864-5 = 52-3 (a line and a half); 866 = 49; 868 = 56 (half-line, with an insignificant change); 871 = 68 (spoken in the *Helen* by Teucer, in the *Thesm.* by Euripides as Menelaus); 905 = 557 (changed); 906-910 (half) = 558, 561-4 (half—the second half of the line is made thoroughly comic in the parody); 911-2 = 565-6 with ἐσχάρας (*Thesm.*) for ἐς χεῖρας (*Helen*). The following lines of the *Thesm.* are paratragedic and with the comic lines stitch together the parody: 867; 869-70; 872-3; 974, suggested by *Helen* 460; 877; 878, suggested by *Helen* 461; 881; 885-6; 889-91; 895-7 (half); 900-904; 911-14; 918-19.

[4] The following are included by Nauck as fragments of the *Andromeda* (those attested by the scholia are acceptable without hesitation): 1016 = fr. 117 (schol.); 1019-1021 = fr. 118 (the schol. show that Aristophanes has adapted very freely from a speech of Andromeda) 1022-3 = fr. 120 (the schol. again show free adaptation from a choral passage); 1030, 1034, 1040, cf. fr. 122 (schol.); 1065-69 = fr. 114 (schol.); 1070-72 = fr. 115 (schol.); 1098-1100 = fr. 124 (modern conjecture); 1101-2 = fr. 123 (modern); 1105 = fr. 125; 1107 = fr. 128; 1110 = fr. 127; 1128 = fr. 139 (all modern). For the date of the play cf. schol. *Thesm.* 1060.

remarks come from Euripides, while the invasions of the Scythian policeman are obvious signs of adaptation. The parody is, then, conducted as follows: there is a Euripidean monody, composed of free adaptations and comic bits; Euripides appears briefly as Perseus, then enters as Echo; there follows a scene parody, with quotations at the beginning, which shades off into a wholly comic ending; then Euripides returns as Perseus, beginning with adaptations and soon arriving at highly comic paratragedy, including a line from the *Medea* (298 — *Thesm.* 1130). The *Andromeda*, like the *Helen*, was just a year old.[4]

Preceding the two chief scenes of parody, we have in the *Thesmophoriazusae* also a scene-parody of the *Palamedes*. This is identified in line 770; the audience knows here, as in the other cases, that the productions offered are, of course, in the family, i. e. by Euripides. The device of scattering impromptu tablets with written appeals may be all that is borrowed here. The Kinsman delivers a brief monody in good Euripidean fashion, which may include direct quotations, although the scholia do not help us to identify them.[5] The *Palamedes* was produced with the *Trojan Women* in 415; since Aristophanes calls the former a "frost,"[6] we can guess why Euripides failed to win, even with the great *Troades* as final movement in what seems to have been a Trojan suite. Two analogous visual parodies—apparently consisting of travestied costumes—occur in the *Birds*, 100, 281 and schol., and are there declared to refer to Sophocles' *Tereus* and to Philocles' play of the same name.

The second type of indication used by Aristophanes to mark a parody is the name of the poet without the name of his work. Such a marker is definite enough to point out the parody and runs no danger of pedantry. We find in our three plays seven occurrences of this pointer. In the *Birds* we find the quotation "this not by others, but by their own quills" labelled as Aeschylean.[7] Later, the business-like Poet introduces himself as "a nimble squire of the Muses, Homerically speaking"; we can not find the Muses Homerically mentioned in just this context,

[5] *Thesm.* 776-784. The date of the play is given by Aelian, *Var. Hist.* II, 8.

[6] *Thesm.* 848.

[7] *Birds* 807-8 = Aesch., *Myrmidons* fr. 139.

but the epic flavor lasts.[8] The Poet also offers a lyric parody, introduced by naming Pindar:[9] the original runs "For among the roaming Scythians, wanders apart from the host one who has got him no house borne on a wagon, and without honor he goes his way"; Aristophanes makes it "For among the roaming Scythians wanders Straton, who has got him no garment twirled in the weaving, and without honor goes the jacket with no tunic." The exquisite distortion of this parody would best be savored by one who recalled the original, and Aristophanes assists his audience as far as he can. To some, at least, light may have been reflected on another Pindaric bit fifteen lines earlier: the Poet had hailed Peisthetairos as "thou father, founder of Aitna, bearing the name of sacrifices most holy";[10] and if some well-read person had wondered where he had met *that* before, line 939 might have told him. In the *Thesmophoriazusae* the best-attested quotation from Euripides is from the *Alcestis*—"thou rejoicest in the light of day, and thinkest thou thy father rejoices not?"[11] The Kinsman makes Euripides proclaim this his own.

There are also some less definite allusions. In the *Lysistrata* the heroine proposes an oath "as they say in Aeschylus somewhere"—only she feminizes it by substituting a sheep for the seven chieftains' bull.[12] Later in the same play the old men quote Euripides as having rightly called woman "a shameless creature"; interestingly enough, we cannot find this phrase in our Euripides, but it does appear in Sophocles' *Electra*.[13] Probably this was a tragic phrase used by both poets—and doubtless more—and who could point to the original author? A similar bit of *materia tragica* seems to appear in the *Thesmophoriazusae*: the phrase "wise associations," which is addressed by the Kinsman to Euripides, might be a Euripidean phrase, but for us is paralleled only by Sophocles.[14]

[8] *Birds* 909-10 and 913-14.

[9] *Birds* 939, 941-45 (and schol.) = Bergk I, 409, but reading στρατῶν, cf. White, *Scholia to Aves*, pp. 178-9.

[10] *Birds* 926-7 (and schol.) = Bergk I, 408.

[11] *Thesm.* 194 = *Alcestis* 691, identified in line 193; cf. schol. Date of the *Alcestis*, 438. Cf. *Clouds* 1415.

[12] *Lysis.* 188-9 (cf. schol.) = *Seven against Thebes* 42.

[13] *Lysis.* 369 = Soph., *Electra* 662.

[14] *Thesm.* 21 and schol.; cf. Soph., *Locrian Ajax*, fr. 14, "Wise are

In the *Thesmophoriazusae* there are several parodies, the origin of which is indicated somewhat clearly by the situation in which they occur. Since Euripides appears, we should expect to find him quoting himself from time to time. The line from the *Medea* mentioned above is an example. However, since it occurs in a paratragedic passage, the hearer would have to be keen indeed to identify its source exactly. A previous line, "I swear by aether, dwelling-place of Zeus,"[15] stands out more sharply. There are numerous paratragedic passages, for one or two of which we can find parallels.[16] More definitely earmarked are: a revision of the famous line from the *Hippolytos*, "Your mind swore, it wasn't your tongue that took the oath; I didn't ask it to";[17] the phrases learned from Euripides by the "modern" husband, "to the guest from Corinth," and perhaps "this complexion of the girl's pleases me not";[18] and the warning "A wife is a tyrant to an aged bridegroom."[19] Possibly we may include the scene-parody in which the Kinsman defends himself by seizing the baby which turns out to be little Jackie Barleycorn in person; the scene suggests the *Acharnians*, the *Telephos*, and even the *Orestes*,[20] but this scene may have been common property among the tragic poets and less Euripidean to the Athenians than it is to us. On the other hand the borrowings from Agathon, delivered by his servant and himself, were presumably just such

monarchs through association with the wise." This Aristophanes directly parodied in the *Heroes*, fr. 308, where, as the scholiast to the *Thesm.* tells us, he ascribed it to Euripides, as did Plato and Antisthenes.

[15] *Thesm.* 272 = *Melanippe the Wise*, fr. 487; cf. *Frogs* 100.

[16] *Thesm.* 5-6 and schol., cf. *Orestes* 81, a suggestion of Bergler, see Rogers, *ad loc*; of course the *Orestes*, produced in 408, was not Aristophanes' source; *Thesm* 6, cf. Helen 471 (Rogers); *Thesm.* 11, noted in schol.; *Thesm.* 14-15, cf. *Melanippe the Wise*, fr. 484 (Bergler *ap.* Rogers, *ad loc.*); *Thesm.* 71, and the other passages noted above, notes 3 and 4.

[17] *Thesm.* 275-6, cf. *Hippolytos* 612, cf. *Frogs* 1471. Date of the *Hippolytos*, 428.

[18] (a) *Thesm.* 404 = *Stheneboia*, fr. 664, date, before 424; cf. *Wasps* 1074; (b) *Thesm.* 406 is paratragedic.

[19] *Thesm.* 413 = *Phoinix* fr. 804. The *Phoinix* was over 16 years old, since it was mentioned in the *Acharnians* (date 427), lines 421-2.

[20] *Thesm.* 689-760; *Achar.* 325-346; *Telephos*, cf. Nauck, p. 580; W. H. van de Sande Bakhuysen, *De Parodia*, pp. 20 f. Its date was 438; *Orestes* 1567-end.

a mixture of quotation and paratragedy as we find in the scenes of Euripides with his Kinsman; but we cannot cite sources for details. The audience would no doubt expect Agathonian language at this point and be alert for parodies.[21]

The largest number, by far, of Aristophanes' parodies have no indication as to their source. There may be some indication that they are parodies, but the hearer, or reader, must recall if he can the source of the saying which is borrowed or travestied. Usually parodies of this class reveal their nature by the vocabulary used—sometimes by the appearance of an irrelevant proper name, as in the first Pindaric parody from the *Birds* mentioned above, often by the use of words typical of the class of poetry, or even of the author whence comes the parodied bit. In this second subspecies, the distinction between quotation and paratragedy would never be obvious; in fact, even such differentiation as can be achieved by scholarly methods must be somewhat arbitrary. However, the attempt to indicate the various shadings of difference is worth while.

In the *Birds* we find in lines 250-1, "those whose tribes fly over the ocean-gulf of the sea with the halcyons," a strong reminiscence of Alcman [22]—a piece of para-lyric. Borrowings from this type of poetry are conspicuous in the *Birds*, though found in other plays as well. In line 275 we find the phrase "having an out-dwelling color," which is a parody of Sophocles.[23] Next we find an Aeschylean line, "Who is this poet-prophet, a strange bird striding on the mountains?" [24] In line 609 we find a rearrangement of Hesiod, "For five generations of men lives the yelling crow." [25] In the parabasis we are first greeted by a

[21] *Thesm.* 39-45, 46-48, 49-50, 101-129. Curiously enough, the one identifiable bit comes from Euripides, *Thesm.* 120, "Leto and the drum-beats of Asia," = Erechtheus, fr. 370 (dated about 421; see W. N. Bates, *Euripides*, p. 247).

[22] Diehl, fr. 94 (II, p. 35), Bergk, fr. 26 (III, p. 35); μετ' ἀλκυόνεσσι ποτῆται is the special phrase from Alcman, who, however, uses ἅμ' for μετ'.

[23] ἕξεδρον χρόαν—probably the original (*Tyro*, fr. 654) had χώραν, cf. schol. Pearson gives the dates of the *Tyro* as "shortly before the *Birds*" on the basis of this parody; it may just as well have been 25 years before.

[24] This is quoted, except for the word ὄρνις, from the *Edoni*, fr. 60; cf. schol., μουσομάντις and ὀρειβάτης are the striking words.

[25] λακέρυζα κορώνη is the striking phrase; this is fr. 171, 3rd ed., A.

flood of epic language—"Come then, men by nature 'of darkling life,' resembling 'a generation of leaves,' 'of little strength,' models of clay, 'shadowy, strengthless tribes,' wingless 'creatures of a day,' 'wretched mortal men,' 'like to dreams,' pay attention to us 'the immortal,' 'the living forever,' the aerial, the 'ageless,' 'the devisers of imperishable council'."[26] There follows immediately an ornithoform cosmogony which would naturally suggest the *Theogony* as its prototype;[27] the epic language just mentioned makes a brilliant prelude to the late epic matter of this sequel. At the very end of the parabasis Aeschylus' famous "tawny cock-horse" appears suddenly; this beast was a favorite of Aristophanes.[28] The chorus also begins its next ode with a Sophoclean bit of enthusiasm, couched in ten-dollar words—*ὁμορροθῶ, συνθέλω, συμπαραινέσας ἔχω*;[29] almost immediately the same play furnishes another couplet, with a slight alteration this time.[30] After several episodes, in one of which occur the Pindaric parodies mentioned above, we reach the beautifully bombastic interview between Iris and Peisthetairos, conducted in tragic language with a strong dash of Homer, which is of course Iris' native dialect. In the midst of this a line from Aeschylus' *Niobe*, "I'll raze in flames his palace and Amphion's halls with fire-bearing eagles," stands out from the rest because of the sudden appearance of Amphion.[31] After this episode has ended with a descent to the strictly comic level, other episodes are

Rzach, Leipzig, Teubner, 1913. The substitution of *πέντε* for *ἐννέα* is apparently made for the sole purpose of fitting the line into its place.

[26] *Birds*, 685-9; the Greek is: *ἄγε δὴ φύσιν ἀνδρες ἀμαυρόβιοι, φύλλων γενεᾷ προσόμοιοι | ὀλιγοδρανέες, πλάσματα πηλοῦ, σκιοειδέα φῦλ' ἀμενηνά, | ἀκτῆνες ἐφημέριοι ταλαοὶ βροτοὶ ἀνέρες εἰκελόνειροι, | προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν τοῖς ἀθανάτοις ἡμῖν τοῖς αἰὲν ἐοῦσιν, | τοῖς αἰθερίοις τοῖσιν ἀγήρως τοῖς ἄφθιτα μηδομένοισιν. φύλλων γενεᾷ*. This suggests a specific passage, *Iliad* VI, 145-9, cf. Simonides' reminiscence of this: Bergk, III, fr. 85, p. 425; Diehl, I, p. 257, fr. 29 of Semonides of Amorgos.

[27] *Birds* 690-704, cf. *Theogony*, 116-125.

[28] *Birds* 800, *Peace* 1177, *Frogs* 932, Aesch., *Myrmidons*, fr. 134.

[29] *Birds* 851-2; quotation from the *Peleus*, fr. 489; this play is earlier than the *Knights*, cf. a parody in line 1099.

[30] *Birds* 856-7 = *Peleus*, fr. 490; I regard the 2nd line, read as in the MSS, as probably part of the parody, the alteration being the insertion of Chairis, the bad flautist.

[31] *Birds* 1247-8 = *Niobe*, fr. 160; cf. schol.

opened with quotations: the first from Sophocles' *Oinomaos*,[32] the second a self-quotation by Cinesias, though he appears to begin with Anacreon.[33] Both of these use strikingly elevated language, which is maintained by the poet throughout the second episode; a third episode begins with a lyric bit about the "long-winged, many-hued swallow" and almost at once shifts to a rousing line of Aeschylus, "Wings, wings I need; ask not the next," in which "wings" have supplanted the "arms" which Achilles demanded in his despair.[34] The Archilochian *τήνελλα καλλίνικος* of line 1764 is appropriate to the close of a play in which parody of all sorts is so frequent. This frequency would no doubt render the audience especially alert to parody and thus tend to promote recognition. We can also reasonably imagine that the actors would use a mock-tragic manner with the parodies, especially the resounding "Wings, wings I need," and the like.

In the *Lysistrata*, we find a Homeric half-line, "War shall be the men's concern," which Lysistrata revises later to suit the new order.[35] Later, the chorus greets Lysistrata with tragic dignity as "Queen of this deed and plan";[36] Lysistrata's replies also suggest Euripides.

In the *Thesmophoriazusae* no directly traceable parody of this class appears, but the Kinsman's line, "upon the thigh-pieces, smitten in gory veins by this my dagger shall she stain with blood the altar," has a true tragic ring and may be closer than

[32] *Birds* 1337-39 = *Oinomaos*, fr. 476, cf. schol.

[33] *Birds* 1373 = Anacreon, Bergk, III, p. 263, fr. 24; Diehl, I, p. 461, fr. 52. The quotations or parodies from Cinesias include lines 1393-6, and 1398-1400; cf. schol.

[34] The lyric bits, of which *πτεροποίκιλοι* and *ταρυσίπτερε ποικίλα χελιδοῖ* are the striking words, are in lines 1410-12 and 1415; cf. Alcaeus, Bergk, III, p. 178, fr. 84 (and schol. *Thesm.* 162) and Simonides, Bergk, III, p. 419, fr. 74; line 1420 = Aesch., *Myrmidons*, fr. 140; cf. schol. (*πτερῶν* for *ὅπλων*); *τὸ δεύτερον* is the striking word.

[35] *Lysis.* 520 and 538 = *Iliad* VI, 490; the epic form *ἀνδρεσσι* is the hint contained in this bit; Lysistrata substitutes *γυναιξίν*.

[36] *Lysis.* 706 = Euripides' *Telephos*, fr. 599, cf. schol.; the whole phrase *ἄνασσα πράγους τοῦδε καὶ βουλεύματος* has a tragic ring. Lysistrata's lines 713 (cf. schol.) and 717 (*τί ζῆν' ἀΰτεῖς;*) sound Euripidean; Rogers believes the whole passage, lines 706-17, is parody.

paratragedy.[37] The scene, as mentioned above, parallels the *Telephos*.

There remain some parodies which are almost, if not quite, unmarked. It is tempting to regard the metre as significant here; a comic line without resolution is infrequent as compared with tragedy,[38] and these parody lines are usually unresolved; this does not, however, always set them apart from their context, and cannot be considered a really positive indication of a parody. The following examples, then, are practically without identification. The phrase from line 1244 of the *Birds*, "Whether a Lydian or a Phrygian," may be found in the *Alcestis*, but it is so buried in paratragedy in the *Birds* that we must suppose it is simply a tragic phrase, not a specific parody.[39] This paratragedy begins gradually during the excitement caused by the discovery that a god has eluded the frontier guards and works up to the epic language of Iris and her highly tragical exchange with Peisthetairos.[40] The phrase just noted as well as an identifiable parody mentioned above (p. 6) is from Peisthetairos. Iris offers a more imposing tirade, including the phrase "the mattock of Zeus"; the scholiasts found this in Sophocles' *Chryses*, and we can also discover it in the *Agamemnon*.[41] Clearly, then, this is a phrase which was practically common property among tragic writers; it should then be classed with paratragedy. It is worth noting that as parody shades off into paratragedy, so paratragedy on the other hand shades into literary reminiscence, the most notable instance of which in the *Birds* is the allusion to Odysseus' necromantic sacrifice.[42] There is an allusion of this type to

[37] *Thesm.* 694-5; see above p. 8.

[38] J. W. White, *The Verse of Greek Comedy*, London, Macmillan, 1912, pp. 37-8.

[39] *Alcestis* 675; date, 438; cf. p. 6.

[40] Beginning perhaps in 1182-3 with a faint suggestion of the parodos of the *Prometheus*, continued by the Hesiodic 1194, followed by 1197-8 in the same choral ode; Iris' first extended remarks are Homeric, 1231-3, then the tragic interchange follows; the conclusion is provided by the chorus in 1262-6.

[41] *Birds* 1240 (the whole passage is 1238-42), *Chryses*, fr. 727, *Agamemnon* 508.

[42] *Birds* 1561; Rogers notes the following rather faint reminiscences: *Birds* 488, cf. Hdt., VII, 14; *Birds* 1145 ff., cf. Hdt., II, 136; *Lysistrata* 809-819, based on Phrynichos' portrait of Timon in the *Monotropos*, cf.

Sophocles' *Tyro* in Lysistrata's phrase, "Poseidon and a bassinet" (*Lysistrata* 139), and there is a suggestion of Alcman in the proclamation of Agathon's servant.[43]

Also in the *Lysistrata* we find the line, "I am a woman, yet there's wit in me," from Euripides[44] and later in the same speech another quotation from the same poet, "Each saying of mine ever seeks its end here."[45] So in the *Thesmophoriazusae* the line, "Suffering naught greater than what we have done," is parodied from Euripides[46] without close imitation of the quite simple verbiage.

A special class of unintroduced parody is that composed of quoted or parodied proverbs and scolia. This class includes: in the *Birds*, "What, pray, would feet not achieve?" and "The gods are long-suffering"; in the *Lysistrata*, "a leathern prop" and the famous scolion phrase "And I shall bear my sword henceforth in a myrtle bough."[47]

Tabulation of the source and date of the works parodied yields the following results: from epic, one parody with a name attached, four passages with one or more significant words, one allusion;[48] from lyric poetry, one parody with name attached, and four with significant verbiage;[49] from Aeschylus, one fully named parody, two with the author's name, and four with sig-

Birds 1549. The following, noted by the schol., are parallels, not parodies: *Birds* 709, cf. Hesiod; 842, cf. *Palamedes* of Euripides; 1121, cf. Pindar; 1647, cf. *Ion* 1520-1; 1720, cf. *Troades* 308; *Lysis.* 963, cf. *Andromeda* of Euripides, fr. 116.

[43] *Thesm.* 43-4, 46-7; cf. Alcman, Bergk, III, p. 57, fr. 60; Diehl, II, p. 27, fr. 58.

[44] *Lysis.* 1124 = *Melanippe the Wise*, fr. 483, cf. schol.

[45] *Lysis.* 1135 = *Erechtheus*, fr. 363, cf. schol. The *Erechtheus* may be dated about 421, cf. note 21.

[46] *Thesm.* 519 (*οὐδὲν παθοῦσαι μεῖζον ἢ δεδράκαμεν*) = *Telephos*, fr. 711 (*παθόντες οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ δεδρακότες*).

[47] The respective lines are: *Birds* 1147 (the proverb said "hands," not "feet"); *Birds* 1620, a quotation; *Lysis.* 110 (the original was *συκίνη ἐπικουρία* instead of *σκυτίνη*); *Lysis.* 632 ("henceforth" [*τὸ λοιπόν*] does not appear in the scolion); the proverbs are noted by the schol.

[48] From Homer, *Birds* 685 ff., 909, 1561, *Lysis.* 520; from Hesiod, *Birds* 609 and 690 ff.

[49] Archilochos, *Birds* 1764; Alcman, *Birds* 250, *Thesm.* 43; Alcaeus (?) = Simonides (?), *Birds* 1410; Anacreon, *Birds* 1373; Pindar, *Birds* 926 and 939.

nificant words;[50] from later plays, twenty parodies. Most of the later plays can be dated exactly or approximately. There are five parodies from the *Telephos* and *Alcestis* of the year 438;[51] one each comes from the *Medea* (432), *Hippolytos* (428), *Phoinix* (before 426), *Stheneboia* (before 424), Sophocles' *Peleus* (before 425); and two are from Euripides' *Erechtheus* (*ca.* 421).[52] Except for this last, the plays were ten years old or over when Aristophanes parodied them; the *Erechtheus* may have been between five and ten years old. Recent plays are used only in the positively identified parodies of the *Thesmophoriazusae*.[53] The plays which cannot be dated are the *Tyro*, *Oinomaos* and perhaps the *Chryses* of Sophocles, and *Melanippe the Wise* of Euripides.[54]

On the basis of these three comedies, generalizations should not be too numerous. It is reasonable, however, to point out that a general and somewhat arbitrary distinction can be drawn between specific parody and what Aristophanes seems to have intended as paratragedy. That is, more often the poet expected his audience to recognize the tragic, epic, or lyric manner, or even the manner of a certain author, but not necessarily a specific source: among such passages we may include paratragedy, as indicated above, and such definite parodies as are announced, if at all, only by their vocabulary. As E. W. Hope[55] shows, paratragedy appears quite regularly in scenes of excitement or other heightened emotion, mock or genuine. Such lines might well have been delivered by the actors in such a way as to emphasize

[50] *Myrmidons*, *Birds* 800, 807 (with the poet's name), 1420; *Edoni*, *Birds* 276 and *Thesm.* 134 (the latter with the name of the poet and the tetralogy); *Seven*, *Lysis.* 188 (poet named); *Niobe*, *Birds* 1247.

[51] *Telephos*, *Lysis.* 706, *Thesm.* 519 and 689; *Alcestis*, *Birds* 1244, *Thesm.* 194 (poet identified).

[52] *Medea*, *Thesm.* 1130; *Hippolytos*, *Thesm.* 275 (indicated as Euripidean); *Phoinix*, *Thesm.* 416 (indicated as Euripidean); *Stheneboia*, *Thesm.* 404 (identified as Euripidean); *Peleus*, *Birds* 851 and 856; *Erechtheus*, *Lysis.* 1135, *Thesm.* 120.

[53] *Palamedes*, four years old, *Thesm.* 770; *Helen* and *Andromeda*, of the previous year, *Thesm.* 850 and 1011 respectively.

[54] *Tyro*, *Birds* 275, *Lysis.* 139; *Oinomaos*, *Birds* 1337; *Chryses*, *Birds* 1240; *Melanippe*, *Lysis.* 1124 and *Thesm.* 272.

[55] E. W. Hope, *The Language of Parody*, a Johns Hopkins dissertation, 1906.

the disparity with the usual comic style. Specific parody, on the other hand, depended for its effect on realization by the audience of the author, and preferably the passage, which was being utilized. In these cases, Aristophanes gave an additional hint, as described above, to assist the appreciation of the spectators. It seems unlikely that he depended on a reading knowledge of the literature he travestied. We may readily suppose that all Athenians were acquainted through public recitations with Homer and possibly Hesiod. Revivals of Aeschylus may have brought some of his plays into common knowledge, and recent plays would of course be known because of their production.

We may doubt whether the average spectator was thoroughly acquainted with poetry, dramatic or otherwise, beyond the limits just suggested. Such an average spectator would, then, appreciate fully the parodies on the *Palamedes*, the *Helen*, and the *Andromeda*; and he would understand those on Homer, possibly Hesiod, on proverbs, and on scolia. He would at least see that there was a point to such parodies as were indicated by authors' names or by the situation, from any other parodies he would get an effect of paratragedy. The educated spectator would naturally appreciate the parodies better and receive the benefit of the running comment on literature, which in the *Birds* is largely substituted for the usual political japery, and the educated reader of the plays would derive still more pleasure from parody. It seems likely, however, that to a large extent Aristophanes used parody for his own amusement without attempting always to get it across to his public. Perhaps that is why parody bubbles up everywhere in the earlier plays and becomes less frequent later: parody is to a large extent a young man's game.

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HITTITE DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS.

In no category does Hittite show the old alongside the new more strangely than in the formation and inflection of its demonstrative pronouns. While some of the stems of the common IE pronouns are found also in Hittite, there are others which are characteristic of the latter only; and the declension of demonstratives in Hittite is either in a very rudimentary stage, or, as in case of *kas* and *apas*, shows only a slight resemblance to the pronominal declension of the other IE languages. Nevertheless the antiquity of the Hittite material suggests that by all means its demonstrative pronouns ought to contribute something, perhaps considerable, to the solution of the various problems concerning the origin and inflection of IE demonstratives.

The first question that suggests itself is: How does Hittite affect the hypothesis that IE demonstrative pronouns are derived from demonstrative particles? The arguments in favor of this supposition are stated clearly and concisely in Brugmann, *Gr.*, II, 2, pp. 311 f.[1] In the first place the nom. **so* Skt. *sá* Gr. ὁ is without case-ending and therefore probably a particle in origin. In the next place the vowel alternation e. g. in **k̂o-* **k̂ā-* **k̂i-* is the same as in some old particles, e. g. OBlg. *že- go*: Lith. *-gi*. The most conclusive argument is the existence of particles which are not case-forms, but identical with the stem of demonstrative pronouns, alongside of the latter. Just as we find the particle **kᵘe* = Skt. *ca* Gr. τε Lat. *que* Goth. *-h* alongside of the relative-interrogative **kᵘo-*, so among demonstratives the particle **e* (in Skt. *a-sāú*, Gr. ἐ-κεῖ, Osc. *e-kas* nom. pl.) exists beside the pronominal stem **e-* e. g. in the Skt. gen. sing. *a-syá*, OHG *es*. Similarly we find the particle **k̂e* (e. g. in Lat. *ce-do, huius-ce*, Gr. κεῖνος < **κε-ενος*) beside pronominal **e-ko-* **e-kā-* in Osc. nom. pl. **ekas** "hae." To these examples of Brugmann others can be added with ease. Beside the IE pronominal stem **to-*, e. g. in the acc. **tom* = Skt. *tám* Gr. τόν Toch. *cam* Lith. *tą*, etc. Hittite now furnishes the particle *ta* "then, thereupon." The pronominal stem *i-* of Lat. *is* (nom. sing. masc.), Skt. *id-am* (nom. acc. neut.), Gr. Cypr. ἴν (acc. masc.), etc., is paralleled

[1] Similarly Hirt, *Idg. Gram.*, VII, pp. 140 f., derives pronouns from adverbs.

by the deictic particle **ī* in Av. *ī* or Gr. *οὗτοσ-ί, νυν-ί*, etc. It is true that this **ī* [2] may be thought of as an instrumental singular of the pronoun (Brugmann, *op. cit.*, II, 3, p. 980), but it is at least equally probable that the long *ī* is merely a case of IE lengthening of final vowels. Cf. Brugmann, *Gr.*, I, p. 496. Again the pronoun **ne- *no-*, in Gr. *κεῖνος* < **κε-ενος* or in the Umbr. acc. sing. neut. *enom* (only as adverb), exists alongside of the particle **ne* in Lat. *-ne* (e. g. *ego-ne, tū-ne*) or Gr. Thess. *ὄ-νε, τό-νε*. Beside the particle **ŭ* e. g. in the enclitic Skt. *u ū* or in Gr. *πάν-υ* "very" or Goth. *wileiz-u* "*θέλεις*," is found the demonstrative stem **u- *eu-* in Av. and OPers. *ava-* "ille," OBlg. *ovŭ . . . ovŭ* = *ὁ μέν . . . ὁ δέ*.

As we examine the various stems of the Hittite demonstrative pronouns, we find a number of them already indirectly accounted for above. Leaving in abeyance for the moment the relation of the Hitt. particle *ta* with *tas*, usually translated "et is," which will be discussed below, there is the Hitt. enclitic pronoun *-as* "he" alongside the particle *-a*, which correspond respectively to the IE demonstrative stem **e-* and the particle **e *ē* [3] mentioned above, except for the *o*-grade of the Hittite, which is conditioned upon the enclisis of the Hittite words. The Hittite demonstrative *sas* is merely the declined IE **so*, referred to above. Furthermore, if the now current view that *tas* and *nas* are compounds of the particles *ta* and *nu* with the enclitic pronoun *-as* should prove to be correct, each of these is composed of two elements which were originally particles. Turning to the more emphatic demonstratives, *ka- ke-* "hic" of course belongs to the particle **k̂e* referred to above in connection with other IE *k̂*-pronouns. The stem-forms *ku-* and *ki-* (if the latter is not illusive) [4] are explained as a cross between **k̂e-* and the pronominal stems **u-* and **i-*, which, as seen above, were themselves particles in origin.

[2] If this particle *-i* is the weak grade of the corresponding feminine **(i)i̯ā*, as Brugmann surmised in *Gr.*, II, 2, p. 328, it would still be a case of a particle which shows the uninflected pronominal stem.

[3] The Hitt. particle *-a* has the by-form *-ya*, which Sturtevant, *Hitt. Gram.*, p. 171, n. 78, rightly explains as developed after *-i* and *-e*. Connection of *-a -ya* with the relative pronoun IE **i̯o-*, mentioned e. g. by Gŏtze-Pedersen, *Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser*, XXI, 1, p. 46, appears much less probable.

[4] This stem-form appears only in the nom. acc. sing. neut. *ki*, which is more probably (see below) explained otherwise.

The stem of the pronoun *apas* "ille" Sturtevant, *Hitt. Gram.*, p. 201, refers to the preposition **obhi* "to, toward," and this, as he remarks, would be another instance of a pronoun based on an indeclinable particle. The objections to Sturtevant's derivation are twofold. Of lesser moment is the fact that the neut. sing. of *apas* is *apat* instead of **api*, as opposed to *ki* (not **kat*) of the otherwise identically declined *kas*. It would be strange if the *i*-stem, although original for *apas*, had disappeared completely here, whereas in case of *kas*, where it was secondary, it found its way into one form; and this all the more because the declension of *apas* also, in case of the correctness of Sturtevant's derivation, must have been patterned after that of *kas*, for that would be the obvious explanation of the substitution of *-a-* for the *i* of **obhi*. However, in view of the uncertainty of the nature of the *i* of *ki* (see below) this objection does not weigh so heavily. Much more important is the fact that *apas* "ille" refers to distant objects (see Delaporte, p. 43) and that consequently its derivation from **obhi* "towards" is semantically unsatisfactory. Its meaning agrees much more with the suggestion of Hrozný,[5] *Spr. d. Heth.*, p. 137, that its source is the IE **apo* of Skt. *ápa* Gr. *ἀπό* etc., which shows the exact meaning required, e. g. in the derivative Gr. *ἄπιος* "distant." However, against this derivation in turn speaks the absence of the spelling with the double *pp* in case of *apas* as opposed to *appa* = IE **apo*, since Sturtevant, *JAOS*, LII, pp. 1 ff., has shown that IE voiceless stops are written double in Hittite. We may take care of this objection by assuming a contamination in pre-historic times. A stem **appa-* "ille," derived from the IE **apo* = Hitt. *appa* "back, again," received its $p < bh$ for $pp < p$ from its opposite [6] **api* = IE **obhi* Skt. *abhí* Lat. *ob*. The substitution of the lenis for the fortis through such an association would be easier than many another similar contamination because of the slight difference between them. The stem-form *apu-* of the acc. sing. and nom.

[5] So also Milewski, *RO*, VIII, p. 107. Whatever its ultimate origin, it is related to Lyc. *ebe*, cf. e. g. Pedersen, *loc. cit.*, p. 47.

[6] As a parallel to this change of an internal consonant through word-contamination may be cited the Germanic words for father and mother. In English *father* instead of **fader* for the OEngl. *faeder* because of the *th* of *mother*; in German, conversely, *Mutter* OHG *muoter* got its *t* instead of *d* as in *Bruder* OHG *bruoder* from *Vater* OHG *fater*.

acc. pl. took its place beside *apa-* after the pattern *ka-* : *ku-* rather than through independent influence of the pronoun **ŭ-* or particle **ŭ*.

Those demonstrative pronouns which have either no declension at all or only the mere beginnings of a declension are necessarily particles or adverbs in origin regardless of whether or not their source can be detected. Hittite has three pronouns of this type, of which the indeclinable *asi* may be analyzed as compounded of the particle *a* with **sa* IE **so*, which furnished the nom. sing. for the stem **to-*, the final *-i* being the appended particle *-i*, unless due to the influence of other pronouns which received their *i* similarly. In the same way the pronoun *uni* (with acc. *unin*) may well be the particle **u* with **ne* and final *-i* as in *asi*. So also *eni* (with acc. *enim*) is probably the IE particle **e* with **ne*, and final *-i* as before. Differing only as to ablaut of the initial vowel is the stem *ani-* which, however, occurs only in the nom. sing. masc. *anis* and the ablative *anaz* which looks like that of an *a*-stem.

It thus appears that every strictly demonstrative pronoun of the Hittite language can be traced to a particle or combination of particles found alongside, sometimes in Hittite itself, sometimes in other IE languages. There can therefore be no doubt that Hittite furnishes valuable evidence for the theory that demonstrative pronouns are in origin merely declined demonstrative particles.

We are now in a better position to take up the most serious of the problems concerning Hittite demonstratives, the origin of *nas* and *tas*, usually taken to be compounds of the adverbs *nu* and *ta* with the enclitic pronoun *-as*, although Hrozný, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 f., equated *tas* directly with the IE pronoun **to-*. The basis for the analysis of *nas* as *nu-as* is the fact established by Ungnad, *ZDMG*, LXXIV, pp. 417 ff., that *nas* is not accompanied by any otherwise necessary sentence-connecting particle. He therefore concluded that *nas* must contain such a particle within itself and must be analyzed as *nu* + *-as*. Friedrich, *ZA NF*, II, pp. 293 f., drew the analogous inference for *tas*, which he conceived as the Hitt. particle *ta* with *-as*. Now of the facts about Hittite sentence connection as established by Ungnad there can of course not be any doubt. Whether on the other hand the conclusions drawn about the compound origin of *tas* and *nas* are

correct is another matter. At any rate there are various angles to the question which Ungnad and Friedrich completely ignored and which should be taken into account before definitely accepting the translation of *nas* and *tas* as "et is."

The difficulties of this analysis are most serious for *tas* because of the complete correspondence, e. g., of the acc. masc. *tan* with IE **tom* = Skt. *tám* Gr. *τόν*, etc. If Hitt. *tan* is "et eum" we must either give up altogether direct equation of Hitt. *ta-* and IE **to-* (so the writer, *AJP*, LIII, pp. 194 f.) or else assume that IE **to-* is itself a compound of a particle **to* with the pronoun **-os*,[7] as does Sturtevant, *Hitt. Gram.*, p. 199. It is hard to say which of these two alternatives is the more improbable. Before accepting either it will be well to examine the question whether the facts concerning Hittite sentence connection cannot be explained in some other way, and the reason really is not far to seek. Since demonstrative pronouns are merely declined demonstrative particles, they will serve as sentence connectives just as well as the particles, and the gradual appearance of the declension makes no difference. Therefore if *ta* was a sentence connective as long as it was indeclinable, after the development of its declension this declined *ta-* was just as capable of being a sentence connective as the undeclined *ta* was before; and there is no reason for assuming the addition of the pronoun *-as*. It is simply one instance of the general asyndetic use of anaphoric pronouns in sentence connection, a use found in practically every language regardless of how much it is given to the use of connective particles. Thus Brugmann, *KVGr.*, p. 651, quotes even from the Greek of Homer: *ὁ δ' Ἄβαντα μετῴχετο καὶ Πολύιδον, υἱέας Εὐρυδάμαντος, ὀνειροπόλοιο γέροντος, τοῖς*[8] *οὐκ ἐρχομένοις ὁ γέρων ἐκρίνατ' ὀνείρους* "for them as they went the old man did not

[7] That an IE **tos* with short *o* instead of the long *ō* expected from the assumed contraction should in the Hittite language still be felt as Hitt. *ta* + *-as* is utterly incredible, but unless that was the case the assumption will not explain the facts of Hittite sentence connection in the manner assumed by Ungnad. Moreover, while the explanation of the short vowel of IE **to-* by elision or analogy is possible, it adds nothing to the probability of the hypothesis.

[8] Demonstratives used as sentence connectives are on the way to becoming relative pronouns. From the Hittite law code (10) *tak-ku* LÚ. GAL.LU-*an ku-iš-ki ḫu-u-ni-ik-zi ta-an iš-tar-ni-ik-zi* is almost "if any one has bewitched a man *whom* he has made ill."

interpret dreams." That τοῖς should here be translated "and for them" is of course not to be thought of, for, even if the IE pronoun **to-* should have originated as Sturtevant supposes, it would have been a simple pronoun to the Greek consciousness. It might be added that we also should not be influenced by the translation "et eum" for Hitt. *tan,* for "and him" and "this one," "and it" and "this," are always interchangeable logically; and no one could decide between one or the other in a language of the past except by indirect inference, and it is this inference for *tas* that rests on a particularly weak foundation.

There are still other points of weakness in the theory that *tas* originated as *ta* + *-as*. The same argument that is used for *tas* ought to apply equally well to any other pronoun that can stand at the head of a sentence without another connective. Such a pronoun is the Hitt. *sas* (Sturtevant, *op. cit.*, p. 200) which, however, cannot be composed of a particle **sa* with the pronoun *-as* because there is no Hitt. sentence-connecting particle **sa*. Now if an uncompounded *sas* can act as the sole sentence connective, so can an uncompounded *tas,* and the one argument for the origin of the latter as *ta* + *-as* falls to the ground.

Finally, there is a positive reason against the derivation of *tas* from *ta-as* in the relation between the pronouns *sas* and *tas,* the Hittite representatives of IE **so* and **to-*. Since we are forced to assume that the suppletion of the stem **to-* with **so* in the nom. sing. masc. and **sā* in the fem., as found in Sanskrit, Doric Greek, Gothic, and Tocharian,[9] is of IE age, the existence in Hittite of the two parallel but incomplete paradigms *sas* and *tas* beside each other must be a secondary[10] state of affairs. We find e. g. in the nom. sing. masc. both *sas* and *tas,* in the acc. both *san* and *tan,* in the acc. pl. masc. both *sus* and *ṭus*. The Hitt. paradigm *sas* thus bears witness to the existence in Hittite of some forms going back to the IE suppletive paradigm. That other Hitt. forms like *tan* and *tas,* which correspond sound by sound to other forms of this IE paradigm (**tom* and **tŏs*), should be nevertheless not of IE age, but purely Hittite com-

[9] See Schulze-Sieg-Siegling, *Tooh. Gram.*, p. 169.

[10] It is possible that the encroachment of the *s*-form of the stem on the *t*-form began in the IE age, but there is no advantage in so assuming: such an assumption would explain nothing not as well explained otherwise.

pounds, imposes quite a strain on one's credulity. Moreover, the splitting of the one IE paradigm into two in Hittite is not complete. In the neuter sing. there is no **sat,* but only *tat* = IE **tod* Skt. *tát* Gr. *τό* (Sturtevant, p. 203; Delaporte, pp. 39 f.). The extremely common neuter sing. naturally resisted analogy most easily of all case forms.

In view of these opposing considerations as well as of the want of compelling power in the syntactic arguments, we seem compelled to throw overboard the now universally accepted derivation of *tas* from the particle *ta* with the enclitic pronoun *-as,* and to return to Hrozný and accept the simple and convincing equations: Hitt. *tan* = Skt. *tám* Gr. *τόν,* nom. pl. *tas* (as fem.) = Skt. *tás* Goth. *þōs,* etc. The pronominal forms like IE **tom* Hitt. *tan,* as did those of other demonstratives, arose by secondarily declining an originally uninflected particle, in this case the IE **to* Hitt. *ta.*[10a]

The case of *nas,* analyzed as **nu-as* by Ungnad (*loc. cit.*), is not so clear. We have here no immediate IE cognates to dispose of, and there is no Hittité particle **na,* which by assuming a

[10a] Unexpected and decisive confirmation for the theory of *tas* here adopted was recently furnished in an article by Friedrich, *RHA,* VI, pp. 158 ff. The intermediate stage between a demonstrative particle and a demonstrative pronoun is an uninflected demonstrative pronoun, i. e., a particle which refers to persons, things, or words without inflectional ending. It is this stage that is found in a number of examples of Hitt. *ta* mentioned by Friedrich. Thus in KUB XI 20 I 5f. (*ta* GIŠ-*i ḫa-ma-an-ki* "him he binds to the wood") *ta* is equivalent to *tam* "him" (Friedrich "et eum"), and in KUB XI 17 v 14 (*ta par-ši-ya* "it he breaks into pieces") *ta* is the same as *tat* "it" (Friedrich "et id"). It is true that Friedrich is not yet willing to recant, and offers other explanations, but his objections to Hrozný's equation Hitt. *ta-* = IE **to-* are now less convincing than before. That *ta* is often translatable as a conjunction does not gainsay its origin as a demonstrative particle, and the argument drawn from the absence of oblique cases like the gen. **tel* and the dat. **tedani* is nullified by the fact that also Tocharian *ta-,* for which origin from the IE pronoun **to-* cannot be doubted, inherited only the nominative and accusative cases, whereas all the others are secondary developments in Tocharian itself. Cf. *Lang.,* XI, pp. 196 ff. Moreover, even if IE **so-*to-* should have had a complete paradigm, the absence of e. g. **tel* or **tedani* in Hittite would be explained by the encroachment of the old stem *sa-,* which in IE was confined to the nom. sing. masc. and fem., whence e. g. *sel* and *sedani* for **tel* and **tedani.*

declension could have developed into the pronoun *na-s*. On the other hand the phonetic difficulties in the way of this analysis are even greater than for *tas*, for, if **nu-as* yielded *nas*, it must have been by some analogy. Sturtevant, *op. cit.*, p. 199, suggests the acc. pl. *nus* < **nu-us* as the starting-point. Putting it into the form of a proportion, we have nom. pl. *nas*: acc. pl. *nus* = *tas*: *tus*. While this analogy is conceivable, it seems hard to believe that the acc. pl. should play such an important part, and one cannot understand why the same analogy should not have worked on the nominal *u*-stems to bring about a universal transfer to the *a*-declension; all the more since in the latter case there was no conflicting tendency, as would have existed for *nus* in the analysis as *nu* + *-us*, which was supported by all the other forms, as e. g. the acc. sing. **nu-an*. At all events analysis by the speakers of the language of, e. g., an actual *nan* as *nu* + *-an* became impossible after the change, and yet Ungnad's hypothesis is based upon the assumption that the omission of other sentence connectives with *nas* is due to the recognition of *nu* in the assumed complex. It may be that a particle **na* existed beside *nu* in prehistoric times and that this particle when declined became the pronoun *nas*. This **na* would of course be cognate with IE **ne* Lat. *ne* etc., and also with the IE *n*-pronouns. In view of the inconclusiveness of the syntactic arguments of Ungnad this alternative seems about as probable as the other. It is also possible that *nas* is a real compound of the assumed **na* with the pronoun *-as*, and that this relation was felt as long as **na* was actually in existence. All in all, it is best to leave the origin of *nas* an open question but to bear in mind that it is only a question of origin and not of actual interpretation, for the recognition by the speaker of *nu* in *nas* is a pyschological impossibility. The question to decide is whether the absence of an actually apperceived *nu* in sentences with *nas* is to be explained by origin from **nu-as* and the persistence of an old habit of sentence formation, or the similar persistence due to the secondary declension of an originally uninflected particle.

Also in the inflection of Hittite demonstratives there is a strange admixture of the new with the old. Since they vary not a little among themselves, it will be advantageous to discuss each separately.

The declension of the enclitic pronoun *-as* calls for no comment

in the nominatives and accusatives, the only forms[11] strictly belonging to the paradigm. The endings are mainly the regular endings of nouns as well as pronouns and usually direct descendants of the IE endings; so the nom. sing. masc. *-as* like *antuhsa-s* "man" or Gr. ἄνθρωπο-ς, the acc. masc. *-an* like *antuhsa-n*, with *-n* < *-m* in Skt. *devá-m* or Lat. *hortu-m*, the neut. nom. acc. *-at* with the pronominal *-d* of Skt. *tá-d* Gr. τό < *τοδ, etc.; in the masc. pl. *-as* and *-us*, the former with IE *-ōs* as Osc. **púis** the latter as the nominal acc. Hitt. *antuhsus*. The neut. pl. *-e* (*-i*) is the IE **-ai* as in Lith. *taî* or Lat. *quae*. See Sturtevant, p. 206.

It is merely a question of nomenclature whether the corresponding tonic forms of the genitive, dative, and ablative singular, *sc. edas, edi* or *edani, etez* or *ediz*, shall be considered a part of the same paradigm as the preceding (so Delaporte, p. 39) or whether they are to be taken as forms of a different pronoun, as Sturtevant, pp. 200, 207. The fact that no competing cases from both stems are found argues for their being suppletive formations, and the only question is whether the two stems were ultimately identical, which here means whether *ed- et-* has an *e* in ablaut[12] with the *a* of *-as* and whether the *d/t* is formative, but this question is hard to decide. If we apply the principle that the oldest demonstrative pronouns are declined demonstrative particles, we are led to considering the stem *ed- et-* as identical with the IE particle **ed*, found e. g. in Lat. *ecce* < **ed-ce*, OBlg. *jed-inŭ jed-inŭ* "unus." Cf. Brugmann, *op. cit.*, II, 3, p. 984. However, it is an undecided question whether the *-d* of this particle is originally the case ending *-d* of the neuter singular, so that **ed* is a stereotyped case form, or whether on the contrary some original particle in *-d*, as e. g. this **ed*, became used as a neuter without case-ending, as in fact neuters are generally, and the *-d* was ultimately adapted to case usage by secondary association of such neuters with masculines without

[11] I am not convinced by Holger Pedersen, *loc. cit.*, p. 67, that the enclitic datives *-si* (sg.) and *smas* (pl.) belong to *-as* instead of the reflexive IE **soi*, etc.

[12] Since the forms of *et-* are not enclitic, their tonic *e* as opposed to the enclitic IE **o* Hitt. *a* of *-as* is in accordance with the prevalent theory of the origin of the IE *o*-grade.

-d. I incline with Sturtevant [13] to the latter alternative, in which case the suppletion of *-as* with *et-* is secondary, but so also would be ultimately that of *-aṣ* with the neut. *-at.*

Of the case forms yielded by this *ed- et-*, the gen *ed-as* has the regular ending of nominal consonant stems, e. g. *humand-as* or *sahann-as* (: *sahhan*). It is the IE **-os* of Gr. *ποδ-ός*, etc. The ablative *etez* has the regular *-z* of all Hitt. ablatives of the singular, differing from nominal ablatives only by the *e*-grade of the preceding vowel as opposed to the *o*-grade, e. g., in *irmalaz.* The dative *ed-i* is also transparent, being formed with the same IE **-ai* or *-ei* as, e. g., *humant-i* or *sahhan-i.* The longer dative ending of *ed-ani* occurs also in other pronouns, cf. *set-ani, ked-ani, aped-ani, tamed-ani.* It is nevertheless of nominal origin, arising by patterning after the datives of *n*-stems,[14] as *sahhan-i,* misinterpreted as *sahh-ani.* A particularly good source for this misdivision may have been the heteroclitic stems in *-iyas,* as *memiyas* "word." This has the gen. *memiyan-as* and the dat. *memiyan-i* from the original *n*-stem. Now if we may assume that there also existed originally a dative **-ani* beside *ed-ani,* or **kani* beside *kedani* we can establish the intermediate link by the proportion *-as* : **-ani* or *kas* : **kani* = *memiyas* : *memiyani.* That **-ani* should then go to *ed-ani* and to *ked-ani* from **kani* is as might be expected.

The inflection of *tas* and *nas,* being almost completely parallel to that of *-as,* requires little comment. The only difference is that *tas* forms the neut. pl. *ta* opposed to *-e* or *-i* and *ne.* This is the regular IE **tā* as found in Vedic Skt. *tā́* Av. *tā* Gr. *τά* and is therefore an inherited form, a fact which constitutes another objection to derivation of Hitt. *tas* from *ta* with *-as,* since the latter shows only *-i* or *-e.* It is incredible that in case of two alternative forms *-e* and **-a* as assumed by Sturtevant, *op. cit.,* p. 198, n. 21, the one found in the supposed phrase should never be found in its final member, although *-as* is the most

[13] So *op. cit.,* p. 204. He cites the appearance of the *d* in Skt. adverbs like *tadā* "then" and *yadā* "when," as well as the use of the *d*-forms of pronouns in Skt. compounds. Cf. e. g. *tad-víd* "knowing this," but also derivatives like *tad-íya-ḥ.* See Whitney, *Skt. Gram.,* § 497.

[14] A similar analogical transfer of a form originating in *n*-stems is shown by certain plural genitives in Aryan and Germanic, e. g. Skt. *sénā-nām* : *sénā,* OHG *gebōno* : *geba.* Cf. Brugmann, *op. cit.,* pp. 239 f.

common of Hittite pronouns and exceeds *tas* in frequency by a very large margin. Friedrich (*loc. cit.*) felt the force of the objection, but thought *ta* could be derived from **ta-i*, which, as stated by Sturtevant, is impossible according to Hittite phonology.

Both *tas* and *nas* are found only in the nominative and accusative cases of both numbers. The former, as derived from IE **to-*, furnishes one more important trait common to Hittite and Tocharian, since only the nominative and oblique (IE acc.) of the demonstratives of the latter language are of IE origin (e. g. nom. sing. *sās* = Hitt. *sas*, acc. *cam* = Hitt. *tan*, nom. pl. fem. *toṣ* — Skt. *tâs*), while all the other cases are later developments. See *Lang*, XI, pp. 196 ff.

Also the inflection of *sas* is parallel to that of *-as* and *tas*. It has only *se*, not **sa*, in the neut. plural. The absence of the nom. pl. masc. **sas* may be accidental in case of such a rare and archaic pronoun.

The pronoun *sas*, in contrast to *-as*, *tas*, and *nas*, has some forms besides the nominatives and accusatives which all show regular pronominal endings. The dative *sedani* is parallel to *edani* and can be explained by the proportion *-as* : *edani* = *sas* : *sedani*, a fact which speaks for the association into one paradigm of the forms of *-a-s* and *ed-* in the minds of the Hittite speakers. The genitive *sel* has the usual *-el* of most Hitt. pronouns, e. g. *kel* : *kas* "hic," *kuel* : *kuis* "who." In the ending *-l* Hrozný, *op. cit.*, p. 53, saw an old adjectival suffix which in other IE languages gave way to its thematic form *-lo-* or to *-li-*, an explanation unobjectionable from both the formal [15] and semantic points of view and much more probable than the assumption of a borrowing from non-IE languages. The ablative *sez* has the regular pronominal *-ez* already encountered in case of *ętez*.

The pronouns *eni* and *uni*, as opposed to the invariable *asi*, show inflection just where it might first be expected in case they originated from uninflected adverbs. Since the forms in *-i* appeared like the nom. acc. sing. neut. of nominal *i*-stems, they were felt to be such when their use allowed it, and then developed

[15] That this *-el* may well have been originally a nominative of any gender, is shown by the use of the stem-form in *-l* as nom. sing. in **sāuel* "sun" = Lat. *sōl*, cf. Skt. Ved. *súvar* "sun."

the corresponding cases of the masculine by proportional analogies: *eni-s* : *eni* = *suppi-s* : *suppi*, *uni-n* : *uni* = *suppi-n* : *suppi*. In the same way the declension occasionally might spread also to other case forms, e. g to the acc. pl. masc. *unius*.

The pronouns *ka-s* "hic" has the regular *-s* in the nom. sing. masc. and the regular *-n* in the acc. *ku-n*. Why the stem-form *ku-* should become fastened on the acc. sing. is not clear—analogy to the acc. pl. *kus* might account for it if we assume its previous existence, but it could hardly account for its creation in view of the absence of a corresponding *-un* in nouns and other pronouns, all of which would offer exactly the same opportunity for the analogical creation.

The most obscure form of *kas* is the neut. nom. acc. *ki* (*ki-i*, rarely *ki-e*). Since all other pronominal neuters end in *-t* < IE *-d*, there is slight probability that this is an old by-form with an *i*-stem (so Hrozný, *op. cit.*, p. 140, n. 3, 7), which ended in *-i* instead of *-it* because of the influence of nominal *i*-stems, e. g. *suppi*, neut. of *suppis*. It is to be observed particularly that the one inflected pronominal *i*-stem of Hittite, *sc. kuis*, has *kui-t* in the neuter, not **kui*. Furthermore, the assumed *i*-stem for *ki* is suspicious because it occurs nowhere else in the paradigm of *kas*, and because *apas* "ille," the declension of which follows *kas* completely otherwise, here has the expected *apat* instead of the corresponding **api*. The explanation for *ki* lies in the occasional *ki-e*, i. e. *ke*, beside *ki-i*. The form *ki* is merely the plural *ke* used as a singular as well as a plural, and the tendency to distinguish the two by usually writing *ki-i* for the former is merely orthographic. It is a well known fact that neuter singular and plural of demonstratives are interchangeable to a very large extent in all except the very simplest situations. A person may refer to the whole complex as a unity with the singular or to the parts of the same complex with a plural. Thus in referring to a speech just completed Greek used either τοῦτο or ταῦτα. Cf. Xen., *An.*, III, 1, 26: ὁ μὲν ταῦτ' ἔλεξεν with *ib.*, 2, 9 τοῦτο δὲ λέγοντος αὐτοῦ. Starting from this large common sphere of usage the Hitt. plural *ke* or *ki* displaced the singular completely, as conversely in English the plural of *this* and *that* disappeared in substantival use.

The other singular forms of *kas* show no peculiarity: gen. *kel* like *sel*, abl. *kez* like *sez*, dat. *kedani* like *edani* and *sedani*.

There is also an instrumental *ket* with the *-et* of most nominal instrumentals, e. g. *haset*: *hasas*.

In the plural the nom. acc. masc. *kus* points to a *u*-stem which probably first became established in the accusative because of its resemblance to nominal accusatives in *-us* and then went to the nominative, where it won its way because it afforded an opportunity to distinguish between singular and plural; whereas *kas* would have been both, an ambiguity particularly embarrassing in case of pronouns.[16] The neut. pl. *ke* < IE **kai* is regular and has been commented upon above. The dat. pl. *kedas* is a curious but transparent instance of a complex analogy. The *d* came from the singular *kedani*, and the ending *-as* from the *-as* of the gen. dat. pl. of nouns, e. g. *antuhsas*: *antuhsas* "man." That *kedas*, in contrast to the corresponding nominal datives, was not also a gen. pl. is conditioned on the one hand by its *d*, which was associated only with the dative in case of the singular, on the other hand by the existence of a special pronominal gen. pl. in the form *kenzan*. This form Sturtevant, *op. cit.*, p. 205 rightly takes to be a phonetic development from **kensan*,[17] of which the final *-san* = IE *-som* is identified by him on the one hand with the Hitt. particle *san*, on the other with the ending IE *-sōm* of pronominal genitives like **toi-sōm* **tā-sōm* = Skt. *téṣām tāsām*, assuming that *-som* with short vowel was not only the original form, but even preserved to the IE period, whereas the substitution of the forms with the long vowel which originated in the *o-* and *ā*-declension by contraction from *-o-om* and *-ā-om*, was a purely Sanskrit occurrence. Although it cannot possibly be decided just when *-ōm* took the place of *-om*, this explanation otherwise is enlightening as well for the IE as for the Hitt. forms discussed. Not so convincing, however, is Sturtevant's analysis in as far as it concerns the initial *ken-*, which he and Milewski, *RO*, VIII, pp. 109, n. 19, think of as having a formative *n*. It should be noted that except for its first *n* the form *kenzan* in its entirety corresponds to IE **koisom* or **koisōm*, formed exactly like **toisŏm* Skt. *téṣām* or **kʷoisŏm* Skt. *kéṣām*. I therefore suggest

[16] The demonstrative pronouns generally bear the brunt of the distinction between the genders and numbers where such distinctions are necessary.

[17] Hitt. *ns* before a vowel becomes *nts*, written *nz*. Cf. Sturtevant, p. 134.

that the first *n* is a product of nasal anticipation of the final *-n*.[18] If this is the case, Hitt. *kenzan* and the like are another witness for the IE age of genitives like **toisōm* and at the same time, by suggesting the origin of the ending from the particle **som* Hitt. *san*, afford an explanation for this otherwise anomalous form, for it suggests that the IE pronominal *-sōm* or *-som*, as opposed to the nominal ending *-ōm* or *-om*, had at first nothing to do with the latter but was associated with it because of accidental similarity.

The declension of *apas* "ille" is almost exactly parallel to that of *kas* and undoubtedly patterned after it. The only exception is the regular nom. acc. neut. *apat* as opposed to the irregular *ki* of *kas*. In view of the explanation offered above for the latter, we may assume that an original **kat* which was lost later had been the pattern for *apat*.

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[18] I have suggested a similar nasal anticipation for *henkan* "fate, death, pestilence" < **oikom*, cf. Gr. *οἶκτος* "grief." See *Lang.*, X, p. 314.

THE EPICUREAN DOCTRINE OF GRATITUDE.

That Epicurus left specific teaching on the topic of gratitude is manifest from the surviving titles of his writings, from the extant remains, and from quotations recognizable in the writings of other authors. It is also evident that he treated the topic with reference to (1) the gods, (2) Nature, (3) those who guide the disciple in the path of wisdom, (4) friendship and friends, (5) present time, and (6) past blessings, the recollection of which is (*a*) a preserver of youthfulness, (*b*) an inalienable treasure, and (*c*) a healing reagent in time of misfortune. The topic will be discussed here in the above-given order.

No Gratitude Due to the Gods.

This is set forth in the first of the Principal Doctrines: "The blessed and immortal nature neither experiences vexation itself nor occasions it in another, that is to say, it is not susceptible of feelings of either anger or gratitude, for all such emotions are incidental to weakness."[1] This characterization of the gods is condensed to the single adjective *securus* in Horace, *Sat.* i, 5, 101-3:

> namque deos didici securum agere aevum,
> nec, si quid miri faciat natura, deos id
> tristis ex alto caeli demittere tecto.

Since *tristis* here means "angry," it may be inferred, on the principle of one for two, that *securum* signifies "immune from anger or gratitude." It follows that this is the interpretation placed by Horace upon his source, Lucretius, v, 82:

> nam bene qui didicere deos securum agere aevom.

This doctrine, that men need neither fear the anger of the gods nor owe them gratitude for favors conferred, is, of course, the first part of the "fourfold remedy" (τετραφάρμακος) of Epicurus. In his system this is a negative element; the positive

[1] References are to the text of Bailey, *Epicurus*, Oxford, 1926, though I am not always employing his beautiful translation, because it sometimes obscures allusions to specific doctrines: for example, in this instance οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι is rendered "by anger or favor," where χάρισι means "feelings of gratitude."

element consists of the obligation to cultivate gratitude toward Nature and friends. The two elements are reciprocal to each other.

Gratitude to Nature.

Gratitude to Nature is enjoined in Frag. 67: "Gratitude must be vouchsafed to blessed Nature because she has made the essential things easy to procure and those things that are hard to procure non-essentials."

Since Nature, though possessed of activity, is not possessed of volition, and consequently is incapable of either malicious or benevolent feelings, Epicurus is guilty of a certain inconsistency in enjoining gratitude to her and thus personifying her. This would have caused him little concern, however, because he aimed to employ language that would be readily understood and would appeal to mankind.[2] He repeats this offence of inconsistency in enjoining obedience to Nature as to one who is ready and willing to guide men in the path of wisdom: "We must not do violence to nature but obey her."[3] That she is a teacher is assumed in another passage: "She teaches us to regard as things of less moment the pranks of Fortune."[4] Again, when the body suffers, the soul cries out and Nature "passes the word along" that certain wants must be satisfied.[5]

This conception of Nature as a kindly, friendly power, urging men to be wise, is particularly manifest in the Odes of Horace, who often reproduces the spirit of Epicurean ethics more faithfully than Lucretius. It must be recognized, however, that it is not the way of Horace to state expressly his belief but to exemplify it. Sestius is to be reminded that the constant imminence of death forbids us to hope for length of life.[6] Plancus is to be encouraged by the knowledge that fair weather follows foul.[7] Winter bids us make merry within doors.[8] The friendly shade and the babbling water invite us to enjoy life while we have it.[9] Valgius is reminded that the aspect of Nature is not always austere.[10] Nature advises us to be happy while we may.[11]

[2] H. Usener, *Epicurus*, pp. 88-90 (Teubner, Leipzig, 1887).
[3] *Vatican Collection*, xxi.
[4] *Frag.* 77.
[5] *Frag.* 44.
[6] *Odes* i, 4, 14-15.
[7] *Ibid.* i, 7, 15-19.
[8] *Ibid.* i, 9.
[9] *Ibid.* ii, 3, 9-19.
[10] *Ibid.* ii, 9, 1-8.
[11] *Ibid.* ii, 11, 9-17.

Torquatus is reminded that the circle of change in Nature is eternal but human life is brief.[12] Nature, again, is a stern mistress, bending us to her way: "drive her out with a pitchfork, she will return again and again."[13]

Lucretius, in general, leans far more to veneration than to gratitude. In the apostrophe to Venus which forms the prologue of his poem we recognize a Romanized Φύσις, *Aeneadum genetrix*, where adoration is mingled with patriotic sentiment, but gratitude is not manifest. This is true enough in spirit to later, but not to primitive, Epicureanism. The strictly proper attitude would have been one of gratitude to Nature as a kindly, coöperative, and admonitory power.

Gratitude for Guidance in the Path of Wisdom.

Under this heading it is more correct to speak of gratitude for "guidance" than for "instruction," because the founder was regarded in the light of a pathfinder who blazed a way for his followers. Lucretius is therefore speaking by the book when he writes of "treading in his footsteps."[14] Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus were denominated among later Epicureans as καθηγεμόνες and subordinate leaders were called καθηγηταί.[15] The word "teacher" is almost unknown in Epicurean writings.

That all contributions of money were placed upon a voluntary basis in Epicurean circles is rendered certain by the following statement:[16] "(Diocles says) that Epicurus did not require his disciples to deposit their possessions in a common treasury, unlike Pythagoras, who used to say κοινὰ τὰ φίλων; for such a procedure was for those who lacked faith in one another, and, if for such, then it was not for friends." In the will of Epicurus there is also mention of "contributions."[17] From this principle it may be inferred that offerings of money were actuated by gratitude, and this deduction is justified by a passage in Philo-

[12] *Ibid.* iv, 7, 1-16.

[13] *Ep.* i, 10, 24. Cicero is talking Epicureanism when he enjoins gratitude to old age: *de Senec.* xii, 42; xiv, 46; cf. i, 5, where he apotheosizes Nature as a wise and benevolent planner.

[14] v, 55.

[15] Philodemus, *de Ira* xlv, 1-14 (C. Wilke, Teubner, 1914); *Index to Philodemus, περὶ παρρησίας* (A. Olivieri, Teubner, 1914).

[16] *Vita*, 11.

[17] *Ibid.* 18; 20.

demus' epitome of Zeno's essay περὶ παρρησίας, which invites us to believe that disciples of Epicurus contributed fees on the basis of gratitude for guidance in the path of wisdom.[18] In two other passages of the same epitome the hope is expressed that disciples will take correction kindly and feel gratitude to their leaders for guidance in the way of truth.[19]

This general principle may be reduced to a syllogism: Wisdom is the most precious of all treasures; it is the philosopher who guides the footsteps of his disciples in the path of wisdom; therefore the disciple owes gratitude to his leader for the greatest of all benefits.

On this point, as often, Lucretius is somewhat heterodox. In his whole poem it is doubtful if a single passage can be found where gratitude to his master is not transcended by veneration. Every reader will recall the opening lines of the fifth book, and especially 8:

deus ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi.

Horace, on the other hand, while lacking the fervor of Lucretius, is more true in sentiment. If we may read *Epistle* i, 6 at its face value, the poet's reaction toward his father's guidance is preëminently gratitude, lines 87-88:

at hoc nunc
laus illi debetur et a me gratia maior.

Confirmation of this interpretation may be found in another passage, where an exquisite Horatian joke will miss fire unless the reader is aware of the Epicurean doctrine of gratitude:[20] "Damasippus," he writes, "for your sound advice may gods and goddesses reward you—with a shave and a haircut." This more precise understanding of Epicurean ethics, as contrasted with the attitude of Lucretius, who cared more for the physical theory, was possibly due to the familiarity of Horace with the writings of the contemporary Philodemus and his school.

Gratitude for the Possession of Friendship.

Under this heading it must be noted that a certain refinement of doctrine enters into the teachings of Epicurus and that

[18] Philodemus, *op. vit.*, *frag.* 55.
[19] *Ibid. frags.* x[b], xiv[b].
[20] *Sat.* ii, 3, 16-17.

gratitude for the possession of friends is deemed an essential of happiness quite apart from gratitude to friends for specific benefactions. This distinction is not expressly stated in any extant passage but may be inferred from the following statement:[21] (Epicurus says) "that the wise man alone will know gratitude, consistently speaking well of his friends, alike when they are present and when they are absent." Horace, who so often displays a genuine community of feeling with Epicurean ethics, discusses this phase of friendship at unusual length in the passage beginning *Absentem qui rodit amicum.*[22] The modern reader would doubtless interpret this as a question of loyalty or disloyalty to friends; the passage quoted above, however, makes it clear that Epicurus would have regarded it as a question of gratitude or the lack of gratitude for the possession of friendship. His logic is made clear from the saying, "Of the blessings that wisdom assembles for the happiness of the well-rounded life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship."[23] If friendship is the most precious of all boons, then, he taught, we ought to be perpetually grateful for the possession of friends and display this gratitude by speaking well of them on all occasions and by defending them when others speak ill of them.

Gratitude to Friends for Benefactions.

Epicurus left an essay entitled περὶ δώρων καὶ χάριτος. Since this topic is discussed at length by Horace in *Epistle* i, 7, addressed to Maecenas, it may be assumed, not without reasonableness, that the drift of Epicurus' doctrine has been there set before us. After depicting the gaucherie of the stupid giver who urges his guest to take liberally of the pears before they are thrown to the pigs, the poet lays down the general principle, 20-21:

> prodigus et stultus donat quae spernit et odit;
> haec seges ingratas tulit et feret omnibus annis.

When Horace says that "this seed-bed has produced a crop of ingrates in the past and will do so for all ages to come," he is certainly taking a metaphor from Epicurus, who wrote:[24]

[21] *Vita*, 118.
[22] *Sat.* i, 4, 81-103.
[23] *Principal Doctrines*, xxvii.
[24] *Vita*, 120b.

"Friendship likewise has its beginnings in a calculation of needs; it is certainly necessary to take the preliminary steps, *for we also plant seed in the ground,* but it perfects itself through reciprocity of favors among those who have attained to the full enjoyment of pleasures."

Now Horace in the epistle mentioned above defines with adequate precision the respective obligations of the giver and the recipient. The generous man who is at the same time wise declares himself ready to help the deserving but is nevertheless aware of the difference between gifts that possess real value and those that do not, 22-23:

> vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus
> nec tamen ignorat quid distent aera lupinis.

The recipient, in turn, is under no obligation to gratitude except in so far as the benefactor bestows his gift with intelligent consideration of the rights and needs of the one who receives it, 24:

> dignum praestabo me etiam pro laude merentis.

He proceeds to make application of these principles by narrating the fable of the foxy little mouse that ate himself full in the grain-bin and by the story of Philippus, who, with misplaced humor, enabled Volteius Mena to become a farmer. If Horace must sacrifice his liberty in order to live on the bounty of Maecenas, then he retires from the contract, because no gratitude is due where true reciprocity of favors ceases. Similarly, Volteius owes no gratitude, because the gift he received was unwisely bestowed. The recipient must be free to preserve his true character and his self-respect.

If this epistle is really, as we believe it is, a Latin sermon based on Epicurus' essay *On gifts and gratitude,* we may draw this conclusion, that wisdom was required alike in bestowing and in accepting a gift and that gratitude was correspondingly delimited. Seneca quotes Epicurus as saying:[25] Nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam. This fits in precisely with our exposition. Furthermore, we may recognize in the relationship that Horace wished to maintain between himself and Maecenas an example of that reciprocity (κοινωνία) of which

[25] *Ep.* 81, 11.

Epicurus spoke, in the passage quoted above, as necessary to the full realization of the pleasure of friendship.

Gratitude for the Gift of the Present Day.

The attitude of Epicurus toward current time is to be deduced in large part from his denial of all prophecy, which is well attested.[26] From this denial it follows that each additional day of life is in the place of a gift to us, as it were, a treasure-trove. Horace expresses this idea very neatly:[27]

> quem fors dierum cumque dabit, lucro
> appone . . .

Specific authority, if needed, for the association of gratitude with this bounty of Fortune has been preserved by Seneca on the express testimony of Epicurus:[28] Stulta vita ingrata est et trepida; tota in futurum fertur. "The life that lacks wisdom is void of gratitude and filled with apprehension; its outlook is entirely toward the future." By converting this negative statement into a positive we arrive at the principle that the wise man is grateful for the gift of each new day and lives in the present. Horace is particularly partial to this doctrine:

> dona praesentis cape laetus horae.[29]
> omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum;
> grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora.[30]
> tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit horam
> grata sume manu . . .[31]

Although the elaboration of this doctrine is not preserved in any of the extant remains of Epicurus, one might venture the conjecture that it found a place in the essay *On choice and avoidance* in the following shape: "Do not try to know the future but make the best possible use of each day as it comes." This is the pattern, at any rate, into which Horace throws the advice to the mythical Leuconoe:[32] Tu ne quaesieris . . . carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero. Moreover, since Epicurus often repeats himself and the doctrine of the future is set forth in the

[26] *Frags.* xxiv; 3; *Vita*, 135; Cicero, *de Div.* i, 3, 5.
[27] *Odes* i, 19, 14-15.
[28] *Ep.* 15, 10.
[29] *Odes* iii, 8, 27.
[30] *Ep.* i, 4, 13-14.
[31] *Ibid.*, i, 11, 22-23.
[32] *Odes* i, 11.

letter to Menoeceus,[33] which is distinctly protreptic in tenor, some exhortation to this frame of mind may have been made in the *Protrepticus*.

Gratitude for Past Blessings.

That the desirability of accumulating a store of grateful recollections is a chief motive for the proper use of each day as it comes is declared in the opening paragraph of the letter to Menoeceus: "Wherefore, both when young and when old, a man must devote himself to philosophy, to the end that while he is growing old he may be young in blessings through gratitude for what has been." That Horace was familiar with this paragraph is evidenced by the faithfulness with which he renders the substance of its content in his epistle to Bullatius.[34]

> Tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit horam
> grata sume manu, neu dulcia differ in annum,
> ut quocumque loco fueris vixisse libenter
> te dicas.

In advocating this principle Epicurus took issue with the traditional ethics of the Greeks and with Solon's advice in particular.[35] His pronouncement is on record: [36] "The adage 'Look to the end of a long life' betrays a lack of gratitude for past blessings." To Epicurus of course, a grateful attitude toward the past was an essential of the happy life. In another passage he sets up the presence or absence of gratitude as a test of old age: [37] "Forgetting the good that has been he has become an old man this very day." Thus the practice of gratitude is a preserver of youthfulness.

A doctrine ancillary to the above is the inalienability of grateful recollections: [38] "The aged man has cast anchor in old age as in a haven, having locked securely in a grateful memory the recollection of previous blessings that he had no right to count upon." Elsewhere Epicurus enjoins the necessity of recognizing that "nothing can render undone what has been done." [39]

[33] *ad Men.*, 127.
[34] *Ep.* i, 11, 22-25.
[35] *Herod.*, i, 32; Sophocles, *O. T.* 1529 (cf. Jebb's notes *ad. loc.*).
[36] *Vat. Coll.*, lxxv.
[37] *Ibid.*, xix.
[38] *Vat. Coll.*, xviii.
[39] *Ibid.*, lv.

Horace, as so often, reproduces with similar feeling and correct understanding this recipe for the insurance of happiness: [40]

non tamen irritum
quodcumque retro est efficiet, neque
diffinget infectumque reddet
quod fugiens semel hora vexit.

A second doctrine subsidiary to the above is the healing effect of the recollection of past pleasures, which is explicitly stated as follows: [41] "One must heal his misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by recognizing that nothing can render undone what has been done." Evidence is available that this sentiment was a commonplace of Epicurean consolation, a branch in which the sect specialized: Cicero, replying to a letter of the Epicurean Lucceius [42] condoling with him on the death of his daughter Tullia, reveals that his correspondent had stressed this point: [43] Das mihi iucundas recordationes conscientiae nostrae rerumque earum quas te in primis auctore gessimus. So Laelius, consoling himself for the death of Scipio, is made to say: [44] Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Cicero here is quoting the detestable Epicurus, with whose ethics he possessed more sympathy than his fancied responsibility to contemporary orthodoxy allowed him to admit.

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[40] *Odes* iii, 29, 45-48.

[41] *Vat. Coll.*, lv.

[42] *ad Fam.* v, 13, 3, end: quamquam tuis monitis praeceptisque omnis est abiciendus dolor. This reveals Lucceius as an Epicurean.

[43] *Ibid.*, v, 13, 4.

[44] *de Amic.* xxvii, 104. Cf. iv, 15 and *de Senec.* iii, 9.

A DECREE OF THE YEAR OF KOROIBOS.[1]

The present text of the decree published as *I. G.*, II², 675 + 525 has presented several difficulties. An attempt is made here to solve these as a result of a new reading for the name of the secretary.

The inscription *I. G.*, II², 525, which J. Kirchner in the *editio minor* had assigned to the end of the fourth century, was shown by A. Wilhelm to belong with the four fragments published as *I. G.*, II², 675.[2] All of these five fragments have been restored on the basis of well-known formulae with a stoichedon arrangement of 42 letters with the exception of fragment *a* of *I. G.*, II², 675. This fragment contains the prescript. In consequence of the reading Μυρρ]*ινούσιος* for the secretary's demotic, it was restored with 43 letters and assigned to the year of the archonship of Glaukippos II, which is now dated in 275/4. But it may be clearly seen on the squeeze that the part of the letter preceding the nu of _ _ _ *νούσιος* is not an iota, but the right part of a mu. The upright bar has a perceptible slant and for an iota would be out of alignment with the preceding and following lines. The demotic, then, is Ῥα]*μνούσιος*. The secretary must be restored as Πάμφιλος Θεογείτονος Ῥαμνούσιος, and the decree must be assigned to the year 306/5, the archonship of Koroibos. This permits frag. *a* to have a congruent stoichedon arrangement of 42 letters. Consequently, since Demetrias is known to have held the seventh prytany (*I. G.*, II², 470; *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 5) and Akamantis the eleventh (*I. G.*, II², 1492 B), either Pandionis or Antigonis must be restored in line 1 of the *editio minor's* text as the eighth prytanizing tribe of this year.[3] Furthermore, the only calendar equation which will accord with the two previously known equations of this year, [Γαμηλιῶνος *ἕνηι καὶ*

[1] In the preparation of this paper, the writer has received many suggestions from Professor B. D. Meritt, who has also confirmed the reading of the squeezes.

[2] *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXIX (1914), p. 266; cf. *addenda* to *I. G.*, II², 675.

[3] Kirchner (*Rh. Mus.*, LIX [1904], p. 298 and his note on *I. G.*, II², 1492 B, line 95) and Dittenberger (*S. I. G.*³, 334, note 2) have both concluded on the basis of the evidence in *I. G.*, II², 1492 B, lines 95-96, that Antigonis held the ninth prytany. However, Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 447) appears to have refuted this by demonstrating that it would make Amphitrope the only deme of Antigonis to be culled from any of the last five original tribes.

νέαι], ἐβδόμη[ι καὶ εἰκοστῆι τῆς πρυτανείαι]ς (*I. G.*, II², 470) and Μουνυχιῶνος ἕνει καὶ νέαι ἐμβολίμωι, ἐνάτει καὶ εἰκοστεῖ τῆς πρυτανείας (*I. G.*, II², 471; cf. *I. G.* II², 472), is [Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ὀγδόει ἐπὶ δ]έκα, ἕκτει [καὶ δεκάτει τῆς πρυτανείας]. This conforms to the calendar scheme given in Dinsmoor's *Archons*, p. 430, and to the evidence presented by him that, according to the Metonic system, Mounichion of the year 306/5 required an intercalary day, although it followed a full Elaphebolion.[4]

The calendar of this year, therefore, may be reconstructed as follows:

Pryt. I	30		Hekatombaion	30
Pryt. II	30		Metageitnion	29
Pryt. III	30		Boedromion	30
Pryt. IV	30		Pyanopsion	29
Pryt. V	30		Maimakterion	30
Pryt. VI	30	Erechtheis or Kekropis[5]	Posideon	29
Pryt. VII	29	Demetrias	Gamelion	30
	Pryt. VII, 27 = Gamelion 30			
Pryt. VIII	29	Pandionis or Antigonis	Anthesterion	29
	Pryt. VIII, 16 = Anthesterion 18			
Pryt. IX	29		Elaphebolion	30
Pryt. X	29	Oineis	Mounichion	30
	Pryt. X, 29 = Mounichion 30			
Pryt. XI	29	Akamantis	Thargelion	29
Pryt. XII	30	Antiochis	Skirophorion	30

The year of Glaukippos, from which *I. G.*, II², 675 has been removed, remains an intercalary year, although it must be mentioned that Dinsmoor does not consider the evidence conclusive.[6] In the decree *I. G.*, II², 676 of this year, Prytany XII, 23 is equated with Skirophorion 21. This makes the last prytany have 32 days, the regular length of prytanies in intercalary years, and the evidence is conclusive unless one assumes irregularities.

Further changes in the present text of *I. G.*, II², 675 + 525

[4] Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 387-88.

[5] These are the only two prytanies which may be restored in the inscription *I. G.*, II², 773, which has been assigned to the sixth prytany of this year by Dow, *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 415-16.

[6] Dinsmoor, *Archons*, p. 393.

must be made as a result of an examination of the squeezes of the various fragments. In fragment *a* of *I. G.*, II², 675, there is an iota above the eta of ὀγδόης. This is the final letter of the superscription [θεο]ῖ. Fragment *b* of *I. G.*, II², 675, containing the probouleuma-formula which normally is inscribed after the prescript and motive-formula, must be shifted farther to the right, for the lettering at the beginning of the preserved portion of line 4 is close and not quite stoichedon. The new position allows more space at the left for the insertion of an extra letter to explain the compensating crowding. This line should be restored with 43 letters, and indeed the restoration of the usual formula (reading περὶ τούτων instead of περὶ αὐτῶν as in the *Corpus*) demands the longer line.[7] In line 4 of fragment *d* the space to the left of δοῦναι is vacant, and this, in turn, is preceded by an iota. The restoration of the ἐφόδια-formula, as given in the text below, seems preferable to that in the *editio minor*, since . . . δραχμὰς is placed in its regular position after the subject and adjacent to the phrase ἐκ τῶν εἰς τὰ κατὰ ψηφίσματα ἀναλισκομένων τῶι δήμωι.[8] For τῶν αἱρεθέντων in line 5, compare *I. G.*, II², 264, 360, and 555. The number of drachmae for ἐφόδια is tentatively restored as ϷΔΔ, whereas ΔΔΔ is inserted for the sum for the erection of the stele, in accord with analogous readings on the stone in *I. G.*, II², 116, 124, and 360. In *I. G.*, II², 525, the omicron in line 7 is followed by a pi, not a gamma, and is preceded by a vacant space, which, in turn, is preceded by an iota. Since the stele broadened slightly as it neared the base, the relative position of the fragments from top to bottom may be determined. In fragment *a*, from the end of the inscribed portion to the right margin, there is approximately 0.014 m.; in *I. G.*, II², 525, there is 0.02 m.; and in fragment *d* near the base there is 0.023 m.

This new date for the decree also removes a difficulty concerning the "treasurer of the demos." This official relinquished his office in 303 B. C. and, with the exception of a momentary return to power in 301 B. C., is never alluded to later as a disbursing officer.[9] Hence, Dinsmoor changed the phrase τὸν ταμίαν τοῦ

[7] See the examples listed in Larfeld's *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik*, pp. 669-71, in which τούτων is far more frequent.

[8] See Larfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 691-92.

[9] Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 1005 and Dinsmoor, *Archons*, p. 64.

δήμου, restored in line 6 of *I. G.*, II², 525, to τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆι διοικήσει,[10] but left unexplained the words τὸν ταμίαν τοῦ which are on the stone in line 6 of fragment *d*. Concerning these latter words, Kirchner had remarked, "6 in. cum Koehlero suspiceris supplendum esse δήμου; sed quaestor populi ab hac aetate alienus est." The assignment of the decree to the year 306/5 requires the restoration of the "treasurer of the demos" in both places. Other difficulties, pointed out by A. C. Johnson (*Cl. Phil.*, IX [1914], pp. 430-31), who objected to a third century date for *I. G.*, II², 675, are also removed.

The following text is proposed:

I. G., II², 675 + 525.

306/5 B. C. Στοιχ. 42

(*I. G.*, II², 675, frag. *a*)

[Θ ε ο] ι

[Ἐπὶ Κοροίβου ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Παν-/Αντιγ]ονίδ[ος ὀγδόης
[πρυτανείας ἧι Πάμφιλος Θεογείτονος Ῥα]μνούσιος ἐ-
[γραμμάτευεν· Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ὀγδόει ἐπὶ δ]έκα, ἕκτει
[καὶ δεκάτει τῆς πρυτανείας· ἐκκλησία κυρία]· τῶν π[ρο]-
[έδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν----------]

(frag. *b*)

---------- μοι .....[18].....
[δεδόχθαι τεῖ βουλεῖ τοὺς προ]έδρους ο[ἵτινες ἂν τυγ]-
[χάνωσιν προεδρεύοντες ε]ἰς τὴν πρώτην ἐ[κκλησίαν χ]-
[ρηματίσαι περὶ τούτων, γνώ]μην δὲ ξυμβάλλ[εσθαι τῆς β]-
[ουλῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον ὅτι δοκε]ῖ τεῖ βουλε[ῖ· ....[9]....]

(*I. G.*, II², 525)

[---------- ἀναγρ]άψαι δὲ τόδε [τὸ ψή]-
[φισμα τὸν γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ πρ]υτανείαν ἐν στήλε[ι]
[λιθίνει καὶ στῆσαι ἐν ἀκροπόλε]ι πλησίον τῆς στήλ[η]-
[ς ἐν ἧι γέγραπται τὸ ψήφισμα ὃ τοῖς] προγόνοις αὐτῶν
[ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγρα]φὴν τῆς στήλης
[δοῦναι τὸν ταμίαν τοῦ δήμου ΔΔΔ δραχμὰ]ς ἐκ τῶν εἰς τ-

[10] Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 64, note 4.

[ὰ κατὰ ψηφίσματα ἀναλισκομένων τῶι δήμω]ι. ᵛ ὅπ[ως ἂν]
[οὖν ----------]

(fragments *c* and *d*)

---καὶ εἰς τ-
---αις δωρεαῖς τω-
---πρέσβεις καὶ ἀλ-
---ι. ᵛ δοῦναι δὲ ἐφόδ-
[ια τῶν αἱρεθέντων πρ]έσβε[ων ἑκάστ]ωι τὸν ταμίαν τοῦ
[δήμου ᵛΔΔ δραχμὰς] ἐκ τῶν εἰς τ[ὰ κατὰ] ψηφίσματα ἀναλ-
[ισκομένων τῶι δή]μωι. *vacat*
vacat

No effort has been made to restore the first lines of fragments *c* and *d*, but a suggestion may be offered as to their probable content. Diodorus narrates, after his account of the entry into Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes in the year 307/6, that Antigonus sent grain and timber to Athens: *Ἀντίγονος δέ, παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀθήνηθεν πρεσβευτῶν καὶ τό τε περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἀναδόντων ψήφισμα καὶ περὶ σίτου καὶ ξύλων εἰς ναυπηγίαν διαλεχθέντων, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς πυροῦ μὲν μεδίμνων πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας, ὕλην δὲ τὴν ἱκανὴν ναυσὶν ἑκατόν.*[11] This gift must have been made in the autumn of 307,[12] since thirty quadriremes were ready for action when Demetrius sailed for Cyprus in the spring of 306.[13] Similarly, our fragments *c* and *d*, dated in the eighth prytany and containing the words δωρεαῖς and πρέσβεις, may be conjectured to refer to the despatch of an embassy to Antigonus in the eighth prytany of 306/5. Then, in *I. G.*, II², 1492 B, lines 97-102, we have the name of one of the ambassadors, Xenokles of Sphettos, and a record of the successful return of the embassy to Athens in the tenth prytany with a gift from Antigonus of one hundred and forty talents.

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[11] Diodorus, XX, 46, 4.

[12] The time required for the events narrated by Diodorus may be used as an argument in favor of an entry into Athens by Demetrius early in the year 307/6, but the problem of the year of Anaxikrates is not a part of this paper.

[13] Diodorus, XX, 50, 3. See Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, p. 112 and Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*,² IV, 1, pp. 152-53.

Τὰ ἐπίθετα.

Ephialtes' reform of the Areopagus is described by Aristotle (*Aθ. Πολ.*, 25, 2) in language which is, *prima facie* at least very strange: [Ἐφιάλτης] . . . *τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ Κόνωνος ἄρχοντος ἅπαντα περιείλετο τὰ ἐπίθετα δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς πεντακοσίοις τὰ δὲ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀπέδωκεν.* *ἐπίθετα* means not merely "privileges"[1] but "additional privileges,"[2] i. e., "privileges" not originally but subsequently obtaining to the Areopagus, probably during its seventeen year hegemony[3] after the Persian Wars. The Etymologicum Magnum (*s. v. ἐπίθετα*) defines *τὰ ἐπίθετα* as *τὰ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῇ βουλῇ προστεταγμένα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ προστεθέντα*, and we know from Harpocration[4] that *τὰ ἐπίθετα* is the equivalent for *τὰ μὴ πάτρια ὄντα*. But, if this is what *τὰ ἐπίθετα* means in this passage, it seems to involve Aristotle in a twofold contradiction: firstly with himself; and secondly, with our other authorities for the period, viz., Diodorus and Plutarch. For elsewhere Aristotle ascribes the power of *νομοφυλακία* to the Solonian, Draconian, and perhaps even pre-Draconian Areopagus;[5] and, in describing the work of the Thirty,[6] he implies that Ephialtes attacked the *πάτριος πολιτεία*. Similarly Plutarch (*Cim.*, 15) says that Ephialtes destroyed *τὰ πάτρια νόμιμα* and Diodorus (xi, 77, 6) amplifies this to *τὰ πάτρια καὶ περιβόητα νόμιμα*.

An attempt has been made to escape these contradictions by an explanation widely propagated by our master authorities, Busolt and Swoboda, and generally accepted[7] by everyone who

[1] cf. Bonner, R. J. and Smith, G., *Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*; Chicago, 1930, p. 257.

[2] Sandys, Sir J. E., ed. *Aθ. Πολ.*, London, 1912, p. 107 on chap. 25.

[3] *Aθ. Πολ.*, 25, 1; 41, 2.

[4] *s. v. ἐπιθέτους ἑορτάς*; cf. Isoc., *Areop.*, 7, 29.

[5] *Aθ. Πολ.*, 8, 4; 4, 4; 3, 6.

[6] *Ibid.* 35, 2.

[7] E. g. Koehler, *Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1892, p. 344; Lipsius, *Das attische Recht* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 34; Sanctis, G. de, *Atthis*, p. 423: 'uno scrittore democratico.' Loegdberg, L. E., *Animadversiones de Aotione Paranomon* (Upsala, 1898), p. 52, gives a clear account of the position.

has felt the gravity of the contradiction.[8] The explanation is a simple one, viz., that τὰ ἐπίθετα is a "tendenziöse demokratische Auffassung"[9] of an Atthid source which aimed to spread the soothing belief, "ut ἐπίθετα tantum non patria iura eripi Areopago iis viderentur." If there are contradictions in the text, the reason, it is said, is obvious: "Apparet igitur diversis fontibus Aristotelem usum esse."[10] In other words, we are asked to believe that Ephialtes actually did subvert τὰ πάτρια νόμιμα, with the notorious exception of its jurisdiction in homicide cases; but he did it, we are told, under the guise of attacking τὰ μὴ πάτρια ὄντα, i. e. τὰ ἐπίθετα.

It seems to me that there are at least three imperfections inherent in this explanation: (1) it fails to explain why Ephialtes' reform, if it was *altogether* an attack on the πάτριος πολιτεία, did not strike at the very heart of τὰ πάτρια, viz., the Areopagus' jurisdiction in cases involving φόνος, ἀσέβεια, and πυρκαϊά. (2) A second imperfection in the ordinary explanation of τὰ ἐπίθετα is this: as an argument, "fontibus diversis uti" is extremely weak; it may explain away contradictions, but it is altogether too facile a weapon in scholastic disputes. (3) The most serious trouble with the explanation we are considering is the difficulty it leaves for certain prevailing theories of what νομοφυλακία is. And although the proponents of these theories have not noticed it as yet, this is exactly where the explanation falls short of solving all the difficulties in the passage. What these views have in common is the fact that they represent νομοφυλακία as a particular or special rather than a general power.

These views are currently set forth in English[11] by Mr. Wade-

[8] In my opinion, a better way of explaining away the contradiction would involve a reference to the distinction between νόμος and φύσις, put neatly by Antiphon, *Οω. Pap.* XI, 1364, pp. 96 ff.: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἐπίθετα, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἀναγκαῖα; on this view all νόμοι concern only τὰ ἐπίθετα and, from a legal point of view, there is no contradiction between τὰ πάτρια and τὰ ἐπίθετα. But the Sophistic distinction is not one that Aristotle accepts: cf. *Rhet.* I, x, 1368 b 7 for νόμος κοινός as κατὰ φύσιν.

[9] *Griechische Staatskunde*, pp. 94, n. 1; 797, n. 2; 894, n. 4.

[10] Loegdberg, *loc. cit.*

[11] Cf. Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.*, for what I believe is a similar view. Although Miss Smith is a little confused on the subject, this, I think, is her genuine belief. In discussing 'Αθ. Πολ., 25, 2 she is driven (p.

Gery in his article [12] on the Demotionidae inscription. He tells us that the Areopagites were a "court of law and gave judgments: at first out of their own breasts; and then, when Statute Law began they became 'Guardians of the Laws' and kept and controlled the Statute Book. . . . They continued until Ephialtes to give judgment in law suits and to have the last word, as legal experts, in admitting Statutes to the Statute Book."

But if *νομοφυλακία* is a *particular* power, it cannot be identical with *τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή* of chapter 25, 2, for the language used there shows plainly that a *general* power is meant: *τὰ ἐπίθετα δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή, τὰ μέν . . . τὰ δέ.*[13] If, on the other hand, *νομοφυλακία* is identical with *τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή*, it cannot be a *particular* power. We are therefore faced with the necessity of denying either the identity of *νομοφυλακία* of chapter 4, 4 with *τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή* of chapter 25, 2, or the truth of the "particularist" view as stated by Mr. Wade-Gery.

The latter course would be a most difficult one to take: it would involve disputing our most eminent authorities and rejecting our only clue [14] as to the "Inhalt" of *νομοφυλακία*. It is true that that clue comes from the most suspicious chapter of the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, but there seems to be no good reason for casting it into the refuse basket along with the "reforms of Draco." The weakest point in Mr. Wade-Gery's case is that it rests upon

257) to call *τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή* a "*general* oversight of the constitution"; but in discussing *νομοφυλακία*, she refers (p. 262) to *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 4, 4 and defines *νομοφυλακία* as "*simply* the duty of watching the magistrates and insuring that their administrations should be entirely in accord with the laws." (The italics are mine.)

[12] *Class. Quart.*, XXV (1931), p. 140.

[13] I have heard it suggested at Oxford that *δι' ὧν* means "among which," but it is clearly impossible Greek, even Aristotelian Greek, to make *δι' ὧν* equivalent to *ἐν οἷς*. *δι' ὧν* is "through which" and expresses almost an idea of means, as though the verb were *ἐγένετο* rather than *ἦν*. I don't think that there is any rescue from the difficulty in this direction.

[14] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 262. Note the language used of *νομοφύλακες*: Philochorus, fr. 141 a; 141 b: *τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἠνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι.* Cf. Harp., *s. v. νομοφύλακες* and Suidas, *s. v. νομοφύλακες*. Pollux, 8, 94 makes them sit in the ecclesia, *ὅπως διακωλύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν ὅσα μὴ συμφέρει*; cf. Phot., *s. v. οἱ νομοφύλακες*. Cicero, *Leg.* III, 20 translates *νομοφυλακία* as "custodia legum"; cf. Columella, XII, 3 for *νομοφύλακες* as "custodes legum." See too Gronovius' *Thes. Graec. Ant.* v, 2574 F, 2108 E, and the *Thes. Ling. Graec., s. v. νομοφύλαξ*.

a very shaky distinction between νόμος and ψήφισμα,[15] but in using νόμος as "Statute" he has the valuable agreement of Vinogradoff[16] and Schreiner.[17] It seems to me that the best support for his view is a statement of Harpocration (*s. v.* ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος) which he himself does not quote: τοὺς ἄξονας καὶ τοὺς κύρβεις ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν μετέστησεν Ἐφιάλτης ὥς φασιν Ἀναξιμένης ἐν Φιλιππικοῖς. This passage shows that νομοφυλακία, if this is what Ephialtes destroyed, was really connected, no doubt essentially, with a stewardship of the books. I do not think that as yet we have sufficient evidence to refute Mr. Wade-Gery, even if that were desirable. Consequently, we are obliged to take the alternative of denying the identity of νομοφυλακία and τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή.[18] And there are at least two ways in which we can do this.

We might suggest that νομοφυλακία was not a static but a developing conception; that it did not always mean the same thing; and that the differences in meaning merely represent different stages of its development. This would allow us to say that the power, which is ascribed to the Areopagus under the early constitution, was not a "fixed idea"; and that it is both wrong and unnecessary to identify it with the powers of which Ephialtes stripped the Areopagus in 462 B. C. Originally, we might hold, this power was particular; later, it became general.

But there are, I believe, serious objections to this suggestion of evolution. In the first place, its acceptance demands a drastic modification of the "particularist" theories; it will make those theories applicable only to the early period. This, it seems to me, is an unwarranted modification; not only does it rob those theories of much of their value, but it also contradicts what little

[15] *Vide* Keil in Gercke and Norden's *Einleitung*, ed. 2 (Leipzig/Berlin, 1914), vol. III, p. 380; Schultess, O., in Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.*, VII, p. 1723; and Brillant, M., *Les Secrétaires Athéniens* (Paris, 1911), p. 102; and the comment of the editor on *IG*, I suppl. 1 a, p. 57. The formal distinctions made by Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* V, x, 1137 b), Demosthenes (XX, 92) and Xenophon (*Mem.*, I, 2, 41 ff.) are not substantiated by epigraphic evidence (*vide CIA* II, 331, 465, and 467, and the comments of Tarbell, F. B., in *A. J. P.*, X [1889], p. 79.)

[16] *Historical Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1922), vol. II, pp. 74, 129 ff.

[17] *De Corpore iuris Ath.* (Diss. Bonn, 1913), p. 12.

[18] The two powers are still differentiated at the time of the Thirty; cf. Pollux, VIII, 112 for ἐπιμεληταὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῶν νόμων.

we know about *νομοφυλακία*. For the statement of Anaximenes implies that it was a particular power, viz., the keeping of the Books, which Ephialtes destroyed. Moreover, if there was a development, it must have been inverse to that suggested, i. e., not from particular to general but from general to particular; for certainly the language of the early chapters, exclusive of the solitary clause in 4, 4, implies generality quite as much as the phraseology of 25, 2. But to my mind the most grievous objection to what we might call the "stage" theory is the fact that it will be forced to endorse the view that *τὰ ἐπίθετα* is only a "tendenziöse demokratische Auffassung"; for *νομοφυλακία* at any stage of a possible development could scarcely be called "accretions."

It seems to me most important to take *τὰ ἐπίθετα* at its face value; but if we do take a firm stand and avoid trying to explain away the ordinary meaning of *τὰ ἐπίθετα*, we are obliged, in abandoning utterly any identity between *νομοφυλακία* and *τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή*, to explain what the latter term means, if it does not mean a "guardianship of the constitution."

My suspicion is that we have been misled in our interpretation of the passage in 25, 2 by a mistranslation of *πολιτεία*. Mr. Wade-Gery, in discussing the reforms of Cleisthenes, has recently pointed out[19] the ambiguity resident in this word: it means either *res publica* or *civitas*. We ought to remember, however, that to the Greek mind it must have been not so much "ambiguous" as what the Germans call *doppeldeutig*: it meant not either *res publica* or *civitas* but probably both. For the Romans and for us, however, it is "ambiguous," because we have no word in Latin or in English which will adequately translate its full meaning. So whenever we encounter the word *πολιτεία*, we are faced with the necessity of deciding which meaning is uppermost.

The meaning of *πολιτεία* in 25, 2 should be determined, not by our pre-conceived notions of what Ephialtes did, but by the context of the passage; and we should not restrict ourselves to

[19] *Class. Quart.*, XXVII (1933), p. 25 with n. 1. I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Wade-Gery's interpretation of *πολιτεία* in *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 20, 1; for *πολιτεία* with any form of *δίδωμι* or its compounds regularly means "citizenship"; cf. *OIA* II, 395, etc.; Michel, *RIG*, 19; 366-8; Xen., *Hist. Graec.* I, 2, 10.

chapter 25, but we should examine too the wider context of chapters 23, 24, and 26. If we do this I think there is no doubt at all as to what πολιτεία means for us in 25, 2. In chapter 23, 1 we are told that the Areopagus regained its hegemony διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίας αἰτία; the στρατηγοί were unable to find money, and the Areopagus came forward with eight drachmae for each man. These statements, of course, have been suspected on the ground [20] that the Athenians could not have been such cads as to demand pay in a crisis; but I think we may reasonably overlook this objection until we have more information about the nobility of the Athenian soldiery. Granting that what Aristotle says is true, his statement carries an assumption which, to my knowledge, has never been observed by commentators: namely this that, if the Areopagus knew that it had eight drachmae for each man, it must have known how many men there were. In other words, the *viritim* distribution presupposes a knowledge of the number of men eligible for service. How the Areopagus would have obtained this knowledge is clear from reading ahead into chapter 26, 1 where Aristotle supports the frequent testimony of Thucydides [21] that campaigns were conducted by conscriptions made ἐκ καταλόγου. The language of 23, 1 implies that the Areopagus actually administered the salaries itself; it did not merely supply the generals with money to distribute. The reasonable conclusion is, I believe, that the στρατηγοί turned over to the Areopagus the κατάλογος, the conscription lists.[22] Moreover, whatever the relation [23] of the κατάλογος to the πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικός, it seems highly probable that, at a time so critical, the κατάλογος would have been closely checked with the πίναξ. Now if the κατάλογος and the πίναξ were

[20] Cf. Walker in *CAH*, vol. V, n. 5, pp. 473, 474.

[21] VI, 43; VII, 16, 20; VIII, 24.

[22] The κατάλογος did not, of course, include the Thetes who served in the Athenian fleet at Salamis; but ἑκάστῳ in 23, 1 may mean only "each citizen." In any case, the refusal to fight was not confined to the Thetes.

[23] *Vide Diet. des Ant.*, *s. v.* Dilectus, pp. 206-212. At least Suidas, *s. v.* κατάλογος, and the Scholiast on Arist., *Eq.*, 1380 call the κατάλογος a πίναξ. Moreover, the customary census requirements for citizenship in all Greek states (Arist., *Pol.*, 1279 b 4, 1329 a 10; Walker, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* [Oxford, 1913], p. 146) must always have kept the civil registers closely dependent on military lists. Cf. Gilbert, *Greek Const. Ant.* (N. Y., 1895), p. 316.

both carried to the hill of Areopagus, the Areopagus had in its power the chief[24] citizenship registers. My opinion is that this actually happened; that the Areopagus, once in possession of these books and realizing their importance, kept them and, through keeping them, got control of admissions to citizenship. And, in considering pleas for admission, it probably built up for itself a judicial authority around the administrative power, since it was essentially a court of justice. We should compare closely Plato, *Laws*, 754d, where *νομοφύλακες* are keepers of the census lists: *πρῶτον μὲν φύλακες ἑστωσαν τῶν νόμων, ἔπειτα τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἀπογράφῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὸ πλῆθος τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, κτλ.*

I should like next to consider chapter 24. We are told in paragraph 1 that, with money rolling into Athens, Aristides recommended a movement of people from the country to the city; and that such a movement occurred, perhaps on so great a scale that we might venture a comparison to the movement of provincials into London during the Industrial Revolution. Administering the new Confederacy was a big task; more than 20,000 men, we are told (24, 3), were "nourished" (*τρέφεσθαι*) in the civil service. Eager for some of this "nourishment" (*τροφή*), the country people came to Athens and clamoured for eligibility to procure it. And (25, 1) as the "crowd" increased, *αὐξανομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους*, Ephialtes came forward as a champion of the people, *τοῦ δήμου προστάτης*; he had a reputation for being honest and, above all, "right about the *civitas*," *δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*. After conducting suits against individual members of the Areopagus he removed from the council itself "all the accretions," *ἅπαντα τὰ ἐπίθετα*, which constituted its "guardian power of citizenship,"[25] *ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή*. Of these "accretions," he "gave back," *ἀπέδωκεν*,[26] some, *τὰ μέν*, to the Council of 500,

[24] I. e. the *κατάλογος* and the *πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικός*; not of course the *φρατορικὸν γραμματεῖον* kept by the phratries, the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* kept by the demes, or the list of *ἔφηβοι*.

[25] *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 25, 2. I. e. its "custodia civitatis" as opposed to its ancient power as "custos rei publicae," *ἐπίσκοπος τῆς πολιτείας*, in 8, 4.

[26] Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 155 is the only commentator of whom I know who brings out the true force of *ἀπέδωκεν*; he translates "restored." If *τὰ ἐπίθετα* were only a "tendenziöse demokratische Auffassung," we should have to translate *ἀπέδωκεν* "give away," instead of "give back"; and that, I think, would be difficult.

and some, τὰ δέ, to the ecclesia and the courts. In other words, he gave back to the στρατηγοί (a "committee" of the βουλή) [27] control of the κατάλογος; to the ecclesia, its administration of the πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικός; and to the courts, judicial authority in cases involving admission to citizenship. The result of these restorations was that the πολιτεία was relaxed, ἀνίεσθαι . . . τὴν πολιτείαν (26, 1) to a point where it had to be limited by legislation (26, 4). Pericles' limitation of the franchise [28] is a direct result of the enfranchisements made possible by Ephialtes' reforms.

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[27] Cf. Hill, *Sources*, p. 205, nrs. 54-56 for the relation of the στρατηγοί to the βουλή.

[28] Ἀθ. Πολ., 26, 4; Ael., *Var. Hist.*, VI, 10; XIII, 24; Suidas, *s. v.* Δημοποιητός.

NOTE ON *PROMETHEUS*, 52.

In a recent number of *The Classical Review* (L [1936], p. 3) the question is raised whether *Pro.* 52 should read with the Mediceus οὔκουν ἐπείξει τῷδε δεσμὰ περιβαλεῖν or δεσμὰ τῷδε with the Aldine. The collocation -δε δε- is very harsh here if the line is read without a pause. That harshness may be sought for its dramatic effect is obvious, and I find a case of δὲ δε- in Menander (*Ep.* 500 Loeb, Cairo frag. Z, line 3) : λόγου δὲ δεῖται ταῦτα καὶ συμπείσεως. Here Smicrines, answering his daughter, whose words are sweet and gentle in rhythm, explodes with a sputtering fury that is as raucous as a machine-gun. The effect is obviously intentional and well illustrates Menander's power of suiting his style to his characters. The line must be delivered rapidly and inharmoniously to bring out the effect.

Now in the line of *Prometheus,* spoken by Kratos, this explanation will not do; the line cannot be read rapidly. In fact Kratos is not represented as speaking in particularly harsh tones. The line can be read rhythmically only by dwelling on τῷδε and pausing expressively after it. If this manner of delivery is appropriate to the thought, then and only then can we justify the reading of the Mediceus. A simple test shows that an expressive pause after τῷδε is exactly what we want. Dramatically this rendering of the line is perfect; the difficulty exists only when the line is read undramatically.

There is abundant evidence that Kratos is addicted to the elementary form of wit that consists in catching up a word of the last speaker and building a retort about it. Note the following echoes in his retorts: δεινόν, δειμαίνεις (39, 41); ὑπερστένω, στένεις (66, 68); ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶ (69, 70); ἐγκέλευε, κελεύσω (72, 73). With such evidence before us we can hardly suppose that the echo τοῖσδε, τῷδε (51, 52) has no significance. This is in fact Kratos' feeblest repartee; without the significant pause it might never be noticed. Punsters in English use the same method of drawing attention to their wit.

I give now the speeches of Hephaestus and Kratos in full with my attempt to translate the point.

Ηφ. ἔγνωκα τοῖσδε—κοὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν ἔχω.
Κρ. οὔκουν ἐπείξει τῷδε—δεσμὰ περιβαλεῖν,
ὡς μή σ' ἑλινύοντα προσδερχθῇ πατήρ;

Hephaestus: "Here is the proof; I can't gainsay it." Kratos: "Here is the man then—that you'd better hurry and chain fast, before your dawdling catches father's eye." As usually happens when an attempt is made to translate the lively qualities of Greek, the result is lacking in dignity. This example is a useful warning that unusual rhythms in Greek drama are often particularly expressive. The whole subject should be investigated.

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AUT REGEM AUT FATUUM

Seneca, *Apocolocyntosis*, 1: ego scio me liberum factum ex quo suum diem obiit ille qui verum proverbium fecerat, aut regem aut fatuum nasci oportere.

The proverb seems to be reasonably explained by Otto's[1] paraphrase of the Greek aphorism quoted by Porphyrio in explaining Horace, *Satires* II, 3, 188, *viz.* μωρῷ καὶ βασιλεῖ νόμος ἄγραφος: "für Könige und Narren giebt es keine Gesetze, sie stehen über ihnen, sind ihnen nicht unterworfen." As one might say in English: "if you can't be a king, be a simpleton; in either case you will be extended a toleration denied to the generality." See Erasmus's *Adagia* (No. 1201) *passim* for a learned and biting commentary on the idea.

But while the meaning is clear enough, the application in this present passage is less so. Otto goes so far as to say: "Seneca hat absichtlich und willkürlich dem Sprichworte einen Sinn untergeschoben, der ihm eigentlich fremd ist." This lacks justification, but it seems to indicate, along with Birt's[2] ⟨*bis*⟩ *verum* and Wachsmuth's[3] ⟨*bifariam*⟩ *verum*, that the bearing of the proverb here is not so obvious as it might at first sight or in casual reading appear to be. The use of *aut* . . . *aut* implies a pair of ideas mutually exclusive on a logical basis, as in Caligula's epigram (Suetonius, *Calig.* 37): aut frugi hominem

[1] A. Otto, *Sprichwörter der Römer* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1890), p. 299.
[2] Th. Birt, *De Senecae Apoc. et Apotheosi lucubratio* (Index Lect. Academicarum, Marburg, 1888).
[3] C. Wachsmuth, *Zu Senecas Apoc.*, Leipziger Studien, 11², p. 337.

esse oportet aut Caesarem. But on the day when Claudius was elevated to the principate, the mutual exclusiveness of the *aut regem* and the *aut fatuum* broke down; the king and the simpleton became one and the same person. This idea, curiously and interestingly enough, repeats itself in chapter 11 of the *Apocolocyntosis*: occidit (sc. Claudius) in una domo Crassum, Magnum, Scriboniam, Tristionias, Assarionem, nobiles tamen, Crassum vero *tam fatuum ut etiam regnare posset,* where the *rex* (potentially) and the *fatuus* again coincide.

Claudius evidently did anything but reinforce the claim of the proverb, and that is why *verum* in the phrase *verum proverbium fecerat* has provoked challenge. Facts have shown in the case of Claudius, and might well have done so in that of Crassus, that a man can be *both* a king and a fool, not necessarily one or the other. Ball[4] does not save the situation for the proverb by laying emphasis on the *nasci*; "Claudius was not *born* a king." "Ought to be born either a king or a simpleton" means simply "ought to belong to one division of society or the other"; it is assumed that where one is born, there he stays.

But Claudius did not make the proverb ⟨*bis*⟩ *verum* (Birt) nor ⟨*bifariam*⟩ *verum* (Wachsmuth) either; he simply made it false. No longer after contemplating a Claudius on the throne (I speak now of the common view, not of Momigliano's rehabilitated figure) could one say: "A man ought to be born either a king or a simpleton"; the one status had absolutely coincided with the other. Now we have the proper clue to correction; *verum* of the text should be *merum*. Claudius had reduced the commonplace saying to a "mere proverb," a proverb, that is, without any basis in fact. For this use of *merus* within the limits of the *Apocolocyntosis* alone cf. ch. 6, 1: *mera mendacia,* "nothing but lies," and ch. 9, 1: *mera mapalia,* "sheer nonsense."

It remains to be said that the latest editor of the *Apoc.*, René Waltz,[5] treats the phrase *qui verum proverbium fecerat* as an instance of an extremely grim humor; "entendez ironiquement que Claude, à la fois roi et imbécile, donnait un démenti au proverbe." It is evident that Professor Waltz's line of thought

[4] A. P. Ball, *The Satire of Seneca* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1902), p. 156.

[5] R. Waltz, Sénèque, *L'Apocoloquintose du divin Claude* (Paris, 1934, Collection Budé), p. 19 (Notes Complementaires).

coincides with mine as developed in this note; he prefers however, with his usual admirable caution, to save the traditional text by an ingenious finesse.

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LUCIAN, PHILOPSEUDES § 9:

Deinomachos in his expostulation against the sceptical Tychiades exclaims: *καί μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ τὰ προφανέστατα ἂν παραδέξασθαι ταῦτα τῶν ἐκ περιόδου πυρετῶν τὰς ἀποπομπὰς καὶ τῶν ἑρπετῶν τὰς καταθέλξεις καὶ βουβώνων ἰάσεις καὶ τἄλλα.*

The manuscripts and editions seem to be agreed on *ἑρπετῶν*, although "snake charming" is plainly not what the sense requires here. Between intermittent fever and swelling of the groins we should expect some other bodily affectation. The disease referred to is surely *ἕρπης* (herpes or shingles). The change from the one word to the other is easy and may have been caused by the snake story which follows. The word *ἑρπήτων* which I suggest here would certainly be less well known than *ἑρπετῶν*. Hippocrates mentions *οἱ ἕρπητες* several times (*Liqu.* 6; *Aph.* 5, 22 *ἕρπησιν ἐσθιομένοισι*; *Prorrh.* 2, 13 *οἱ ἕρπητες*) and remarks (*Prorrh.* 2, 13) *ἀκινδυνότατοι πάντων ἑλκέων ὅσα νέμεται, δυσαπάλλακτοι δὲ μάλιστα.*

I was pleased to find this conjecture had also occurred to Johannes Vahlen, whose pencil note I have before me in his copy of Bekker's edition in the University of Illinois Library. He refers there to Munro's note on Lucretius' *sacer ignis* 6,660, where Celsus is cited in a passage (5, 28,4) in which *sacer ignis* seems to mean the same as *οἱ ἕρπητες*.

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NOTES ON PLAUTUS.

I. Plautus, *Aul.*, 107-8:

> Nam noster nostrae qui est magister curiae
> dividere argenti dixit nummos in viros.

Euclio, the miser, is here debating whether to leave the house to collect his share of the money which is being distributed to

citizens by the *magister curiae*. He fears that if he goes some one may steal his pot of gold; if he does not go, people may suspect that he is wealthy enough to disregard the gift of a few denarii. In the original Greek the reference was probably to the theoric dole of two obols, and commentators usually assume that Plautus is here giving a loose translation of the Greek. But the term *argenti nummos* does not seem to refer to two obols, and Plautus usually translates such Greek allusions into Roman practices that might readily be understood by his audience.

Plautus may well be referring here to the Roman practice of repaying whenever possible the citizen-tribute collected during a war, or at least some part of it. We know that during the Second Punic War the one-mill tax was usually doubled and trebled every year and that, though some repayments were made from time to time after the war when the Punic indemnities came in, there were still in 187 B. C. over 25 times the simple mill-tax to be repaid to citizens out of the booty brought back by Manlius Vulso from Asia. Livy refers to this last payment in 39, 7, 5: ut ex pecunia . . . stipendium conlatum a populo in publicum, quod eius solutum non esset, solveretur. This final payment of 187 amounted to about twenty-two million denarii (*Econ. Survey of Ancient Rome*, I, p. 135), proving that the simple tax had amounted to about 900,000 denarii. Livy's mention of *quod eius solutum non esset* implies that some payments to citizens had been made from time to time before 187. It is not likely that ordinary citizens like Euclio received very much on such occasions. If a simple tribute were repaid at any one time, a citizen who had been taxed one tenth of one per cent on a property of 4000 denarii would of course receive only four denarii, and this would accord well with the phrase *argenti nummos*.

There is also some hesitation about the meaning of the phrase *magister curiae*, which does not occur in classical Latin with reference to Rome; though, as Prescott has pointed out (*T. A. P. A.* 1903, pp. 49 ff.), it was freely used in some of the towns of Roman Africa that had adopted older Roman institutions. In the distribution of a large number of trifling sums it is likely that the quaestor of the treasury called upon the *curiones* to aid in making the payments in their respective *curiae*. I think

that we have in this passage of the *Aulularia* a reference to one of the smaller reimbursements of the war-tax before 187 B. C.

II. In the fourth act of the *Mostellaria* (ll. 858-994) Plautus undoubtedly intended to bring out a clear contrast in character between the two slaves Pinacium and Phaniscus. Since the Ambrosian MS does not name the speakers, while the later MSS content themselves with giving the initial *A* (= *advorsitor*) for either or both the slaves and at times patently disregard the proper division of speeches, modern editors differ in the assignment of the lines. A definite clue is sometimes given, as when Theopropides in ll. 947 and 949 addresses the younger as *puere*. This is of course Phaniscus (see l. 885), who is master's favorite. As for the rest, we must assign the lines as best we can according to the tone of each speech. At several points Plautus clearly represents Pinacium as the older slave, a brazen, saucy, experienced man who says little because he is too sophisticated to betray what he knows, while Phaniscus is a docile lad who in stupid simplicity answers all questions till he unwittingly reveals his master's secrets.

Lindsay's edition usually respects the distinction, especially in assigning ll. 936-7 and 938 to Phaniscus and the rude remarks of ll. 940, 941-2, 943-4, and 948 to Pinacium. However, I would suggest that the characterization would be more consistent if some of his other assignments were altered. Certainly the Teubner text is correct in giving the first part of 952 (*senex hic ellebrosust certe*) to Pinacium and the more polite *erras perverse pater* to the boy. Later, at l. 987, Theopropides is half convinced that he has been deceived, and it is he, I think, who raps at the door this time (988). Then Pinacium, afraid of consequences if the door opens for Theopropides, makes excuses to be off. He asks the boy to come away and takes to his heels. (In fact he has to dress for the rôle of Simo before l. 998.) Phaniscus is called back (*puere*), and it is he who says "sequor" and speaks the last two lines of the scene. By this distribution of lines I think it will be found that the two slaves speak in character throughout; and we know enough of Plautus to be sure that he is quite capable of producing consistent characters.

III. In *Mostellaria*, 1149, Tranio, having duped Theopropides, remarks: "If you are a friend of Diphilus or Philemon,

tell them how your slave tricked you; you will furnish them with the best dupe scenes in comedy." This is usually taken to be a direct translation of the original. If it is, the author is not very likely to have been Philemon as is generally assumed, but a rival of his. However, I believe that this is Plautus' way of asserting that he has improved on his originals, an assertion of no little importance to Plautine criticism. He probably had used the *Phasma* of Philemon, "contaminating" it with some scene or some lines taken from a play of Diphilus. The meaning of the line would then be: "Go tell Philemon and Diphilus that they neglected their opportunities in writing their plays, and let them learn from me how to invent scenes of deception." (Of course neither Tranio nor the audience would know or care whether or not these Greek dramatists were still living.) If this be the meaning of the passage, we shall have to consider the *Mostellaria* one of the "contaminated" plays, and also assume that Plautus invented a considerable portion of the intrigue.

IV. On the Life of Plautus.

In his *Plautinische Forschungen* (2nd ed., pp. 70 ff.) Leo severely criticized the statement about Plautus that Aulus Gellius (III, 3, 14) had from Varro. Taking particular exception to the words: *pecunia omni quam in operis artificum scaenicorum pepererat in mercatibus perdita,* he insisted that they were reminiscences of Greek literary gossip and could hardly apply to Plautus. Though Leo's assertions have in turn been criticized, Sonnenburg's recent article on *Maccius* in *P. W.* (XIV, 99) agrees with Leo. Mesk (*Wiener St.*, XLI, p. 91) and Schanz-Hosius (p. 56) do not improve matters by making Plautus a "Theaterarbeiter."

A "stage-hand," if any such citizen could have existed at the time of the young Plautus, could hardly have accumulated capital enough from his trade to serve in any maritime venture, for very few days of each year were then devoted to theatrical productions and a laborer's wage was then seldom more than half a denarius the day (*Econ. Survey of Ancient Rome*, I, p. 188). If Plautus saved any money, it was not as a "Theaterarbeiter." If Gellius quoted Varro exactly, we must assume not that the phrase *in operis* was used in the later connotation of

"in the service of" but rather that the genitive is one of definition. We must then define the meaning of *artificum scaenicorum* for the early period, since this phrase later changed as much in meaning as did other words of the theatre like *histrio* and *ars ludicra*. Plautus twice (*Amph.*, 69 and *Poen.*, 37) uses *artifices* of important people on the stage who are eligible for the *palma*. (Both passages may belong to a revival performance, but nevertheless they are fairly early.) In both passages therefore the reference is to skilled artists such as actors, dancers, singers, or flute players—not to "stage-hands." This use of the word *artifex* is still found in Cicero, *Quinct.*, 78 (where the reference is to the famous Roscius) and in Livy, VII, 2, 6. During the Empire all, including common laborers, who helped about the theatre and the circus came to be called *artifices*, but that certainly was not so before Cicero's day.

In the early usage, as we learn from an antiquarian note in Aulus Gellius (XX, 4, 2), comedians, tragedians, and tibicines were called *artifices* in the sense of the Greek phrase *οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνῖται*. These, as we know, were actors and musicians, and at Rome the Greek connotation of the phrase *artifex scaenicus* doubtless dates from the early time when, in imitation of Greek usage, the Roman actors formed a club—a club which included the dramatic poets when the poets also acted.

Varro, then, had his statement from an early source, since he used the word in an archaic sense. We may not be enthusiastic about all of Varro's lore—he makes many mistakes—but he is found reliable enough in his researches so that for events that fall within historical times he should be accepted unless he can be proved incorrect. Hence I see no reason for doubting the statement of Varro that Plautus had made some capital by working as an *artifex scaenicus*, presumably as actor, possibly as actor-manager like Pellio and Ambivius Turpio. In fact the passage that Gellius quotes from Varro regarding Plautus fits into the conditions of that time better than do the many amendments proposed.

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HAROLD CHERNISS. *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935. Pp. xiv + 418.

It might seem unnecessary to write a new book on Aristotle as an historical source of Pre-Socratic philosophy in order to prove that his reports on the early thinkers are only of limited value, for the research in this field during recent decades has been generally based on this presupposition. No one in our times would take him any longer as that infallible authority which he used to represent, also in this respect, to former generations. In reality all the revolutionary attempts of the last thirty years to rediscover the true spirit of the single Pre-Socratic philosophers have sprung from the feeling that we had to free ourselves from the perspective in which Aristotle saw his predecessors, whose theories were to him only imperfect and stammering anticipations of his own philosophy. The author of the present book, however, does not seem sympathetic toward this literature—he does not even quote, so far as I can see, such an important contribution as Karl Reinhardt's *Parmenides* (Bonn, 1916) which tried to change the whole Aristotelian view of the development of Pre-Socratic philosophy. Cherniss seems to be convinced that a new and comprehensive treatment of the problem is unavoidable, if we are to reach less hypothetical conclusions.

Cherniss' book is the first part of a series of investigations; it will be followed by a parallel inquiry into the Aristotelian criticism of Plato and his school. Both books are preliminary to a definite presentation of the historical evolution of Greek philosophy in these periods. Modern criticism of Aristotle's treatment of the Pre-Socratic thinkers has resulted, up to this time, from single contradictions between the preserved fragments of these thinkers and the statements of Aristotle about their doctrines or from the contradictions between Aristotle's differing statements about one and the same doctrine. Cherniss starts from the axiom that a systematic thinker who is concerned with his predecessors is not interested in them for historical reasons at all but takes them only as typical representatives of certain philosophical standpoints. Aristotle's dealing with other philosophers is part of his dialectical method, and the terms and categories of his own thought are the standards to which he refers them. Cherniss gives a new analysis of those parts of the Aristotelian writings which treat the doctrines of the Pre-Socratics, discussing them from the point of view of how they had to be simplified or modified by the philosophical

perspective of Aristotle. He deals not only with the direct statements of Aristotle on the Pre-Socratic doctrines but with his whole polemic against them, including the passages in which he quotes them as witnesses of his own ideas. He collects all the objections of Aristotle to a certain point of Pre-Socratic philosophy and shows how Aristotle, according to the aim of his argumentation, renders the sense of the same doctrine in different ways and even gives contradictory statements about it. On the other hand, heterogeneous theories or thinkers often appear in Aristotle as similar or related to one another according to his changing point of view. Thus Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists may appear as opposite to one another and at other times as one type; even Plato and the Atomists may appear now and then to resemble one another. Heraclitus and the Milesian school are included under the notion of Physicists, although the former was a philosopher of an altogether different type, only because Aristotle wishes to compare his theory of fire with the one element of the earlier Monists. Aristotle, of course, is not to be blamed for this; but for us, who do not possess the complete works of these philosophers, it becomes misleading. One cannot blame Aristotle if he calls the elementary principle of a Pre-Socratic thinker *στοιχεῖον* or the "seeds" of Anaxagoras *ὁμοιομερῆ*, although these notions are not older than Plato. But modern scholars have often understood him as though these were notions of the Pre-Socratics themselves and have consequently misinterpreted the whole sense of their speculation. Many important observations of this kind have already been made, and sometimes one would wish that Cherniss had indicated those which are not new. I should not complain myself for not being quoted on page 19, note 73, for having observed already that Aristotle's criticism of Anaximander is wrong in pointing out that he should have called his *ἄπειρον* "encompassed" (*περιεχόμενον*) rather than "encompassing" (*περιέχον*), for Aristotle misinterprets the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander as "matter" in his own sense (cf. *Paideia*, 2nd ed., p. 217); but I think there are other scholars who ought to be quoted in a book which strives for as complete annotation as this work does. In the summary at the end Cherniss reduces Aristotle's errors and misinterpretations to seven main types which are illustrated by the rich material of the preceding chapters. The sagacity of the author proves to be equal to the complicated task.

Cherniss does not treat the matter in the usual chronological order of the Pre-Socratic thinkers but interprets Aristotle's criticism within the systematic context of the Aristotelian writings. The philosophical rubrics under which he presents the material are the following: (1) the principles, (2) space, motion, weight, and time, (3) causality, (4) soul and psychical phenomena, (5) empirical arguments. Besides, there are added two

chapters: "Quotations and Accommodations" and "Aristotle and the History of Pre-Socratic Philosophy." This architecture of the book reveals most distinctly the methodical intention of the author, and this is what is really new in his book. This method offers the advantage of making the philosophical tendency which is dominating Aristotle's representation of the Pre-Socratics as perspicuous as possible. The evidences are not all of the same strength, but it is of course impossible to examine them here in detail. At any rate it is very important for any future evaluation of the Aristotelian testimonies that such an inquiry be made once, and the impression of its result, which as a whole is a negative one, will stand as a warning sign-board at the road to the Pre-Socratics. No statement of Aristotle on a Pre-Socratic argument should be used before all other passages dealing with the same argument have been examined in their full context in order to find out the tendency of its treatment. Cherniss is justified particularly in warning against the incautious use of Diels' *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, which contain a handy survey of all the "Testimonia" but ought not to mislead the reader and make him feel that he can dispense with the trouble of looking up the passage in the original context and weighing its value.

The critical examination of the whole Aristotelian material from this viewpoint must alarm the surviving historians of philosophy of the older type; but it will give also a valuable methodical impulse to those modern critical investigators in the Pre-Socratic field, who do not cling any more to the doxographical methods of Zeller's famous but antiquated work. Cherniss' book will approve or correct the results of their criticism from a new angle. On the other hand it must be remarked that the evidence of Cherniss' analysis is mostly negative, for in an inquiry on Aristotle the Pre-Socratic problems themselves cannot be discussed in full. The author, of course, is aware of this (p. 347). A new book is wanted to show how his criticism of Aristotle affects the interpretation of the Pre-Socratics themselves. Cherniss' criticism of Aristotle, moreover, does not touch all essential problems raised by modern research in the Pre-Socratic philosophy and thus is not the key which opens all closed doors. The fruit of these studies is of different value for the various Pre-Socratics. There are many questions with which the informed reader might approach the new book but to which it does not give answer. Parmenides does not receive much new light. The old doubt of whether Plato or Aristotle rightly saw the essence of Heraclitus' philosophy in the doctrine of the permanent flux is not solved. The question of whether or not Aristotle misinterprets the motive of Xenophanes' monism, as Reinhardt suggests, is not answered, although one could easily defend Aristotle. The controversies, which for two decades have

been threatening the conventional chronology of the Pre-Socratic systems and, hence, questioned the whole picture of their historical development formed by the leading scholars of the nineteenth century, cannot be promoted from this side. Finally it is perhaps not unnecessary to stress the point that not all the Aristotelian misrepresentations of Pre-Socratic theories sagaciously revealed by the author really affect our historical knowledge of them, for, as I have said already, his analysis is concerned not only with the explicit "historical" statements of Aristotle but even more with his occasional polemic, from which even former scholars would not have dared to draw conclusions as to the real content and meaning of Pre-Socratic doctrine.

From the standpoint of Aristotle also Cherniss' book is a very important contribution, even though more to the negative understanding of the philosopher. Cherniss shows that Aristotle because of his peculiarity as a philosopher was not able to see his predecessors historically, since he was unable to surpass the limits of his own conceptual world and thus had to measure them by the standards of his own thought. In this the author is right to a great extent, but he did not escape the danger, of which he is aware himself, of writing a criticism of Aristotle instead of an analysis. For, as a whole, his book amounts to a severe charge against a suspect witness. At this point Cherniss' attitude becomes itself unhistorical and he makes the same mistake to which he objects in Aristotle: he measures him by a standard alien to him. The only difference is that he does it not unconsciously in behalf of a philosophical world view, like Aristotle, but consciously and in behalf of historical truth. It is the same sort of historical understanding which caused Mommsen to pronounce his famous but somewhat paradoxical verdict on Tacitus: he does not answer any of the questions which an historian would ask. It is true that Aristotle is not interested in the individuality of the single philosophers as such, as a modern philologist would be; what he seeks in the historical process is the successive development of truth, a view which was renewed by Hegel in his *History of Philosophy*. And, after all, there remains the strange fact that Aristotle is just the philosopher to whom all history of philosophy owes its existence.

If we want to understand historically Aristotle's relationship to the philosophy of his predecessors, we must not stop at the negative fact that he did not understand it in our sense. His attitude towards this problem is not even always the same, but it is obvious that it has undergone a certain development. I know that Cherniss is not fond of this point of view (cf. *A. J. P.* LVI [1935], p. 261-271), but in the present case it certainly would disclose an aspect worth considering. Let us take, for example, the famous survey of the various meanings of *αἰτία*

in the development of earlier philosophy as given in the first book of the Metaphysics. This so-called "first history of philosophy" evidently has its root in the passage of Plato's *Phaedo* (97C-98C) where Anaxagoras is said to have added to the material principle of the earlier natural philosophers the question of a teleological or formal cause. From this germ-cell Aristotle has developed, by means of his own distinction of the four meanings of *αἰτία*, the fundamental scheme of his history of the problem in the *Metaphysics*. He repeats there almost verbally some of Plato's words about Anaxagoras and also retains other specific views of Plato on the Pre-Socratics. The fact cannot be disputed that this whole "history of philosophy" belongs to the oldest parts of the *Metaphysics* and had its origin still in the internal discussions of the Platonic Academy (cf. my *Aristotle*, p. 128). Aristotle's attitude in his historical sketch conforms essentially to Plato's historical attitude, which is determined by two features: (1) the consciousness of the Platonic school as the only true philosophy, (2) the general striving obvious in Plato's later dialogues, as well as in the writings of his pupils, to use the fruits of earlier Greek speculation and to include them as partial truth in the building up of his own system. Plato tries to incorporate them in a new Platonic scheme of history, which is one of the last achievements of his old age. This type of philosophical self-assertion by historical self-repercussion implies just the characteristic features which Cherniss discovers in Aristotle's criticism of the Pre-Socratics. I should put this fact in the foreground of every attempt to understand Aristotle's attitude in his systematic writings towards the history of philosophy. On the other hand Aristotle's own great achievements in the field of history during his later years and the parallel works of the disciples organized by him show that the investigation of the detail occupied his mind on a large scale and became more and more a purpose in itself for his pupils. This sort of historical interest cannot be explained any longer as an outgrowth of his dialectical method. Theophrastus' *History of Philosophy* in XVIII books, Eudemus' *History of Geometry and Astronomy* and the same author's *History of Theology*, Meno's *History of Medicine*, Aristotle's Collection of the 158 constitutions including their history, and his Chronicle of the musical and gymnastic games of the Greeks are not to be understood unless we suppose in their authors' minds a feeling for the individual things which were treated in these works, even though the categories of Aristotle's systematical thought still exercised their influence in them in some respects. We must not separate Aristotle's interest in the history of philosophy from his historical research in all these other fields of civilization. So far as the history of philosophy is concerned, the tremendous work that was accomplished by his pupils is perhaps much more

significant for Aristotle's attitude towards the early thinkers in his old age than are his own systematical writings of his early and middle years. I am convinced that we cannot form a complete idea of Aristotle's knowledge of Pre-Socratic philosophy without taking into account Theophrastus' and Eudemus' respective works. Certainly they were even closer to the mind of their master than Aristotle was in his former years to his master Plato. If this is so, we cannot say, of course, that Aristotle had nothing to do with doxography. I think we have to acknowledge behind Aristotle's dialectical use of historical facts an imposing knowledge of the material; and from the increasing tension between them resulted the historical research of his school in his later years.

Also in the interpretation of the detail a more earnest consideration of Aristotle's development would have saved the author from overdoing his point of view. I choose a sample from page 344. There he writes about the theory of Aristotle (*De gen.* 335 A 14-18) that of the four simple bodies fire alone is nourished by the other elements: "Not only does Aristotle here try to reconcile with his own doctrine a theory which he elsewhere (*Meteor.* 354 B 33) condemns, but in so doing he develops as his own a principle which he attacks in another work as absurd (*De an.* 416 A 9-18)." Before we make up our mind to charge Aristotle with disputatiousness to the point of insincerity, we ought to look for another explanation of the facts. Since I proved in my *Aristotle* that he changed his view even in fundamental points, it does not seem too audacious to assume that there was a time when he adopted the Pre-Socratic theory, which he rejects later in the *Meteorology,* that fire is nourished by the other elementary bodies. We read this in *De gen.* 335 A 14-18 (which therefore must represent a former stage, at least in this passage). But Aristotle seems to have assumed then even the specific form of this theory which he combats in *Meteor.* 354 B 33, if I was right in suggesting (*Aristotle,* p. 153) that the proof for the divinity of the heavenly bodies preserved to us in Cic. *N. D.* II (c. 16 *init.*) belongs to a lost dialogue of Aristotle as well as the preceding and following arguments which Cicero explicitly attributes to him. Rose and Bernays refer them to the dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. None of these arguments is to be found in Aristotle's pragmaties, but the fact that they differ from his later school doctrine does not prove that he did not hold these views in a former period. I should not have neglected (in my *Aristotle,* p. 153) the passage in *De gen.* 335 A 14-18 which lends new support to my explanation.

But I should not like to get lost in critical detail; and, even if the author has limited his horizon in some respects in order to concentrate entirely on his point of view, this might be considered, in another sense, an advantage. Perhaps the success of

his work is partly due to this restriction. It would be ungrateful not to recognize that it is distinguished by thoroughness and mastery of the highly problematic material, by consistency in pursuing its leading idea, and by an unusual degree of logical penetration. Cherniss is one of the most capable of the younger scholars in the field of Greek philosophy. We may expect from his efficiency a continuation worthy of the beginning.

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NICOLAE I. BARBU. Les Procédés de la Peinture des Caractères et la Vérité Historique dans les Biographies de Plutarque. Paris, Nizet et Bastard, 1933. Pp. v + 242.

This book is one of three studies which in the last ten years have sought to correct the views set forth by Friedrich Leo (*Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form,* Leipzig, 1901) concerning the rhetorical form of Plutarch's *Lives* and their literary ancestry. Leo, it will be remembered, held that Plutarch arranged the subject-matter of his biographies in topical categories after a broad scheme, variable in individual cases, and worked in deference to an inner principle, namely, that character (ἦθος) is best illumined by the deeds (πράξεις) of a man. He suggested that this principle, deriving from the ethics of Aristotle, controlled the inception and presided over the development of Peripatetic biography from which Plutarchan biography descends in an unbroken line.

Barbu, like his predecessors, W. Graf Uxkull-Gyllenband (*Plutarch und die griechische Biographie,* Stuttgart, 1927) and A. Weizsäcker (*Untersuchungen über Plutarchs biographische Technik,* Berlin, 1931), rightly protests against Leo's effort to diagram the form of the *Lives* and to assign to them a place in the history of ancient biography without determining the sources from which Plutarch drew and his methods in utilizing them. However, Gyllenband and Weizsäcker base their dissent from Leo's views on the intensive study of a few selected biographies of Greek personages. Barbu has ranged at large through all the *Vitae,* Greek and Roman. Synthesizing the subject-matter of the various lives under several divisions, such as origin and character, political activity, military achievements, and death, he endeavors to fix the various sources from which the biographer gleaned the information presented under these topics. The upshot of the investigation is a laudatory appreciation of the merits of Plutarch as a biographer. He is far more than primarily a moralist, an estimate that has been voiced by certain critics. The *Lives* are characterized by erudition, a

serious attitude toward history, and an intelligent and impartial weighing of variant traditions in the effort to arrive at a true life-portrait of the subjects.

Barbu has an especial quarrel with the trend imparted to research in the sources of Plutarch by Eduard Meyer, who, after an examination of the life of Cimon as presented by Plutarch and Nepos, concluded that the likenesses between their two accounts demonstrate that both took over material already assembled in a Hellenistic biography of Pericles' rival. Barbu is quite unimpressed, and in the opinion of the reviewer, justly, by Gyllenband's attempt to conjure up in the second century B. C., under the influence of men like Polybius and Panaetius, the genesis of straightforward, factual biographies of Greek men of action and to demonstrate that it was these lives which, encomiastic in vein and responding to the desire of Hellenized Rome to measure her own great men by illustrious Greek examples, were the sources of both Nepos and Plutarch. Gyllenband does not entirely close the door on the possibility that from the pens of such biographers as Phanias, Idomeneus, and Satyrus may have come lives of statesmen and rulers. Nevertheless he insists that in such lives, if they did exist, full sway was held by the romantic and anecdotal proclivities of the Peripatetic biographers, interested always more in personality and in the intimate life of a worthy than in his public career; such works would not properly constitute a politico-historical biography and, in any case, were not models for or analogies to Plutarch's *Lives*. In the present state of our knowledge this is the only sane conclusion, and against it cannot stand the picture of biographical development created by Leo, who, great scholar though he was, succumbed too easily, both in his study of elegy and biography, to the charms of atavistic relation and rhetorical form.

For M. Barbu, on the contrary, there was no such thing as political biography in the Hellenistic period. Extant fragments of Peripatetic biographers which have been regarded as indicating the existence of lives of men of action emanate not from political biographies but from "psychological" works, to the composition of which the Peripatetics devoted themselves. Evidently Barbu would include "ethical" under his term "psychological." Events and incidents from the lives of political and military leaders figured only as illustrative material in such treatises. The biographical interests of the Peripatetics were restricted to representatives of intellectual, artistic, and literary creativity; no need was felt for biographies of men who figured in public affairs, save for lawgivers and orators, because historiography in the Alexandrian period freely admitted personality to its pages.

One fault in Barbu's reasoning is his easy assurance that one formula is applicable to all adherents to the Peripatetic move-

ment. Furthermore he too cavalierly rejects all extant data making against his views or distorts these data to agree with his hypothesis. He does not scruple by his ratiocination to rule out Phanias' work "On the Tyrants of Sicily," the fragments of Idomeneus dealing with events in the public life of such men as Pericles and Aristides, the fragments of Satyrus touching Dionysius the Younger and Philip (the latter in spite of the surface references in Athenaeus pointing to a Περὶ τοῦ Βίου Φιλίππου). In his evaluation of Satyrus' work as a biographer he is not at all disturbed by A. Gudeman's excellent article in *P-W*, with which he shows no sign of being acquainted. Indeed it is characteristic of Barbu frequently to neglect modern apparatus of scholarship; nowhere does he use Jacoby's current re-editing of the Greek historical *Fragmenta*, even when his work touches authors now included in Jacoby's volumes, such as Stesimbrotus. He is also quite capable of quoting such old-time writers in his field as Brunck and C. F. Hermann with the comfortable phrase "chez Müller."

These blemishes might be dismissed as small imperfections if they did not exemplify a carelessness in workmanship and a superficiality of method evident again and again in this book. An ambitious task has not been well performed, and the many defects in details are bound to shake the reader's confidence in the reliability of the author's conclusions. The book is a riot of misprints which are inadequately corrected by an appended table of errata almost entirely concerned with the Greek quotations. The necessity of unriddling dozens of wrong references is a sore trial to the patience of the reader. There are some gross errors in translation, of which one of the most unwittingly comical (p. 78) occurs where M. Barbu slips on the meaning of νωθρότητος (*Fabius*, i, 3) and thereby attaches to Cunctator the novel stigma of illegitimacy. The reader must be warned that in multifarious instances assertions of the author as to matters of fact cannot be taken at their face value. Some of these slips are relatively insignificant as when (p. 52) it is said on the authority of Plutarch that Solon had dissipated his fortune by charities, whereas it was Solon's father who had been improvident. However, what shall be said of the technique of a scholar who omits Stesimbrotus (*Them.* xxiv, 4) and Eratosthenes (*Them.* xxvii, 5) when (p. 150) he purports to be giving a list of authors cited by Plutarch in chaps. xxi-xxxii of the *Themistocles*, or who (p. 197), when comparing the accounts given by Plutarch (*Fab.* xi-xii) and Livy (xxii, 28-29) of the rescue of the discomfited Minucius by Fabius, asserts that Livy does not mention Hannibal's remark to his friends to the effect that the cloud which had been hovering above the heights had at length burst in a furious storm (*Fab.* xii, 4)? If Barbu had read Livy's narrative to the end, he would have discovered the saying in xxii, 30, 10. Blun-

ders like these, which the reviewer regrets to be obliged to call typical of the author of this treatise, are not calculated to inspire respect for the findings of an investigator of sources.

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LEO INGEMANN HIGHBY. The Erythrae Decree: Contributions to the early history of the Delian League and the Peloponnesian Confederacy. *Klio,* Beiheft XXXVI. Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936. Pp. viii + 108. RM 6.50 (bound 8.00).

This book by Highby was written as a doctoral dissertation under the direction of Walter Kolbe at Freiburg and is in some ways a companion-piece to Nesselhauf's *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delisch-attischen Symmachie,* which also appeared in *Klio* (see Beiheft XXX. Reviewed in *A. J. P.*, XL [1934], pp. 281-287). In general, it may be said that Nesselhauf treated the period after *ca.* 460 and that Highby has confined himself to the period before 460. His principal epigraphical evidence is the Athenian decree concerning Erythrae (*I. G.*, I², 10), to which he gives a searching study and a new interpretation.

The results are admirable. From a textual tradition almost hopelessly corrupt in many passages Highby has reconstructed a stoichedon inscription with 47 letters in each line, and has given support, usually convincing, to his readings and interpretation. The inscription marks the entrance of Erythrae into the Delian League, and yet must itself be dated some years after the founding of the League. The early growth of the League is then traced, with a demonstration that Ephesos, Lampsakos, Myos (p. 46), Kyme, Pitane, and Elaia (p. 55), at least, did not enter the League until after 471, that Myrina and Gryneion were still Persian (p. 55) in 476, and that part of the Thracian Chersonnesos (p. 50) was still Persian as late as 466/5. On p. 53 Highby shows that the Aeolian cities did not revolt from the Great King after Mykale. It is a convincing refutation of Leo's view that in the very first years the Ionian and Aeolian cities had been members of the League. In this gradual expansion of the first decade or decade and a half Erythrae also joined the League. The exact date of this important event depends on the date of the Erythrae decree, which can be fixed approximately on the basis of letter forms.

Though the stone is lost, the preserved copy gives some evidence of the character of the lettering. Highby makes the comparison with *I. G.*, I², 22 (450/49), 19 (454/3), and 18

(458/7), and concludes that forms of beta, rho, and phi show that the Erythrae decree must be older.[1] His inclination has been to date it in the middle 'sixties, perhaps somewhat earlier (p. 35). This epigraphical evidence needs further study, and Highby should have consulted also the early lists of the tribute quota. The so-called early forms of ϐ, ϼ, ϸ, and ⊕ all occur in *S. E. G.*, V, 5 (which is dated in 450/49), and also in *S. E. G.*, V, 1 (454/3), 2 (453/2), and 4 (451/0). In this last inscription the rho's in ἀρχῆς and ἐγραμμά[τευε] of the prescript had also the tail, which is characteristic of the rho's of the Erythrae decree. On the basis of letter forms alone, there is no reason why the Erythrae decree should be dated earlier than 450.

It is perhaps legitimate also to observe that a line of 47 letters implies that the letters should be relatively small (possibly *ca.* 0.012 m. in height, as were those in the other decrees concerning Erythrae, *I. G.*, I², 12 and 13), and not too widely spaced. These features argue for a later rather than an early date. One other item of evidence may give an indication which is more precise. Highby has now restored at two points in the text of the Erythrae decree the phrase ἄνευ τῆς βολῆς τῆς Ἀθεναίον καὶ τῶ δέμο (p. 7, lines 26-28). This implies the democratic ascendancy of the Council of the Five Hundred, and one wonders whether it is not more appropriate after the reforms of Ephialtes than before.

The local Erythraean decree from the middle of the fifth century which provided for the purification of the citizenship (pp. 36-38) is recognized by Highby as following closely on the constitutional changes outlined in *I. G.*, I², 10. Indeed, Highby uses it as a very convincing piece of evidence in support of his interpretation of the Attic decree. But we have Wilhelm's opinion (cited by Highby) that the epigraphical similarity between the local Erythraean decree and the Athenian decree concerning Phaselis (*I. G.*, I², 16) is very close. The best opinion now is that the Phaselis decree must be dated about 450 (Oliver, *Hesperia*, II [1933], pp. 496-497), and the indication again is in favor of a date for the Erythrae inscriptions somewhere in the 'fifties. This observation has value only in the light of the suggestions made above; Highby quite correctly warns (p. 38) that too much weight cannot be laid on similarity between one inscription from Erythrae and another from Athens.

If the Erythrae decree is dated in the 'fifties, we must assume a more leisurely expansion of the League than even Highby has proposed, but this idea of slow growth has recently found a slight bit of support in the Athenian decree concerning Sigeion which must be dated in 451/0 (see *Hesperia*, V [1936], no. 3, p. 360).

Highby includes *I. G.*, I², 12/13 *a*, which also has a stoichedon

[1] The forms of rho in *I. G.*, I², 19 are ϸ and R, not ϼ as shown in the *editio minor* of the *Corpus*.

line of 47 letters, as part of *I. G.*, I², 10 (pp. 7 and 33). He quotes Nesselhauf as authority (p. 6, note 2) that *I. G.*, I², 12/13 *b* cannot be so assigned. Nesselhauf's reasons are not given, though they are said to depend on observations made in the Epigraphical Museum in Athens. I suspect that they have to do with the shape of the letter rho, which is written without a tail in *I. G.*, I², 12/13 *b*. But the same objection is valid also for *I. G.*, I², 12/13 *a*, in which the rho appears without the extra stroke. The forms of letters for these fragments are incorrectly indicated in the *Corpus*; rho is consistently ᚹ, not ᚱ.

The latter part of the dissertation is given over to a successful refutation of Hans Schaefer's "agonal" conception of the development of the Greek idea of *συμμαχία*, and Highby finds himself in agreement with the concept of federation as developed by J. A. O. Larsen in his recent studies in *Classical Philology* (XXVIII [1933], pp. 267-276; XXIX [1934], pp. 1-19). The final chapter offers a new argument for the date 471 for Themistokles' flight from Greece.

In view of the fact that the book is published in English, and that proof was read by the author during such time as was available in the midst of a journey to Greece and Anatolia, errors in typography are relatively few. Those that remain, so far as I have observed, are not misleading. In the text itself of *I. G.*, I², 10, one should perhaps make the correct readings *φρ*[*ό*]<*ρ*>*αρχον* in line 13 and [*δ*]<*έ*>*μο* in line 27. Hondius' publication of Attic inscriptions is cited correctly as "Novae Inscriptiones Atticae" on p. 6, but elsewhere (pp. vii, 33, 62) as "Novae Inscriptiones Graecae." A page of *errata* cares for most of the other typographical mistakes.

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Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XLVIII. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936. Pp. 225.

This volume, dedicated to the memory of Milman Parry, is opened by a paper in which Professor H. J. Rose discusses a number of passages from Latin poets: Catullus (45),[1] Horace (*Odes* I, 23), Propertius (III, 24, 7-8), *Consolatio ad Liviam* (379), Manilius (II, 672; V, 542), Juvenal (V, 104; V, 143;

[1] Cf. now W. A. Oldfather in *Classical Studies Presented to Edward Capps* (1936), pp. 268 ff. I should note that if, as Professor Rose thinks, Acme and Septimius face each other and his lucky side is left while hers is right, Love cannot "shift from side to side" of the pair; both *unlucky* sides would be together as would both lucky sides.

VI, 157; VI, 223-4). The treatment of the "imperfect proportion" exemplified by the passage from Propertius is particularly interesting for the other illustrations of this figure which have been collected here. Professor Rose incidentally detects a lacuna in the anonymous fragment quoted in *Tusc. Disp.* I, 94.

G. F. Else in a study entitled "The Terminology of the Ideas" seeks to show that the Platonic ideas grow out of certain entities called Kinds, which are not abstractions but concrete elements of the moral and physical world. Since Plato comes to believe that the single characteristic token of the Kind can be grasped in its purity only by a mind free from the body, he makes it transcendent and then develops, as a preparation for grasping these ideas, a lower dialectic of which the subject matter is the kinds or classes in the natural world, *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*. The introduction of this "lower dialectic" Else finds in *Parmenides* 135 B where he believes that the *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*, which Parmenides says are necessary (135 B 6), must be different from the transcendent ideas of 135 A. It would be very strange for Plato to introduce thus without warning and in the same terminology a new and important philosophical conception; but that the *εἴδη* of 135 B are the same as those of 135 A is certain, for they are obviously open to the same objections (*εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας*, 135 B 6-7) and they are described in the same way (cf. *μηδέ τι ὁρίζηται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου . . . μὴ ἐῶν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι* [B 7 ff.] with *εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριζῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος* [A 1 ff.]). Else says that *τι* is used of the transcendent idea "as a sort of apology for using *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in an unfamiliar context" and on this basis thinks it proper for the *εἴδη*, which Parmenides calls indispensable, not to be qualified by *τι* since they are simply natural kinds. He has overlooked the *τι* in 135 B 7 which by his own canon would make these the same as those of 135 A.[2] The study as a whole is as unconvincing as this example of a crucial argument. Else ventures the interesting statement, for which no serious argument is offered, that the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* in the *Republic* is not an "Idea" at all.

[2] The "canon" itself is unacceptable. *τι* emphasizes the objective existence of a "thing" and is no mere "apology or quotation mark." Cf. *Rep.* 480 A: *αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὅς τι ὄν, Timaeus* 51 B-C: *ἆρα ἔστιν τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ . . . ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν . . . μόνα ἐστὶν . . . ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι . . . ἀλλὰ μάτην ἑκάστοτε εἶναί τί φαμεν εἶδος ἑκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος.* So *Phaedo* 65 D: *φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;* where Else omits the last two words. Similar is Else's notion that *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* means transcendent "only in myths and then only when the whole context or words like *εἰλικρινές* or *θεῖον* make the meaning unmistakable." *Parmenides* 133 C 3-6 is explicit refutation of this "rule" and *Timaeus* 51 C 1 a good example of a case where it will not hold.

J. A. Notopoulos writes on "The Divided Line of Plato's *Republic*," which he interprets as a symbol of the dynamism of thought. "Fully to understand Plato, who defines Being as δύναμις," says the author, "we must include movement as a metaphysical factor in the divided line." In the "highest level" of the Line, for example, he finds a perpetual movement of thought and a concomitant movement "of the pattern itself. In this pattern the Ideas are images of the Good. Thus the image vs. original motivation of movement is continuous even in the final segment of the Line." For this *Republic* 532 C is cited as evidence; here as frequently in the essay it is difficult to find in the passage itself any support for the author's interpretation.

Professor W. C. Greene, who in the preceding volume of these *Studies* wrote on "Fate, Good, and Evil in Early Greek Poetry," now publishes a study of these ideas in Pre-Socratic philosophy. He finds efficient and formal causality in the various Pre-Socratic philosophies; and, although he concludes that Plato and Aristotle were right in believing that the predecessors of Socrates failed to conceive of a final cause, he urges that these critics overlooked the notion of a living, divine causality which is implicit in each of the Pre-Socratic systems, while the full-fledged teleology of Diogenes of Apollonia is simply ignored by Aristotle. The Pre-Socratics, Professor Greene holds, established—though unconsciously—the limits of the ethics of naturalism; the teleological bias of Plato and Aristotle was not the outcome of Pre-Socratic speculation on *physis* but of a fusion of early religion with the *a priori* reasoning of Parmenides and the Pythagoreans. A study of these same ideas in Greek tragedy is promised by the author; this should prove to be illuminating for the notion of causality in the crucial fifth century. Free and critical as Professor Greene is, he cannot entirely escape the Aristotelian influence which has formed our whole conception of cause; yet he fully appreciates the fact that the Aristotelian analysis of causal factors is not to be projected back upon Pre-Socratic thought as a canon by which to judge the early thinkers. Perhaps in the study of early literature lies our only means of appreciating the possibility of a conception of causality which is not merely an embryonic form of Aristotelianism.

Brooks Otis in a detailed study of the *Argumenta* of the so-called Lactantius establishes a common archetype for the MSS C V $\pi\epsilon\beta$ M N U and argues that the relationship of the MSS is as valid for Ovid as for Lactantius. As a result of this he contends 1) that M is not the most excellent but the most doctored Ovidian text, 2) that ϵ must be given as much weight as the whole consensus of Z^1 (= MNU$\pi\beta$), 3) that the *consensus* of NU is to be preferred to M and is at least equal to the *consensus* Mβ, 4) that π is an equal of ϵ, 5) that the first hand of U is to be preferred to N.

Robert Schlaifer writes on "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle." He finds that by the middle of the fifth century three general assumptions underlay the Greek attitude toward slavery: 1) certain tasks are fit only for slaves, 2) certain men are fit for these tasks alone, 3) all barbarians fall within this class of men. Plato and Aristotle then sought to explain the bases of the last two assumptions. Treatment of the ancient criticism of the institution is necessarily brief because of the paucity of the surviving evidence.

Professor Joshua Whatmough publishes a new Raetic inscription of the Sondrio group. This is a retrograde inscription on the lip of the beak of a bronze flagon; it was found in an Iron Age cemetery at Castaneda and shows, according to Professor Whatmough, that the Sondrio alphabet is distributed over a territory wider than was hitherto known, although he adds that the place of discovery is no guarantee of the provenience of such an object.

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OTTO SKUTSCH. Prosodische und metrische Gesetze der Iambenkürzung (Forschungen zur griechischen und lateinischen Grammatik herausgegeben von Paul Kretschmer und Wilhelm Kroll, 10. Heft). Goettingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1934. Pp. 98. Reichsmark 5.50.

With a critical discernment heightened by extensive knowledge of the work of previous investigators, Otto Skutsch examines the text of Plautus in order to solve two questions concerning iambic shortening: (1) Is a word-ending ever a *brevis brevians*? Or, to phrase it differently, do we find iambic shortening of the types *sémper hŏc ád me* and *sempér hŏc ad mé*? (2) Are there any places in the dialogue-verses of Plautus from which iambic shortening is barred?

To the first question Skutsch gives the answer that a word-ending may be a *brevis brevians*, but only when the gap between it and the following word is bridged by synaloepha. In reply to the second question, he proves by a statistical study that iambic shortening is not excluded from any place in the verse.

While the same patient care is expended on every part of this investigation, the answer to the first question is less firmly grounded than that to the second. The data which Skutsch presents warrant, to be sure, his conclusion that a word-ending can be a *brevians* when the gap between it and the *brevianda* is bridged by synaloepha; i. e., that the following types of iambic

shortening occur: *éripe ĕx óre* (*Sti.* 718); *exéo hŏc ornatu quo vides* (*Cas.* 932). However, they do not, as it seems to me, warrant his conclusion that a word-ending can be a *brevians only* under these conditions.

The investigation is at this point involved in difficulties. It runs afoul of the problem whether, as Leo affirms but Lindsay denies, synaloepha of *-us* and of *-is* occurs. If Skutsch is right in his conclusion that a word-ending may be a *brevis brevians* only when the gap between it and the following word is bridged by synaloepha, Leo's position is strengthened. However, this conclusion rests in part on the assumption that Leo's position is correct. It depends in part, also, on such hypotheses as the following: that apocope of *e* may occur in *necne* (*Mil.* 1051) and *saepe* (*Pers.* 848); that *illud* may have the length of two morae (*Trin.* 258); that *quidquid* may be pyrrhic or else may consist of two words (*Merc.* 337); that *numquid* (*Merc.* 282) may be pyrrhic.

Furthermore this conclusion is reached by the aid of rather extensive emendation, a procedure which is open to question. In justice to Skutsch it should, however, be stated that in nearly every instance the emendation is slight or else is necessary or arguable because of some irregularity not connected with iambic shortening and that in most instances both conditions are found.

The second part of the book disproves the theories of Jachmann (*Studia prosodiaca*, Marburg, 1912), some of which are shared by other scholars, concerning special restrictions in the use of iambic shortening in the penultimate and the antepenultimate thesis of iambic and trochaic verses with masculine ending, in the arsis preceding the caesura of the iambic senarius or the diaeresis of the trochaic septenarius, and in both thesis and arsis of descending proceleusmatics. Skutsch demonstrates with the aid of statistics that iambic shortening was not particularly avoided in any part of the dialogue verses of Plautus and that its rarity in certain places is due to the rarity of resolution in those places.

A few generalizations are tentatively proposed at the end of the book. In spite of an unconvincing *argumentum ex silentio* which they include, they deserve to be pondered by Plautine scholars.

That Plautus did not consciously follow a rule of iambic shortening is indicated, Skutsch thinks, by the fact that no such rule has come down to us. Had such a law existed, it would, he says, have reached Varro from Accius and been transmitted to later grammarians. That, on the other hand, in this departure from the technique of his Greek models, Plautus relied upon his ear alone, is thinkable only on the assumption that a syllable which had undergone iambic shortening possessed the same quantity as a syllable which was short normally. Now

Jachmann, who holds that iambic shortening was avoided in the crucial places in the verse—that is, near the end of the verse or near the caesura or the diaeresis—concludes that iambic shortening obscured the rhythm and for that reason was shunned in these places. If the assumption that these positions *are* crucial is correct—and the assumption is greatly favored by the demonstration in the present study of the rare occurrence in them of resolution—their tolerance of iambic shortening indicates that syllables thus shortened did not differ in quantity from other short syllables.

The reason for Plautus' introduction of iambic shortening into his verse Skutsch finds in his striving after coincidence of word- and verse-accent. Taking iambic shortening over from the Latin of every-day speech, the poet in a few instances carried the practice farther than it was carried there. Skutsch stresses, finally, his conviction that the quantitative nature of Plautus' verse was not impaired by its introduction.

In its method of procedure and in the critical keenness, the broad scholarship, and the unbounded patience with detail which it manifests, this book is worthy of the son of Franz Skutsch. It is a contribution to the critical study of Plautus, as well as to our knowledge of early Latin verse. The author discusses many individual passages in Plautus and also a smaller number in Terence, reference to which is facilitated by an *Index Locorum*. I have detected only one misprint: "*Dass* nunc *betont ist*" (p. 11) for "*Dass* hunc *betont ist*."

Otto Skutsch's readers will look forward with much interest to his fulfillment of the promise implied in note 2 of pp. 12-13: "Den Grund für die prosodische Besonderheit der Bakcheen und Kretiker sehe ich darin, dass in einer Andante keine Allegroformen passen. Wie weit ein bewusster Formwille vorliegt, ist schwer zu entscheiden. Das Verhältnis zwischen formeller Gegebenheit und stilistischer Haltung hoffe ich einmal in grösserem Zusammenhang behandeln zu können."

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A. Gellii Noctium Atticarum Liber I, with Introduction and Notes, by HAZEL MARIA HORNSBY, Ph. D. Dublin, Hodges, Figgis, and Co.; London, Longmans, Green, and Co. (Dublin Univ. Press Series). Pp. lxvi + 227.

As the author truly says, no adequate commentary on Aulus Gellius exists in any language. How much time and labor such a work would demand is shown by Dr. Hornsby's 165 pages of

notes, exclusive of the introduction (a good part of which would be included in a commentary) and indices. She used the text of the L. C. L. translation (with permission of the publishers), which she kindly speaks of as satisfying a long-felt want. The translator could wish that the want had been sufficient to make a second impression necessary after eight years and so give an opportunity for correcting the slips and oversights which seem to be inevitable in a first printing. Yet Gellius gives us an abundance of material which makes him worth reading and studying. A former classmate of the reviewer, later a distinguished professor of classical philology, at one time used to read a chapter of the Attic Nights daily before going to bed, a habit which might be recommended, not as soporific but as thought-inspiring. Some of the slips in the Loeb edition Dr. Hornsby has silently or courteously corrected, others she has mercifully overlooked. It seems worthy of note that there is not an ill-natured criticism in the entire volume.

The notes are very complete, possibly too all-inclusive for a final commentary but an admirable foundation for one; the author does not, as commentators so often do, dodge difficulties. Especially interesting are some of the longer notes, e. g. on pp. 65, 111, 148, 183, 184, and 198; but the whole book may be read with pleasure and profit. In the introduction the life and times of Gellius and the text are fully discussed and, with particular sanity and good judgment, the sources. "The tirade against the Chaldaeans" seems a somewhat odd characterization of what is in fact a complete *reductio ad absurdum* of a superstition which still finds enough believers to call for a syndicated article on "Your Daily Horoscope" in our morning newspapers. Whether the speech may or may not safely be imputed to Favorinus, Gellius certainly says plainly enough that he took it from that philosopher. The language of Gellius is so fully treated that it seems ungracious to ask for more; but some additions might have been made from E. Yoder's Pennsylvania dissertation (Philadelphia, 1928) on the position of possessive and demonstrative adjectives and from L. Delmasso's "Aulo Gellio Lessicografo" (*Riv. di Filol.*, 1935; cf. Gudeman, *Phil. Woch.*, 1935, pp. 1217 ff.).

P. 51, the translation of *elegantia* in the Loeb is unfortunate, if it suggests the artificial writing of the age. It is rather the quality ascribed to Julius Caesar by Cicero (*Brutus*, 75, 261) and Quintilian (x, 1, 114), i. e. the careful choice of words which results in distinction of style. Cf. Gell., I, 10, 4. To *negotiorum* (p. 53) might be added Canius' *otiandi non negotiandi causa* (Cic., *Off.*, iii, 14, 58). On *geometrica* (p. 54) see A. L. L., x, p. 240; that form is perhaps made still more probable by the occurrence of *dialectica* in the same sentence, although the latter word

has no variant corresponding to *geometria*. In the note on *clarissimum virum* (p. 63), *perfectissimus* (*spectabilis*) and *illustris* need fuller explanation to cover the usage "of imperial times" (see Amm., vol. i, L. C. L., p. xxviii), and "within the equestrian order" does not apply to the fourth century. *Sidus* (p. 64) probably means "sun"; cf. Amm., xv, 10, 2, and especially Pliny, *N. H.*, ii, 13, *hic* (i. e. *sol*) *reliqua sidera occultat*. On *Corinthium* (p. 110) Gellius' explanation of the origin of the proverb seems at least as probable as that of Strabo. To the note on ἐφυσιογνωμόνει (p. 113) might be added Amm., xv, 8, 16. *Matre Evandri* (p. 124) has always seemed to the reviewer a humourous superlative of *antiquus*; Evander is typical of antiquity (Hor., *S.* i, 3, 91) and his mother carries us back a generation. The expression is used also by Ammianus (xxx, 4, 12) and neither there nor in Gellius does there seem to be any other ground for not using "Evander" alone. *Verbis praesentibus* (p. 125) doubtless means "present-day language," but the common meaning of *praesens* gives that sense, and it seems more than doubtful whether the force of the word as used of magistrates has any bearing on its significance. *Praesens* in that usage is perhaps not too clear (see Amm., vol. i, L. C. L., p. xxxiii), but it certainly seems superfluous in Amm., xiv, 1, 10 to say that Thalassius was praetorian prefect "actually in office," and the meaning "at court" suits Lamprid., *Sev.*, 32 equally well; better in fact, for how could one give a successor to a man who was not actually in office? On p. 127 A. A. Howard's classic study of the "Aulos" (*Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, iv, 1893) might well have been cited. On p. 143 consultation of Dr. Van Deman's *Atrium Vestae* ("the last word on the subject" according to Platner and Ashby's *Topog. Dict. of Ancient Rome*) or of the Dictionary itself would have modified the note on that monument; and consultation of the latter, the note on *Ianus medius* on p. 164.

The above notes are merely evidence that the book has been read with care. It is an excellent and valuable contribution, and it is to be hoped that the author will continue to the end what would be a long and difficult task, but proportionally interesting and helpful. The proof-reading seems to have been very carefully done. The reviewer notes only *converrebat* for *converrebant* on p. 52; he had added "tabus" on p. xiv, but on reaching p. 129 found that the author prefers that spelling.

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MARIO UNTERSTEINER. Sofocle (studio critico). Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1935. Vol. 1, pp. 640; vol. 2 (bibliography and notes), pp. 173.

In this study Professor Untersteiner devotes himself to an account of the purpose which motivated Sophocles in his writing and to the development of that purpose. Sophocles, he holds, intended to show how the individual finds and fulfils himself in the world. He can do so only by setting human reason and spirit against the apparently irrational order of things and conquering this by rising to a height of experience in which reason and feeling, man and god, fuse to absorb all differences and the individual is complete. This cannot happen, however, until the irrational aspect of the world (*l'assurdo*) represented by an individual (Tiresias, Iole) or an event (the supposed death of Orestes, the involuntary sin of Oedipus) has been accepted and lived through. In his first chapter Professor Untersteiner traces the development of the individual in Greek literature up to Sophocles. In the second chapter (which is by far the longest) he analyzes at length the seven tragedies in an endeavor to show how each successive protagonist comes nearer to the ideal until the process begun in the *Ajax* is fulfilled in the *Oedipus at Colonus* and the most gifted and experienced of Sophocles' heroes dies a god. The plays are discussed in the order laid down in a short and sensible chapter on chronology, which follows. The author next discusses the relation of Sophocles to his contemporaries and in the fourth and last chapter recapitulates and elaborates the conclusions reached in the analysis. Here he attempts to show how Sophocles adapted the traditions of the Greek stage to his purpose; how he met the religious and ethical problems; and, once more, how his work culminates in the self-realization of the individual.

On this difficult thesis Professor Untersteiner has brought to bear an impressive familiarity not only with Sophocles and ancient literature but also with modern authorities, whom he treats with the most winning fairness and courtesy. He has used care and skill to make his theories consistent, although contradictions occasionally appear. In vol. 2, p. 119, note 12 he deals at length with "le molteplici innovazioni fatte dal Poeta riguardo a particolari delle leggende prese a trattare"; yet he tells us (vol. 1, p. 512) that Sophocles "non altera quasi in nulla il mito." However, the basis for judgment must be, not the consistency of the thesis with itself, but its consistency with Sophocles. And here two objections must be urged which seem to be fatal. In the first place the whole structure is built up, bit by bit, out of an insistent series of exaggerated interpretations. When Electra justifies Agamemnon and herself to Clytaemnestra (*El.* 558-609), she is demonstrating "che cosa è

la vita" (vol. 1, p. 287). Polynices' *μὴ πεῖθ' ἃ μὴ δεῖ* (*Oed. Col.*, 1442) means "non tirar in campo incessantamente una nuova idea tua personale, che voglia dominare e convincere la mia individualità" (vol. 2, p. 111, note 191). In *El.* 685 *εἰσῆλθε λαμπρός, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκεῖ σέβας* means that "la vita è giovinezza, somma cosa, e si palesa nello splendore del corpo" (vol. 1, p. 291). In *Oed. Col.*, 608 the gods become "l'assoluto" (vol. 2, p. 122, note 28). Even the guard in the Antigone is oppressed, not by his awkward predicament, but by Life (vol. 1, p. 103).

As a result of this spiritual interpretation of every stray line and casual assent in Sophocles, the individual that so painfully emerges is no flesh and blood character at all. And this is the second objection. The author's thesis sometimes leads to illumination. His representation of Deianira as the wise but passive beauty whose one effort to act is fatal; of Iole as a second such beauty beginning to repeat Deianira's own history; of Creon in all his appearances as one whose logic, good as it is, must fail because there is no humanity behind it; all this, and much else, is good. But to make Heracles in his torment long for annihilation "in un' ansia delirante di spiritualità" (vol. 1, p. 254) is surely to exaggerate. To build on a vague hypothesis as to what Oedipus secretly told Theseus is perilous. It is even worse to make Oedipus curse his sons because they have not realized the fulness of *τέρψις* (vol. 1, p. 611), to contrast Orestes and Electra as "cervello e sentimento" (vol. 1, p. 309), "il non-essere" and "l'essere" (vol. 1, p. 312), to make Odysseus in the *Ajax* not a character but "la rivelazione della verità" (vol. 1, p. 92). Professor Untersteiner extracts from the Greek what never was there; for the clash of wills, even the clash of motives within a single will, he substitutes a struggle of antitheses. He himself admits that, instead of men, we thus have Man (vol. 1, p. 627). But this is to take away Sophocles' famous portrayal of character and face us instead with a procession of pale abstractions burdened with the metaphysics of the nineteenth century. From this ordeal issues a poet whom few will recognize.

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H. I. BELL. Recent Discoveries of Biblical Papyri. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1937. Pp. 30. Price $.75.

There has been such a wealth of discoveries in the Biblical field during the past few years and they have in general been published so promptly that a survey of the import and present

trends of the interpretation from one of the most distinguished scholars in the field is most welcome. Naturally the most space is devoted to the Beatty Papyri, the most important discovery of all time for the text study of the Bible, for it carries back over a century our knowledge of the text of the various books represented in the fragments.

Dr. Bell recognizes that the last word has not been said in the interpretation of these fragments. More has been done on the New Testament fragments than on the Old, and so his survey and criticism are there more searching. Many subjects are touched on in this discussion, notably the evidence for the original text, the order of the books, the date of composition, and the inclusion or exclusion of works of doubtful authenticity.

Perhaps on this last point, the inclusion of the Pastoral Epistles in the codex of the Epistles of Paul, more weight should have been given to the progressive crowding of the text on the pages of the manuscript after the scribe had passed the middle. This implies that the scribe believed he had more text to copy than space on which to copy it. This crowding continues to the very end of the preserved leaves; it is hardly possible to explain why he should do this, if he knew that approximately six leaves would be left blank at the end. I believe we must accept that the Pastoral Epistles were originally in the manuscript. As the space was inadequate on the leaves needed to match the beginning of the manuscript, it is best to assume that extra leaves were added.

Dr. Bell rightly assumes that the great value of the Old Testament fragments lies in the fact that many of them antedate the *Hexapla* of Origen. Yet accommodation to the Hebrew and other text corruptions are found even in the oldest fragments. At present only the general resemblance to the text of the Alexandrinus manuscript as against the Vaticanus has been noted. The same tendency is found in the pre-Christian fragment of Deuteronomy published by C. H. Roberts (Manchester, 1936). Full publication and study of all these will add much to our knowledge.

Naturally the fragment of a new Gospel published by Bell and Skeat (British Museum, 1935) comes in for further discussion. The date early in the second century A. D. is insisted upon and thus the Gospel of John is defended both in its first century origin and in the general reliability of its text, for John is unquestionably a chief source of this unknown Gospel.

Other fragments briefly treated are the Fourth Gospel in the John Rylands Library, Tatian's *Diatessaron* from Dura-Europus, the Michigan *Shepherd of Hermas,* and the Hamburg *Acta Pauli.*

In conclusion, the antiquity of the codex, the date of introduction of Christianity into Middle Egypt, and the indivisibility

of Papyrology as a study are touched on in a brief but illuminating fashion.

The reviewer can commend both the scholarship and the sane judgment of the author.

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ALOIS WALDE. Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. Dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage, von J. B. HOFMANN. 9. Lieferung. Heidelberg, *Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung*, 1936.

The eighth fascicle of this work was briefly reviewed in this Journal, LVII (1936), p. 225. The present fascicle covers *hērēs* to *is* and in its 80 pages (641-720) corresponds to 31 pages (363-393 incl.) of the second edition. Nearly every article is increased in length: examples are those on *hodiē, homō, honor, hybrida, iaciō, iecur, iēiūnus, ignominia, ignōscō, imperō, incolumis, indulgeō, indūtiae, intestīnus, is.* I note important new views in the articles on *inānis, ingruō, insolēscō, interpres.* Among new articles are those on *heus, hirpex, historia, ībis, idiōta, impendium, impetīgō, interpolō, intervāllum, invideō, involō, Inuus, ipsillēs.*

A few special points: Under *herĭ*, Hofmann refers to my argument in *Lang.*, VI, p. 315, but he has somewhat misunderstood it. Under *hūmānus*, the discussion of the length of the first vowel seems to me rather confused and not very enlightening; perhaps no enlightenment is possible. Under *ībĭ*, Hofmann accepts a recent view of Walde that it corresponds to Greek ἐπί, with change of the vowel in the proclitic position. The caption form *īcō* is given, and *iciō* and *icō* are regarded as false forms. I wonder if this verb really had any inherited present and if the present *īcit* (Plautus, Lucretius) was not made from the homonymous perfect, and thence a few other forms of the present stem; for a perfect *īcit* would hardly be formed from a present *īcit:* cf. *dīcit dīxit, dūcit dūxit*, and on the other hand *vincit vīcit, relinquit reliquit.* The formation most similar is *vīsit*, present and perfect, which is not a radical verb but has a consonantal suffix in the present stem.

The discussion of the suffix in *īdem* is good and also the explanation of *identidem* as from *idem et idem* (given in the second edition as an alternative to *idem itidem*, which is properly rejected by Hofmann). In writing *ignōminia* and similar words with long initial vowel (cf. also under *in-* "un"), Hofmann seems to accept Priscian's dictum (II, 82, 7, Keil) that vowels were long before *gn* (cf. also Hofmann in Stolz, *Lat. Gr.*[5], pages 104-5), but this view is now generally rejected (cf. Sommer, *Hdb. d. lat. Laut- u. Formenl.*[2], page 121, and Buck, *Comp.*

Gram. of Greek and Latin, page 94, as well as the orthography in Meillet's larger recent works). Oscan *-en* "from" is mentioned under *imus, in,* and *inde,* but it is only under *inde* that Brugmann's view is given (and rejected, though it is the most satisfactory). Words beginning with *ins-* in the second edition are now printed correctly with *ins-*; why the older books neglected to mark "hidden" quantities, even where the length was definitely known, has always been a mystery to me.

I can say no more than what I have said in reviews of previous fascicles, that the work is indispensable to the serious student of Latin, and indeed of etymology in many portions of the Indo-European field.

ROLAND G. KENT.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

WILLIAM MEREDITH HUGILL. *Panhellenism in Aristophanes.* Planograph. Chicago, University of Chicago, 1936. Pp. ix +106.

This reviewer ventures far from his own field to commend an excellent and interesting book.

The nature of the study is well described in the author's preface. "The present inquiry was begun as an examination of the various comedies in chronological order in an endeavor to trace the growth and development of Aristophanes' political creed. . . But it was soon discovered that the poet's views did not so much grow or develop . . . as only vary in the emphasis with which they were set forth. . . It was found that an allegorical passage in the *Lysistrata* contained a fairly complete synopsis of the poet's whole political faith." The book "is a detailed discussion of the pertinent matter of the *Lysistrata,* in which the other comedies have been laid under heavy but incidental contribution to explain and illustrate a most significant but much misunderstood passage."

Aristophanes alone had the courage to voice publicly the submerged popular longing for peace. He was opposed to the policy of the *probuli* and to the oligarchic plans for peace. In his own programme he proved himself both Panhellenist and patriot. He proposed compromise and reconciliation as the way to peace, with the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta as the ultimate solution.

The heart of the author's study is the examination and interpretation of the allegory of the carded fleece and civic web, through which the poet sets forth his suggestions of reform to follow peace. For domestic reform Aristophanes proposes to banish both sycophants and clubs (which proves conclusively his

absolute political independence), and, anticipating a similar suggestion in the *Frogs*, to re-enfranchise debtors and enfranchise metics and loyal foreign residents on condition of *andragathia*. In the passage dealing with imperial reform, *apoikiai* is interpreted by reference to the contemporary Thucydides and Andocides as meaning all cities which acknowledged the leadership of Athens. And Aristophanes is proposing, not *Einheitsstaat* (Beloch, Busolt, Meyer, van Leeuwen, Ferguson), not the transfusion to Athens of new blood from the subject cities (Wilamowitz), but a revival of the Confederacy of Delos and the policy of Cimon (Whibley, and less clearly Croiset) and, more specifically, the assembling at Athens of a federal council. At the end of the allegorical passage the cloak which is to be woven for the *Demos* is a *chlaina*, which in Aristophanes symbolizes prosperity; and the *Demos* "is not the corrupt creature of Cleon in the first part of the *Knights*, but the royal figure of its concluding climax."

There is a select bibliography of four pages, no index, but a very full table of contents.

The author tentatively promises other articles to come, dealing with topics of an allied nature. One hopes the promise will be fulfilled.

ROBERT SAMUEL ROGERS.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

SIR WILLIAM CRAIGIE AND JAMES R. HULBERT. A Dictionary of American English on historical principles, Part I, A-Baggage. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1936. Pp. xii + 216. $4.00.

The reviewer of this, the first instalment of a monumental work, is faced at the outset with a peculiar difficulty. The editors named above are those whose names appear on the front cover (which also serves as the title-page of Part I) and on the spine. The Part under review also includes, however, a title-page for the work as a whole, and this title-page reads as follows:

"A Dictionary of American English on historical principles, edited by Sir William Craigie, . . . with the collaboration of James R. Hulbert, . . . George Watson, Associate Editor, Mitford M. Mathews, Assistant Editor, Allen Walker Read, Assistant Editor . . ."

Who are the editors of the Part under review, and what is the relationship between them? Are Professors Craigie and Hulbert jointly and equally responsible for Part I? And did the other editors also do work on this Part, or has their editorial labor been

confined to other Parts, yet to be published? The present reviewer finds himself unable to answer these questions and is moved to protest that so important a piece of research has been issued in such a manner that its authorship is left uncertain.

The circular letter from the publishers which accompanies the instalment unluckily sheds no light on the questions raised above, but it gives us much interesting information about the undertaking. Thus we are informed that the dictionary "will be issued in Parts, manufacture and publication of the Parts to extend through a period of years. The Dictionary will comprise between 20 and 25 Parts. It is our hope to be able to publish four Parts a year . . . Five Parts will make a Volume. . . . *All* the reading and compilation have been done from A to Z. Approximately a million cards are on file in the Dictionary office, each one containing a dated quotation showing the use of a word. . . ." From the Preface we learn further that the work includes "not only words or phrases which are clearly or apparently of American origin, or have greater currency here than elsewhere, but also every word denoting something which has a real connection with the development of the country and the history of its people." On the other hand, "the end of the nineteenth century has been selected as a fitting point at which to terminate the admission of new words. . . . It has also been found necessary to restrict the inclusion of slang and dialect words to those which are of early date and special prominence. . . ." Moreover vast numbers of words are omitted because there is nothing especially American about them (as the indefinite article *a*). This very limitation, however, helps "in exhibiting clearly those features by which" American speech "is distinguished from that of England and the rest of the English-speaking world." The other restrictions in scope are to be regretted but could hardly have been avoided, for time and money were restricted too. One must agree, besides, that "in a work of this nature . . . it is not necessary to deal, otherwise than exceptionally, with pronunciation and etymology" (Preface, p. vi). Nevertheless in words like *after*, the usual American pronunciation of which differs from that heard in the received standard of British speech, some indication of the American usage would seem imperative, and one is astonished to find such differences ignored in the work under review. A historical dictionary which fails to take pronunciation into account must also fail, of course, to explain some of the word-forms which it records. Thus in the article *Africa* the spelling *Africky* appears; the editors mark this with a [*sic*], as if it were a mistake! Another restriction hardly justifiable is that to decent speech. Thus the familiar Americanism *ass* 'arse' is omitted, although *ass* 'donkey' is duly recorded! The Oxford English Dictionary, upon which the work under review is modeled, suffered only

a partial expurgation; in the Dictionary of American English, if we may judge by its first instalment, Bowdler (or, better, Comstock) will reign supreme. Along with this attitude goes a certain euphemistic tendency, exemplified in the term *colloquial*. The editors distinguish two grades of colloquialism; the lower grade seems identical with the *vulgarism* of ordinary English speech.

Let me add a few remarks on matters of detail. The etymologies suggested for *ain't* and *an't* are phonetically weak, since the loss of *r* before *nt* is without parallels; these forms go with *cain't* and *can't* in their phonetic development (see *Philological Quarterly*, III, p. 215). An entry *any more* would make it possible to include the use recorded in *American Speech*, VI, p. 460. The meaning 'on horseback' recorded for *aboard* is surely humorous, not serious. The spellings *offence* and *defence* (p. 77) are departures from American usage. The last quotation given for *admire at* 'wonder at' is dated 1865, but the meaning is not marked obsolete. The fact that *afternoons* adv. is a genitive (not a plural) in origin might well have been noted. The Arlington sheep was hardly so named from the village but rather from the estate of George Washington Parke Custis, the stepson of George Washington; note the quotation of 1809. Now and then the editors break through their self-imposed limits; thus *all over* 'everywhere' is entered, although its earliest occurrence is dated 1904.

What has been said above in adverse criticism weighs but little when set against the many solid merits of this dictionary. We have here a study of the American (as distinguished from the British) vocabulary done on a bigger scale and with a greater degree of scientific rigor than any of its predecessors can boast of. The dictionary upon its completion will take its place among the fundamental works on the history of our culture, indeed (so the philologist is tempted to say) as the chief of these. The publishers have brought out the first instalment in a form so worthy that it is a delight to read and to behold. All who have taken part in this undertaking are to be congratulated upon the first fruits. May it have a financial success not too incommensurate with its success as a work of scholarship.

KEMP MALONE.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

NOTICES.

Die Adjektiva bei Menander von Karl Klaus. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1936. Pp. xvi + 160.

This is an extremely useful conspectus of all adjectives found in Menander, including the old fragments and *Monostichoi*. The author has utilized previous studies of the vocabulary of Menander and has added to or corrected them in some cases. It is to be hoped that he will find means to publish his work on nouns and verbs as well. In his summary and conclusions many interesting facts appear. The opinion that Menander's work bears very little relation to that of Aristophanes is confirmed when we find only 1.5 per cent of his adjectives previously attested in comedy alone, whereas 20 per cent are not found elsewhere in comedy and 9.3 per cent are previously attested only in prose.

The author often follows Wilamowitz in his translations. Unfortunately they do not always do justice to Menander, blunting the sharpness of his characterization. It is perverse to note that τοπαστικόν is *hapax legomenon* while translating "Einfälle hat die Dirne." Onesimus uses other words in -τικος that are philosophic. This is his own pseudo-philosophic coinage and should be translated by a similar bit of unfamiliar jargon, say "intuitious" or the like. By translating πανούργως καὶ κακοήθως (*Ep.*, 318) as an admiring exclamation, we miss Onesimus' quick shift from admiration to suspicion of Habrotonon's unscrupulous and unmannerly methods. Again ἑτοίμως should have the meaning attested by Hesychius "promptly," not "gern." Compare Spanish *pronto* for the semantic development.

When a passage is obviously reminiscent, this fact seems important enough to make other data unnecessary. Compare *Ep.*, 526: ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίπληκτος αὐτὸς τῷ βίῳ with Eur., *Or.*, 922: ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίληπτον ἡσκηκὼς βίον; and *Perik.*, 688 f.: ἐφόλκια παιδία with Eur., *H. F.*, 631 f.: ἄξω λαβών γε τούσδ' ἐφολκίδας χεροῖν, ναῦς δ' ὡς ἐφέλξω. But Klaus does not list ἐφόλκια among the adjectives, as I should be inclined to. In any case it is clear that this book will be most helpful in the interpretation of Menander.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE. L. A. POST.

WOLFGANG SCHADEWALDT. Sophokles und Athen. Frankfurt, Klostermann Verlag, 1935. Pp. 23. (Wissenschaft und Gegenwart, No. 7.)

In this inaugural address delivered at the University in Leipzig the author tries to explain what it was in the work of Sophocles that made him the "darling of Athens." The answer is not startlingly novel. "Die Tragödie des Sophokles wusste

dem Volk sein tieferes Sein im vergrösserten Massstab des Helden, gedeutet an den Gestalten der alten Kunde, vor Augen zu führen." Such a solution gains meaning only by analysis of the poet's conception of the heroic; and, consequently, it is with such an analysis that the author has concerned himself. The tragic hero, he finds, is for Sophocles characterized by a soul that wavers between the restraint which is the result of social attachment and the wilfulness that ever threatens to burst the bonds of love and friendship. The hero, devoted entirely to his purpose, does not understand the every-day world, and the world casts him out; but he, even seeing the destruction which is the necessary fruit of his action, scorns the safety of baseness. Hence even the gods do not debase him when they destroy him.

Schadewaldt follows Reinhardt in distinguishing between an earlier and later attitude of Sophocles. After the *Oedipus Rex* the "hero" is supplanted by the "noble man" (γενναῖον ἦθος). This change is connected with the collapse of the old morality after the plague as it is reported by Thucydides. On the admission of the author this theory requires further proof, which is promised for the future. The "hero" of the earlier Sophocles is also related to the Thucydidean sketch of Athenian character. This analysis is, to my mind, hard to reconcile with the *Oedipus Rex*, and it seems to have no concern for the structural peculiarities of the *Ajax*; but here too enlightenment may come with Professor Schadewaldt's fuller treatment.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. HAROLD CHERNISS.

KEMP MALONE. Widsith. London, Methuen and Co., 1935. Pp. xiii + 202.

Professor Kemp Malone's *Widsith* is the outcome of a good deal of searching independent study combined with the results obtained by a long series of earlier investigators. In an introduction Professor Malone gives a general description of the poem and deals with the composition, interpolations, measurement, and proportion, the author, language, metre, rime, parallels. After this thorough introduction there follows the text, with textual variants and extremely instructive footnotes. The bibliography is exhaustive and the glossary of proper names contains not only the opinions and findings of the editor's predecessors, but also, to a great extent, the results of Professor Malone's own research. And if a good deal of this material will, by necessity, remain hypothetical and controversial, one must state that the editor advances our knowledge on these matters considerably. On the whole the book shows very fine critical judgment, sound conservatism (e. g. in dealing with interpolations), as well as a

courageous attempt—often rewarded by success—to solve problems hitherto unsolved. One wonders if the metrical structure of the poem would not have stood out more clearly in case Heusler's system (in *Deutsche Versgeschichte*) had been used for a metrical transcription of the poem. It might be worthwhile to treat the matter of vocabulary in a more exhaustive way, with comparative material, so that results for problems of style and literary type might be obtained. As it stands, Professor Malone's edition of Widsith is an admirable piece of work; if in the future much progress is made in our knowledge of this Old English poem, the present editor's contributions, judging from what he has achieved, will be the most important ones. That Widsith is a continual problem for Professor Malone is shown by his recent note, "Widsith: Addenda and Corrigenda" in *Modern Language Review*, XXXI (1936), pp. 547-549.

Bryn Mawr College. Fritz Mezger.

Otto William Heick. The *Ab Urbe Condita* Construction in Latin. Diss. Nebraska (printed at the University of Nebraska), 1936. Pp. 81. $1.00.

This doctoral dissertation lists examples of the *ab urbe condita* construction from Latin writers down to and including Suetonius. Livy, as the subject of special treatises, and Pliny the Elder (except for Book II) are omitted; and Cicero's philosophical works and Quintilian are studied only in part. Heick shows that Cicero was the first writer to employ the construction widely and freely and he attributes this extension (p. 70) "to the influence of rhetoric, which was very fond of imitating Greek models," and to the scarcity of abstract nouns in the Latin language. He also points out that the poets made more use of the construction than Stolz-Schmalz would lead one to think (pp. 70-72).

The list of examples includes some passages that have no rightful place there: Cic., *Fam.* X, 16, 1: *Servilius rogatus* rem distulit (p. 17); XII, 30, 2: qui profligato bello ac paene sublato *renovatum bellum* gerere conamur (p. 18); *Q. Fr.*, III, 3, 3 (p. 18); Ov., *Trist.* IV, 3, 34 (p. 30); Ov., *Met.* II, 558-9 (p. 30); Lucan, I, 426 (p. 37); Tac., *Ann.* I, 55: post quod in arma itum (p. 48). Also, cited under *dubious examples*: Cic., *Verr.* II, 3, 54 (p. 53); Tac., *Ann.* IV, 45 (p. 55); VI, 40 (p. 55); Vitruv., IV, 1, 9 (p. 57).

There are misprints in citations on pp. 15, 17, 18, 29, 42, 43, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 67, 73. On p. 57 the *Consolatio ad Liviam* is by implication ascribed to Ovid.

Alice F. Braunlich.

Goucher College.

ALINE L. ABAECHERLI. The Institution of the Imperial Cult in the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire (Estratto da Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni, vol. XI, 1935, pp. 153-186).

This is a thoroughly useful study by a writer who has given us others and will, it is to be hoped, give us many more. Miss Abaecherli reviews the evidence for the beginnings of Imperial worship in the Western provinces, and in particular casts reasonable doubts on the view that in Africa Proconsularis we must place them as late as the Flavian epoch. I am personally unconvinced by the contention that the altar at Tarraco was "probably provincial under Augustus," but that is a matter of shades of probability; and, if Miss Abaecherli is wrong, it does not detract from the value of her paper.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

F. G. MOORE. The Roman's World. New York, Columbia University Press, 1936. Pp. xiii + 501. $3.75.

In a volume of approximately five hundred pages Professor Moore gives us a comprehensive survey of the political, social, and cultural environment of a typical Roman at various stages of his city's history. The author's net has been widely cast, for there are chapters on political development and external expansion, on agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, religion, festivals, houses and furniture, the common round and the great occasions of family life, education, literature, philosophy, law, the fine arts, and, finally, the changes in the physical aspect of the city itself. With these go useful maps and plans, forty pages of well-chosen illustrations, a select bibliography, and an index. Attractive print lends charm to a well-told story whose simplicity and clearness of style half hide the industry and erudition required to write upon so many fields with so few mistakes and such constant use of the results of very recent research. A few questions might perhaps be raised. Is it true to the scale of values prevalent in a Roman's world to relegate the discussion of the army to an appendix, even if the material is somewhat technical? And would a library, public or private, be likely in the Augustan period to contain a copy of Cicero's Letters (p. 232)? But these are minor matters when almost all is good. Although the author does not claim to be presenting the results of original research, there is everywhere evidence of independence, careful scholarship, and an excellent sense of values. The result is a notable text-book which is not likely soon to become antiquated.

T. R. S. BROUGHTON.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

WERNER SCHUR. Sallust als Historiker. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1934. Pp. 292.

Schur has set himself the task of interpreting the development of Sallust's thought from the *Epistulae* to the *Historiae*. He believes that Seel in his *Sallust* (1930) took too little account of the changes in Sallust's thinking and in his *milieu*. He has an excellent analysis of the political thought of the letters and of the difference between them. The change in tone and in the concrete proposals is well explained as due to the change in the situation during the interval between the letters. Sallust's theory is compared with that of Cicero and with the theoretical basis of the Augustan principate.

The later works are given double analysis—the historical material and the excursuses on the philosophy of history. The former is good work. The *Bellum Jugurthinum* is discussed in detail and fruitfully as a work undertaken preparatory to the writing of the *Historia*, a study of the beginning of tendencies fully revealed in the period of the *Historiae*. The discussion of *Bellum Catilinae* centers around the idea that Sallust wished to correct certain views made current by Cicero and to put the conspiracy in its proper place in the history of the downfall of the Republic. The *Historiae* are ingeniously reconstructed as the story of what Sallust considered the death struggle of the real Republic.

A great deal is said about the influence of Posidonius' theories, and there is some keen work on the sources of passages where Schur believes that Posidonius was the source. The author comments on all the passages where Sallust may seem biased, and shows that he was sufficiently objective, "although not a historian of the dispassionate type of von Ranke."

The book should stimulate further consideration of Sallust's thought and has many worth while suggestions. Most readers will feel, however, that the detailed discussion of Sallust's theories of history adds very little, for it is not proven that the theories announced in the several works make any great difference in his transmission of historical information to posterity. A tendency to schematize the material and disregard disconsonant facts is noticeable here and there.

RICHARD M. HAYWOOD.

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WALTER WOODBURN HYDE. Roman Alpine Routes. Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1935. Pp. xvi + 248; map.

Forty years ago, travelling down the Radstädter Tauern, I had the thrill, still vivid in recollection, of noticing a weathered

Roman milestone and a stretch of Roman pavement beside the modern highway. Here at last we have in English a detailed and judicious account of the manner in which the Romans braved the dangers of Alpine cliff, avalanche, and marauder and left for our admiration such remarkable engineering works as the 40-foot vertical rock cutting, 500 feet long, at Donnaz in the Val d'Aosta, with its tunnel at the end. In traversing from West to East these Alpine passes, of most of which he has familiar knowledge, Professor Hyde discusses many incidental questions like the origin of the Etruscans and the affinities of the Veneti. To these, as to Alpine road problems, he brings wide reading and impressive mastery of the evidence and its discussion. He concludes that, of the 23 chief Alpine passes, the Romans knew 17, plus a score of less important ones. On the vexed question of Hannibal's route over the Alps in 218 B. C., Hyde favors Polybius rather than Livy and the Little St. Bernard rather than the Mont Genèvre. He writes in an easy style, at times careless—on page 1, a noun is left without its verb—, but always interesting; there is a full and useful Index, but it apparently does not include footnotes. One pass I traversed, the Col de l'Agnel (dell'Agnello), which stands out in my memory, thus missed the Index, though properly listed with its elevation (8855 ft.) on p. 49. The map is unusually clear and graphic and the typography excellent; the misprints I noticed are not misleading. The venerable American Philosophical Society maintains its tradition in this Memoir; the book deserves a wide public.

C. U. CLARK.

CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK CITY.

Cicéron, Correspondence, Tome III. Texte établi et traduit par L. A. CONSTANS. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1936.

This volume seems to have been printed before the unfortunate accident that took the translator's life. It contains the letters written between 55 and 51. The French version is continued with the same care and felicity that marked the previous volumes. Corrupt spots in the text are very conservatively handled and rendered with great plausibility; for example, p. 145, 26, line 3, where we incline to replace the difficult *felicitate a quid* by *facilitate aliquid*. The sole novelty, perhaps, is the adoption of the view that Trebatius was not converted to Epicureanism, supported by a long note on p. 148. Dates, as before, seem to be transposed according to the republican calendar (pp. 214 and 215). The numbering of letters differs very little from that of Tyrrell and Purser. All things considered, it is a most attractive and usable volume and it would be gratifying to know that the remainder of the work is already in manuscript from the same hand.

NORMAN W. DEWITT.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

Die römische Sklavennamen (Breslau diss.) by Julius Baumgart lists the Roman servile names derived from names of places, kings, deities, owners, and personal characteristics; that is, the work begins as a linguistic study. Therein it is useful. When, however, the author draws inferences from this nomenclature regarding the provenance of the slaves, he is on less sure ground. He assumes too readily that the Italian owners named their slaves with little reference to the names they bore before and that Greek names are frequent not because the bearers had to a large extent come from east of the Adriatic but because the custom had arisen in Italy of applying Greek names to slaves of whatsoever origin. Such assumptions can be proved true in individual cases, but they are extremely unlikely in the case of the great masses of slaves at Rome (see *Am. Hist. Rev.*, 1916, pp. 692 ff.).

T. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Volume III: Roman Britain, R. G. Collingwood; Roman Spain, J. J. Van Nostrand; Roman Sicily, V. M. Scramuzza; La Gaule Romaine, A. Grenier. Edited by Tenney Frank. Baltimore, *Johns Hopkins Press*, 1937. Pp. 664. $4.

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TOWNS OF ASIA MINOR.

I

TARAMPTOS

A correct reading of the preserved letters on fragment 25 of *I. G.*, I^2, 63 enabled Meritt and West, some years ago, to decipher for the first time the name of one of the cities from the Ionic-Caric district that was assessed tribute by Athens in 425 B. C.[1] This name Ὀρανι[ε̄τα]ι was also recognized by them as being the same as that which is in part preserved in two of the earlier lists of tribute-quota: Ὀρανιε̄τ[αι] (*S. E. G.*, V, 2, line 19) and Ὀ[ρ]ανιε̄ται (*S. E. G.*, V, 4, line 27). With the name established, Robert was able to make the identification with the Uranium mentioned by Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, V, 107), and to show that the site of the city must be sought somewhere in Caria not far from Halikarnassos.[2] This is all clear gain, for it not only identifies the one city of Uranium but also shows that the cities together with it assessed as συντελεῖς (lines 110-116) must be sought in Caria, and not in Lycia, as West and I had suggested.

Robert's further suggestion (*op. cit.*, p. 282) that the names in lines 114-115 should be read as

[K]υμ̣[ισσε̄ς]
[π]αρὰ M[ύνδον]

[1] *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.*, pp. 18-19. The text cited in this article is that which appears on pp. 64-69 of the above mentioned volume.

[2] *Revue de Philologie*, 1936, p. 279. Robert also points out (*op. cit.*, pp. 275-276) that the restoration Ναχσία παρὰ M[ύριναν] suggested in *S. E. G.*, V, p. 34 (*s. v.* Μύρινα) and repeated in *The Athenian Assessment*, p. 76, cannot be correct. Ruge (in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*,

needs additional consideration. In any case, I believe that the restoration M[ύνδον] is open to suspicion, for Myndos was itself so unimportant that it was located in the assessment list by reference to its more powerful neighbor Termera (lines 261-262). This was the occasional practice in the early quota lists, and the regular practice in the lists datable after 430 B. C. So, even if the suggested restoration [K]υμ̣ι̣[ισσῆς] should be right, the reading [π]αρὰ M[ύνδον], in this or in any other line of the inscription, would probably be wrong.

But, insofar as the restoration of lines 114-115 is concerned, there is a serious technical difficulty which has escaped Robert's attention and which renders impossible his restoration [π]αρὰ M[ύνδον]. The surface of the stone is preserved uninscribed at that point where the final nu must have appeared. No letter was ever inscribed at that point, and Robert can maintain his restoration only by assuming some omission or irregularity on the part of the stone-cutter. This epigraphical evidence was made clear in the publication by Meritt and West in 1934,[3] and even as long ago as 1869, the correct designation of this uninscribed area was made by Koehler (*Urkunden und Untersuchungen*, Plate X, no. 18) when he published the text as follows:

I
P
Y M I
\ P A N||||||||||||frei
P O ≷ F||||||||||||
Ɔ P A N I||||||||||||frei
T A Y T E ≷ . . ſ M Γ
Φ O P O ≷ E T A X Θ E

A correct methodology and a proper regard for the evidence allow the restoration of only four letters after the mu in line 115.

s. v. Naxia) suggested παρὰ M[ύλασα] or παρὰ M[ύνδον] following Boeckh and Rangabé respectively (cf. Koehler, *Urkunden und Untersuchungen*, p. 190). Robert suggests παρὰ M[ύλασα] or, preferably, παρὰ M[ΛητοΓ].

[3] *The Athenian Assessment*, p. 18: "One significant fact, which has escaped the attention of recent editors of this document, is that the stone is uninscribed after the ninth letter space in lines 3-5."

This limitation was again signalized by the restoration suggested in *The Athenian Assessment*, p. 65:

[π]αρὰ Μ[ύραν] *vac.*

Of course, the restoration [π]αρὰ Μ[ύραν] can no longer be maintained, now that it is known that these cities belonged to Caria and not to Lycia. Their approximate geographical position was discussed by Robert, who remarked, in the course of his comments on one of the names (*op. cit.*, p. 281): "Il sert à localiser ces Οὐρανιῆται aux environs d'Halikarnasse, dans la presqu'île d'Halikarnasse et de Myndos; sans doute ne saurait-on dépasser à l'Est la ligne Theangela-Taramptos."

It is evident that Robert has allowed himself to propose a restoration epigraphically impossible, when the correct solution lay ready to his hand in his own delimitation of the area of the syntely. Line 115 should be restored [Τ]άραμ[πτος] *vacat*. The name occurs in an inscription from Halikarnassos,[4] and belongs to the island now called Tarandos, situated just off the northern shore of the mainland between Bargylia and Pedasa.[5] Its identification now enables us to fix more accurately the location of the cities of the entire syntely, not to the west in the general region of Myndos, but rather to the east of Halikarnassos on the mainland side of the isthmus Halikarnassos-Pedasa.

This raises the question whether Robert's restoration [Κ]υμ-γ[ισσῆς] for line 114 of the assessment decree may not also be incorrect. I do not believe that a formal demonstration can be made either for or against, but I wish to point out that lines 113-114 can also be restored

[Κᾶ]ρ[ες *hὸν*]

[Τ]ύμγ[ες ἄρχει].

The entry is one that has already made its appearance in the quota lists, where reference may be made to the following items:

[4] *Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*, IV, p. 70, no. DCCCXCVI, line 18: ἐν Ταράμπτωι. Ruge (in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, *s. v.* Taramptos) gives further bibliography.

[5] See the map published by Robert, *Revue de Philologie*, 1936, p. 283. This map is a valuable part of Robert's article.

S. E. G., V, 10 (Col. III, line 26)

[Κᾶρε[ς hῶν Τύμνες ἄρχει]

S. E. G., V, 14 (Col. I, line 89)

[] [Τύμ]νες

S. E. G., V, 15 (Col. II, line 79)

[Κᾶ]ρες hῶν Τύ[μν](ες ἄρχει)

A comparative study of *S. E. G.*, V, 14 and 15 shows that these last two items, at least, refer to the same people. So the name of the dynast can be made out as Τύ[.]νες, only the mu in Τύμνες depending essentially on restoration.

Furthermore, these Κᾶρες are mentioned in both *S. E. G.*, V, 14 and 15 immediately after Συαγγελῆς, reading across from left to right in 14 and straight down column II in 15. Syangela was, I suspect, the nucleus of the syntely mentioned in lines 110-119 of the assessment decree. Quite irrespective of objections that have been raised to identifying Syangela with Theangela, whose site is known, the city lay in the neighborhood of Halikarnassos (cf. Ruge, in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, *s. vv.* Syangela and Theangela). With Amynanda in the year 446/5 it formed a syntely for the payment of tribute (*S. E. G.*, V, 9, Col. III, lines 20-21), and the combined tribute in the years before the war amounted usually to one talent. It should be noted that neither name Συαγγελῆς nor Ἀμυνανδῆς appears in the preserved portions of the regular Ionic-Caric panel in the assessment decree.

These are the names, therefore, which should be assigned to the syntely of lines 110-119, and they represent a large section of the peninsula which stretched from the northern to the southern shore, extending, however, no further east than the line Bargylia-Killara-Keramos. From this district it is intelligible that a total tribute might have been expected in 425 B. C. high enough to justify in some degree the prominent position which the syntely has at the beginning of the Ionic-Caric list; only a small part of such tribute at best could have come from the western part of the peninsula, where the cities of Halikarnassos, Pedasa, Karyanda, Termera, and Myndos by Termera are all known to have been assessed separately and not as part of any syntely (cf. lines 144, 269, 258, 154, and 261-262).

Finally, the Κᾶρες *hõν* Τύμνες ἄρχει are not to be confused with the Τύμνιοι, citizens of Tymnos, a town which Robert locates in the Rhodian peraea (*op. cit.*, p. 281, note 6). It may be that the restoration of lines 140-141 should read:

---- Ἰδυμ[ῆς]
---- Τύμν[ιοι]

instead of Ἰδυμ[ῆς *hõν*] | Τύμν[ες ἄρχει] as suggested in *The Athenian Assessment*, p. 65.

Lines 110-119 of the assessment list may now be read as follows:

110 ------

[Κᾶ]ρ[ες *hõν*]
[Τ]ύμν[ες ἄρχει]
115 [Τ]άραμ[πτος] *vacat*
[.]ροσε[....] *vacat*
Ὀρανι[ῆτα]ι
ταύτεσι [σ]ύμπ[ας *ho*]
φόρος ἐτάχθε.[6]

II

Komistratos

In his review of *The Athenian Assessment* in *Revue de Philologie*, 1936, p. 277, Robert comments briefly on one of the restorations proposed: "Aux lignes 279-280, je ne sais d'où les éditeurs ont déniché la ville de Komistratos, qu'ils songent à placer en Lycie: [Κομίστρ]ατος (?) [ἐν Λυκία]ι." The restoration was made with reference to Hierocles (685, 6), who mentions among the cities of Lycia one by the name Κομιστάραος. Ruge (in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, *s. v.*) remarks that the city was so listed "offenbar mit verderbter Namensform." Ramsay, to be sure, has explained the form Κομιστάραος as a

[6] As one of the more important towns, the name Συαγγελῆς should be restored near the beginning of the list, as possibly also Ἀμυναδῆς. In line 116 there is either the name of a town, or a locative designation for Taramptos, i. e. [π]ρὸς Ε[....].

corruption of Κώμη Μάστανρα (*The Historical Geography of Asia Minor,* p. 426), but a much simpler explanation is provided by the item here listed in the assessment decree. The resolution of Κομιστάραος into Κομίστρατος requires no violent orthographic change, and suggests itself at once, we believe, to one who has both the text of the assessment decree and an unemended record of the towns of Lycia named by Hierocles before him.

III

Killara

The name listed in the tribute-quota list *S. E. G.*, V, 4 (col. V, line 28) as Κι . . αρ . . has been identified by Meritt and West with that which appeared also in the assessment decree of 425 B. C. as [. .]λλ[- -], so that the restoration made in *S. E. G.*, V, 4 is now Κι[λλ]αρ[ε̄ς], while that in the assessment decree (lines 216-217) is [Κι]λλ[αρε̄ς | hō̄]ν Σ̣α̣[--- ἄρχει]. Robert (*Revue de Philologie,* 1936, p. 277) rejects the identification, because, as he says, ". . . ce rapprochement est sans valeur; car aucune des lettres conservées dans la liste de 425: —λλ—, ne se retrouve dans les lettres conservées de la liste *SEG,* V, 4: Κι . . αρ . . , et réciproquement." But Robert failed to use all the evidence at his disposal, when he neglected the explanation offered by Meritt and West that the second letter of the word in the assessment decree was almost certainly an iota (*The Athenian Assessment,* pp. 21 and 71-72), even though his footnote 4 (*op. cit.*, p. 276) shows that he had read the necessary description of the stone. There is also other evidence, which was unpublished when Robert wrote his article, and which must be taken into consideration. The letters that can be deciphered in *S. E. G.*, V, 4 are actually Κι.λαρε̣̄---. Though the lambda and epsilon are here given a sublinear dot, the characteristic strokes are preserved and lambda and epsilon alone are possible.

In reality, then, the comparison between *S. E. G.*, V, 4 and the assessment decree should be made with these letters from each name:

K I . ᴵ A P Γ .	(*S. E. G.*, V, 4)
. ᴵ L L	(Assessment Decree)

Where the names coincide, two out of the three letters of com-

parison are common to both items. I regard the restoration Κι[λ]λ̣αρε̣̄[ς] as certain in *S. E. G.*, V, 4 and the restoration [Κι]λλ[αρε̄ς | *hō*]ν Σ̣α̣[- - - ἄρχει] as equally certain in lines 216-217 of the assessment decree. Robert is undoubtedly right in identifying these people as the citizens of Kildara, which he locates slightly east of a line between Bargylia and Theangela (see his map, *op. cit.*, p. 283), but the restoration in the fifth century documents should be Κιλλαρε̄ς and not Κιλδαρε̄ς as he suggests.[7] I do not know where Robert found the name of the dynast Σα[μος--] (*op. cit.*, p. 277) which he ascribes to Meritt and West in quoting (incorrectly) their restoration. It is probably a proof-reader's error.

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[7] I have been unable to control Robert's reading Κιλδαρεῖς, but assume that he has given the delta correctly. Cf. *Rev. Arch.*, 1935, II, p. 163.

XIV, 4, 1 momento temporis parui.

It is unusual for an adjective to agree with *temporis* in a phrase of this kind—compare Pseud. Quint. decl., CCCVI *breue temporis momentum*; Amm., XXVII, 2, 1 *temporis breui puncto*, XXXI, 8, 8 *puncto temporis breui*—and I should conjecture *paruo* but for the possibility that Ammianus wrote *parui* because of his dislike of *homoioteleuta* and a wish to avoid *momento . . . paruo.*

10, 16 mox dicta finierat, multitudo omnis ad quae imperator uoluit, promptior, laudato consilio, consensit in pacem.

In 1588 Sylburg read *mox ut*, which was proposed again by Haupt, *Ind. lect. aest.* (Berlin, 1874), p. 3, but this conjecture is not accepted by Wagner, Eyssenhardt, Gardthausen, or Clark. Lately Damsté, *Mnem.*, LV, 1927, p. 243 has proposed *uix*—in some curious way having failed to see it in Wagner's note—as if *mox* as the equivalent of *simulac* were not fairly frequent in late Latin [1] and as if there were not other examples in Ammianus at XVI, 7, 2 and XVII, 1, 2. Both these last passages are misunderstood by Rolfe in his recent translation.

XV, 4, 2-3 nauigari ab ortu poterat primigenio, copiis exuberans propriis, ni ruenti curreret similis potius quam fluenti . . . iamque ad . . . solutus, altaque diuortia riparum abradens lacum inuadit.

In V there is a lacuna of seven letters between *ad* and *solutus.* Petschenig, *Philol.*, L, 1891, p. 340 proposed *ad plana uolutus* and this is adopted by Rolfe. But *plana* is insufficiently long, and in view also of XV, 11, 16 *procliui impetu ad planiora degrediens, proprio agmine ripas occultat, et paludi sese ingurgitat, planiora* would be better.

XVI, 8, 10 Dionysius . . . ob hoc idem uitium et tonstrices docuit filias.

Cornelissen, *Mnem.*, XIV, 1886, p. 245 proposes *esse uoluit* for *docuit. Voluit* is refuted by Cic., *Tusc.*, V, 58 *tondere filias suas docuit* (sc. *Dionysius*) and Val. Max., IX, 13, ext. 4, *Dionysius . . . tondere filias suas docuit*, and the absence of *esse* may be a Graecism.

[1] J. C. Jones, *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie*, XIV, 1906, pp. 529-531.

10, 10 nam et corpus perhumile curuabat, portas ingrediens celsas, et uelut collo munito, rectam aciem luminum tendens, nec dextra uultum nec laeua flectebat, (tamquam figmentum hominis) nec cum rota concuteret nutans, nec spuens, aut os aut nasum tergens uel fricans, manumue agitans uisus est umquam.

Some have wished to alter *nam et corpus perhumile curuabat, portas ingrediens celsas,* but the text is sound. Lumbroso, *Aegyptus,* XIII, 1933, p. 279 quotes Cic., *de orat.,* II, 267 and Castiglione, *Cortegiano,* ed. 1733, p. 115. For the rest compare Xenophon, *Cyropaideia,* VIII, 1, 41-42 *Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑποδήματα τοιαῦτα ἔχουσιν ἐν οἷς μάλιστα λαθεῖν ἔστι καὶ ὑποτιθεμένους τι, ὥστε δοκεῖν μείζους εἶναι ἢ εἰσί . . . ἐμελέτησε δὲ καὶ ὡς μὴ πτύοντες μηδὲ ἀπομυττόμενοι φανεροὶ εἶεν, μηδὲ μεταστρεφόμενοι ἐπὶ θέαν μηδενός, ὡς οὐδὲν θαυμάζοντες.* Compare also Ammianus, XXI, 16, 7.

10, 19 obstetrix corrupta mercede, mox natum, praesecto plus quam conuenerat umbilico, necauit.

Damsté, *Mnem.,* LV, 1927, p. 247 without giving any reason says 'immo uero: modo natum,' from which it appears that he does not know that *mox* is sometimes used in late Latin with the meaning of 'recently' or 'just now.' For an exact parallel to this passage compare Arnobius, II, 21 *mox aliquem natum.* In Ammianus, XIX, 9, 9 *nostrorum caduera mox caesorum fatiscunt ac diffluunt adeo ut nullius mortui facies post quadriduum agnoscatur,* where Cornelissen, *Mnem.,* XIV, 1886, p. 258 conjectures *uix* for *mox,* presumably *mox* and *caesorum* go together and mean 'as soon as they are dead.' See E. Löfstedt, *Philolog. Komm. zur Peregr. Aetheriae* (Uppsala, 1911), pp. 243-244 and *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift,* XII, 1916, pt. 5, pp. 69-70.

12, 18 tandem per te uirtutem et consilia militare sentimus.

Damsté, *Mnem.,* LV, 1927, p. 247 proposes *maritari* for *militare,* thereby introducing an expression in much need of a parallel to support it. *Militare* is unobjectionable, but *simul* has probably been lost before it.

12, 19 cum nullae laxarentur indutiae.

E. Löfstedt, *Philolog. Komm. zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae,* p. 192 quotes this passage as one in which *laxarentur* is practically the equivalent of *concederentur* as if it stood alone.

Compare XXII, 15, 22 *laxataque copia* and XXVII, 9, 7 *copia laxaretur.*

12, 30 aduenit, o socii, iustum pugnandi iam tempus, olim exoptatum mihi uobiscum, quod antehac arcessentes, arma inrequietis motibus poscebatis.

Cornelissen's proposal, *Mnem.*, XIV, 1886, p. 247, to read *ardescentes* is refuted by the line in Virgil of which Ammianus is thinking—*Aen.*, X, 11 *adueniet iustum pugnae, ne arcessite, tempus.*

12, 34 ne siquid contigisset aduersum, deserta miserabili plebe, facilem discedendi copiam repperirent.

A. Kiessling, *Ind. schol. aest.* (Greifswald, 1874), p. 4 alters *facilem* to *facile*, and is followed by Clark. That the change is needless is shown by Apuleius, *Met.*, VI, 16 *paulo facilior adeundi fuit copia.*

12, 43 qui clamor ipso feruore certaminum, a tenui susurro exoriens, paulatimque adolescens ritu extollitur fluctuum, cautibus inlisorum.

In has dropped out before *ipso*. Compare XVI, 2, 13 *aliis in ipso proelii feruore truncatis* and XVII, 13, 26 *quae . . . et ante proelia et in ipso correximus feruore pugnarum.*

XVII, 2 3 ut . . . nullus ad erumpendi copiam facile perueniret.

Eyssenhardt reads *nullus ad erumpendum quopiam facile perueniret*, but at XX, 4, 14, *ne ad euadendi copiam quisquam perueniret*, makes no change or comment.

XVIII, 6, 2 detinebant paene publicum defensorem, memores quod relictus ad sui tutelam, cum inerti et umbratili milite, nihil amiserat per decennium, simul metuentes saluti, quod tempore dubio, remoto illo aduenisse hominem conpererant inertissimum.

Damsté, *Mnem.*, LV, 1927, p. 253 adds *suae* before *simul.* This is unnecessary. An exact parallel to this passage is to be found in XVII, 13, 10 *cohors praetoria ex aduerso Augustum cautius stipans, resistentium pectora moxque terga fugientium incidebat, et cadentes insuperabili contumacia barbari non tam mortem dolere, quam nostrorum laetitiam, horrendo stridore, monstrabant*; where C. F. W. Mueller, Fleck. *Jahrb.*, CVII, 1873, p. 345 proposed *suam* before *mortem.*

8, 6 necessitate non uoluntate ad haec quae noui scelesta prolapso: egere me praecipitem iniqui flagitatores.

Clark here refuses to accept Kellerbauer's *moui, Blätter f. d. Bayerische Gymnasialschulwesen*, VII, 1871, p. 18; but at XXIX, 5, 8 *non sponte sua ad id erupisse, quod norat scelestum* he does accept his *morat.* Compare XV, 8, 6 *quos ad haec temptanda quae mouerunt, rabies egit et furor.*

XIX, 4, 3 ne peregrinus poenas dissociati regalis matrimonii lucraretur.

Cornelissen, *Mnem.*, XIV, 1886, p. 255 proposes *eluctaretur*, denying that *lucraretur poenas* is Latin. The expression is to be found as early as Manilius V, 319 *poenamque lucretur*, and as near in time to Ammianus as Paneg., XII, 30 *qui . . . primi sceleris poenas lucrari quiescendo potuisset.*

12, 4 pars per alios desideriorum indice missa scriptura, supplicationibus expresse conceptis, consulta numinum scitabantur.

Burger in *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, IV, 589, 1 cites this passage with *excitabantur* for *scitabantur*. *Excitabantur* is unknown to Wagner, Eyssenhardt, and Gardthausen, and, though Burger does not say it is, it seems to be a conjecture of his own. There is not the slightest ground for it. At XXIV, 8, 4 *consulta numinum scitabamur, scitabamur* is the accepted correction of *citabantur.*

XXI, 2, 4 utque omnes nullo inpediente, ad sui fauorem inliceret, adhaerere cultui Christiano fingebat, a quo iam pridem occulte desciuerat.

This passage is given so by Eyssenhardt, Gardthausen, and Clark. V, however, has not *pridem* but *pridie*, as it has also at XXVI, 5, 2 *Lupicinus enim, pridem a Iouiano pari modo promotus, magister equitum partes tuebatur eoas*, where the editors named are again agreed in reading *pridem.* But as early as Vell. Pat., II, 83, 3 *pridie quam* is used in the general sense of 'before,' and it may very well be that in each of these two passages in Ammianus *pridie* is no corruption of *pridem* but what the historian wrote. It now seems established that *pridem* is the true reading at Apuleius, *Met.*, V, 14, and I can not at present produce another example of *pridie* by itself in a general sense, but I should not be surprised if other examples lie buried at the foot of the page in editions of late Latin writers.

13, 1 si copia patuisset.

Cornelissen, *Mnem.* XIV, 1886, p. 265 proposes *data esset,* but compare XIV, 11, 8 *si copia patuisset.*

13, 2 consiliorum ambiguum retinebant multiplices morae.

Gudeman in *Thes. Ling. Lat.* IV, 443, 21 understands *consiliorum* as dependent on *morae.* But it belongs to *ambiguum.* Compare Tac., *Hist.* II, 83; IV, 21, and also III, 43 with Ammianus XXVII, 8, 9. This is by no means the only passage in Ammianus which writers in *Thes. Ling. Lat.* misunderstand. See, for example, H. Hagendahl, *Studia Ammianea* (Uppsala, 1921), pp. 5, 37, 103.

XXIV, 4, 20 pro salute currentibus.

Madvig, *Aduersaria Critica,* III, p. 267 alters *currentibus* to *concurrentibus* because 'non currebant pro salute munitores, sed concurrebant (cum hostibus) et certabant'; and more recently Damsté, *Mnem.* LVIII, 1930, p. 6 also finds *currentibus* 'absurdum' and alters it to *certantibus.* Is not *pro salute currentibus* to be recognised as a Graecism like τρέχων περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς in Herodotus IX, 37 τὸν δὴ . . . λαβόντες ἔδησαν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ . . . ὁ δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἐχόμενος, ὥστε τρέχων περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρό τε τοῦ θανάτου πεισόμενος πολλά τε καὶ λυγρά, ἔργον ἐργάσατο μεῖζον λόγου?

XXV, 3, 11 elefanti tardius praecedentes, magnitudine corporum, cristarumque horrore, pauorem iumentis incutiebant et uiris.

Haupt, *Ind. lect. aest.* (Berlin, 1874), p. 11, conjectured *stridorumque* for *cristarumque,* comparing XIX, 7, 6; XXV, 1, 14 and XXV, 3, 4, and this is adopted by Gardthausen who gives no indication that it has no manuscript authority. Heraeus very ingeniously conjectures *crustarumque,* comparing XIX, 2, 3 *elephantorum agmina rugosis horrenda corporibus.* But I do not know that *crusta* is in fact used of an elephant, and, even if it were, there is no valid reason for altering *cristarumque.* Compare Livy XXXVII, 40, 4 *ingentes ipsi* (sc. *elephanti*) *erant; addebant speciem frontalia et cristae.*

XXIX, 2, 4 inde effectum (so Clark for *fectum*) est per orientales prouincias, a dominis (so Heraeus for *ad omnis*) metu similium exurerentur libraria omnia.

Clark accepts Heraeus' addition of *ut* after *prouincias.* But

efficio followed by the subjunctive is Ovidian and Apuleian, and Ammianus is very ready to omit *ut* in such a case. To take an example almost at random, compare XXX, 10, 4 *altiore cura prospectum, expedito consilio, Valentinianus . . . uocaretur in imperium cooptandus,* where Novák wished to insert *ut* after *prospectum.* Even at XXV, 7, 11 *difficile hoc adeptus, Nisibis et Singara sine incolis transirent* it may be doubted whether *ut* is to be inserted after *adeptus.*

2, 24 multa et uaria, quae (ut leuius interpretemur) egit asperrime.

O. Günther, *Quaest. Amm. Crit.* (Göttingen, 1888), p. 55 remarks: 'corrige quaeso lenius.' Cf. Cic., *p. Murena,* 31 *in mitiorem partem interpretari*; Tac., *A.*, II, 30 *si mollius acciperes.' Lenius* is in fact the reading of a fifteenth century manuscript; but the better attested *leuius* is sufficiently defended by such passages as Cic., *Pro Rosc. Amer.,* 93 *quos qui leuiore nomine appellant, percussores uocant* and *Pro Murena,* 87 *ut leuissime dicam.*

5, 23 debuisse melius corrigi.

The second hand in V gives *lenius,* which is possible; but *mollius,* which occurred to me and has been suggested by F. Walter, *Berl. Phil. Woch.,* 1913, col. 1662 but is not mentioned by Clark, is rather more probable. Walter compares for the corruption XXII, 4, 6, where V has *meliores* for *molliores.* For *mollius* compare XIV, 7, 12 *aduocatos . . . adlocutus est mollius.*

5, 24 Tullianum illud aduertens 'salutaris uigor uincit inanem speciem clementiae.'

Ammianus quotes from *Ep. ad Brut.,* I, 2, 5, except that he has *uigor* for *seueritas.* This is altered to *rigor* by the second hand of a fifteenth century manuscript and that is read by Gardthausen and by Clark. Though both editors thus here reject the reading of V, neither of them rejects it at XVIII, I, 4 *inusitato censorio uigore.* See further E. Löfstedt, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der späteren Latinität* (Stockholm, 1907), p. 100.

XXX, 6, 3 ne laberetur spectantibus et uilibus.

For the sake of the clausula Harmon conjectured *spectandus* (misprinted in Clark's edition as *spectantus*). Heraeus conjectured < *multis* > *et uilibus,* Novák conjectured < *peregrinis* > *et uilibus.* Simpler than any of these proposals is *spectantibus et uil*<*ior*>*ibus.*

XXXI, 6, 5 adiectis plurimis quos primo transgressu necati inedia, uino exili uel panis frustis mutauere uilissimis.

E. Schneider, *Quaest. Amm.* (Berlin, 1879), p. 40 proposed to read in place of *necati, enecati*—not *enecti*, as Clark says in his critical note. Petschenig suggested *uexati* and subsequently F. Walter, *Berl. Phil. Woch.*, 1920, col. 717, suggested *paene necati*. *Necati inedia* is perhaps no more strange as an expression not to be taken literally than 'I am dead with the cold' is in English. At XXIX, 3, 3, *necatus ad exitium fustibus*, notice the addition of *ad exitium*.

10, 8 proinde horrifico aduersum fragore terrente, primum apud Argentariam signo per cornicines dato, concurri est coeptum, sagittarum uerrutorumque missilium pulsibus, crebriores hinc indeque sternebantur.

Before *primum* Valesius inserted *ubi*, which was retained by Eyssenhardt. Gardthausen rightly removed it, but Clark puts it back again. *Primum* stands for *ut* (or *ubi*) *primum* as in Julius Valerius III, 27 *sed ad haec primum ortu solis lux mundo est reddita, ex uertice arboris acuta quaedam uox, sed enim discrebilis et intelligenda sic adpulit*, where Kuebler wrongly keeps Mai's *cum* before *primum*.

13, 10 furore ex oculis lucente.

For the sake of the clausula Heraeus proposed, and Clark accepts, *elucente*. In support of it the reader is referred to XV, 13, 1. What he will find there is *facundia sermonis utriusque clarus. Unde sublimius quam sperabatur eluxit*, which is no help at all. *Elucente* is justified by XVI, 12, 36 *elucebat quidam ex oculis furor*.

14, 3 non nulli alienarum rerum auidi, siqui caducum uel aliud petisset ex usu . . .

As *rerum auidi* gives no proper clausula, W. A. Baehrens, Burs. *Jahresb.*, CCIII, 1925, p. 51 changes the order of the words. Probably *auidiores* should be read. It is legitimate to suppose that Ammianus used the comparative for the positive simply for the sake of the clausula. Compare XXVII, 4, 4 *Scordisci . . . hostiis captiuorum Bellonae litantes et Marti, humanumque sanguinem in ossibus capitum cauis bibentes auidius*, where *auide* would have given no proper clausula, and XXVII, 6, 1 *Rusticus Iulius . . . bestiarum more humani sanguinis auidus*, where

auidus suits the clausula, and *auidior*, if Ammianus had wished to use it, would not.

14, 5 magnarum opum intemperans adpetitor, laborum impatiens, duritiamque magis adfectans inmanem, in crudelitatem procliuior, subagrestis ingenii, nec bellicis nec liberalibus studiis eruditus.

In *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, IV, 1230, 84 *inmanem* is taken with *crudelitatem*, as in Cic., *Phil.*, VII, 27 and XIV, 25. I should have thought it certainly belonged to *duritiam* as in Cic., *Part. Orat.*, 81.

Clark's edition of Ammianus is one of the finest American contributions to Latin scholarship and is far superior to any earlier edition. It has for some time now been out of print, and a thoroughly revised text and apparatus criticus is a very pressing need. That the text was not as good as it might have been even when it appeared, and is much less good than it could be made now, needs no demonstration; but there may result some benefit from pointing out, what seems not to be realised, that the apparatus criticus contains a rather surprisingly large number of errors.

In several places scholars are said to have made conjectures which they never did. Thus at XIV, 11, 11 C. F. W. Mueller, Fleck. *Jahrb.*, CVII, 1873, p. 341 conjectured not *adsciscet* but *adsciscet*, which Clark attributes to Ehrismann who proposed it thirteen years later; at XV, 2, 4 Schneider conjectured not *obseruatas* but *obseruatos*; at XVI, 10, 3 Kiessling proposed not the nonsensical *potestatis* but *posteritatis*; at XVI, 12, 3 Günther proposed not *ad maiora stimulati fiducia* ⟨ *aucta* ⟩ but either *stimulata* or *ad maiorem stimulati fiduciam*; at XVII, 5, 10 Cornelissen conjectured not *in defluxum* but *in deflexum*; at XVIII, 1, 3, what Madvig proposed was not what is attributed to him but what is attributed to Mommsen; at XIX, 6, 7 Cornelissen conjectured not *inluni* but *interlunio*; at XXI, 13, 13 Eyssenhardt conjectured not *efflaturum* but *efflaturam*; at XXIV, 1, 10 Kellerbauer never proposed *cuiusdam*; at XXVI, 6, 11 Kellerbauer conjectured for *ardenti* not *audenti* but *audendi*; at XXX, 1, 15 Haupt proposed not *susceptus in fide grandi remansit inmobilis* but *susceptus fide grandi remansit inmobilis*; at XXXI, 10, 4 what Petschenig conjectured was *peruium peruadunt*.

Many other conjectures are assigned by Clark to the wrong person. I give the following forty-seven examples, which should be corrected as shown:

XIV, 2, 2 [*enim*], W. in *Lit. Centralbl.*, 1871, col. 1084; 2, 7 *iniquitati*, Horkel in 1862; 8, 1 *uiget*, Gardthausen in 1869; 8, 9 *hominum*, Kellerbauer in 1873; 9, 1 *nouissimus*, not Tross, whose 'bekannte' translates *notissimus*, but J. Hermann, *Obs. crit. Amm.* (Bonn, 1865), p. 7; 11, 19 *extentis*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873; 11, 28 *erat*, Brakman in 1909.

XV, 2, 7 *perque*, Stangl in 1905; 3, 5 *inter conuiuia*, Tross, *Athenäum*, III, 1818, p. 33; 8, 10 *prope desperatum*, Hadrianus Valesius in 1681; 8, 13 *cautissime* transposed after *turbatosque* by Niemeyer in 1897; 10, 5 *montanisue*, Kellerbauer in 1871; 12, 2 *uir* (but after *aliquis*), Cornelissen in 1886.

XVI, 8, 3 *retuli esse interfectum*, Günther, *Philol.* L, 1891, p. 69; 12, 29 *incautior*, Langen in 1867.

XVII, 7, 4 *euehebantur*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873; 7, 6 *sepiebant*, R. Unger in 1868; 13, 25 *tribunali*, Kellerbauer in 1873.

XIX, 2, 15 *frustrati curam*, R. Unger in 1868; 6, 8 *pedetemptim*, J. Hermann in 1865, *euntium*, Dederichs in 1878; 7, 3 *densetaque acie*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873; 12, 18 *ut imitandus*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873.

XXI, 10, 2 *excessu breui*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873.

XXII, 9, 11 *perridiculoso*, K. E. Georges in 1878; 10, 3 *idem est*, Horkel in 1862; 15, 13 *liquorem*, Gardthausen in 1869.

XXIII, 6, 73 *inclutae*, W. Tomaschek, *Zeits. f. d. Österr. Gymn.*, XXIII, 1872, p. 283; 6, 78 *capiant*, Horkel in 1862.

XXIV, 1, 7 *ex* (or *e*), Löfstedt, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der späteren Latinität* (Stockholm, 1907), p. 94; 4, 26 *cum tribus*, Horkel in 1862; 8, 2 *cum eo id*, not Heraeus' for Horkel mentioned it in 1862.

XXV, 3, 18 *abeo*, R. Unger in 1868; 4, 25 *feruore*, W. in *Lit. Centralbl.*, 1871, col. 1085, *feruorum*, J. Piechotta, *Curae Apuleianae* (Breslau, 1882), p. 53; 7, 4 *pendentium*, restored by Löfstedt, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

XXVI, 6, 11 *ad haec*, Kellerbauer in 1873; 6, 15 *cauationem*, Novák in 1885; 7, 17 *stipatumque iam*, Schneider in 1879; 8, 10 *a*, C. F. W. Mueller in 1873.

XXVII, 10, 7 *situ*, Freinsheim on Florus I, 16, 12.

XXVIII, 1, 36 *colligeret*, Dederichs in 1878; 2, 12 *erumpentum*, Löfstedt, *Eranos*, VII, 1907, p. 140, *euentus*, Eyssenhardt in editio minor, 1872, p. v and *Rhein. Mus.*, XXIX, 1874, p. 640.

XXX, 7, 6 *sese*, Löfstedt, *Eranos*, IX, 1909, p. 12.

XXXI, 2, 2 *pauendi*, Kellerbauer in 1871; 10, 1 *eaque*, Stangl in 1905.

The following are said to have been proposed by Petschenig 'in Indice,' but were proposed by him in *Philologus*, the first two in 1891, the third in 1892: XV, 12, 2 *crustis*; XX, 11, 31 *auia eius;* XXVI, 10, 10 *absumit quod*. At XVIII, 4, 7, he proposed *contextis* not 'in Indice' but in *Woch. f. Klass. Philol.*, XIII, 1896, col. 744.

The apparatus criticus suffers from other defects of various kinds. At XV, 5, 12 only part of Novák's conjecture, *Česke museum filolog.*, 1898, p. 82, is given; at XVII, 5, 13 only part of Haupt's conjecture is given; at XVIII, 7, 3 it is not shown who deleted *compelli*; at XXII, 8, 45 it is not said who conjectured *pigrum*, which was in fact conjectured by W. Tomaschek, *Zeits. f. d. Österr. Gymn.*, XXIII, 1872, p. 285; at XXIII, 6, 66 it is not said who is responsible for *maximae*; at XXVI, 7, 1 only part of Cornelissen's conjecture is given; at XXVI, 9, 8 *suffugio* appears both as the reading of V and as a conjecture by Lindebrog; at XXVIII, 1, 2 it is said that V has *quaeque* although that is in the text and no variant is mentioned; at XXVIII, 5, 11 it is not shown who conjectured *congregaretur*; at XXXI, 8, 4 it is not shown who is responsible for *erumpere barbari*.

Several misprints and false references need correction, as in XXIV, 6 where the section numbers jump from 15 to 17 and XX, 3, 8 where Macr. *Sat.*, I, 16, 12 should be Comm. in Somn. Scip., I, 16, 12.

Clark records many bad conjectures and not enough of the better sort. Some of the latter, indeed, though not even mentioned, ought to be in the text. Thus, that at XVII, 1, 7 *ut enim* ⟨*in*⟩ *rebus amat fieri dubiis et turbatis* should be read was pointed out by Kellerbauer in 1873. The correction has been made again by Novák, *Wiener Studien*, XXXIII, 1911, p. 307 to whom Rolfe wrongly assigns it. Similarly at XXIII, 2, 2 *cum primam consultae rationes copiam praebuissent* I conjectured *primum* for *primam* only to find that it was proposed long

ago by Horkel, *Reden und Abhandlungen* (Berlin, 1862), p. 248. Compare XVIII, 2, 1 *cum primum ratio copiam tribuisset*, Tac., *Ann.*, I, 58 *ubi primum tui copia*, 63 *ubi primum copia fuit*.

It may be wondered how reliable are Clark's reports of readings. I can speak of only one passage. At XXV, 8, 14 Clark's note has 'quod uelut AG.' The same statement is made by Gardthausen. But it is false. A and G both have *quod uel*, which appears in Clark's apparatus criticus as a conjecture of C. F. W. Mueller, who did indeed propose it in Fleck. *Jahrb.*, CVII, 1873, p. 353, and of Novák.

Scholars are for ever publishing suggestions which were made long ago. Take Damsté, for example, who published conjectures and explanations of passages in Ammianus in 1927 and 1930. The nine following were not new: XIV, 1, 10 *sibi opposita*, P. Langen, *Emend. Amm.* (Düren, 1867), p. 8; XIV, 6, 18 *haud paucae*, W. A. Baehrens, Burs. *Jahresb.*, CCIII, 1925, p. 52; XVI, 12, 3 *stimulata*, O. Günther, *Quaest. Amm. Crit.* (Göttingen, 1888), p. 19; XVI, 12, 30 *armorum*, Cornelissen, *Mnem.*, XIV, 1886, p. 247; XX, 8, 15 *dimittere*, Clark, Vol. II, p. vi; XX, 11, 5 the same proposal was made by W. A. Baehrens, *loc. cit.*; XXI, 12, 8 the same explanation was given by Niemeyer, Fleck. *Jahrb.*, CLV, 1897, p. 121; XXI, 12, 17 *auidius bibendi* was considered by Haupt, *Ind. lect. aest.* (Berlin, 1874), p. 8; XXV, 4, 23 *dum*, H. Ehrismann, *De temporum et modorum usu Amm.* (Strassburg, 1886), p. 11. F. Walter has also made suggestions which are not new: XIV, 1, 10 *sibi opposita*, P. Langen in 1867 and Damsté in 1930; XVI, 5, 5 *membra*, Brakman, *Amm. et Ann.* (Leyden, 1909), p. 5; XX, 5, 6 *uigentibus*, Novák, *Listy filologické*, XII, 1885, p. 394; XXVIII, 6, 14 *interiuit*, C. F. W. Mueller, Fleck. *Jahrb.*, CVII, 1873, p. 348. Others have made the following suggestions which were not new: XVI, 5, 14 *scatentes:* Leo in 1911, proposed by Schneider in 1897; XXIII, 6, 31 *insignibus:* Thörnell in 1927, proposed by Walter in 1913; XXVIII, 4, 32 *uenuste:* P. Thomas in 1921, proposed by Novák and read by Clark in 1915.

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DID CICERO COMPLETE THE *DE LEGIBUS*?

The theory that Cicero did not complete the *De Legibus* is at present the generally accepted one.[1] My thesis is that this theory is based on no genuine evidence whatever, and that all the data which bear on the point should lead us to the opposite conclusion.

Let us first consider the external evidence. In spite of Sprey's arguments,[2] there are clear indications that Cicero worked on the *De Legibus* both in the period 54-52 B. C. and also in the years of his great productivity of philosophic treatises, 46-43. The evidence for this fact has been summarized and supplemented in a recent dissertation.[3] It seems equally clear that the treatise had not been published in the early part of 44, when the *De Divinatione* was written.[4] There is really no evidence that it was published in the lifetime of Cicero, in spite of Reitzenstein's theory[5] that it was completed hastily and given out in connection with the Philippics, as part of Cicero's polemic against Antony. This theory rests partly on false assumptions[6] and has not been accepted by other scholars; it must remain what its author called it, a *Vermutung*.

There is on the other hand no evidence that Cicero did not publish the work near the end of his life, probably after Caesar's assassination. But even if it was not published until after his death, that is not proof that he left it incomplete. Attention has been called to the difficulty and danger which might have attended its publication under Caesar's dictatorship or even under

[1] E.g., R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Leipzig, 1905, I, p. 479; F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1912, pp. 46-47; W. S. Teuffel etc., *Geschichte d. röm. Litteratur*, 6th ed., Berlin, 1916, I, pp. 406-407; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte d. röm. Literatur*, 4th ed., Munich, 1927, I, p. 498.

[2] K. Sprey, *De M. T. Ciceronis Politica Doctrina*, Amsterdam diss., Zutphen, 1928, pp. 19-115.

[3] E. Kalbe, *Quibus Temporibus M. T. Cicero Libros de Legibus III scripserit*, Leipzig diss., Dresden, 1934, pp. 1-7.

[4] *De Div.* II, 1-4.

[5] R. Reitzenstein, *Drei Vermutungen zur Geschichte d. röm. Litteratur*, Marburg, 1894, pp. 1-31.

[6] Cf. S. Häfner, *Die Literarische Pläne Ciceros*, Munich diss., Coburg, 1928, pp. 95-101.

the confused conditions immediately thereafter.[7] It may well have been left completed at the time of Cicero's death and published afterwards.

We have definite proof in the fragment quoted from Book V [8] that Cicero had written that book at least, and that it was part of the published work. Du Mesnil [9] has presented a rather clever argument that the work was planned to contain eight books in all and he uses the fact that we have no quotations from Books VI, VII, and VIII as an indication that they were never written. We have no quotations from Book IV either; yet it would be rather rash to suppose that a Book V existed while a Book IV did not! And the more usual assumption is that the work contained or was planned to contain not eight books, but six, like the *De Re Publica*.

It is evident, then, that the external evidence, positive and negative, is simply indeterminate; in fact we have no external evidence which bears directly on our specific problem. We must therefore depend entirely upon the indications supplied by the work itself. But before examining this evidence in detail, let us consider briefly the form of the work and the reasons for that form. As the *De Legibus* is a closely connected sequel to the *De Re Publica*, such an examination must include consideration of the earlier work.

In 54 B. C. Cicero was working on the *De Re Publica*.[10] At that time he had already published in the dialogue form the *De Oratore*, a narrated dialogue with the fictive date 91 B. C. He asks us to assume that he had received an accurate report of the actual conversation of the *De Oratore* from Cotta, one of the younger participants in the dialogue. Cicero had also written, or was writing at about this time, another treatise in the dialogue form, the *Partitiones Oratoriae*,[11] a purely dramatic dialogue without proem, introductory remarks, or adornment, in which Cicero himself is the chief speaker and his son the other charac-

[7] Häfner (see note 6), p. 99; Kalbe (see note 3), p. 22.

[8] By Macrobius, *Sat.* VI, 4, 8.

[9] A. du Mesnil, Edition of *De Legibus*, Leipzig, 1879, pp. 5-6; cf. Kalbe (see note 3), p. 23.

[10] *Ep. ad Q. Fr.* II, 12, 1; III, 5, 1-2; *ad Att.* IV, 16, 2.

[11] Hirzel (see note 1), p. 493, note 4; Schanz-Hosius (see note 1), p. 463.

ter. These two works are his only known original dialogues up to this time, though he had earlier made translations from Plato.[12]

In October 54, Cicero wrote to Quintus[13] that he was then busy with the *De Re Publica*, which he had begun in May. Frequent changes had taken place in his plan for the work. He had arranged to put it in the form of a dialogue of Scipio the Younger, Laelius, and their friends, held in 129 B. C., and divided into nine books, one for each day of the conversation, and he had already written two books on this plan when his work was interrupted by a visit from Gaius Sallustius. Upon hearing the two completed books, Sallustius expressed the opinion that the work would have a much greater influence if its fictive date were brought down to Cicero's own time and if Cicero were to make himself the chief speaker. Cicero had done well, continued Sallustius, to put the *De Oratore* in a previous age, yet one recent enough so that Cicero himself had at least seen the interlocutors in the dialogue; the obvious implication was that 129 B. C. was far too remote a dramatic date for the *De Re Publica*. Sallustius also cited the example of Aristotle, who had spoken in his own person on these subjects; presumably the reference was to dialogues of Aristotle. What Sallustius was in effect urging was a break with the method of the *De Oratore* and the adoption of the general plan of the *Partitiones Oratoriae*.

Cicero saw advantages and disadvantages both in a dialogue placed in a remote period and in one of contemporary date with himself as chief speaker. In the former case he would be precluded from any mention of recent events; in the latter he might cause offence by reference to recent political controversies. He decides nevertheless to take Sallustius' advice; he thinks he can avoid offence and resolves to make the work a dialogue between his brother Quintus and himself.

But when the *De Re Publica* was published, probably in 51,[14] a plan had been adopted which was very close to that on which Cicero had been proceeding before he heard Sallustius' criticism; the only changes were that the duration of the conversation had

[12] Schanz-Hosius (see note 1), p. 527.

[13] *Ep. ad Q. Fr.* III, 5, 1-2.

[14] *Ep. ad Fam.* VIII, 1, 4; *ad Att.* V, 12, 2.

been reduced from nine days to three, and the number of books from nine to six, two for each day.

The similarities in the technical plan of the *De Re Publica* and that of the *De Oratore* are obvious; the most important of them are: 1) both are narrated dialogues; 2) the time chosen is a public holiday; 3) the scene is a house outside the city, and the place where the dialogue is held is briefly described; 4) the conversation is assumed to have reached Cicero's knowledge through narration by one of the younger men present; 5) two breaks are introduced into the conversation; 6) three proems in Cicero's own person are provided, one at the beginning of each time division of the dialogue; 7) the date of the dialogue is the last year of the life of its chief speaker; 8) a considerably larger number of persons is present than those who actually take an important part in the conversation.

Of course the influence of Plato, particularly in the *Republic*, upon both Ciceronian dialogues was great. Of the items of similarity between the *De Oratore* and the *De Re Publica* mentioned above, 1, 2, 3, and 8 apply also to Plato's *Republic*, and item 7 was evidently suggested by Plato's *Phaedo*. In addition, Cicero's *De Re Publica* owes to Plato's *Republic* the following: 1) the main subject and a number of subordinate topics, such as justice and injustice, the forms of government, the ideal statesman, and the drama; 2) the concern of the early part of the conversation with subjects remote from the state; 3) the mystical ending concerned with the life after death.[15]

In the *De Legibus*, a sequel to the *De Re Publica*, begun in or before 52 B. C.,[16] Cicero decided to make the time of the dialogue contemporary and to introduce himself as the chief speaker, as in the *Partitiones Oratoriae*, thus following the plan suggested by Sallustius for the *De Re Publica* as well as the example of Plato in his *Laws*. He is thus able to introduce recent events into the conversation.

The opinion has been recently expressed[17] that Cicero, in the

[15] For the Platonic influence upon the *De Oratore* specifically cf. Hirzel (see note 1), pp. 486-489.

[16] A. Gudeman, "Zur Chronologie von Ciceros de Legibus," *Berl. Philol. Woch.* XII (1892), cols. 930-932; cf. Kalbe (see note 3), pp. 10-22.

[17] Sprey (see note 2), p. 21.

letter referred to above, does not intend to say that he has decided to follow Sallustius' advice for the *De Re Publica*, but that his final statement on the subject [18] really contains a reference to the *De Legibus*. According to this theory *nunc et id vitabo* refers to his resolve to keep the *De Re Publica* at the fictive date 129 B. C., and *loquar ipse tecum* reflects his plan for the sequel dialogue. This is obviously a forced and improbable interpretation of Cicero's words. But it does seem natural that, after having rejected Sallustius' proposed plan for the *De Re Publica*, he should have adopted it for the *De Legibus*; this would have been a characteristic compromise.

And he was undoubtedly strongly influenced by Plato to adopt this technical arrangement. Cicero considered Plato's *Laws* as a sequel to his *Republic*,[19] and identified the Athenian Stranger of the *Laws* with Plato himself; [20] he informs us specifically that he is following Plato's example by composing *Laws* as a sequel to his own *Republic*.[21] His imitation of Plato in the general structure of the *De Legibus* can be summarized under the following heads: [22] 1) He has made the fictive date contemporary and has given himself the chief rôle, throwing off the mask of Scipio as Plato did that of Socrates; 2) He has begun the work with the dialogue, omitting any explanatory preface. As the *De Re Publica*, like Plato's *Republic*, is a narrated dialogue with proem, so the *De Legibus*, like Plato's *Laws*, is a purely dramatic dialogue; 3) The number of interlocutors is the same as in Plato's dialogue; 4) The peripatetic character of the dialogue and the attempt to harmonize scene with subject are evidently imitations of both Plato's *Laws* and his *Phaedrus*; 5) The time of the dialogue, a long, perhaps the longest, summer day, is the same as that of the *Laws*.

The relation of the *De Legibus* to the *De Re Publica* is very close; the later dialogue makes concrete the general ideas presented in the earlier one, which would be incomplete without its sequel, since Cicero's "laws" are the laws of the ideal republic proposed by Scipio. It has been argued [23] that, on account of

[18] *Ep. ad Q. Fr.* III, 5, 2: . . . *ne in nostra tempora incurrens offenderem quempiam. Nunc et id vitabo et loquar ipse tecum.*

[19] *De Leg.* II, 14.

[20] *De Leg.* I, 15.

[21] *De Leg.* I, 15.

[22] Hirzel (see note 1), pp. 473-476.

[23] Reitzenstein (see note 5), p. 2.

this close relationship, the difference between the two dialogues in assumed time and in speakers is unnatural. The explanation presented for this abnormality is that what we have of the *De Legibus* was written, or begun, at a time when Cicero intended, as we have seen, to make the *De Re Publica* a contemporary dialogue, with himself the chief speaker. Therefore, it is assumed, if Cicero had completed the *De Legibus*, he would have revised it to make it agree with the final form of the *De Re Publica*, putting his laws into the mouth of Scipio, who would have been supposed to hold a second conversation with his friends to supplement that recorded in the *De Re Publica*.

This specious theory has been accepted, rather surprisingly, by certain other scholars besides its author.[24] It seems improbable on its face and, what is more important, it can easily be disproved.

There is no abnormality in the relation between the two dialogues in the opinion of Cicero. We know this, first, from the text of the *De Legibus*. The work contains nine references to the *De Re Publica*, and in five of these passages Scipio is mentioned as the chief speaker of that dialogue.[25] These references to Scipio are distributed among all of the three extant books; they show that the difference in time and in speakers was definitely a part of Cicero's plan. In the conversation of the *De Legibus*, Cicero refers to the *De Re Publica* as a previous work of his own authorship; what else could he do, and what could be more natural?

A second demonstration that the present relationship between the two dialogues was exactly what Cicero intended it to be can be drawn from the consideration of two other pairs of his dialogues. Nine years after the publication of the *De Oratore*, Cicero wrote the *Brutus de Claris Oratoribus*, a sequel to the *De Oratore*. "Herein the principles laid down in the former work find a historical and practical application," says an editor of the *Brutus*,[26] and this statement would also be appropriate as a description of the relationship of the *De Legibus* to the *De Re Publica*. The assumed date of the *De Oratore* is 91 B. C., while

[24] Häfner (see note 6), p. 95; Schanz-Hosius (see note 1), p. 498.

[25] I, 15, 20 (Scipio), 27 (Scipio); II, 23 (Scipio); III, 4, 12 (Scipio), 13, 32, 38 (Scipio).

[26] M. Kellogg, Edition of *Brutus*, Boston, 1889, p. ix.

the *Brutus* is a contemporary conversation between Cicero, Brutus, and Atticus. We find a similar relationship between the *De Natura Deorum* and the *De Divinatione*; the latter dialogue is a sequel to the former. The fictive date of the *De Natura Deorum* is 77-75 B. C., when Cicero was about thirty years old. Cicero is present, but takes practically no part in the conversation; the sole reason for his presence is that he may write it down later, according to the convention of the dialogue. But the *De Divinatione* is a contemporary conversation between Cicero and his brother Quintus.

It is clear then that Cicero not only disagreed with those modern scholars who consider the relationship between the *De Re Publica* and the *De Legibus* strange and unnatural but found such a relationship so satisfactory that he used it in three pairs of closely related dialogues.

Cicero has also been accused [27] of making an error in having Atticus, in the dialogue, suggest that Cicero, who had written a treatise on the republic, should now *write* one on its laws.[28] But surely the process supposed to be gone through in the composition of a dialogue was well known and would make Atticus' meaning obvious. As Cicero's reply indicates, Atticus is asking him to discuss the subject with Quintus and himself, with the purpose of publishing the discussion later as a treatise. Cicero's thought on the subject is clearly stated at the end of the *Tusculan Disputations*,[29] where he says that he will write out the five-day discussion and send it to Brutus.

The suggestions that the form of the *De Legibus* and its relation to the *De Re Publica* are indications of its incompleteness have perhaps been sufficiently answered. Possibly a few words more should be said about the absence of a proem, since that point has been so greatly stressed. It appears to be agreed upon by a number of scholars [30] that a proem to the dialogue would be superfluous and that there is not the slightest need for it. Those who are still doubtful might reread the beginning of the

[27] Hirzel (see note 1), p. 478.

[28] *De Leg.* I, 15.

[29] *Tusc. Disp.* V, 121.

[30] Hirzel (see note 1), p. 476; Leo (see note 1), p. 46; Reitzenstein (see note 5), p. 4; Du Mesnil (see note 9), p. 5; Kalbe (see note 3), p. 22.

dialogue to see whether any necessary or desirable information is withheld from them. They will find, I believe, that everything Cicero could have told them in a preface is stated in the dialogue itself. We have here simply a Sophoclean instead of a Euripidean prologue.[31] But certain scholars still miss a "dedicatory epistle;"[32] the *De Legibus* is not specifically dedicated to anyone, they complain, while the *De Re Publica* is; the words of dedication are lost in the *De Re Publica,* but we know they were there and that the work was probably dedicated to Quintus.[33] Here again the sequel dialogues of the other two pairs can help us. While the *De Oratore* and the *De Natura Deorum* are formally dedicated, neither of their sequels, the *Brutus* and the *De Divinatione,* contains any specific dedication. The former can be considered as dedicated to Brutus by the implication of its title, and the latter as offered to Quintus, since he is the only interlocutor besides the author. In the same way the *De Legibus* can perhaps be thought of as dedicated to Atticus, since he is the first speaker, and therefore his name would stand at the beginning of the text.

Those who hold the theory that the first book of the *De Legibus* contains practically the same material as did *De Re Publica* III are naturally bound to conclude that there is something seriously wrong with the *De Legibus.*[34] The close relationship between the two dialogues especially would make such a state of affairs highly abnormal, and the abnormality would not be less because the sequel dialogue was published a number of years later than its predecessor.[35] We should certainly

[31] The much quoted words *in singulis libris utor prooemiis* (*ad Att.* IV, 16, 2) have no application to the problem; they refer exclusively to an early plan, later abandoned, for the *De Re Publica.*

[32] E. g., Kalbe (see note 3), p. 23.

[33] *De Re Publica* I, 13; cf. Hirzel (see note 1), p. 469, note 2. A dedication to Quintus would be the least Cicero could do after promising his brother to make the treatise a dialogue between Quintus and himself.

[34] This is the theory of A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa,* Berlin, 1892, pp. 50-61.

[35] Reitzenstein (see note 5) seems to think that the period of time which elapsed between the publication of the two dialogues would make such a duplication of material less noticeable. But perhaps he is prepared to believe in such repetition because he assumes that the first book of *De Legibus* was written hastily and that the whole work was prepared for publication in a great hurry!

have conclusive evidence of such repetition before believing that Cicero could have been guilty of it. But there is no such good evidence; the material in *De Re Publica* III which is thought to have been the same as that of *De Legibus* I has been lost, and the theory of duplication of source material has been of late generally rejected by scholars [36] and has recently been disproved as fully as such an assumption can be disproved.[37]

We now come to the details of the composition. The opinion that there are certain repetitions and unevennesses in the *De Legibus* which make it impossible or very difficult to consider it a completed work was first expressed in 1842.[38] This statement, made before Vahlen's masterly work on the great textual difficulties of the treatise had been done and before Cicero's detailed plan for its structure had been traced,[39] has been repeated by a long succession of scholars and reappears in the latest general treatments of the work.[40] Let us see what these inconsistencies are.

In the first place charges of unevenness of treatment and of omissions are made against Cicero's defence of his "laws" in Books II and III. We are dealing here with commentary on a text; Cicero first presents the text of his laws very concisely in archaistic legal language and then gives a detailed discussion of their several provisions. Classical scholars do not need to be told that a commentator on a text normally discusses some passages at length, others briefly, and about others says nothing at all. Yet the fact that Cicero does exactly this is essentially the basis for the criticism of his commentary and the theory that it

[36] E. g., A. Laudien, "Die Composition u. Quelle von Ciceros I Buch der Gesetze," *Hermes*, XLVI (1911), pp. 108-143; A. Loercher, *Jahresberioht*, CLXII (1913), pp. 129-134.

[37] Sprey (see note 2), pp. 23-53.

[38] J. Bake, Edition of *De Legibus*, Leyden, 1842, pp. xxiii-xxvii. Cf. A. Reifferscheid, "Kritische Beiträge zu Cicero de Legibus," *Rhein. Mus.*, XVII (1862), pp. 269-278.

[39] J. Vahlen, Edition of *De Legibus*, Berlin, 1870 and 1883; T. Bögel, *Inhalt u. Zerlegung des zweiten Buches von Ciceros de Leg.*, Kreuzberg, 1907; "Zum zweiten u. dritten Buch von Ciceros Schrift de Legibus," *Χάριτες F. Leo . . . dargebracht*, Berlin, 1911, pp. 297-321. I have not been able to see G. Lazić, *De Compositione Secundi et Tertii Libri de Leg.*, Karlowitz, 1904.

[40] E. g., Teuffel and Schanz-Hosius (see note 1).

was never finished. Yet since Cicero is supplying, not merely notes, but also a defence of his ideal laws, unexplained omissions of commentary on very important provisions might show that something is wrong. In Book II the omissions pointed out are in sections 34 and 41. In 34 we find the first case where any provisions of the laws are omitted from discussion. If the writing of the notes on these particular laws had been temporarily omitted, with the idea of supplying the missing material later, there would presumably be no mention in the commentary in its present form of the laws not explained. But what do we find in Cicero's text? *Marcus . . . Iam de haruspicum religione, de expiationibus et procurationibus sat esse plane in ipsa lege dictum puto. Atticus. Adsentior, quoniam omnis haec in religione versatur oratio.* Cicero notes the omission and explains it to his reader. This is also true in 41, the second case of omission, where Cicero says: *Iam de periuriis, de incesto nihil sane hoc quidem loco disputandum est.* And later in the same section, in a passage where the text is corrupt, he seems to be explaining again: . . . *satis in lege dictum est.*

These are the only omissions in the commentary of Book II which deserve to be mentioned. In Book III only the latter part of the commentary is preserved; here Cicero omits without explanation the comment on several brief passages of the laws;[41] in most of these cases he mentions the provision not discussed and then passes directly to the next law. A characteristic passage is III, 40: *Deinde sequitur quibus ius sit cum populo agendi aut cum senatu.* Doubtless he explained the first omissions in Book III, which would naturally occur in the lost portion of the commentary.

The custom of a writer or lecturer who plans to do something several times which his readers or hearers may not understand is to give a complete explanation when the first case occurs, perhaps to repeat this explanation in briefer form in one or more succeeding cases, and thereafter to take it for granted that the matter is understood. This is exactly what Cicero has done, as we have just seen. How is it possible to suppose that, if he had planned to go back and insert commentary on these passages of his laws, he would have made plain statements in the text, as he

[41] See III, 28, 40, 43, 46.

has done, that they needed no commentary? All the "laws" which Cicero has omitted from discussion are simply Roman laws about which there was no controversy and which needed no defence or explanation before the Roman audience he was addressing.

But other provisions of the laws are discussed at great length in the commentary! Naturally; let us see which these are.

1) The authority of the augurs and the reality of divination (II, 31-33). Cicero was an augur himself; he stresses the political importance of that priesthood. His special interest in the problem of divination is shown by the fact that he devoted a special treatise to the subject.

2) The performance of sacrifices by women at night (II, 35-37). Cicero's interest in this subject was chiefly due to the Bona Dea affair of 62 B. C. Also, a reconciliation between the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Roman provisions on the subject was appropriate here.

3) The importance of music in the state (II, 38-39). Here a discussion of Plato's views is natural; Cicero confines it to moderate limits.

4) Punishment for the impious (II, 41-44). Cicero is here led into a discussion of the persons guilty in the matter of his own exile, a subject on which he was fond of dilating.

5) The powers of the plebeian tribunes (III, 19-26). This very long discussion is devoted to one of the most controversial subjects in Roman politics—a subject on which Cicero differed greatly from the extreme conservatives, whom he is chiefly addressing in the *De Legibus*. Quintus defends the reactionary point of view with spirit.

6) The method of voting in popular assemblies (III, 33-39). Here again Cicero differs from the extreme conservatives and proposes an original compromise measure,[42] which he defends at length against Quintus, who is again the exponent of reaction. The number of laws on the mode of balloting cited by Cicero during the discussion shows that this had long been a controversial subject in Roman politics.

The reason for the treatment of each of these subjects at length is too obvious to require further discussion.

[42] Cf. *A. J. P.*, XLII (1921), pp. 314-315.

The very long passage at the end of Book II, devoted to the religious rites of families and the laws of burial, was omitted from our list. This is a special case. Cicero tells us[48] that a place will be found in the *De Legibus* for some discussion of problems of the Roman civil law. He has arranged his "laws" in Books II and III in such a way that the last law in each book will naturally give rise to a long technical treatment of certain problems of the Roman law. In Book II this treatment, on the subjects mentioned above, is contained in sections 46-68. In the corresponding essay in Book III he evidently discussed the technical problems connected with the legal limits of the powers of elected officials. The preparation for this discussion is contained in 47-49, but the discussion itself is lost.

Certain repetitions have been pointed out, which, it is thought, Cicero would have removed in the final preparation for publication. In II, 8 and 9, there is a very slight repetition by Quintus of a preceding remark by Marcus; a repetition which is quite characteristic of Cicero's style. The fact that what Quintus says in III, 12, when Cicero finishes the recitation of the laws of Book III, is very similar to Atticus' remark (II, 23) at the corresponding point in Book II has also been criticized unfavorably. This repetition is obviously due to Cicero's desire to emphasize his reasons for keeping his ideal laws so close to the actual law of Rome. The greater originality of the laws of Book III is marked by Atticus' phrase, *etsi a te paulum adlatum est novi* (III, 12).

The charge of repetition in III, 16-17, is of a different character. In 15 there begins a discussion of forms of government, preliminary to the commentary on the laws. At this point a great lacuna occurs, and where the text resumes, we find ourselves in the midst of that commentary. In 16-17 a few words are said about the plebeian tribunes just before the break. The argument is that Cicero *must* have gone on at this point to a detailed discussion of the tribunes, and that this would obviously be inconsistent with the long consideration of their powers found in the commentary on the laws (III, 19-26). Such an argument is of the same character as the theory that the ideas expressed in *De Legibus* I would prove to be a repetition of the discussion in

[48] *De Leg.* I, 17, etc.

De Re Publica III, if the latter were extant. If scholars are to discover "disturbing repetitions" in an author's work, they must find them in the extant text, not in passages which are lost! There is no indication in III, 15-17, that Cicero is leading up to an immediate detailed discussion of the plebeian tribunes; we have here rather a brief consideration of the balance of powers in the state.

The criticisms made in regard to I, 33,[44] and II, 55-65,[45] hardly need to be discussed; obviously the only real difficulties in these passages are textual. And the same applies to Reifferscheid's theory that the commentary lost in the great lacuna of Book III was never written.[46] This theory is based on a misunderstanding of Cicero's plan for Books II and III and particularly of the special discussion *de potestatum iure* which Cicero is introducing at the point where Book III breaks off. When these misunderstandings are cleared up there is nothing left of the argument. The great lacuna begins and ends in the middle of a sentence; the loss of pages in an archetype manuscript is the only logical explanation, and a quite sufficient one.

The attempt[47] to identify Cicero's lost and perhaps unfinished treatise *De Iure Civili in Artem Redigendo* (Gellius, I, 22) with the *De Legibus* and to use Quintilian's statement[48] as a proof for the incompleteness of our treatise is also antiquated and no longer needs refutation.

A great part of the *De Legibus*—considerably more than half, in all probability—is lost, and there are frequent lacunae, short and long, and many serious textual difficulties in the extant portion. But, in my opinion, the work shows every evidence of having been put in final form by Cicero. It is obvious that he planned the *De Legibus* carefully[49] and was consistently faithful to his plan. Bögel[50] has traced carefully the parallelism

[44] Kalbe (see note 3), p. 24.

[45] F. Boesch, *De XII Tabularum Lege a Graecis Petita*, Diss., Göttingen, 1893, pp. 4-12.

[46] Reifferscheid (see note 38), pp. 272-274.

[47] Reifferscheid (see note 38), pp. 271-272; cf. Kalbe (see note 3), pp. 16-17.

[48] III, 10: *componere aliqua de eo coeperat.*

[49] Hirzel (see note 1), p. 477.

[50] Bögel in Χάριτες *Leo* (see note 39).

between the second and third books. One important point, to which I have already referred, I believe he has missed. The long disquisition on the family rites and the laws of burial at the end of Book II (46-69) is introduced as special commentary on the last of Cicero's religious laws (22 extr.). It seems equally certain that the essay *de potestatum iure* which concluded book III was a corresponding addition to the last of Cicero's laws on the magistrates.[51] In III, 47-49, where Cicero is introducing this essay, now lost, he begins with the assumption that he has finished the commentary, closely parallel to his "forgetfulness" in II, 45. Atticus then insists that there is a gap to be filled, as there was in Book II.[52] Cicero must now treat the legal powers of the state officials, according to the law of Rome. Cicero's last law on the magistrates had given the censors the duty of examining retiring magistrates on their official conduct during their term of office. This provision would involve as a basic condition for its fulfilment the exact determination of the legal limits of the powers and duties of these officials, and this is clearly the subject of the special disquisition at the end of Book III. Thus the plans of Books II and III are completely parallel, with very slight exceptions in detail, for each of which Cicero had an obviously good reason.

The care and skill with which the argument of Book I has been developed and the pains taken with its composition have frequently been noticed.[53] And the connection between Books I and II is now recognized to be clear and logical.[54]

We find in the *De Legibus* none of the small inconsistencies which have been noted, for example, in the *De Natura Deorum*.[55] The latter work is included in Cicero's list of completed treatises in *De Div.* II, 3, yet obviously could not have received its final

[51] III, 11: *Censoris fidem legum custodiunto; privati ad eos acta referunto nec eo magis lege liberi sunto.*

[52] III, 48: *si de sacrorum alienatione dicendum putasti cum de religione leges proposueras, faciendum tibi est ut magistratibus lege constitutis de potestatum iure disputes.*

[53] E. g., R. Hoyer, *De Antiocho Ascalonita*, Diss., Bonn., 1883, pp. 17-18; Laudien (see note 36), p. 130.

[54] Sprey (see note 2), pp. 90-94; Loercher (see note 36), p. 134.

[55] See J. B. Mayor's edition of the *De Nat. Deor.*, Cambridge, 1880-85, III, pp. xxv-xxvi.

preparation for publication; there still remain in it contradictions in regard to the time division of the conversation.

Obviously, in the present state of the *De Legibus*, no absolute proof can be offered that it was entirely finished. We have clear evidence that five books were written; we cannot now demonstrate that the sixth, or, if they were planned, the seventh and eighth, were finished. Yet all the indications from what is now extant would tend to establish the treatise as a completed work.

The problem considered in this article has somewhat more importance than that of a minor item in the history of Latin literature. If the *De Legibus* as we have it is to be considered as merely a tentative first draft of a treatise, then scholars are perhaps justified in neglecting its contents as they have in fact done to a considerable extent.[56] But if what we have of the work is as Cicero wished it to be, we must treat it as Cicero's most careful formulation of the concrete provisions of an ideal constitution for the Roman state; it then becomes our most important source for his well-considered conclusions in the domain of political theory.

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[56] Cf. *A. J. P.*, XLII (1921), pp. 320-323.

A PASSAGE IN ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS RELATING TO THE THEORY OF TRAGEDY.

In his treatise *On Destiny* Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most illustrious of the Aristotelian commentators,[1] has left us an interpretation of the tragedy of Laius, the father of Oedipus.[2] I shall try to evaluate this neglected passage [3] for the theory of tragedy by considering, first, its place in the treatise as a whole, secondly, its broad relation to the philosophy of Aristotle, and thirdly, its interest for the criticism of the *Poetics*.

I

In outline the work is a classification of causes, which may be set forth as follows:

A efficient causes, *αἴτια ποιητικά* (*De Fato*, 3)
  I of purposeless acts [4] (4)
  II of purposive acts (4)
    a) antecedent causes, *αἰτίαι προηγούμεναι* (8; cf. 24)
      i) acts according to nature, *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν* (4) Here belong destiny, *ἡ εἱμαρμένη* (6), necessity, *ἀνάγκη* (9), spontaneity, *τὸ ἑκούσιον* (13, 14, 33), and *animal* instinct, *ὁρμὴ τῶν ζῴων* (13, 14, 33, 36, 38).

      ii) acts according to reason, *κατὰ τὸν λόγον*, (4) Here belong counsel, *βουλή* (11), foreknowledge of the gods, as revealed in oracles (30, 31), and free will, *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν* (5); which involves possibility, *ἐξουσία* (5), choice, *προαίρεσις* (12), *rational* instinct, *λογικὴ ὁρμή* (33), and virtue and vice, *ἀρετή, κακία* (5); and which results in a righteous deed or a wrong, *κατόρθωμα, ἁμάρτημα*, praise or blame, *ἔπαινος, ψόγος*, and honors or punishments, *τιμαί, κολάσεις* (34).

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[1] See Gercke in Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, I, 1453-5. For a bibliography of Alexander to 1926, see Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (1926), p. 179 of the "Verzeichnis der Arbeiten."

[2] *De Fato*, 31. This work is cited according to sections, the other minor works of Alexander according to page and line in the edition of Ivo Bruns (Vol. II, parts I and II of the *Supplementum Aristotelicum*). There is a separate edition of the *De Fato*, with a translation, by Augustine FitzGerald (London, The Scholartis Press, 1931).

[3] It is not discussed in Robert's *Oidipus* or elsewhere so far as I know.

[4] For example, toying with chaff or aimlessly plucking out hairs. Such an act cannot be explained in terms of chance (b), because it has no teleological value; see Vincenzo Cioffari, *Fortune and Fate from Democritus to St. Thomas Aquinas*, Diss., Columbia, 1935, p. 5.

b) causes *not* antecedent,[5] but occurring "accidentally and by chance," αὐτομάτως καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης.[6] These have a purpose, but it differs from the actual end (4, 9; cf. 8, 24).

B material causes (. . . τὰ δὲ ὕλης ἐπέχει λόγον, 3)

C "the cause which lies in the form,"[7] ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτία (3)

D the final cause, τὸ τέλος (3)

The author considers that the existence of destiny, though not, to be sure, its nature, is established by the "innate conviction of mankind,"[8] but everywhere he denies strenuously that it is absolute and insists that free will also has an active role in shaping men's lives. He therefore turns deliberately against the Stoics,[9] and the tone of his discussion is strongly polemical. Mingled with telling analogies there is much sterile dialectic,[10] yet he has no small fund of insight. He remarks, for instance, that the popular notion of destiny has a psychological basis: being eager to claim credit but to shun responsibility, men naturally ascribe their successes [10a] to free will, their failures to destiny.[11]

To illustrate the several kinds of causes he uses the example of a statue (3). The efficient cause (A) is the sculptor, the

[5] 8; cf. 24, and Cicero, *De Fato*, 9, 19: . . . interest inter causas fortuito antegressas et inter causas cohibentia in se efficientiam naturalem.

[6] 4. In the section περὶ τύχης of the *De Anima* it is shown by a process of elimination that τύχη does not properly belong in any of the four recognized classes of causes, though most closely connected with the efficient. The four are all αἴτια καθ' αὑτά, while τύχη belongs to the αἴτια κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The same distinction is made in the pseudo-Plutarch, *De Fato*, 7; cf. Aëtius, I, 29, 2 (*Doxographi Graeci*, p. 325).

[7] Here and often below I have ventured to adopt a phrase of Fitz-Gerald's, although I do not believe his version is always impeccable.

[8] ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόληψις, 2; cf. 26, and *De Anima*, p. 179, 26-31.

[9] Cf. Jean Félix Nourrisson, *Essai sur Alexandre d'Aphrodisias*, Paris, 1870, pp. 23-25. Zeno is mentioned in *De Fato*, 26. On Alexander's value as a source for Chrysippus, see Alfred Gercke, "Chrysippea," pp. 693-4 (*Jahrbücher für Philologie*, Suppl. XIV, pp. 691-781); Otto Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (*Problemata*, Heft IX, 1933), Chapter VII.

[10] Such are the refutations of two Stoic paradoxes (35-37), each in the form of a *sorites*, the content of which we need not reproduce. Alexander impugns a weak link in each chain of argument.

[10a] Cf. n. 68 *infra*.

[11] 2; cf. 7, and *De Anima*, p. 180, 4-12; Chrysippus, fragm. 32 in Gercke, *op. cit.* (in n. 9).

material cause (B) is the bronze or stone of which it is made (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphýsics*, IV, 2, 1013 B), the form (C) may be that of a discus- or spear-thrower, and the final cause (D) may be "the honouring of someone, or some act of piety towards a god."[12] As destiny seems to bear the closest analogy to the sculptor, it is placed among the efficient causes, and the other three classes (B, C, D) are dropped somewhat peremptorily at this point.

Destiny, which is identified with the influence of the heavenly bodies, the cause of all generation (6), does not belong among the purposeless acts (I), because it always implies a τέλος (5); nor yet among purposive acts according to reason (ii), because the essence of these is that the doer has the choice of omitting to do them, whereas the idea of destiny excludes any such choice. Thus the things created by artisans result from choice, not necessity; it is absurd to say that a house or bed was made by destiny, or a lyre tuned by destiny.[13] Destiny therefore falls among the "things produced by nature" (i), and in fact destiny and nature are identical except in name.[14]

Yet not all of the things produced by nature spring from necessity, for their generation may be "impeded" by a force "contrary to nature" (τὸ παρὰ φύσιν); similarly, the action of destiny may be impeded by a force contrary to it. No doubt reason and chance are the impediments to which Alexander refers. Yet the life of the individual usually follows the course which is implicit in his nature, for this is his "principle," or "cause" (ἀρχή, αἰτία; cf. *De Anima*, p. 185, 15-17, ed. Bruns). Thus the danger-loving man is more than likely to meet with a violent death; the intemperate will probably live a life of pleasure and excess, "unless something more nobly born within him prevents this"; the patient man (καρτερικός) may normally expect "the endurance of labours, the suffering of evils, and the ending of life in such catastrophes"; while the slavish and the insatiable live only for the acquisition of wealth (6; cf. *De Anima*, p. 185,

[12] For the four causes cf. also *De Anima*, p. 176, 8 ff.

[13] 5; cf. *De Anima*, p. 181, 33-34.

[14] 6; cf. *De Anima*, p. 185, 11-12. The chief difference between acts according to nature and acts according to reason is that the former have their principle and cause within themselves, while the latter "have the principle of their movement and their effective cause not within them, but from without . . ." (4)

26-31). Here, of course, we find the assumption which underlies the various ancient writings on ethology, such as the *Characters* of Theophrastus. Of the types mentioned, only the καρτερικός could be regarded as a possible hero of tragedy, for all the others would be excluded by Aristotle's demand that the hero be free from κακία καὶ μοχθηρία (see p. 434 *infra*).

So it would appear that, knowing a man's φύσις, one could predict with reasonable certainty the course of his future life. Yet such prophecy sometimes fails utterly, and this can only be due to the fact that one's nature and destiny do not always "have free passage."[15] So it is that, although the physiognomists, like the soothsayers, rely upon the general consistency of nature, they too may err completely in their judgments of character. The intimates of Socrates burst into laughter at the outrageous "character-analysis" which the physiognomist Zopyrus made for him, yet the sage assured them seriously that his nature was indeed such as his features suggested but that he had risen above it by the practise of philosophy.[16] His natural propensities (cf. Cicero, *De Fato*, 5, 9 and 11) had been overcome by a powerful "impediment," and this, Alexander means, was his choice or free will. It is clear, then, that φύσις, however great its strength, was thought to be only a *tendency*.

Not only is the Stoic position, that everything obeys the dictates of destiny, inacceptable because it destroys the possibility of free will, but it is opposed by the widespread belief that some

[15] εὐοδεῖν, mistranslated by FitzGerald as "be fortunate."

[16] On the possibility of improving upon one's native endowments see *De Anima*, p. 175, 30-32. The anecdote about Socrates, which first appears in Cicero (*De Fato*, 5, 10; *Tusc.*, IV, 37, 80), had become a philosophical commonplace; for a full discussion see Richard Foerster, *Scriptores Physiognomonici*, Teubner, 1893, vol. I, pp. vii-xiii. Cf. the similar case of Stilpo, as recounted by Cicero (*De Fato*, *l. c.*).

Alexander is known to have written a commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Φυσιογνωμονικά (Foerster, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. xxxiii). His strong interest in such matters is revealed by numbers 86-87 of Foerster's "Sylloge locorum," *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 283.

Socrates' eyes seem to have been his most striking feature, but all that we read about them is complimentary (cf. *Script. Phys.*, vol. I, p. 142, 18 ff.; vol. II, p. 49, 9 ff.), so it cannot have formed a part of Zopyrus' analysis, as did, perhaps, the fact that he had no hollows in the neck at the collar-bone (Cicero, *De Fato*, *l. c.*)—supposedly a mark of slowness and stupidity.

events take place "accidentally and by chance" (b).[17] These acts "follow causes considered to be the efficient causes of certain other things" (8; cf. 4, *ad fin.*). For example, a man is said to discover a treasure "by chance" if he does so when he is digging for some other purpose;[18] one who goes into the market-place receives the payment of a debt "by chance" if he has gone there on some other errand;[19] and a stolen horse is recovered "accidentally" when he runs away from his captors in search of feed and falls into the hands of his proper owners (8; cf. *De Anima,* p. 179, 3-6). The Stoic would urge that any such act is due to some necessary "cause not clear to human understanding."[20] But, Alexander replies, the truth is that the causes, far from being "too obscure for human reasoning power," are quite obvious: the act of digging and the journey to the market-place. These acts simply take place for another purpose, and so they are attributed to chance; they are not due to antecedent causes. To the class of *αἴτια ἄδηλα ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ* belongs rather the operation of such mysterious things as amulets and magic charms, in which no one discerns any element of chance (8).

In an important section of the *De Anima* both free will and chance are derived from "non-being," since both depend upon causeless motion (*ἀναίτιος κίνησις*), and this in turn depends upon an admixture of non-being. Proof of non-being is found in the difference between things eternal (*τὰ ἀίδια*) and things transitory (*τὰ φθειρόμενα, De Anima,* p. 170, 7 ff.). It does not inhere in all things, nor that in great abundance (*De Anima,* p. 171, 28-29), but is confined to our own comparatively small world (*ibid.,* lines 30-34) and, further, to the animate beings in it (lines

[17] 7. For a full discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of *tyche* see Cioffari, *op. cit.* (in n. 4), Ch. II.

[18] For the example cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* IV, 30, 1025 A 14; Alexander, *De Anima,* p. 177, 35 ff.; and the pseudo-Plutarch, *De Fato,* 7 (572. A). Gercke has shown that the pseudo-Plutarch has as its source an anonymous Platonist of the beginning of the second century A. D., who went back to Aristotle for his logic (Alfred Gercke, "Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus," *Rhein. Mus.,* XLI, N. F. [1886], pp. 266-291).

[19] The example comes from Aristotle, *Physics,* II, 5, 196 B 35. Cf. Torstrik, *Hermes,* IX (1875), pp. 425-470.

[20] *αἴτια ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ.* Cf. pseudo-Plut., *l. c.* in n. 18; v. Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,* vol. II, fragm. 965-973.

34 ff.). Non-being (and with it, potentiality) does not inhere in acts according to necessity, nor in acts of frequent occurrence; it gives rise only to acts of infrequent occurrence (*De Anima,* p. 172, 3-6).

Non-being in causes external to us produces acts according to fortune and chance, while in causes within ourselves it produces acts of free will.[21] Non-being influences choice to the same extent that it influences nature and habit, the determinants of choice (*De Anima,* p. 171, 16-18). Consequently we sometimes reach decisions which, because of the weakness of our mortal nature, have no antecedent cause (*ibid.,* lines 18-20). Thus free will is identified with the choices that we make without any antecedent cause (*μὴ προϋπαρχούσης αἰτίας*). Non-being destroys uniform and consistent action, and accounts for the fact that oftentimes persons of similar endowments and breeding differ from one another—what today we should call the "psychology of individual differences" (*ibid.,* 22-27).

The remarkable feature of this doctrine is that free will is made to spring from man's imperfection, not his strength. But Aristotle's explanation, if not Alexander's, would be that by very reason of this imperfection man yearns for the good that he lacks, so his acts of free will represent efforts to reëstablish in himself and his conduct the harmony characteristic of things necessary and external to himself—in other words, to subject himself to the action of the supreme cause, which is God.[22] On the meaning of this divergence from the thought of the *De Fato* I shall comment later (see p. 434 *infra*).

The idea of "contraries" (*τὰ ἀντικείμενα*) serves as a criterion for distinguishing between necessity and free will (cf. *De Anima,* p. 169, 39 ff.). Necessity refers to "things naturally produced by certain causes, the contraries of which could not possibly come into existence." Such is the action of fire, which is "not capable of receiving cold" (cf. *De Anima,* p. 184, 18-19); and of ice, which is not receptive of heat so long as it remains ice; but cold water is less restricted by necessity, for it may receive heat, the opposite. Such acts, however, as extending the finger or raising the eyelid, result from free will, because one may

[21] *De Anima,* p. 171, 14-16. The passage should be compared with *Eth. Nic.* as cited on p. 434 *infra.*

[22] Cf. Hamelin, *Le système d'Aristote*[2], p. 391, n. 1.

perform them or not, as he chooses. Hence potentiality, or "the possible and the chance occurrence of things one way and another" (*τὸ ἐνδεχόμενόν τε καὶ τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν γίνεσθαί τινα*), is inconsistent with the doctrine of universal necessity (9).

When they try to retain free will in the face of their stubborn belief in a universal destiny, the Stoics abuse the term, saying that in the case of animate beings whatever act takes place results from "free will," but that this is merely an *ὁρμή*, or instinct,[23] a necessary motion resembling the necessary downward movement of a falling stone (13). Such reasoning, replies Alexander, is also inconsistent; they ought not to restrict such "free will" to living creatures only but ought to add, for example, that growing hot is "in the power of" fire! Really, a distinction is to be drawn between "spontaneity" and free will. The spontaneous is that which "proceeds from an uncompelled assent" (*τὸ ἐξ ἀβιάστου γινόμενον συγκαταθέσεως*), while "free will is that which is produced along with an assent rendered according to reasoning and judgment" (*τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τῆς κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν συγκαταθέσεως*). Any act according to free will is spontaneous, but not every spontaneous act involves free will, so spontaneity is the broader term. Spontaneity belongs to the unreasoning animals, "which yield to their impressions (*φαντασίαι*) alone," whereas free will is limited to man, who subjects his impressions to the test of reason.[24] The reasoning (*λογικός*) man is the principle (*ἀρχή*) of his acts. Of course he does not always use his reason to the full; laziness or the lack of opportunity for deliberation may prevent it (14). Still, free will is inherent in, and characteristic of man, "just as for the sphere existence consists in rolling down an inclined plane,"[25] so it is idle to object that "no man is able to do the contrary of his future action."[26] Though everything else obeys external causes, the principle and cause of man are within him (15).

To be sure, the Stoics urge that "animals will perceive and

[23] The Latin equivalent is *appetitio, appetitus animi* (Cicero, *Acad.*, II, 8, 24; *Fin.*, III, 7, 23).

[24] *λόγος*. This is rational instinct (33) contrasted with animal instinct (36).

[25] Cf. Cicero, *De Fato*, 18, 42, and n. 55, *infra*.

[26] The proposition quoted would be consistent with the virtual denial of potentiality made by Diodorus; cf. p. 432 *infra*.

act according to destiny, and that some . . . will only show energy, but others will act in a rational way, and at the one moment fail and at the other succeed. . . ." [26a] Then praise and honors will follow a righteous act, while censure and punishments will follow error. Yet in the case, at least, of the reasoning animals their errors and righteous acts will be due to reason, not necessity. We do not say that one behaves righteously when he merely happens to be doing what is right and fails when he happens to be doing the evil; we say that he succeeds [26a] when, having it in his power to do the evil, he chooses to do the good instead. The criterion of good conduct is the good *choice,* not simply the good act. Consequently righteousness and error lie quite outside the province of the irrational animals. And a god cannot be said to be righteous but only to "do good deeds," because "the divine does not admit of errors" (*ἀνεπίδεκτον ἁμαρτημάτων τὸ θεῖον*). The gods are superior to praise (34).

Perhaps Alexander is straying from a rigorous analysis when he argues that the repudiation of free will has an undesirable ethical influence,[27] but the contention is as appealing as it is obvious. If men feel that they are released from responsibility for their acts, they will naturally turn from labor and thought to ease and pleasure. In that case a Paris and an Agamemnon could not fairly be blamed for their misdeeds, and the whole concept of virtue and vice would have to be discarded (16). His adversaries' position would also destroy the providence of the gods, the piety of men, and the art of divination (17). Nor could one teach moral principles with any confidence, so that the protreptic spirit of the Stoics themselves is quite inconsistent with their adherence to an absolute destiny.[28] If all of man's acts are controlled by necessity, then error, blame, and punishment will vanish (19, 20; cf. Cicero, *De Fato,* 17, 40). It is rather lame, however, to add that, even if the problem were insoluble and either alternative might, for all we know, be false, free will would be the more desirable falsehood.[29]

[26a] Cf. n. 68 *infra.*

[27] Cf. Cicero's attack on the *ἀργὸς λόγος* (*ignava ratio*) which destroys voluntary action (*De Fato,* 12, 28 to 16, 38).

[28] 18. Cf. v. Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,* vol. II, p. 267, fragm. 926.

[29] 21. The attitude is like that of Cicero when he says that, rather than accept the doctrine of an all-ruling fate, he would embrace

Many of his arguments are directed against the Stoic belief in an inviolable causal nexus (ἄλυσις τῶν αἰτίων)[30] extending through every part of the universe (22). Experience, he maintains, offers many contradictions to this idea. Thus the causal link from father to son, and so on, is not endless but may be broken by a celibate. According to this analogy, many generated things "do not succeed in becoming the causes of anything that their innate power implies." So it is that superfluous growths on various parts of the body appear to be antecedents of nothing, and monstrosities seem to be results rather than causes; it is "not everything that is capable of becoming a cause." To say, as the Stoics do, that "the cause of *anything* is obscure"—this is only an evasion (23).

Even if one were to concede that everything has a cause, still it would not follow that everything is the necessary cause of something else. Sophroniscus, merely by virtue of his existence, need not produce a Socrates; although, "granted that it was necessary for Socrates to exist, Sophroniscus was the necessary cause of his existence." Some things may have, not a "proper and antecedent cause" (αἴτιον οἰκεῖον καὶ προηγούμενον), but only an "accidental cause" (αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός) (24). A necessary cause is often followed by a necessary cause, but an accidental cause is rarely ever followed by a necessary cause.

Moreover, mere sequence in time does not imply causation,[31] for standing is not the cause of walking or day the cause of night. Sometimes both prior and subsequent events have the same cause (cf. Cicero, *De Fato*, 5, 9): rising is not the cause of walking, but the purpose of him who rises and walks is the cause

Epicurus' expedient, the declension of atoms, abhorrent as it is to him (*De Fato*, 10, 21). That Cicero adopted free will as a moral postulate rather than on logical grounds is well brought out by Margaret Y. Henry, "Cicero's Treatment of the Free Will Problem," *T. A. P. A.*, LVIII (1927), pp. 32-42.

[30] The *contagio rerum* which Cicero denies (*De Fato*, 4, 7—8, 16), urging that natural causes, such as climate, produce tendencies rather than definite acts.

[31] Cf. Cicero, *De Fato*, 15, 34: Itaque non sic causa intelligi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat, nec, quod in campum descenderim, id fuisse causae, cur pila luderem . . . This, Cicero explains, is the fallacy in the opening lines of the *Medea*, as translated by Ennius.

of both. Likewise it is absurd to say that all things are so bound together by cause that there is no first and no last, for the denial of a first cause means suppressing causation itself and it means eliminating science (ἐπιστήμη), the proper knowledge of first causes. The universe owes its continuity to the influence of the astral bodies, but it is not destroyed by a "transgression of the established order" (τάξεως παράβασις) any more than a kingdom is destroyed just because some few of the king's orders are disobeyed (25).

A Stoic paradox is next introduced (26), which amounts to little in itself but leads to the statement of an interesting doctrine. The meaning seems to be that a good man cannot properly be described as good if it is not in his power to do the opposite of the good act to which his goodness irresistibly inclines him.[32] Alexander replies (27) that this would be true enough if his goodness were born within him as a gift of nature, but that in reality it is developed gradually as the result of choice; before he became good it was in his power to become evil. Thus an artist, before becoming one, had it in his power not to be one; but, having become an artist, he can no longer avoid being one. Man is not born with virtue full blown, but he has an innate "power and aptitude for its acquirement which none of the other animals possesses." If he were born with full virtue, praise and blame could not be assigned to him, but, as it is, he is praised for having acquired virtue despite the imperfections of his natural inheritance (27). It is agreed that most men are evil anyhow; but, if evil were allotted to them by the necessity of nature, how could they escape from being more wretched than all the animals (28)?

A second analogy is even more striking: one may choose whether or not to throw himself down from a height; but, having once so chosen, he can no longer choose to remain stationary. So, having once decided to become sagacious, and having become so, a man no longer has the power *not* to be so.[33] Most of us, I suspect, would judge it fairly difficult to confirm empirically this headlong descent, as it were, to virtue! But it

[32] Cf. Nourrisson, *op. cit.* (in n. 9), p. 50.

[33] Cf. *Eth. Nic.* III, 5, 1114 A 19: *οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι.*

Cf. Rieth, *op. cit.* (in n. 9), p. 158.

is not to be supposed that this sudden crystallization of character, following hard upon an initial freedom of choice, utterly precludes such freedom thereafter, for sometimes it will occur to the sagacious man to do the opposite of what might reasonably be expected of him—and this chiefly to show his freedom of action (cf. *De Anima,* p. 174, 33-35). So soothsayers must be cautious (29)!

The idea that the gods have a perfect foreknowledge cannot, according to Alexander, be used as a proof of universal necessity. It is not "reasonable to suppose that the gods have any knowledge of the unknowable, for things impossible by their very nature preserve this same nature even in the presence of the gods." No god, after all, can make a diameter equal to a side, or make two times two equal five! Perfect foreknowledge is irreconcilable with potentiality; so, keeping potentiality, we must discard foreknowledge. The foreknowledge of the gods is limited to *possible* events (*τὰ δυνατά, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα*), but the art of divination need not be discarded, because the knowledge of the gods, while not perfect, is still far superior to man's. They foresee the possible, if not the necessary event.[34]

So if all events take place by necessity, why do the oracles of the gods resemble counsel (31)? Here we may revert to Alexander's earlier contention (11) that counsel (*βουλή*), which is the distinguishing gift of man (cf. *De Anima,* p. 172, 17-22), would be destroyed by a universal necessity; for counsel has for its objects not things eternal, nor yet things produced by necessity, but only things possible or eventual (cf. *De Anima,* p. 173, 3-5). His example, which brings us finally to the phase of the subject in which we are most interested, is the oracle in which Apollo advised Laius not to beget a son,[35] and his interpretation, which cannot be understood except in the light of nearly everything he has said before, is somewhat as follows. It was optional, depending upon Laius' own choice, whether he was to become a father or not, but he received the counsel of the benign deity as to

[34] 30. According to *De Anima,* p. 185, 33-36 the value of prophecy is that it foretells that which will occur in accordance with nature (cf. the doctrine of Carneades, n. 36 *infra*), and aids men by counsel, bidding them resist the dictates of their worse selves.

[35] Euripides, *Phoenissae,* 19, 20. The same illustration is used by Cicero (*De Fato,* 13, 30) in explaining the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between simple and confatal acts (*simplicia, confatalia*).

the better alternative, although the god himself did not know in detail what the consequences of a mistaken choice would be.[36] In making his unfortunate choice Laius was acting with free will and full responsibility, so that he committed an error which he could well have avoided if he had exerted his reason sufficiently, reflecting that even if the gods are not omniscient, they at least know more about the future than do mere mortals. To such a mistake he may have been disposed by his φύσις (cf. 6, and p. 420 *supra*). This unhappy decision, then, was the first phase of the drama. Alexander does not state explicitly the Stoic position on this point, but of course it would be, according to his own earlier discussion (cf. 8, and p. 422, *supra*), that Laius' paternity resulted from some *necessary* cause "not clear to human understanding."

The second phase was the series of tragic events which later befell Laius and Oedipus. Were these all a necessary result of the choice? In denying this Alexander would have said—if he had expressed himself fully and consistently on the point—that further ἁμαρτίαι were involved and that they sprang from the imperfect φύσεις of the actors; for we have seen (29, 32, and p. 427 *supra*) that, although one's character tended to become crystallized, so to speak, as the result of a decision, this was still no more than a strong *tendency* (6, and p. 421 *supra*) which still left an opening for free will. He is not quite fair to the spirit of the Stoics when he says (31) that they impiously attribute the series of disasters to the activity of a malignant deity, who constantly exerted himself from the very beginning to bring them about, and even went so far as arrange a deception in that he permitted Laius to believe that he could safeguard himself by exposing the child! Yet here the writer is obviously probing a tender spot, because the Stoics, as is well known, regarded God, nature, and destiny as identical,[37] so that it was

[36] Cf. 30, and p. 428 *supra*. According to Cicero (*De Fato*, 14, 32-33) Carneades believed that prophecy was possible only concerning an act produced by a natural cause, even if the act were "true from eternity." Ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis, cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi. For a criticism, see August Faust, *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke*, p. 256, n. 1. Origen used the same example in refuting the ἀργὸς λόγος (cf. v. Arnim, *SVF*, vol. II, p. 278, fragm. 957).

[37] Cf. Diog. Laert., VII, 135; Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 322 B 9; p. 323 A 9; v. Arnim, *SVF*, vol. II, p. 267, fragm. 931.

difficult for them to explain the origin of evil. "Whatever is, is predestined; evil is, so it is predestined. Therefore it must be caused by destiny, which is God. So God must be the author of evil." Such is the dilemma that Alexander thrusts upon them.[38]

So far, then, we have seen that the Stoic position, at least in its extreme form, would foster a type of tragedy in which one calamity inevitably and fatally follows another due to causes inscrutable to humankind, and that Alexander, in combating the Stoics, rejected this theory of a "Schicksalstragödie." Next we must inquire as to how far he has reproduced the doctrine of his master: has he not, perhaps, followed some original line of reasoning?

II

It has been well shown by Chevalier that Aristotle's theory of necessity was an outgrowth of his discovery of the syllogism and that his thought diverged, not unnaturally, from a logical to an ontological conception of necessity.[39] He began by taking two contrary propositions,[40] such as, "Tomorrow there will (or will not) be a naval battle."[41] To him it seemed clear that one of these statements is necessary, but that neither statement taken separately is more necessary than the other, so he ruled that, in the case of two contrary enunciations relating to the future, necessity is inherent in the alternative but not in either term of it singly.[42] This applies, to be sure, only to propositions of a *future* and *particular* content. In *general* propositions, such as, "A diameter is (or is not) commensurate with a side,"[43] and

[38] Cf. Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantia*, 1050 C (v. Arnim, *SVF*, vol. II, p. 269, fragm. 937).

[39] See Jacques Chevalier, *La notion du nécessaire chez Aristote*, pp. 105-112.

[40] Cicero (*De Fato*, 1, 1) calls them ἀξιώματα (*enuntiationes*)—quae de re futura cum aliquid dicunt, deque eo, quod possit fieri aut non possit, quam vim habeant . . . Cf. *Acad.*, II, 95.

[41] The same example is used by Alexander, *De Fato*, 10.

[42] Aristotle, *Hermeneia*, 9, 19 A 28; Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 115, n. 2; p. 116.

[43] Aristotle, *De Caelo*, I, 12, 281 B 12; Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 115, n. 3. Cf. Alexander, *De Fato*, 30: ἀδύνατον γὰρ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ποιῆσαι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον ἢ τὰ δὶς δύο πέντε εἶναι, κτλ. Cf. *De Anima*, p. 181, 10-14.

likewise in *past* or *present* propositions, such as, "You were (or are) seated (or standing)" (*l. c.*), the necessity obviously belongs to the one contrary or the other.[44] He saw further that, if in the case of two future, particular propositions one of the contraries, and not merely the alternative, were necessary, chance and contingency would be eliminated, as also counsel and action.[45] This, then, was his classification of judgments:

A general	B particular		
	B1 past	B2 present	B3 future
necessity in one of the contraries			necessity in the alternative only

Alexander adopted it without change.[46] The Stoic Chrysippus, who, as Cicero observed,[47] tried to steer a middle course between the fatalists (of whom he names Democritus,[48] Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle himself) and the champions of free will, was substantially in agreement with Aristotle on this point, for he held that potential acts include that which will *not* take place in the future; that, for instance, it was not necessary but only possible that Cypselus would reign at Corinth, even though this had been prophesied by an oracle of Apollo a

[44] Aristotle, *Hermeneia*, 9, 18 A 28-33; Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 116, n. 2. On the authenticity of the *Hermeneia*, see Hamelin, *op. cit.* (in n. 22), pp. 27-28.

[45] Aristotle, *Hermeneia*, 9, 18 B 4 and 32; Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 116, n. 3.

[46] Cf. Alexander, *De Fato*, 27: . . . *οὐχ ὅμοιον τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπί τε τῶν μελλόντων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων τε καὶ γεγονότων, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὂν τε καὶ γεγονὸς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι, τὸ δὲ μέλλον γίνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι.*

[47] *De Fato*, 17, 39 to 19, 45.

[48] Democritus had preferred to accept destiny rather than postulate a third, causeless atomic motion, as did his follower Epicurus (cf. Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1928, pp. 133 ff.). Later Carneades pointed out that the Epicureans did not really need to make this assumption in order to defend free will: they might better have begun by reserving a voluntary motion to the atoms themselves, just as they did for the human mind. Emotions, he said, lack an *external* cause, but they are not causeless—a postulate which could have been made of the atoms in the first place (Cicero, *De Fato*, 10, 23 to 11, 23).

thousand years before.[49] But Diodorus the Megarian extended necessity to the class B3 as well. All true propositions, whether past, present, or future, are equally necessary, he argued; the only essential difference is that necessity is apparent in statements of past or present truth but not in statements of future truth.[50] This position would, of course, furnish the best possible basis for the mantic art, but, as Cicero observes (*De Fato*, 9, 20), it would do away with free will altogether.

It is remarkable that Chrysippus, while rejecting absolute necessity, held fast none the less to the idea of an all-ruling destiny. This is shown by his attack on Epicurus' postulate of a third, causeless motion of atoms (cf. n. 48 *supra*), not due to their weight or to any striking of atom against atom (*extra pondus et plagam*). If we assume, said Chrysippus, that there *is* motion without cause, then not every proposition will be either true or false; for whatever lacks an efficient cause is neither true nor false. But every proposition *is* either true or false; so there is no motion without cause (. . . *omnia, quae fiunt, causis fiunt antegressis*), and consequently everything is due to fate.[51] In order thus to retain destiny while avoiding necessity, Chrysippus tried to distinguish antecedent causes as:

A—causae perfectae et principales; and
B—causae adiuvantes et proximae.

Here A involves necessity, which is not everywhere regnant, and B involves fate, by which all things are governed.[52] Every act, in other words, has a "proximate" cause, but not every act a "principal" cause.[53] Thus an assent or "acceptance as real" is

[49] Cicero, *De Fato*, 7, 13. Obviously the fallacy of this oracle, and of the one given to Laius, is that it attempts to assign to an enunciation of *particular* future content all the validity of a *general* enunciation. Chrysippus was begging the question disastrously when he assumed the infallibility of prophecy and deduced from it the existence of destiny (cf. v. Arnim, *SVF*, vol. II, p. 270, fragm. 939; p. 284, fragm. 978).

[50] Cicero, *De Fato*, 9, 17 to 9, 20; Epictetus, *Diss.*, II, 19, 1-3; cf. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, pp. 272, 273; Faust, *op. cit.* (in n. 36), p. 257, n. 1.

[51] Cicero, *De Fato*, 10, 20-21; cf. Alexander, *De Fato*, 15 *ad initium*, Faust, *op. cit.*, p. 256, n. 1.

[52] Cicero, *De Fato*, 18, 41; Faust, *op. cit.*, p. 291; Rieth, *op. cit.* (in n. 9), p. 142.

[53] Cf. Alexander, *De Fato*, 22 on the *σμῆνος αἰτίων* of Chrysippus; cf. Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.

always the result of an "impression" (*visum*),[54] but this impression is only a proximate, not a principal cause. The cylinder offers an analogy: it cannot begin to roll until one has given it an initial push, but thereafter the rolling motion is "in its own power" and the push is no longer required. Similarly, our acceptances require initial impressions, but thereafter they are in our own power, that is, they are not necessary.[55] By these dubious expedients Chrysippus tried to retain a universal destiny while rejecting a universal necessity.

These, briefly stated, were the positions of representative schools with regard to logical necessity. We have yet to note Alexander's relation to his master. It is thought that some of the very passages which testify to Aristotle's theories of logical necessity may have been written as a counter-attack upon Diodorus, that unbending fatalist.[56] These arguments Alexander adopted,[57] but he turned them not only against the extremists but likewise against compromisers like Chrysippus.[58] This fact is perhaps the chief fruit of a comparison between the treatise of Cicero and that of Alexander. Yet, as we have seen, there was, after all, no very serious breach on this subject between Chrysippus[59] and the syllogizing Aristotle. Hence Alexander was already at one remove from his master. The final parting came when Aristotle passed on to his ontological acceptance of necessity,[60] so that we find him ranged by Cicero among the fatalists themselves (*De Fato*, 17, 39).

It is evident, I believe, that the exposition of destiny left us by Alexander is not actually that of the whole Aristotle but rather such as the master might well have given had he founded it upon his logical premisses alone. Alexander presents a reasoned discussion of the subject in this partial aspect, without

[54] Or *φαντασία*; cf. Cicero, *Acad.*, I, 11, 40; II, 6, 18.

[55] Cicero, *De Fato*, 18, 42 to 19, 43. Cf. Miss Henry's article (cited in n. 29 *supra*), p. 39.

[56] Cf. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 272; Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 167, n. 2.

[57] Cf. Nourrisson, *op. cit.* (in n. 9), p. 28.

[58] Democritus was said to have imposed slavery upon mankind, Chrysippus only "semi-servitude" (v. Arnim, *SVF*, vol. II, fragm. 978).

[59] At least as his view is expressed in Cicero, *De Fato*, 7, 13 (see n. 49 *supra*).

[60] Cf. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, pp. 116, 117, 182.

including the ontological phase. Long ago it was observed[61] that the *De Fato* is somewhat exoteric in that the author does not go very far beyond volition itself in explaining man's voluntary acts, whereas in the more scientific *De Anima* he interprets free will in terms of non-being (see p. 423 *supra*), and thus comes rather close to the ontological principle of God as the supreme cause. So we may point to the semi-popular nature of the discussion as not the least important reason for the partial treatment.

But the most important reason of all must not be overlooked. Broadly, Aristotle's logic leads to free will, his ontology to an almost Stoic fatalism. Alexander would have been most inconsistent if he had tried in the *De Fato* to build upon both these discrepant phases of Aristotelianism at once. The very objection which he made to the Stoic notion of Deity (see p. 429 *supra*) might have been made with some show of justice to Aristotle's doctrine of God as the prime mover.

III

Finally, what is the value of the *De Fato* for the theory of ἁμαρτία? As is well known, recent criticism views with strong disfavor its time-honored interpretation as "tragic guilt,"[62] and, after reading the careful semasiological studies of van Braam and Hey,[63] one is strongly inclined to agree that some such term as "tragic error" is much to be preferred. Without repeating the evidence,[64] we may recall that an "error" (ἁμάρτημα) occupies the middle ground between a "mischance" (ἀτύχημα) and a "wrong" (ἀδίκημα), and that three important points are these: (1) the tragic hero has no essential baseness of character; (2) the harmful result of his act is *not* "beyond the possibility of calculation" (παράλογον); and (3) he is not over-

[61] See Félix Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, vol. II, pp. 311-312.

[62] See, for instance, Gudeman's lengthy note on *Poetics*, XIII, 1453 A in his edition (1934), p. 241.

[63] P. van Braam, "Aristotle's Use of 'Αμαρτία," *Classical Quarterly* VI (1912), pp. 266-272; Oskar Hey, "'AMAPTIA: Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes," *Philologus*, LXXXIII (1927), pp. 1-17 and 137-163.

[64] The two most important passages are *Rhetoric*, I, 13, 1374 B 4 and *Eth. Nic.*, V, 8, 1135 B 12.

whelmed by an external calamity but sets the disastrous train of events in motion himself. This is one of those fine-drawn concepts which are the essence of Aristotelianism.[65] The protracted and often futile arguments to which the question has given rise are explained by this very subtlety, and we cannot appreciate this better than by considering, point by point, whether "tragic error," so defined, is the more in harmony with a *Schicksalstragödie* or with the sort implicit in Alexander's treatment of the Laius-episode.

In the first place, the moral blamelessness of the hero is clearly in far better accord with the former alternative,[66] since nobody can conceivably be more innocent than when he is merely the helpless toy of destiny. The other two points are more difficult, but a comparison of the ἁμαρτίαι of Laius and Oedipus will serve to throw light upon them. That of Oedipus is stated by Hey (*op. cit.* in n. 63, p. 161) somewhat as follows. Doubting the truth of his kinship with Polybus of Corinth, Oedipus went to Delphi in quest of an oracle. Instead of a direct answer to his query Apollo gave him a warning as to the future: he had better not slay any man or marry any woman. Concretely, then, his error consisted in killing Laius and marrying Jocasta. The parallelism is evident. Both men received oracular counsel expressed in rather general terms, Laius being admonished to shun paternity, Oedipus to keep clear of homicide and marriage. A fatalist would hold that these acts, being predestined, were bound to take place *whether or not* the agents realized that they were disregarding this excellent advice from a high source. Though they might be aware that they were running a risk, it would make no practical difference in the end. But according to Alexander's view they would be wilfully erring at a time when error could be avoided because of this knowledge, so they would be guilty at the very least of an inadvertence.[67] In this con-

[65] See Walter H. Wente, *Aristotle's Discrimination of Synonyms*, Diss., Chicago, 1935.

[66] Gudeman's insistence (*l. c.* in n. 62) on discarding "tragic guilt" and "tragedy of fate" *simultaneously* seems a little unconsidered.

[67] The degree of guilt which, according to the tragedians, was incurred by disobeying a divine warning of this sort is well expressed by Walter R. Agard, "Fate and Freedom in Greek Tragedy," *Classical Journal*, XXIX (1933), pp. 117-126.

nection it is significant that Alexander regularly gives a definite moral value to words of the stem ἁμαρτ—, sometimes even approximating them to the meaning of ἀδικ—.[68] I think, therefore, that the second point has more value when interpreted in the light of free will.

The third point would also be more consistent with Alexander's implied theory. To be sure, the omniscient and omnipotent deity of the fatalists could have maliciously used Laius and Oedipus as pawns, forcing them to take the initiative, as it were, yet this would be a sort of contradiction in terms, because the true initiative would be coming from a source external to the actors, and this stands in point-blank contradiction to the third principle.

Thus, of the three elements of ἁμαρτία, as enucleated by van Braam and Hey, the first has as its fitting background the ontological fatalism of Aristotle, while the other two are based upon his logical free-will. Are we to conclude that this deep-seated inconsistency pitches the two acute scholars upon the horns of a dilemma, and that in order to escape they must admit, after all, that ἁμαρτία has some definite moral content? By no means: the truth is simply that ἁμαρτία reflects that basic inconsistency in Aristotle's philosophy which was demonstrated by Chevalier. This I take to be the lesson of the treatise *On Destiny*.*

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[68] This is seen in *De Fato*, 34, where ἁμάρτημα is opposed to κατόρθωμα, "righteous act" in the Stoic sense (cf. Pierre Couissin, in the *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie*, III [1929], pp. 249-252) rather than "success," as rendered by FitzGerald. Lacking space for a detailed demonstration, I leave it to the reader to check the other passages through Bruns' indices.

* The writer wishes to thank Professor Campbell Bonner for suggesting this general subject for discussion.

CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

The Roman Empire was for centuries an institution of such universal significance that extant literature still affords an illuminating variety of contemporary opinion which shows how far it figured in active discussion. The present article deals chiefly with the period from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, when the greatness of the Empire did not prevent consideration of its weaknesses and impending ruin. A brief preliminary résumé of some significant points in earlier discussion and propaganda is necessary, particularly in connection with the background of Greek and Jewish opinions.

Polybius interpreted the rise of the Roman Empire in the light of his personal experience in Hellenistic politics, his intimate knowledge of Roman statesmen and his philosophy of history. The decline of the Greeks was followed in his historical cycle by the Roman Empire, which Fortune established as the supreme fulfilment of the political destiny of the world. He held that the success of Rome's deliberate imperialism was furthered by her ideal constitution and by "knowledge gained in disaster."[1] The growth of the Empire was due to natural causes, and its inevitable decline would result either from unpredictable external causes or from the fixed pattern of internal disintegration through luxury, greed, and political rivalry leading to the breakdown of the commonwealth and the despotism of the crowd.[2]

Propaganda against Rome early took the form of prophecies of its ruin and of the return of power to the East. An example is Antisthenes' story of the prophetic corpse of a Syrian soldier and the oracular madness of the Roman general after the battle of Thermopylae in the Syrian War (191 B. C.). The prophecies given in the tale develop from the first simple threat of disaster,

[1] *Hist.*, I, 1-4, 63; VI, 9, and elsewhere. Limited space prevents full reference to pertinent materials; only the more significant passages will be cited, with a few secondary studies for fuller treatment of some important points. Cassius Dio's *Histories* afford much evidence for views of Rome in the 1st and 2nd centuries, drawn from contemporary sources, which supplement and confirm the opinions cited in the present paper.

[2] *Hist.*, VI, 57.

unless the Romans at once give up aggression in the East, to the final picture of a great leader who should bring all the peoples of Asia and Europe to sack Rome, enslave the Romans, and take their wealth to the East. The story seems to have been composed as a dramatic setting for oracular verses circulated among the Aetolians to win support for an alliance with Antiochus against Rome, though it has also been suggested that it was a later invention which formed a part of Mithridates' propaganda.[3]

Within the next generation opposition to Antiochus Epiphanes led to the composition of the most famous Hebrew prophecy of the ruin of great powers, and Daniel's picture of the last of the four great empires became the model for many later attacks on Rome, the last and strongest of the empires, which was destined to destroy all other nations, and for prophecies of its fall, which could take place only at the end of the present *saeculum*.[4] The earliest verses of the extant Jewish Sibylline oracles are assigned by some scholars to the same period, between 160 and 140 B. C., and other portions seem to have been inspired by events between the Macedonian and Mithridatic Wars. They describe Rome as the last empire, which causes fear to many kings and robs the cities of their wealth. They prophesy its future corruption and its ruin, when fire shall flow from heaven and Asia shall receive three times the gold of which Rome has robbed her.[5]

Thus when Mithridates began his campaign for popular support against Rome in Asia and Greece, he found a prophetic convention in familiar use, well suited to his purposes. Oracles that proclaimed the king of Pontus as the destined ruler of the world, whose Messianic character was foretold at his birth by a comet that blazed for seventy nights, were widely circulated.[6] His speeches and letters, as reported by later historians, stressed the evil origin of the Romans, who imitated their first king in

[3] Text in Phlegon, *Mirabilia*, III, ed. A. Westermann, *Scrr. rer. mirabilium Graeci* (Brunswick, 1893); for discussion of the authenticity and date of the story see Schwartz in Pauly-Wissowa, I, 2537, and H. Windisch, "Die Orakel des Hystaspes," *Amsterdam Verhandelingen, afd. Letterkunde*, XXVII, 3 (1928), p. 53.

[4] *Daniel*, chs. 2, 7, composed c. 165 B. C.

[5] *Oracula Sibyllina* (ed. J. Geffcken, Leipzig, 1902), III, 97—end.

[6] Athenaeus, V, 213 b: cf. Windisch, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

the formation of their empire—since they had nothing that they did not seize by force—in their hatred of kings, and in their insatiate greed for power and wealth.[7]

A syncretistic oracle based on Persian and Chaldean sources and circulated in Asia Minor under the name of the sage Hystaspes, perhaps at the time of the Mithridatic Wars, prophesied the ruin of Rome by an oriental power under the leadership of a Messiah, whose victory would be followed by eschatological fire. The oracle of Hystaspes is known to us only through Christian citations, which show its significance in the Christian syncretism of oriental, Greek, and Jewish prophetic writings. In the second century A. D. it was included in the list of seditious and astrological works which were banned under penalty of death.[8]

So a double tradition was established during the period of eastern expansion. The Greek historian's ready acceptance of Rome's place in the succession of world-powers and his praise of the method and character of Roman imperialism forecast the rational attitude of Greek writers and orators in the early Empire. But oracular and apocalyptic writings that fostered expectations of a restoration of power to Asia were at hand to increase popular resentment against the cruelty and greed of the worst Roman officials, and Mithridates' charges were often repeated.[9]

[7] Sallust, *Hist.*, IV, 69 (Mithridates' letter to Arsaces of Parthia): *neque quioquam a principio nisi raptum habere . . . pestem conditos orbis terrarum . . . omniaque non serua et maxime regna hostilia ducant . . . Teque illa fama sequetur, auxilio profectum magnis regibus latrones gentium oppressisse.* Justin, *Epit.*, XXXVIII, 6 (Mithridates' speech to his soldiers): *sic omnem illum populum luporum animos inexplebiles sanguinis atque imperii diuitiarumque auidos ac ieiunos habere.* See also Appian, XII, 10, and cf. Sallust, *Iugurtha*, 80 for the Numidian's use of the same charges against Rome that Mithridates is represented as making.

[8] Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, 20, 44; written *ca.* 138 A. D. For other citations see Lactantius, *Inst.* VII, 15, 18-19; Clemens Alex., *Strom.*, VI, 43, 1. For full discussion of the oracle of Hystaspes and related prophecies see Windisch, "Orakel des Hystaspes," and Cumont, "La Fin du Monde selon les Mages Occidentaux," *Rev. de l'Hist. des Religions*, CLII (1931), pp. 64-96.

[9] It is notable that Mithridates' attack on Rome is the only speech that Justin quoted *in extenso* (*Epit.*, XXXVIII, 4-7). Mithridates' letter to Arsaces was preserved in a collection of letters and speeches

Cicero naturally furnishes the fullest evidence for the views of the Empire held by Roman statesmen of the late Republic. Since his *Glaube an Rom* has been carefully analyzed in a recent study,[10] it is only necessary to summarize characteristic ideas that recur in later writers, often in a form influenced by Cicero's phrasing. His attention was centered about the city itself; the provinces, and even Italy, meant little to him. He idealized Rome's past and feared that the decadence of the present, in the old age of Rome, would end its glory. He held that the Roman power had been established over inferior peoples by military and political *uirtus*, not by the gift of Fortune, and he defined it as *patrocinium orbis terrae uerius quam imperium*.[11] He emphasized the eternal and universal character of the Empire, yet in the *Somnium Scipionis* he pointed out its small extent contrasted with infinity.

During the Augustan Peace the major emphasis was naturally on the greatness of Rome and the eternal and beneficent power it was to exercise in the future. Livy, however, complained that the most unreliable Greek historians were maliciously given to interpolating a fictitious tale of Roman subservience in their accounts of Alexander and to belittling the Roman Empire in comparison with that of Parthia.[12] While there is no sound evidence that this charge referred specifically to the sharp-tongued Timagenes, *felicitati urbis inimicus*,[13] enough is known of his lost *Histories of the Kings* to indicate that they were a model for anti-Roman historians. The extensive use of Timagenes' histories by Pompeius Trogus in his *Philippic Histories*, so widely read in Justin's later *Epitome*, indicates their influence even among Roman writers.[14] The *Epitome* preserves a strong

from Sallust's *Histories*, widely circulated in the 2nd century, another indication of the current interest at Rome in discussions of the character of the Roman Empire.

[10] J. Vogt, *Ciceros Glaube an Rom* (Stuttgart, 1935).

[11] *De off.*, II, 27. Cf. Vogt, *Orbis Romanus* (Tübingen, 1929), pp. 9-11, on the Roman adoption of the Greek idea of the *oecumene*.

[12] *Hist.*, IX, 17, 6-7.

[13] Seneca, *Ep.*, XIV, 3 (91), 13.

[14] For *testimonia* on Timagenes and for fragments of his work see F. Jacoby, *Fragmente d. griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1926), II A, 318-323. For general discussion R. Laqueur in Pauly-Wissowa, II, vol. XI, 1065-1071 and A. von Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig, 1894), V, pp. 218-227.

note of enmity to the Roman power and includes a specific statement of the division of the world between Parthia and Rome. It clearly represents the hostile Greek tendency to criticize and extenuate the greatness of Rome. The victories of Parthia over Rome are described as less glorious than the triumph of the Arsacid state over the remnants of the great oriental empires that preceded it.[15] Greek historians more friendly to the Roman power emphasized its world-wide significance by compiling universal histories; the local histories, popular in the Alexandrian period, lost favor until the separatist movements of the third century aroused interest in the local *patria* once more.[16] While Roman writers in general were more concerned with the city than with the world, except in so far as they considered the two identical, and tended to account for the weaknesses of the Empire in terms of the internal history of the city, the Greeks, free from Roman republican traditions, saw Rome as the center of the Empire, not the Empire as an appanage of Rome.

The forty years that elapsed between the reigns of Augustus and Nero gave opportunity for a clearer perspective and a more objective view of the Empire as a whole and, at the same time, intensified provincial resentment of the faults in the imperial administration. The philosopher Seneca, with his direct control of imperial policies during his royal pupil's *quinquennium* and an anxious interest in them thereafter, shared Cicero's inconsistencies but was more concerned about the Empire as a whole. He used *pax Romana* as a synonym for the Roman conquest[17] and saw the Empire as a providential union of conquerors and conquered, in which most stubborn enemies became faithful allies.[18] Yet he also pictured the Empire as a seditious, discordant, and impotent multitude, ready to destroy itself and others, that could be controlled only by the wisdom and mercy of the emperor.[19] He took recurrent rebellion for

[15] Justin, XLI, 1.

[16] Christ-Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Litteratur* (ed. 6, Munich, 1924), II, ii, p. 711; H. Peter, *Geschichtliche Litteratur über d. röm. Kaiserzeit* (Leipzig, 1897), I, p. 60.

[17] *De prouidentia*, 4, 13: *omnes considera gentes in quibus pax Romana desinit.*

[18] *De ira*, II, 34, 4.

[19] *De clementia*, I, 1, 1 and 4, 1-2, etc.

granted [20] and saw that if the Germans, whose liberty was threatened by the expansion of Rome, should add discipline to their courage and love of freedom, the Romans could not withstand them except by returning to truly Roman *mores*.[21] This frank recognition of the weaknesses of the Empire strengthened his Stoic antagonism to the imperialism of Alexander and his opposition to Nero's imitation of the Macedonian emperor.[22] He evidently felt that the bounds of the Empire, attained in Rome's period of maturity, should not be exceeded. According to Lactantius,[23] Seneca's interpretation of the life-cycle of Rome set its old age at the point when proper occasion for wars ended and when the city began to waste its strength and exhaust itself by civil strife till it fell into a second childhood in which only the strength of the emperors supported its weakness. Eternal Rome was still subject to mortality. As a citizen Seneca boasted that the Roman power was universal;[24] as a Stoic, in the tradition of Scipio, he cried: *O quam ridiculi sunt mortalium termini!*[25] His nephew Lucan incorporated in his epic of the civil wars many reflections on the dangers of civil strife, overexpansion, and the concentration of power in the hands of one man, frequently with direct reference to current imperial plans.[26] The elder Pliny's interest in the whole world of nature led him more sincerely than many Romans to describe Rome as *una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria* and to emphasize the

[20] *Ibid.*, II, 1, 1: *omnes gentes quae Romanum imperium incolunt, quaeque iuxta iacent dubiae libertatis, quaeque se contra uiribus aut animis attollunt.*

[21] *De ira*, I, 11, 3-4.

[22] For Seneca's criticism of Alexander see esp. *Epp. mor.*, 83, 19; 91, 17; 94, 62-3; 113, 29; 119, 7. Cf. J. Stroux, "Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders d. Grossen," *Philologus*, LXXXVIII (1933), pp. 222-240.

[23] *Inst.*, VII, 15. It seems reasonable to suppose that the passage was quoted from Seneca the philosopher. See E. Westerburg, "Lucan, Florus und pseudo-Victor," *Rhein. Mus.*, XXXVII (1892), pp. 47-49.

[24] *Epigr.*, 29, 4: *qui finis mundo est, non erat imperii.*

[25] *Nat. quaest.*, I, prol.; cf. *Dial.*, VI, 28; VIII, 4; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 68; Marcus Aurelius, *Med.*, VI, 36; 44.

[26] See my article, "Lucan and Civil War," *Cl. Phil.*, XXVIII (1933), pp. 121-127; and for general discussion of the opposition to Nero's oriental policies, "Nero and the East," *H. S. C. P.*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 75-103. Noteworthy passages from Lucan are I, 70-72; X, 26-28.

marvellous bounty of peaceful commerce throughout the Roman world.[27]

In the first century A. D. the conviction was widely current that the destined time had come for the great ruler from the East to restore power to Asia and rule the whole world.[28] For a time the old belief took on a strange aspect, for some identified the eastern conqueror with the Roman emperor Nero, and later with Vespasian; but with the spread of the Jewish rebellion this interpretation of the prophecy became impossible for the Jews to accept. The old hope survived, but it was only in his second coming as Antichrist that Nero was expected thereafter to destroy Rome with Parthian help.[29] The association of Jews and Parthians in these prophecies is a reminder of the circulation of common ideas through the oriental world and of the extent of Parthian influence in the eastern provinces.[30] The *Revelations* of St. John, composed not long after Nero's death, show how readily the Christians took over the eastern prophecies as vehicles for their denunciation of Rome and of its hated ruler, though we have no evidence of Christian revision of the Sibylline oracles prior to the third century.

The crisis of civil war and rebellion that ended Nero's reign convinced Tacitus, as he said in the preface of his *Histories*, that it was necessary to consider "the attitude of the provinces, and the elements of strength and weakness in the whole world." He shared the younger Pliny's scorn of the new insolence of provincials and of their tendency to think themselves indispensable to Rome, and viewed with alarm the flattery of aliens by Romans.[31] But he could admire the greatness of the German Arminius, and he criticized both Greek historians who saw nothing worth recording outside their national history and Romans who glorified the heroes of the past but had no interest in those of the present.[32] He ascribed the catastrophes that afflicted

[27] See esp. *Nat. Hist.*, III, 5 and 39; XXVII, 1.

[28] Tacitus, *Hist.*, V, 13; Suetonius, *Nero*, 40, *Vesp.*, 4; Josephus, *Bell. Iud.*, VI, 312. Cf. Ed. Norden, "Josephus u. Tacitus," *Neue Jahrb. f. d. kl. Altertum*, XXXI (1913), pp. 637-666.

[29] Norden, *op. cit.*, pp. 659-660; cf. *Revelations*, 16, 12; 17, 7.

[30] Cumont, "Fin du Monde," pp. 28-30; M. Radin, *The Jews among the Greeks and Romans* (Philadelphia, 1915), pp. 266-267.

[31] *Ann.*, XV, 20-21; Pliny, *Panegyric*, 31, 2.

[32] *Ann.*, II, 88. Cf. Josephus, *Bell. Iud.*, I, 13-16 for criticism of his

Rome to the incapacity of her generals and the sedition of the legions as well as to external force and the treachery of the allies.[33] He saw that greed for power had increased with the growth of the Empire[34] until it became a serious menace to Roman peace. The plundering of Italy by Vitellius' troops[35] was a sharp reminder of what the provincials had to suffer. The withdrawal of soldiers for the civil wars left the frontier forces with only the name, and not the strength, of an army,[36] and the use of barbarian troops was a serious grievance throughout the empire and endangered Roman control of the frontiers.[37] The habit of celebrating triumphs without winning victories fostered the pride of emperors rather than the security of the provinces: this had been noted in accounts of Rome's earlier campaigns against the Germans and became a common charge against Domitian.[38]

Tacitus' account of the revolt of Civilis gives an epitome of reasons for rebellion on the part of border tribes in the West. Batavian dignity, he represents Civilis as declaring to the chiefs and most aggressive men of his tribe, was insulted by the minor officials sent to oppress Rome's former allies and present subjects. Requisitions, levies, and looting were rendered the more unbearable by constant transfer of troops. Since the Roman state had never been in worse straits and since both the free Germans and the Gallic provincials were ready to rise against Rome, the opportunity to profit by revolt against Vitellius, ostensibly in support of Vespasian, was too favorable to let slip.[39] The promise of liberty won Civilis wide support, and his secret propa-

contemporaries who wrote Assyrian and Median history but neglected modern affairs, and note the change in the next century, when the huge bulk of uncritical current histories was deplored by Lucian in *The Way to Write History*.

[33] *Hist.*, III, 45.

[34] *Ibid.*, II, 38. Cf. *Ann.*, III, 40; IV, 72 for similar statements applied to the reign of Tiberius, and note the recurrent emphasis on the rapacity of Roman officials in Dio's history of the early Empire.

[35] *Hist.*, II, *passim*, esp. 66.

[36] *Ibid.*, IV, 15.

[37] *Ibid.*, III, 5; IV, 14; *Germ.*, 37. Cf. Calgacus' gibes at the Roman troops, *Agr.*, 32: *aut nulla plerisque patria aut alia est.*

[38] *Ann.*, IV, 23; *Germ.*, 37; *Agr.*, 41; cf. Florus, *Hist.*, II, 30.

[39] *Hist.*, IV, 14.

ganda stressed the Roman oppression, which concealed slavery under the false title of peace.[40] When the revolt was clearly doomed to failure, Tacitus quotes one of the Batavians as urging surrender on the ground that no single state could avert the enslaving of the entire world and that the nearest approach to freedom that was now possible lay in loyalty to Vespasian.[41] It was no longer logical for a serious historian to claim, as Livy could do, that the Roman arms brought liberty to subjects, not slavery to free men.[42]

The Batavians were a definite part of the Roman world, to which they were closely bound by the increasing Romanization of their institutions, whereas the British Calgacus, in the farthest reaches of the Empire, saw in the Roman peace only desolation: *solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*[43] At best the Britons might be expected to obey, Tacitus thought, but they were not sufficiently subdued to be subservient; they were even less able than other provincials to endure complete slavery, and complete liberty was not possible within the Roman power. Tacitus had less hope than the younger Pliny that the Roman world would learn to prefer unified subservience to anarchical liberty.[44] The exactions of Roman governors added hatred of the Roman name to the inborn ferocity of British and German tribes, as the Roman historian recognized in his accounts of this and other revolts.[45] He could only hope that, since it was impossible that they should love Rome, they might continue to hate each other, so that the Romans might profit by the discord of their enemies as long as her imperial fate forced Rome on.[46]

The accusations of Civilis and Calgacus were, however, the "common charges brought against great empires,"[47] and a case could be made out for Rome, as Tacitus showed in the speech addressed by Cerealis to the Treveri and Lingones after their submission (A. D. 70). Revolt, he pointed out, was futile: war

[40] *Ibid.*, IV, 17. [41] *Ibid.*, V, 25. [42] *Hist.*, XLV, 18.

[43] *Agr.*, 30-31; for discussion of this use of *solitudo* see my note, "Solitudinem faciunt," to be published in *Cl. Phil.*

[44] *Agr.*, 13; *Hist.*, I, 16; Pliny, *Panegyric*, 32, 2.

[45] E. g. in *Hist.*, III, 45.

[46] *Germ.*, 33: *maneat, quaeso, duretque gentibus, si non amor nostri, at certe odium sui, quando urgentibus imperii fatis nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium discordiam.*

[47] *Hist.*, IV, 68.

and disorder had been superseded in Gaul by the Roman peace; the Gauls enjoyed the advantages of good emperors to the full and suffered less than the Romans from cruel ones. The vices of the Roman rule were no greater than those of an independent Gallic government would be. The Empire was a mighty fabric which could not be destroyed without ruining its destroyers, and obedience and security are always preferable to defiance and ruin.[48]

We know very little of Messianic hopes in the West compared with those of the East, but the Boian Mariccus had only to proclaim his godhead to gain a wide support for his promised liberation of the Gallic provinces.[49] Vindex was encouraged to lead the revolt against Rome by a Spanish prophecy similar to the oriental ones applied to Nero and Vespasian.[50] The burning of the Capitol at the time of Civilis' revolt seemed to portend the end of the Empire and the transfer of world power to the transalpine tribes, as prophesied by the Druids,[51] a pendant to the oriental belief in the return of power to Asia. Real belief in the eternity of the Empire required more thorough Romanization than existed in sections where Druidism was strong, and dissatisfaction with Roman rule tended to revive the national religion.

Though German liberty seemed a more serious threat than the Arsacid power to a Roman engaged at the moment in study of the Germanic tribes,[52] the existence of the Parthian Empire beyond the eastern frontier and the extent of intercourse between the related populations of the adjoining territories of the two powers became grave factors when there was unrest in the eastern provinces.[53] Here, where the Romans were the last of a succession of ruling powers, rebellion was usually due, as in the case of the many men who rallied to support the first pseudo-Nero in 69 A. D., to "desire for change and hatred of their present situation."[54] In the Greek cities, however, aside from

[48] *Ibid.*, IV, 73.
[49] *Ibid.*, II, 61.
[50] Suetonius, *Galba*, 9.
[51] Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 54.
[52] *Germ.*, 37.
[53] For discussion of the probability of Parthian support against Rome, see Philo, *Leg.*, 31; Josephus, *Bell. Iud.*, I, 6; Dio Cassius, LXV, 4, 3. On the Iranians in Asia Minor and the mixing of the Iranian and Jewish diaspora see the citations from Cumont and Radin in note 30. Radin holds that there was always a Parthian party among the Palestinian Jews.
[54] Tacitus, *Hist.*, II, 8. Norden, "Josephus u. Tacitus," pp. 659-660.

Alexandria, where recurrent sedition from the time of Claudius to that of Hadrian is recorded in the *Pagan Acts of the Martyrs* and elsewhere, the active efforts of conservative citizens usually prevented serious disorders from arising, as we shall see later. But the case in Judea was notoriously different.

Flavius Josephus, as official spokesman of the imperial policy to the Jews throughout the Empire and in Parthia, attempted to make his countrymen loyal subjects of Rome.[55] He naturally adopted the Old Testament tradition that Jewish defeats were God's punishment for their sins, and the idea of Rome as the instrument of God's wrath led eventually to the *Haggada* myth that Rome was founded for the sole purpose of punishing the Jews for Solomon's marriage to a foreign woman, who led him away from the true worship.[56] Josephus' version of Agrippa's speech to the Jews in 66 A. D.[57] illustrates the type of argument by which the government sought to prevent revolts and furnishes an interesting pendant to the speech of Cerealis.

The rebellion, Agrippa said, was due to excitement inspired by Florus' admittedly harsh government, to the desire for independence, and to individual avarice. But the Roman régime must not be held responsible for its unjust representatives. The time for asserting independence was long past, as the examples of Greece and Macedonia showed, and the whole world was now subject to Rome. The Romans had never been defeated, and their empire included nations much stronger than the Jews; all these, awed by the power and fortune of Rome, were satisfied with the Roman rule. Allies in the revolt could only be sought from uncivilized lands, for in the habitable world all were Romans. The Parthians would not let their Jewish subjects send aid, and God himself was on the side of the Romans. All the peoples of the earth either had, or looked forward to having, the Romans for their masters.

According to Tacitus the portents observed at Jerusalem at the outbreak of the rebellion recalled the old prophecy to the

[55] For discussion of Josephus' propaganda see my study, "Propaganda and Censorship in the Transmission of Josephus," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVI (1935), pp. 137-151.

[56] *Bell. Iud.*, III, 293-294; M. Grünbaum, "Beiträge z. vergl. Mythologie aus der Haggada," *Ges. Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1901), pp. 23-24.

[57] *Bell. Iud.*, II, 345-401.

people and led them to the conviction *eo ipso tempore fore ut ualesceret Oriens profectique Iudaea rerum potirentur.*[58] To the Roman historian the reference to Vespasian and Titus was unmistakable, but the Jews naturally interpreted these great destinies according to their own desires. It is not surprising that Tacitus and Suetonius knew and accepted these eastern prophecies, when we consider not only the keen interest of Romans in Chaldean and Jewish astrologers and fortune-tellers but the extent to which eastern oracles, especially those of the Erythraean Sibyl, were included in the Sibylline Books at Rome that replaced those burned in the Sullan fire and the recurrent difficulty of suppressing spurious oracles unofficially circulated at Rome in the early Empire.[59] After the first despair, the capture of Jerusalem increased local expectation that the recovery of world-power by the East could not be long delayed, as the extant Sibylline verses composed in the Flavian period indicate.[60]

The period of rebellion and ruin also produced new apocalyptic writings akin to those of Maccabean times and set in the age of the prophets for greater authority. These were much read by the Jews throughout the Roman and Parthian territories until after the Hadrianic revolt and were widely used by the Christians, as their preservation in Greek, Latin, Ethiopian, and other translations indicates. The *Book of Baruch* is a curious composite of passages written soon after the destruction of the Temple as a counsel of despair, urging submission to Rome and acceptance of the divine punishment, with later portions that show burning resentment and expectation of vengeance. These later verses prophesy the ruin of Rome by fire from the Everlasting and its occupation by devils, while Jerusalem shall rejoice at the reunion of all her sons.[61] A similar type of apocry-

[58] *Hist.*, V, 13.

[59] Rzach, *s. v. Sibyllen, Sibyllinische Orakel*, in Pauly-Wissowa, II, vol. IV, esp. 2112. The importance of the Babylonian Sibyl of Erythrae and of the Persian Sibyl is clearly indicated in Lactantius' summary of Varro's account of the Sibyls, *Inst.*, I, 6. For further discussion of the influence of eastern Sibylline prophecies in Nero's time see "Nero and the East," pp. 80-86.

[60] *Or. Sib.*, IV, written *ca.* 80 A. D.; V, 50—end. See Windisch, "Orakel des Hystaspes," p. 69.

[61] For translation and discussion see R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1913), I, pp. 569-595.

phal compilation is represented by the *Fourth Book of Ezra*, composed about 120 A. D., which uses the imagery of Daniel's vision for "prophecy" of the Roman oppression, the individual emperors, and the destruction of the Roman eagle, with "its little wings most evil, its harm-dealing hands, and all its worthless body," so that the earth, freed and refreshed, shall hope for the mercy of God.[62] As Hadas has shown,[63] rabbinical literature is full of estimates of Roman achievement and oppression, many of which seem to be traceable to the period of rebellion under Hadrian. Roman justice was praised, but the rapacity of its venal judges was hated. The city of Rome, its buildings, wealth, and traditions were admired, but its social life was condemned and the Romans in general were considered avaricious and grasping, true representatives of an iron age. In general the theory of the Empire was considered admirable but its practice contemptible. A rabbinical story set in the time of Domitian, which represents Rome as preëminent for wealth and Persia for might, sounds like an echo of propaganda for support of the supposedly more powerful empire against the wealthy oppressor.

The official panegyric of Trajan delivered in the Senate by the younger Pliny gives a frank summary of the abuses in the Roman fiscal, judicial, and military administration and of the opposition engendered by it. This exposition of previous oppression lent greater lustre to his idealization of Trajan's policies. He states the official principle of Roman imperialism when he acknowledges only *contemptus imperii nostri* and *imperii dignitas* as grounds for Trajan's wars.[64]

Imperialism seems to have been a much disputed topic in the early Empire, as was natural. Polybius and later Greeks, in keeping with Hellenistic political theory, had accepted it as a fact, not as the basis for accusation. The old theory of Rome's liberation of the Greeks was now generally discarded: Pliny and Tacitus agreed that only the "name and shadow of liberty" remained to the Greek cities.[65] Imperialism was made more

[62] Charles, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 608-615; the passage is quoted from IVth Ezra, 11.

[63] M. Hadas, "Roman Allusions in Rabbinical Literature," *Phil. Quart.*, VIII (1929), pp. 370-386.

[64] *Panegyric*, 16, 4; 17, 4. Cf. Justin, *Epit.*, XXXVIII, 7; Suetonius, *Nero*, 40; Florus, *Epit.*, II, 30, 21, and passages from Tacitus cited above.

[65] Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 24: *reliquam umbram et residuum libertatis nomen*; Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 45: *quae ciuitatium liberae uocantur.*

popular by the fact that war was still a highly profitable undertaking for the victor, and the theory of wars fought to extend the application of the *pax Romana* suited existing conditions better than the old one of purely defensive campaigns, which Pliny cited. Tacitus described the annexation of new territories after Augustus' reign as due chiefly to the habit of imperialism.[66] After Trajan's wars, however, the opposition to active imperialism became more prominent, as we shall see.

Educated Greeks in general adopted the authority of Rome as an inevitable stage in the historical order of the world, precipitated by the political and social bankruptcy of Greece. The writings and public addresses of Dio Chrysostom and Apollonius of Tyana had a twofold aim: to inculcate in their contemporaries a salutary consciousness of the Hellenic past, as a source of pride and reproach to the Greeks and a model to the Romans, and to prevent local risings that could only cause trouble. They tried to substitute loyalty to Rome for resentment of her power, since Greek hegemony belonged irrevocably to the past. Dio's *Discourses on Kingship* show the type of government that he hoped Trajan might approximate, for the welfare of Hellas and of the Empire as a whole. He sought to revive old Hellenic standards of character and culture; thus, while he repeatedly attacked the venality and corruption of the Roman provincial staff, his real bitterness was directed against the Athenians, Alexandrians, and others who had forfeited their heritage, not against the Romans, who at least provided a *modus uiuendi* for them. Rhodes was the one Greek state that he thought still to some extent preserved Hellenic standards.[67] He praised a Roman who adopted Hellenic customs at a time when too many Greeks were donning the toga and shared the general disgust when the Thersites of the Homeric assembly at Borysthenes stooped to servile adulation of Rome. But the city Dio described in his oration to this assembly on ideal government was modelled on Rome.[68]

[66] Orosius, VII, 3, 7, quoting a lost portion of Tacitus' *Histories*. For fuller discussion see J. Hasebroek, *Imperialistische Gedanke im Altertum* (Stuttgart, 1926), pp. 10-26.

[67] A convenient list of references on Dio's attitude toward Rome is given by W. Schmid in Pauly-Wissowa, I, vol. V, 854. See also H. von Arnim, *Leben u. Werke des Dion von Prusa* (Berlin, 1898).

[68] Dio, *Or.*, XXXVIII, 23-27; XXXVI, 17.

Apollonius of Tyana also looked on the adoption of Roman habits as a sign of undue servility and sternly reprimanded the Ionians who took Roman names. He thought the decline of Greek cities was due to the incapacity or corruption of the Roman officials in charge of them and did not hesitate to advise Vespasian on his provincial policies. His activities extended from eastern journeys to study the mysteries of Brahman philosophy to participation in the plans for the revolt of Vindex in Spain, not as a movement against Rome but against Nero, who, he thought, had forfeited his claim to imperial rule.[69] Both Apollonius and Dio emphasized the universal character of the Roman power and illustrated it by the cosmopolitan interests of their lives.

Plutarch contrasted the stable and orderly Roman peace with the continuous movement and drift of all peoples that had characterized the earlier powers.[70] His study of the great Greeks and Romans of the past, especially those of the period of Rome's eastern expansion, led him to consider the question of the causes for the establishment and increase of the Roman power, according to the old formula: was *Virtus* or *Fortuna* responsible? Many Greeks inclined to the view of Polybius, that Fortune guided all the affairs of this world and not least those of the Empire;[71] this principle was consistent with the worship of the ἀγαθὴ τύχη in the Greek cities and was more congenial to Hellenic pride than the idea that the Roman supremacy was due to the superior *uirtus* of the Romans. Hence the Romans were not unwilling to adopt the Greek dogma as useful propaganda in the East.[72] They naturally preferred, as a rule, to ascribe their success to *Virtus*, though some writers gave the two factors equal weight.[73] Plutarch's essay *On the Fortune of the Romans*, following the Greek tradition, summarized the events in Roman history that showed the preponderant influence of Fortune on

[69] Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii*, *passim*. esp. I, 18; IV, 5; V, 36 and 41; Apollonius, *Ep.* 55; 71; 72. Cf. L. Halm, *Rom u. Romanismus im griechisch-römischen Osten* (Leipzig, 1906), ch. 5.

[70] *Fortuna Romana*, 317 b-c.

[71] Polybius, I, 4.

[72] J. Hild, *s. v. fortuna*, in Daremberg-Saglio, II, 1272.

[73] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 40; Florus, *Epit.*, I, 1; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.*, XXXVI, 68; Cassius Dio, *passim*.

Roman affairs and pointed out that Roman shrines to that goddess far outnumbered those of *Virtus*. Whichever was ultimately responsible for its welfare, the Empire stood in equal danger during our period, for the writings of moralists and historians are full of laments about the degeneracy of the Roman people, while on the other hand excessive good fortune was known to bring nemesis in its train: deficiency of the one grace and excess of the other threatened double penalties.[74]

The address to Rome composed by Aelius Aristides (154 A. D.) was an unqualified panegyric of the Roman Empire as a universal power and as the fulfilment of the Hellenistic dream of the commercial and cultural unity of mankind.[75] He accepted the Empire with an enthusiasm that may have been typical of the more prosperous business men of the eastern cities, who had most to gain from the commercial opportunities afforded by the Roman peace. He undertook to convince his countrymen, in terms derived from their own traditions, that Rome was accomplishing for the East what their own hegemonies had failed to achieve. He made the Roman peace the central theme of his panegyric; he contrasted Rome with states in which it was easier to gain safety by rebellion than by submission and the universal peace between cities and satraps with the internal dissensions formerly prevalent. He claimed that Rome alone knew how to rule free men without prejudice to their freedom and to provide a higher form of government than democracy, for the Roman peace was a unique discovery in statecraft. Rome had become the single citadel of the world, and wars were now dimly remembered myths except on the frontiers.[76]

Peace, however, was not considered altogether salutary in its effects. Some men argued that the world's peace ruined great natures, since it lacked the disciplinary value of war, or that the Roman peace was mere slavery, while others answered that men were no longer of such calibre as to be trusted with freedom either to rule themselves or to make war on each other.[77]

The continuation of the anti-Roman tradition among Greek

[74] Tacitus, *Hist.*, I, 3; cf. Florus, II, 13, 2.

[75] *Or.*, XXVI.

[76] *Ibid.*, 22, 29, 36, 40-58, 61 and 70.

[77] Longinus, *de subl.*, 44, 6-10; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.*, XXXI, 100, 125 and 126; cf. Tacitus, *Agr.*, 3.

historians of the second century is indicated by the avowed purpose of Appian's *Roman History*. Appian, an imperial official at Alexandria, wrote his history in Greek to refute the findings of jealous writers opposed to Rome. His chief original contribution was the ethnographical arrangement of his material, peculiarly appropriate to the imperial policies of Hadrian and the Antonines. In his imperialistic view, Roman history consisted of the series of wars by which the greatest and most lasting of world-states was created, but the most glorious of these wars were fought in defence of Greek freedom, and he ascribed their success to Roman discipline and military efficiency.[78]

The historian Florus, writing in the reign of Hadrian or of Antoninus, described the Empire as produced by the rivalry of *uirtus* and *fortuna*. He stressed the successive ages of Rome in a scheme that differed somewhat from that of Seneca and rejoiced that the youth of the city had been renewed under Trajan. He ascribed the most serious losses of Rome to civil wars caused by excessive good fortune; vice had increased as the Empire grew. He felt that the Empire would have been more secure *si barbari tam uitia nostra quam imperia ferre potuissent*, for, while provinces are won by force, they are secured, he thought, by justice.[79]

Justin's epitome of Trogus' *Philippic History*, which, as we have seen, draws largely on anti-Roman sources, has a definitely anti-imperialistic bias. Its arrangement is based on the opposing interests and conflicts of East and West, with emphasis on the evils that result from such ambition as that of the Romans, *imperium spe improba totius orbis amplexi*.[80] The old opposition of Greece and Persia was paralleled in his own time by the division of the world between the Roman and Parthian empires.[81]

Fronto's sketch for a history of Lucius Verus' Parthian campaigns almost rivals Justin in his estimate of the Parthian strength that had defeated Rome in the past, but his primary motive was to lend greater lustre to Verus' rather dubious achievements.[82] He lamented the inner weakness of an empire in which the plebs cared only for spectacles and grain-doles.[83]

[78] *Hist. Rom.*, preface; VIII, 52.
[79] Florus, *Epit.*, I, 1 and 34, 19; II, 13, 2 and 30.
[80] Justin, *Epit.*, XXIX, 2, 1.
[81] *Ibid.*, XLI, 1.
[82] *Principia historiae*, 5.
[83] *Ibid.*, 17.

Like other historians of his time, he rejected the boast that the Roman armies had never been defeated and accepted as axiomatic the principle that the Roman people had won their empire *non minus cadendo quam caedendo*, with alternate success and failure.[84]

Belief in the stability, universality, and eternity of Rome was well established by the time of Lucretius and Cicero and continued to be frequently stated throughout the early Empire, subject, as we have seen, to the limitations imposed by the moral interpretation of past history and by philosophical considerations.[85] Aelius Aristides concluded his praise of the city with the confident prayer that it might endure "till iron floats on the sea and trees cease to put forth leaves in the spring."[86] But those who were hostile to the Roman power looked forward to its dissolution, while Stoic and historical theory alike made expectation of the decline of Rome natural even for loyal supporters of the Empire. Both the current belief in the approaching end of the *saeculum*[87] and the idea of the old age of Rome were also opposed to the dogma of eternity. The expectation that the state would be ruined by civil wars, "by which alone great empires are destroyed," was commonly held throughout the Empire: unconquered abroad, it was vulnerable at home.[88]

This belief was clearly stated in the Sallustian *Suasoria*, which was much studied in the rhetorical schools of the second century:

> This is my opinion. Inasmuch as all living things perish, so at the time fated for the destruction of Rome citizen shall join battle against

[84] *Epist. ad Antoninum*, 7 (ed. Haines, Loeb, vol. II); cf. Florus, *Epit.*, I, 17, 1 and 22, 1; Appian, VII, 8, 53 and Polybius, VI, 9.

[85] See J. Kaerst, *Die antike Idee des Oekumene* (Leipzig, 1903), II; W. Gernentz, *Laudes Romae* (diss. Rostock, 1918); M. P. Charlesworth, "Prouidentia and Aeternitas," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXIX (1936), pp. 107-132; J. Gagé, "La Théologie de la Victoire Impériale," *Rev. Hist.*, CLXXI (1933), pp. 1-34.

[86] *Or.*, XXVI, 109.

[87] Seeliger, *s. v. Weltalter*, in Roscher, *Lexikon d. Mythologie*, VI, cols. 417-425; K. Kerényi, "Das persische Millennium," *Klio*, XXX (1936), pp. 1-35.

[88] Appian, *Hist. Rom.*, 19. Cf. Justin, *Epit.*, XXXI, 5; *Or. Sib.*, III, 464-469 and later oracles; Tacitus, *Hist.*, II, 66, etc.

citizen and, thus worn out and exhausted, they shall fall prey to some king or nation. Otherwise not the world itself nor all the nations together can move or weaken this Empire. Therefore the benefits of concord must be firmly established and the evils of discord uprooted.[89]

The character of Roman civil war had changed since this statement was composed, but the conviction that internal rather than external attacks would cause the final dissolution of the state was not altered. Many writers accounted for the recurrence of civil war by the increase in the wealth, luxury, and immorality of Roman life, and these were also given as independent causes of the decline and approaching ruin of the Empire. Some men naturally preferred to attribute this demoralization to eastern influence,[90] and the East also figured conspicuously in the theory that the Empire had been fatally weakened by over-expansion. Livy's picture of Rome as burdened by her very greatness was repeated as its truth became more apparent,[91] and both Tacitus and Florus showed how fatally the opportunities for greed and vice increased with imperial expansion.[92] In the East, however, the belief that Parthia would eventually overcome the Roman power was a natural concomitant of favorable estimates of Arsacid strength and was confirmed by the prophecies of oriental dominion. Roman fear of the Africans and Germans was also shrewdly gauged.[93]

As we have seen, prophecies throughout the Roman world foretold the approaching dissolution of the Empire, but this could be a consolation only to those who expected the restoration of power and wealth to Asia or who accepted the western prophecies of transfer of Roman authority to the transalpine tribes or to Spain. It was more natural to believe that the mighty fabric of the Roman Empire could not be destroyed without overwhelming its enemies and that the break-down of Rome would be followed by universal war among all peoples and the ruin of

[89] Sallust, *Suasoria*, I, 5, 2. Cf. Cassius Dio, IV, 23. Gregory the Great, *Dial.*, II, 15, gives a later version, which was ascribed in his time to Benedict and was widely quoted during the Middle Ages.

[90] Juvenal, III, 60-83; Florus, *Epit.*, I, 447; Justin, XXXVI, 4.

[91] Livy, preface; cf. Lucan, I, 70-72.

[92] Tacitus, *Hist.*, II, 38; Florus, I, 34, 19.

[93] Hadas, "Roman Allusions," pp. 380-381.

civilization.[94] Herein lay a great safeguard of the Empire during the centuries that followed and one of the essential reasons for the mediaeval belief in the continuity of the Roman power in the West.

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NOTE ON A PASSAGE IN MENANDER.

(*Epitr. Membr. Petr.* 1-5.)

No satisfactory explanation has yet been offered for the first lines of what we possess of Menander's *Epitrepontes*. Smikrines has been informed of the quarrel between his daughter and her husband, and he is giving vent to his indignation at the behavior of his son-in-law:

ἄνθρωπος οἶνον. Αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐκπλήττομαι
ἔγωγε· ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθ' οὐ λέγω·
ἀπιστίᾳ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὅμοιον τοῦτό γε,
εἰ καὶ βιάζεται, κοτύλην τις τοὐβολοῦ
ὠνούμενος, πίνειν ἑαυτόν.

As to these lines, three points have to be borne in mind:

(1) ἀπιστίᾳ (v. 3), though it has been subjected to doubt and was altered into ἀπληστίᾳ by Wilamowitz, is strongly supported by ἐκπλήττομαι (v. 1). The two statements "I am taken aback" and "This thing is almost incredible" go too well together to allow us to accept a conjecture which ignores their connection. (For the wording cp. Plato, *Phaedo* 62 cd τὸ . . . ἐθέλειν ἂν ἀποθνήσκειν ἔοικεν ἀτόπῳ and, in this same play, τέρασιν ὅμοια πεντάμηνα παιδία, v. 682. Ἀπιστία stands for τὸ ἄπιστον εἶναι as in Aesch. *Agam.* 268; Heraclitus B 86.)

(2) The last two lines might seem to suggest that the wine drunk by Charisios was pretty bad and sour. But Körte has pointed out (*Gnomon* 1, p. 21) that 1 obol for 1 kotyle is six

[94] Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 74; Pliny, *Panegyric*, 67, 3; Sallust, *Suasoria*, II, 13; for later instances see Tertullian, *Apol.*, 32 and 39: *oramus etiam pro imperatoribus . . . pro rerum quiete, pro mora finis; ad Scap.*, 21; Lactantius, *Inst.*, VII, 25. On the general topic see W. Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken* (Leipzig, 1930).

times the price of regular table wine. So Charisios was drinking one of the best wines to be had on the market.

(3) What, then, shall we make of βιάζεται ἑαυτόν? The text becomes more puzzling than ever. But is not Smikrines also puzzled? He speaks of a thing more odd and strange than simply "getting drunk" (or spending money, we might add). On this very special and peculiar point he lays his finger when saying emphatically αὐτὸ τοῦτο (v. 1) and τοῦτό γε (v. 3). This fact is evidently the clue to the passage, and, as long as it has not been properly understood, what Coppola remarks will be true: "Le difficoltà del passo sono e rimangono insuperabili." The fact is referred to in lines 4/5. What do they mean?

They mean exactly what they say. Charisios buys the most expensive wine, and then he has even (καὶ) to force it down his throat. He does not enjoy it in the least. This is one more feature of fine, and truly Menandrean, psychology. The young man has decided to drown his grief over his bride's unchastity in drunkenness and debauchery. But, as we are to hear later (Petr. 10 ff., Cair. 215 ff. Jensen), after having hired an expensive prostitute, he does not even touch her; and exactly in the same way, as is mentioned here, after having purchased the finest wine, he takes no pleasure in drinking it. The latter fact has come to the knowledge of Smikrines, and this it is that the old man is commenting on and that he fails to understand. Spending so much money is bad enough, getting drunk is scarcely proper: but that anyone should incur such expense and then not even enjoy what he has bought, this seems to him unaccountable. We may assume then that the lines which once preceded the passage quoted above contained about the following: ["My precious son-in-law seems to have gone crazy. I understand that he is going in for frivolity and dissipation, and spends his time and money in drinking. But for all that, I am told, instead of having a good time and being merry, the longer he revels the deeper he sinks into melancholy, and it is even with disgust that] the chap [sips the best] wine." Read in such a context, our passage ceases to be obscure and problematic; in fact, it displays the ease and lucidity which we are used to admire in Menander.

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FESTUS on *Sex Suffragia. Sex suffragia appellantur in equitum centuriis, quae sunt adiectae ei numero centuriarum; quas Priscus Tarquinius rex constituit* (ed. Lindsay, p. 452). (*adfectae* F; *corr. Aug. effectae ex* W. Rein, *Quaest. Tull.*, p. 9.).

The title *sex suffragia,* applied to a section of the eighteen centuries of *Equites Equo Publico,* occurs only here and in Cicero, *De Rep.* II, 22, 39. (*equitum centuriae cum sex suffragiis*).[1] This passage is therefore of great importance for the early history of the Equites. The traditional interpretation of it (with a comma after *centuriarum*) gives a translation somewhat as follows: "*Sex suffragia* is a title given to those among the centuries of Equites which were added to the total of those centuries established by king Tarquinius Priscus," i. e. of the eighteen centuries of Equites twelve were established by Tarquinius Priscus and the other six (the *sex suffragia*) were added later, presumably by Servius Tullius.

As has often been pointed out,[2] this statement is in complete contradiction to the account of the growth of the equestrian centuries given by Livy. According to him, Romulus established three centuries, called Rhamnes, Tities, and Luceres, to which Tarquin wished to add another three, with different names. He was prevented from doing this by Attus Navius and contented himself with doubling the number of Equites, making three double centuries each divided into two sections called *priores* and *posteriores.* Servius Tullius later formed these into six centuries, still with the old titles, and added twelve new ones.[3] Livy's account gains support not only from Cicero,[4] Valerius Maximus,[5] Dionysius of Halicarnassus,[6] Florus,[7] and the *De Viris Illustribus,*[8] but also from Festus himself.[9]

Rein's emendation *effectae ex* is only one of several attempts to reconcile these two apparently contradictory versions. Other scholars have altered Cicero's text;[10] and some, accepting Festus as the best authority, have even tampered with the text

[1] It is sometimes said that Cicero, *De Rep. IV,* 2 and *Phil.* II, 82 also refer to the *sex suffragia,* but it is, to say the least, very probable that they do not. For discussion of this point see e. g. Denniston on Cicero *Phil. l. c.* and Pauly-Wiss. *s. v. Sex suffragia.*

[2] See e. g. Mommsen, *Staatsr.* III, p. 107, n. 3.

[3] Livy, I, 36; 43, 8 f.

[4] *Rep.* II, 36.

[5] I, 4, 1.

[6] *Ant. Rom.* III, 71.

[7] *Epit.* I, 1, 5, 2.

[8] 6.

[9] Pp. 168-9 (L.) *s. v. Navia*; pp. 468-475. (L) *s. v. Sex Vestae.*

[10] E. g. Lange, *Kl. Schr.* I, pp. 227-234.

of Livy.[11] This last is a desperate measure, and if one must choose between the two versions one has to agree with Mommsen in rejecting that of Festus.

But is it not possible to reconcile them without tampering with the text of any author, except for the slight and obvious emendation of the impossible *adfectae* of the Festus Ms. to *adiectae*? Professor Lindsay, by adopting the punctuation shown above, has pointed the way. The passage thus punctuated could mean: "in talking of the *equitum centuriae* the phrase *sex suffragia* is used. For six was the older number of centuries, the others being subsequently added to that older number. These older six were those of Tarquinius Priscus."[12]

I would like to suggest an alternative interpretation of the same text. Cicero has given us what appears to be the formal title of the eighteen centuries, *equitum centuriae cum sex suffragiis,* and Livy, by mentioning in one passage only twelve *centuriae equitum,*[13] seems to confirm this. Now in Festus the crucial words are *adiectae sunt,* and *adicio* represents all the normal uses of the English word "add," including verbal and mental, as well as actual, addition. I believe that Festus is here using it of verbal addition, as it is used for instance by Pliny; when speaking of the *ordo equester* he says: *ab illo tempore plane hoc tertium corpus in republica factum est, coepitque adici senatui populoque Romano et equester ordo.*[14] With this view of *adiectae sunt* the correct translation of the Festus passage would be: "There is a section of the equestrian centuries known as the *sex suffragia,* and their name is tacked on to that of that group of centuries; they (the *sex suffragia*) were established by Tarquinius Priscus."

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TWO SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT OF CICERO.

Zarbieni, Cicero, *Ad Att.,* II, 4, 2.

In April 59 B. C. Atticus informed Cicero that there was talk of sending Clodius as special envoy to Tigranes of Armenia. Cicero, who had every reason to fear Clodius, blurted out hope-

[11] Muhlert, *De Eq. Rom.*, pp. 10-12 (Hildesiae, 1830) following Goettling, *Hermes* XXVI, pp. 84 f.

[12] Professor Lindsay has very kindly supplied me with this version. He also points out that the omission of the semicolon in his larger edition of Festus (*Glossaria Latina* IV) is a misprint.

[13] XLIII, 16, 14.

[14] *Nat. Hist.* XXXIII, 34, and see the Thesaurus *s. v.* for other similar uses.

fully (*Ad Att.*, II, 4, 2): *Clodius ergo, ut ais, ad Tigranem? Velim Sirpie † condicione!* Of course we know that Cicero's wishes in this instance were far from benevolent, but since the text is corrupt we have not known precisely what he meant. None of the numerous solutions offered (*Scepsii, Zopyri, turpiore, scire qua, sirempse*) seem acceptable. I believe we have a reference here to *Zarbienus,* the king of Gordyene, who, some ten years before, was killed by Tigranes for secretly negotiating with Appius Claudius a proposed revolt from Tigranes to Lucullus (Plut., *Lucullus,* 21; 29). Clodius was then an officer in Lucullus' army and may well have engaged in the negotiations with his brother. The event must have been memorable at Rome, for when Zarbienus was killed by Tigranes Lucullus raised a costly monument to him; then he took over the kingdom of Gordyene temporarily, and used its royal treasure in the payment of his legions: "so that Lucullus received praise for maintaining the war at its own charge without receiving one drachma from the public treasury" (*loc. cit.*, 29). I think we may safely restore the text: *Velim Zarbieni condicione.*

Lascieram, Cic., *Ad Att.*, II, 7, 1.

When Cicero edited his corpus of consular speeches in 60 B. C. (*Ad Att.*, II, 1, 3), he omitted two of them; probably the *Pro Murena,* later published in condensed form, and the *Pro Pisone,* which is mentioned in *Pro Flacco,* 98 as a speech delivered during 63. Later Atticus asked for these (*Ad Att.*, II, 7, 1), and Cicero then explained why he had omitted them. A part of the passage cannot be read as it stands. The MSS give: *alteram non libebat mihi scribere † qui absciram; alteram ne laudarem eum quem non amabam.* Sjögren and Constans give the various emendations that have been offered (*quia abscideram; ab ea descieram; quia obscura erat; quia oscitaram;* etc.), none of which seem satisfactory. Recalling that in the Carolingian script incorrect word divisions are frequent, and that *la* would readily be mistaken for *b,* I would propose to alter *qui absciram* to *quia lascieram.* He refers, I think, to the jocular tone and style of the *Pro Murena;* for in that speech Cicero hid the lack of argument by a verbosity that ranges from ribaldry to exuberant rhetoric. There may well have been more of this jocularity in the original, for he later pruned a great deal in publishing the speech (see para-

graphs 25 and 57). In referring to this speech in *De Fin.*, IV, 74 Cicero used the occasion to apologize to Cato for the light way in which he had treated serious matters in court. I think, then, that Cicero at first hesitated to publish the *Pro Murena* because of its lack of restraint and dignity (*quia lascieram*).

That the other omitted speech was the *Pro Pisone* is likely, since Piso (*cos.* 67) had incurred the deep enmity of Caesar in 63, as of Pompey in 67, and these were the very two men whom Cicero could hardly afford to offend at a time when Clodius was threatening him with banishment. I therefore propose to read: *alteram non libebat mihi scribere quia lascieram.*

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A NOTE.

My attention has been called to the fact that the emendation of the passage in Lucian's *Philopseudes* § 9 suggested by me in this Journal, LVIII (1937), p. 345 had already been brought forward by Professor Campbell Bonner in the *Classical Review,* XX (1906), pp. 301 ff.

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A. S. F. Gow. A. E. Housman, A Sketch, together with a list of his writings, etc. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. 137.

This small volume, by the friend and associate of Housman in Trinity College, contains a slight unambitious memoir and characterization of Housman the scholar, with only incidental mention, as belonging to the record, of the poet. It narrates briefly the events of his life, his schooling at Bromsgrove in Worcestershire (for he was not a native of Shropshire and never lived there), his uneventful and undistinguished four years at St. John's College, Oxford, where apparently he made no impression upon his teachers, nor they on him. "From the single lecture of Jowett's which he attended he came away disgusted by the Regius Professor's disregard for the niceties of scholarship." The story is current in Oxford, I am told, that the particular offense of the Regius Professor was a false quantity, that cardinal crime of English tradition, the pronunciation of ἀκριβῶς with accent on the first syllable, which from the English habit of applying Latin rules to Greek pronunciation yielded a monstrosity as intolerable as a Latin *ámicus*. It will amaze those who have not heard it before to learn that he failed as a candidate for honors and left the University without a degree in 1881. It reminded me of the story which used to be told in my time in Bonn, that the great Bücheler had received his degree with only the predicate of *rite*.

For this failure Housman attached no blame to his examiners, and frankly confessed that he left them no alternative. But he felt the failure, and his brother, Laurence Housman, reports that he returned home as one whom they no longer knew, participating as little as possible in the life of the family, where before he had been the leading spirit, and that only with the lapse of years did this estrangement wear off. In 1882 he entered the civil service, and was for ten years a clerk in the Patent Office. Meantime his contributions to the *Journal of Philology* had attracted much favorable attention, and in 1892 he stood for the vacant professorship of Latin in the University of London and gained the post, from which in 1911 he was invited to Cambridge as Mayor's successor.

These are the bare annals of an academic recluse, which Gow has not succeeded in greatly enriching from correspondence, or by analysis of Housman's character and inner life, or from contacts with other scholars and contemporaries, which seem indeed to have been few and for the most part formal. "We knew him

as one of those who deliberately choose to restrict their friendships to the surface, neither giving nor asking for confidences," and this estimate finds confirmation in the little that is told of him by his brother.[1] "To many who met him casually," Gow continues, "at High Tables or on University Committees he remained, as to the outside world, a figure remote, alarming, mysterious." It does not appear that Housman travelled much in the pursuit of his studies, and indeed it is strange that one whose life was largely given up to text criticism should have depended for the most part on the collations of manuscripts made by others. His perfect mastery of the German language, as evinced by his poetry as well as by his scholarly studies, does not appear to have been acquired in Germany. In his later years we are told that it was his custom to spend three or four weeks in France every summer, but less in search of books and manuscripts than for local architecture and local dishes and local wines. His character as a teacher and lecturer is touched on only slightly, but it seems to have conformed to the traits which have been noticed above. "To call his lectures inspiring would perhaps be to convey the wrong impression, for they were austere both in matter and in manner, and they made a severe demand upon his auditors." His austerity of manner and restraint will seem surprising to those who know his reviews and prefaces, which, whatever one may think of their justice or their taste, are certainly lively. There is nothing which academic youth responds to with more delight than witty raillery and abuse of divergent doctrine and its representatives. Housman might have thronged his auditorium had he chosen to enliven his discourse with the idiom so characteristic of his published work, just as students and visitors once swarmed to the lecture-room of Moritz Haupt in Berlin (one of Housman's heroes), drawn thither often by no higher motive than to hear his witty and incessant "Schelten." Housman's restraint was intelligible and judicious—*maxima debetur puero reverentia*—a 'reverence' which was not often extended to his printed page.

The brief biographical sketch is followed by a very full and very useful bibliographical appendix of all his published work. The three Latin authors completely edited take first place in importance, Manilius (a volume to each of the five books), Juvenal, and Lucan; the last two "in editorum usum"—a somewhat enigmatic and malicious parody of the old-fashioned scholarum in usum, in usum Delphini, etc., meant, as has been said, more properly in editorum 'abusum.' The lectures, papers, notes, and reviews are bewildering in abundance, running to several hundred. The vast majority of these contributions (like

[1] In *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Sept. 19, 1936, and in his recent autobiography, "The Unexpected Years."

the three major editions) are critical, looking primarily to the establishment of a text, by interpretation, often by punctuation, or by emendation—and especially the latter. The list of passages so treated must contain upwards of two thousand entries, and that number would doubtless be exceeded if the separate items of each discussion were recorded.

It is an impressive record in mere bulk, contrasting oddly with the two slender volumes of poems which have given him so high a place in the record of English literature, and a celebrity such as no classical studies could confer. As an Englishman and a classical scholar it has become customary to compare him with Bentley, and Bentley too has a small niche in the history of English literature, not to speak of an immortality in the "Dunciad." No one who experienced it can forget the intoxicating effect of the "Shropshire Lad" on its first appearance in the late nineties. The little volume had its day of sensation, and retained a conspicuous and distinguished place in the minor poetry of the time. But when with the lapse of years nothing more came from the same source, the author was almost forgotten, or if remembered it was recalled sadly that he still lived—a professor of Latin, and that was enough. "Chill *pedantry* repress'd his noble rage" were the words that I heard of him in a review of modern poetry in 1920 or 1921, not much more than a year before the appearance of "Last Poems" (September 1922). The new volume was no greater certainly than the earlier one, but it came to new ears and sent a new generation back to the "Shropshire Lad," freer to enjoy and appreciate it than a generation which had been fixed in the mould of the major Victorian poets. From that time to the present the Housman cult has flourished beyond belief. It received accession from his brilliant and paradoxical lecture "On the Name and Nature of Poetry," from the private printing and circulation of his London inaugural of 1892, and now in addition from 'More Poems,' selected from his unpublished work.

The real Housman devotee of the past few years, and perhaps of the present day, has not been content with his poetry alone. He has discovered a new mine which he treasures only a little less highly, the devastating reviews and the pungent prefaces,—the Iambics and Satires so to speak which supplement the writer of Odes. Housman himself with sly deprecation, not wholly unpleased, I suspect, alludes to the circumstance that the slow early sale of his Manilius had quickened its pace 'as it found purchasers among the unlearned, who had heard that it contained a scurrilous preface and hoped to extract from it a low enjoyment.' In these writings 'the unlearned' found a prose scarcely less brilliant than the author's verse, in the service of a criticism reminiscent of "Absalom and Achitophel." The

names though true and often contemporary were to such admirers as meaningless as Og and Doeg, and not less so the merits of the questions at issue. They were free to enjoy the slaughter without compunction, in the confident assumption of its unerring justice.

Readers of the prefaces or of the journals to which Housman contributed need no reminding of the relentless attacks upon the dullness and ineptitude of editors in general, and of the pitiless persistence with which certain names were pilloried—Robinson Ellis (who in 1892 had commended Housman to the University of London as 'an amiable and modest man'), Bücheler and the whole "Bonner Schule," Sudhaus, Vollmer, Marx, Leo (who is however allowed some grudging praise). The quality and defect of all scholars was measured in his criticisms by one standard, and one question: Were they competent judges of emendation, or were they efficient emendators themselves? The answer was firm and uniform, no. Among his contemporaries he recognized scarcely one who possessed the requisite knowledge and talent for this supreme function of classical scholarship. In the past there had been giants, a Scaliger, a Bentley, with rare survivals into his own time in Madvig, Cobet, and even Baehrens, the exiled German, whose merits could be more highly estimated by the circumstance that his name was anathema in his native land. Munro he recognized as restoring to England her ancient glories, but beyond him he found none of his countrymen to commend. As for himself he says, in reviewing the qualities which an emendator should possess, 'I think myself a better judge of emendation, both when to emend, and how to emend, than most others.' (Manil. V, p. xxxv.)

In the England of the last decades of the nineteenth century, or at least until near its close, the classical scholarship which emerged into the pages of the *Journal of Philology* or the earlier numbers of the *Classical Review* was largely given up to conjectural emendation. Emendation was not often attained, but this did not greatly disturb the lively chase of conjecture. It was like a fox hunt, an aristocratic sport, in which getting the fox was only one incident, sometimes successful. It developed good horsemanship, excellent judges of form, shrewd critics of awkward riding. It was a game which made and unmade academic reputations, but it left the larger historical exploration of antiquity about where it found it. Into this game Housman, following the bent of his training and taste, as well as the fashion of his time, entered with zest, and early became a recognized master. The first large results of his study were the emendations to Propertius, published in 1888. They cover the whole text and in conjectures or suggestions of transposition are above

two hundred and fifty in number. But to what effect? Phillimore in 1901 edited Propertius, and was, I understand, a personal friend of Housman's; but, if I am not mistaken, he introduced no one of his suggestions into the text, and in the apparatus notices them but three times. This need prove nothing, and it is plain enough how Housman himself might have dealt with it, had he chosen to do so. I use the illustration not to indict Housman, but to question the exaggerated cult of conjectural emendation itself. Bentley, two hundred years before, in his Horace fared no better, and out of some hundred and fifty of his own conjectures (as distinct from better manuscript readings and older amendations which he championed) his own countrymen, Wickham and Garrod, in our day have thought well to recognize one and three respectively.

As with Bentley, so with Housman, the text of Manilius, much corrupted because of its technicalities, yields better results. The truth is that textual emendation, pursued as an end in itself, and exercised upon material which has been the object of study for several centuries is no longer a rewarding pursuit and has in fact almost disappeared. To be sure, even the most enamored emendator would not openly confess that he read for the sake of making emendations; his goal, he will assure you, is the purer enjoyment of literature, or at least to read without offense. However, long lists of plausible conjectures suggest too often the enjoyment of fishing beyond the need of fish. Cobet, we are told, always read by choice in some antiquated edition which offered him a livelier stimulus to attention and ingenuity. The old confidence that logic and common sense (the *ratio et res ipsa* of Bentley, so often quoted) even in the hands of genius can restore a corrupt text has given way to a sounder restraint, to preference for the obelus to the conjecture. There is nothing that cannot be made worse by the telling of it, and this wisdom became the obscurantism and superstition of Vahlen and Bücheler, which is the *leitmotif* of Housman's prefaces. Texts are still corrupt and therefore emendation must be sought and will be made, but less by professional emendators, so to speak, than as the incidental product of study directed to larger ends; sometimes from a happy recognition of general considerations hitherto overlooked, but more often from greater familiarity with the special matter and vocabulary of particular subjects, and from a wider knowledge and experience of paleography and text transmission.

Housman's work as a whole is obviously too great for any praise or blame of mine. Nevertheless, taking heart from the example of his own judgments so boldly and often so rashly expressed, I venture the opinion that the results of it as a whole were incommensurate with his genius and his attainments. To

say that his type of scholarship was a survival from an earlier day into an alien present is not I think unfair, and it explains in some degree his ungenerous attitude toward his contemporaries. His heroes were the great emendators and text critics of the past, and his persistent indictment of the Germans of his day took small account of the really great renaissance of classical scholarship in the nineteenth century which originated with them.

English scholars and statesmen of the 18th and early 19th centuries were ingenious in finding Latin texts to fit modern or contemporary situations, and the happy citation of one, in Parliament for example, might earn for the user a greater glory than the success of a political measure. In emulation of this fashion I would call attention to a characterization in Cicero's *Brutus,* which struck me on a recent reading as summarizing compactly some of the most essential qualities of Housman's character: 'habuit a natura genus quoddam acuminis quod etiam arte limaverat, quod erat in reprehendis verbis versutum et sollers, sed saepe stomachosum, nonnumquam frigidum, interdum etiam facetum.' A friendly critic would add some words from the sequel, and with slight twist of application, from the forum to editors and emendators, continue the citation: 'Hominum ineptias ac stultitias . . . non ferebat iracundiusque respuebat, sive morose, sive ingenuo liberoque fastidio.'[2]

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FRANK BURR MARSH, A History of the Roman World from 146 to 30 B. C., with five maps. London, Methuen, n. d. [1935]. Pp. xii + 427. 15s. net.

An apology is due to readers of the Journal for the belated appearance of this review: its tardiness is not wholly to be explained by the fact that the editor received no copy of the book from the publishers, and the reviewer himself must bear his share of blame. But even at this distance of time from publication it may be worth while to welcome what is in some ways a notable addition to the resources of students—and to welcome it with that careful scrutiny which is the only reception worthy of a serious attempt at fresh interpretation.

Let it be said at once that Professor Marsh has produced a readable and well balanced text-book, which covers the period in eighteen chapters, surveys 'The Roman World' and 'Roman Literature' in the last century of the Republic in two more, and

[2] *Brutus*, 236 (de M. Pisone).

ends with eight appendices on various special questions, a brief bibliography and an index. It is a book which will find a public, though not perhaps among those who need a clue to the evidence. The designers of this series doubtless have good grounds for their policy, though it is one which for some reduces the value of the result. Marsh is not unreasonable when he reminds his readers (p. v.) that the authorities for the earlier part of the period are to be found in the compilation of Greenidge and Clay; but when he adds that 'after 70 B. C. the ninth volume of the Cambridge Ancient History will in most cases furnish an adequate guide to the sources,' he is more flattering to their purses than to their standards of adequacy in documentation. Old though it is and out of date, E. W. Fischer's useful volume of *Römische Zeittafeln*, still to be bought without difficulty second-hand, might better have been considered for mention—if sources are really in demand. Whatever his intentions, however, it may be suspected that Marsh's work will be appreciated most highly by students who are not called upon to master the evidence, and by scholars who know it already.

Scholars will read this book with an interest mainly aroused by what is its outstanding feature—an attention to the working of the Roman constitution in practice, and in particular to the peculiar conditions imposed upon politics by the structure of the assemblies. Marsh is greatly impressed by the importance of the group-vote. In the third section (pp. 18-20) of a chapter which sets out to give 'a brief sketch of the organization of the government in 146 B. C.' (p. 12) he rightly describes the Servian tribe as 'originally a territorial division' (p. 18), and then goes on to say that 'since there were only four city tribes as compared with thirty-one rural, it is clear that, although the urban populace might greatly outnumber the country folk, they were politically negligible unless they could attract support from the citizens outside the city' (p. 19). With this there would be no fault to find if it had been made clear at once that such an account, implying as it does that the *plebs urbana* was confined to the urban tribes, cannot claim to be true of the period with which Marsh is directly concerned. But the misleading impression caused by this failure to indicate that the system so described is one which had begun to break down more than a century before 146, if not so early as 312 when Mommsen detected the first signs of its collapse (*Staatsrecht* ii,[3] 402 ff.), is reinforced on p. 21, where Marsh writes that 'the residents of the city must long since have come to be a large majority of those present at meetings of the assembly, but, as they were confined to four tribes, their number was of no practical importance'; and it is only on the next page that the truth about the revolu-

tionary age begins to emerge with the admission that 'at first no doubt the great families could require their dependents to come to Rome and vote on occasion, but later many of these dependents who moved to the city kept their registration in the rural tribes.' So, perhaps without realizing the period of time he has covered, the reader arrives at the Rome whose urban *plebs,* so far from being restricted to the urban tribes, had got such a hold on the remaining thirty-one as to have prepared for the day when, at the beginning of the second century A. D., 'tribus xxxv' could mean in effect little more than the urban proletariat (*ILS* 286, 6046—on which see Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* iii, 446 n. 3).

Mere regrets would be idle; but, in view of the probability that this book will one day go into a second edition, it may be permissible to hope that, when an opportunity occurs, the author will re-write his account of the tribes, and in particular eliminate the chronological vagueness which students of the kind most likely to read a work such as this are the least capable of clarifying for themselves. Indeed, so essential is this subject to his treatment of politics during the revolutionary age that he might well explain in detail how, and when, the tribes composed of landowners in certain areas gave way to the tribes in which a large element derived their membership from their fathers as a personal attribute unaffected by changing territorial connexions. It would be not merely interesting, but also valuable to the argument, to know how precisely he would interpret Livy's account (xxxviii, 36, 9) of the treatment of Formiae, Fundi, and Arpinum in 188 B. C.; what he would infer from the remark said to have been made by Scipio Aemilianus in 142 B. C. (Gellius, *N. A.* v, 19, 16: *cf.* for the date *ib.* iv, 20, 10); what relevance, if any, he would see in § 77 (84) of the document which some are still prepared to call the 'lex Acilia' (and which deserves more notice than it here receives) to the spread of that attitude which is to be discerned in Cicero, *pro Balbo,* 57; and when he would suppose that what Dionysius calls *αἱ τῶν ἀτίμων φυδαί* [*Ant.* xix, 18, 1(22)] came (though there is some evidence to suggest that it was a foible of certain families claiming descent from the earliest inhabitants of Rome to emphasize their distinction by remaining in an urban tribe—*cf.* *ILS* 949 and perhaps 4942) to be predominantly composed of freedmen (*cf.* Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* iii, 447, and, for a valuable criticism of Mommsen's views, together with some useful remarks on the meaning of the phrase 'tribu mouere', P. Fraccaro in *Athenaeum,* N. S. xi, 2, 1933, pp. 150 ff.

When he comes, however, to his treatment of the history, Marsh recognizes that in a rural tribe, as it was actually represented in an assembly, there were to be found 'members of the

city populace who had retained their registration in the tribe in spite of the fact that they or their ancestors had moved to Rome and who had not become dependents of the nobles and knights' (p. 373) and that this was a class whose numbers 'tended constantly to grow' (p. 373 f.). For his general interpretation much depends on the fraction of the total number present at any particular meeting formed by this class. Though he does not say so explicitly, Marsh obviously thinks that it was always so small as by itself to be indecisive; for that seems to be the inevitable inference from his assertion that 'owing to the system of group voting, the city mob was *never*'—the italics are his—'able to dominate the Republic' (p. 31), an assertion repeated in other words on p. 377. By thus emphasizing the importance of the group-vote he implies that, though in mere numbers the floating votes of the *plebs urbana* were enough to swamp such genuine representatives of the countryside as might attend, the group-vote prevented these floating voters from doing so in fact—apparently because so many of them were still in the *tribus urbanae* that the remainder were not numerous enough to control the *tribus rusticae*. This is not altogether easy to believe. Anything like proof is more than the evidence will yield, and it would be foolish to ask that Marsh should demonstrate the numbers and the tribes of these independent members of the urban mob. But if he had traced the development of the tribes, and particularly that of the urban tribes, in greater detail, he might have paused before denying that by Gracchan times the rustic tribes had come to be so heavily represented in the fickle element of the *plebs urbana* that, except when elections or some specially stirring issue drew the country population to Rome, the urban rabble had control effective enough to make it the formidable menace to the country voters which it seems to have been thought by one of Appian's sources in *BC* i (see D. Kontchalovsky in *Rev. hist.* cliii, pp. 172 ff.), and to justify assertions like that of Rullus—'urbanam plebem nimium in re publica posse' (Cic., *de lege agr.* ii, 70). [On this subject see G. Bloch in Bloch-Carcopino, *La république romaine de 133 avant J.-C. à la mort de César*, pp. 100 ff.]

Those who hold that by 133 B. C. the vote of every tribe in a normal assembly was decided by voters from the region whose poorer inhabitants were what was meant by 'plebs urbana' may not find it easy to agree with Marsh about the significance of the group-vote during the period with which he is concerned. For his main contention, if I understand it aright, depends on his belief that a large proportion of the urban population was still restricted to the city-tribes; and his secondary suggestion—that the group-vote enabled political organizers to concentrate on a bare majority of the tribes and leave the rest to vote as they

might (p. 372 f.)—loses much of its plausibility if the effective voting strength of all tribes alike was to be found in what contemporaries seem to have regarded as the more or less homogeneous mass of the urban *plebs*. In that case a certain number of Marsh's conjectures, ingenious though they are, might become unnecessary. There would be no need, for instance, to distort what is probably the truth that the non-senatorial plutocracy was well disposed towards the candidacy of C. Gracchus for the tribunate of 124/3 B. C. into the rasher guess that Gracchus may have 'had some sort of understanding with the knights from the first' (p. 53), or to make the assumption to be found near the middle of p. 126 about the considerations which caused reluctance to spread the new citizens throughout the tribes after the Social War—considerations powerful enough, had they been valid, to command more respect from Sulla than they are rightly recorded on p. 127 to have received. Again, it would be possible to remove a certain difficulty presented in Marsh's account by the history of political bribery—a matter which is mentioned, indeed, in connexion with the electoral campaigns of 101 B. C. (p. 90) but is only said to have been 'becoming a more and more prominent feature of Roman political life' in the period after 70 B. C. (p. 160). We may perhaps agree with Marsh that in its early days bribery 'was probably limited to that portion of the rabble which voted in the rural tribes and to that section of this group which was registered in those tribes where the result was more or less uncertain' (p. 160 f.); but we may be led to revise the chronology, and incidentally to recognize another clue to the period when the tribal system approached the state in which we find it during the revolutionary age, by the reflexion that the Lex Cornelia Baebia de ambitu was passed in 181 B. C. (Livy xl, 19, 11), that in 166 B. C. elections were conducted 'ambitiosissime' (Obsequens 12), and that the law against bribery was strengthened in 159 B. C. (Livy, *Per.* 47).

These remarks, long though they have become, are scarcely enough to indicate even the main reasons for the doubts which in one reader have been raised by Marsh's interpretation of Roman politics; but their justification, if they have one, is the interest of his claim to have revealed 'the existence of a political machine behind the Roman senate' (p. 370) which has generally escaped the notice of historians. About the supposed conditions of its working enough has been said already: of the machine itself there is little to add. In Marsh's treatment the machine becomes plural. There are the 'well-organized political machine' of the Senate (p. 24), a machine built up by the 'knights' not later than 146 B. C. (p. 30 f.), and a 'democratic machine' constructed by Gaius Gracchus (p. 59), some

or all of which were apparently worked by 'machine politicians' (p. 145). The constant use of this particular metaphor is one which might be made more satisfactory by explanation. If it implies no more than that a large majority of the *nobilitas* commonly shared one outlook on the questions of the day, and that in the same way most of the extra-senatorial plutocracy usually held another, to speak for brevity of senatorial and 'equestrian' machines is harmless, though the separate existence of a 'democratic machine' may need further demonstration. But if it were allowed to suggest that the springs of Roman policy in the revolutionary age are always to be found in the views of some unseen but enduring caucuses, and never in the programmes of outstanding individuals acting either alone or in small and variable groups, it would run the risk of obscuring facts which are abundantly clear in the evidence for the Ciceronian age and which it is the service of F. Münzer to have proved for earlier periods. And that risk is real, as a single instance may show. We are told that, after Sulla's death and the departure of Pompeius for Spain, 'the machine permitted the revival of the corn law, and it also consented to the repeal of Sulla's law forbidding the tribunes to hold any other office' (p. 144). The latter achievement was due to Gaius Cotta, and it happens that, in the opinion of some at least, Asconius (p. 66 f. C) gives us just enough information of the circumstances to suggest that the notorious Whiggery of the Aurelii Cottae on this occasion, as on others, brought one of their number into conflict with the more conservative aristocrats (see *CAH* ix, p. 327)—a fact, if such it be, worth notice because of the influence exercised by this family, through his mother, on the outlook of Julius Caesar, but a fact which is overlooked when political life is conceived as the conflict of two or three 'machines.' Nevertheless, though not all may think that the metaphor adds much to what was known before of the republican government, with further explanation and a more definite emphasis on the influence of individuals it might well escape the danger of seeming to be a *suggestio falsi*.

After so much about what is certainly the most original feature of this book, what can be said of the rest must be brief. The treatment of the history is always adequate to its apparent purpose; and, though the author naturally dwells on those aspects which he finds most interesting—as on the circumstances leading up to the Civil War of 49 B. C., which he has discussed in print before, it is only perhaps in the section devoted to the constitutional intentions of Julius that the reader may think the measure scanty. Inevitably, of course, there are questions of the first magnitude to which Marsh's answers will not satisfy all his readers. It is a small matter, perhaps, that

the extra-senatorial plutocracy, from its first introduction on p. 3, is treated throughout as a class 'known to the Romans under the curious appellation of "knights,"' despite the positive assertion of Pliny, in *NH* xxxiii, 34; but more serious regrets may be felt at the account of Gaius Gracchus, of whose legislative measures we are told that 'it is impossible to determine their chronological order or even to distribute them between his two terms of office' (p. 55). If that were so (and it is to be observed that in note 2 on p. 175 Marsh after all assumes that in one detail at least the chronological order can be ascertained), the tribunates of Gaius would return to the region of the half-intelligible, where Marsh is in fact content to leave them; but he will forgive me, I trust, for saying that the attempts made by E. Meyer, E. Kornemann and others to establish a chronology are not so ill-founded as to merit this cavalier neglect, and that before they can be dismissed they must receive that measure of refutation which Marsh could presumably have given them in an appendix. [In this connexion I would add that Marsh twice (p. 48 n. 1 and p. 53 n. 1) ascribes to me, as if I were their author, views which were first formulated by others, as he will see by reminding himself of the literature cited in the footnotes on pp. 44 and 51 of *CAH* ix, to which he refers.] Again, there may be many who will think that Marsh's version of the relations between Pompeius and the other leading figures in Rome is still too much like that of Mommsen. Near the beginning they may find difficulty in the doctrine that any trifling army which Crassus might have secured from one of the measures (not all of which involved an army at all) proposed during the absence of Pompeius in the East was meant to ensure his safety if Pompeius on his return should draw up a proscription list on which 'Crassus felt no doubts that his name would stand among the first' (p. 158); and near the end they may suspect that further study of what Asconius has to say about Pompeius' conduct at the beginning of his sole consulship might modify the account to be given of his relations to the Senate in 52 B. C., and at the same time lend credibility to the far from negligible judgment implied by Julius himself in *BG* vii, 6, 1. These, however, are questions too large for discussion here; and in conclusion, though there are many minor points which invite a comment [such as the brevity of the reference to the 'lex Iulia municipalis' in note 1 on p. 246, and the disagreement with W. Spiegelberg's view of Cleopatra's death (*Sb. Bay. Ak.*, 1925, no. 2/1) implied in note 1 on p. 309], after a final question whether Marsh has not momentarily forgotten the work of Augustus when he says that 'the Social War . . . welded the population of Italy into a single nation' (p. 323) and (despite J. Gagé and W. Weber) that 'if a monarchy was to

be created, a basis for it could be found only in the assertion of some form of divine right' (p. 250), I must be content to repeat that, however much one may disagree with some of the views it contains, this is a book to which many students will be indebted and to which scholars may be grateful for its firm insistence on the need for closer thinking about the constitutional conditions of Roman politics.

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PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. THE VIGIL OF VENUS edited by Sir Cecil Clementi. Third Edition. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1936. 10 s. 6 d. net.


Sir Cecil Clementi issues a third edition of his well-known work on the Pervigilium Veneris. The first edition, published in 1911, contained 52 pages and seven plates, the second (1928) 166 pages and the same plates, the third xi + 269 pages and nine plates. The work is that of a learned lover of the Classics, who would have profited by a more intimate study of philological good form, of which the soul, as of wit, is brevity. With plates of the three codices given, the collation of them (Chapter 12) should have been absorbed in the apparatus criticus that accompanies the text, or rather in a scientifically prepared apparatus.[1] The notes, which contain much of value, need a thorough pruning, and the descriptions of manuscripts, or anything else, could be much reduced without the loss of a fact; for instance, instead of the paragraph (p. 38), at once too full and incomplete, devoted to the quaternions and the signatures of the Codex Salmasianus (with a citation of F. W. Hall's *Companion to Classical Texts* to tell us what a quaternion is) a very brief statement with a reference to Riese *A. L.*[2], I, p. xviii would have been more to the point. The versified translation presented in the first two editions has been extensively rewrought, though not always improved,[2] but is not yet elevated, like Mackail's, to poetry. Space

[1] The author's acquaintance with palaeographical abbreviations could be improved. Thus in arguing (p. 212) for Buecheler's archaic *quom*, l. 59 (my line numbers are those of the Codex Salmasianus =S) against *quo*, to which I would revert (it is now backed up by Vienna 9401 = V), he derives the error from the abbreviated *quō*—but that would normally induce a *quoniam*. Similarly (p. 45) he finds that V with qñ agrees in error with S (*quan*); but qñ is the well-known symbol for *quando* (which T has).

[2] Whatever may be thought of "Loos'd at dawn the virgin-bosoms from the mantle's humid red" for l. 31 (21): *mane virgineas papillas solvit umenti peplo*, the change to "from the wet attire they shed" is hardly felicitous.

could be saved by employing some of the phrases, which often hit the mark,[3] in the notes—some of them are there repeated—and by omitting the translation altogether.

The indispensable parts of the book are the bibliography, which has profited by the assistance of G. B. A. Fletcher,[4] and the plates, which should stand at the end of the book where one can more easily find them. The author has done excellent service in making accessible the pages of the Vienna manuscript (9401 = V) that contains Sannazaro's autograph copy of the *Pervigilium Veneris* along with other bits of an anthology that closely resembles T (*Paris*, 8071). Clementi shows clearly that V is not a copy of T. Sannazaro had obviously touched up the text that he found before making the present copy and he adds further conjectures in this,[5] but he could not have invented l. 39, which is omitted in T, nor could he, so far as we know, have had access to the Salmasianus.[6] But it is not accurately said (p. 47) that of the three manuscripts V "is the nearest to the archetype in accuracy, though not in date." The correct stemma is:



Some of the ten correct readings of V which are "neither in S nor T" (p. 45) may have stood in X^2, but none of them is too difficult for Sannazaro to have found by conjecture.[7] It may be added that on the date and provenience of S, Clementi might

[3] "With her own shy blushes" for *conpari pudore* l. 47 (37) is not one of these. Venus is not bashful. Owen's translation, which he rejects, "O Diana, Venus sends to you maids as modest as yourself" hits the meaning exactly.

[4] See his admirable article in *Class. Phil.* XXVIII (1933), 209-216.

[5] He and no longer Pithou should be credited with *annus* (51) and perhaps *humentis* (16) and *Rhamnes* (73), while his *fontium* . . . *montes* (53-54) is as good as Scriverius's *montium* . . . *fontes*.

[6] The errors in V no less than its good readings point to a derivation from a source superior to T, i. e. X^2, which in the Insular—or the Merovingian—fashion, doubled letters (*possuit*, 31) or had single letters for double and used *i longa* (*iusit* for *iussit*, 28). *Fusta* for *faota* (23) indicates that X^2 itself came from an original (later than X^1) that practised the open *a* and the ligature of *ct*.

[7] It is misleading to state that *vere natus orbis est* (2) is found in V but not in ST, for S has *vere* (*ver* T) and T has *orbis* (*iouis* S). The two words should be considered separately.

have considered the statement in my article in *Revue des Etudes Latines*, XII (1934), 87,[8] where with the approval of Lowe, both the seventh century and Spain are ruled out for S—though not for its original, X'.[9]

Caspar Barth is credited with knowing a codex "seen by mediaeval scholars" (p. xi) but since lost, though subsequent remarks (p. 24) rightly indicate that this manuscript was "only a comparatively modern transcript." The surmise that Aldus "showed Erasmus" another manuscript not T or V (p. 4) is most uncertain. Erasmus mentions not a manuscript, but a poem (*carminis . . . quod . . . exhibuit in antiquissima quadam Galliae bibliotheca repertum*). A copy he might well have had, whether of T or of X^2, perhaps deriving from that brought down by Sannazaro. Note that we have no statement from the careful Aldus himself, but one by Erasmus and another by Lilius Gyraldus (and a sensible one by Pithou).[10]

The author still holds firmly to his theory that the poem is elaborately composed on the principle of choric responsion, with proodos (6 lines), strophe α (4:8), strophe β (6:8:8), mesodos (4), antistrophe β (8:8:6), antistrophe α (4:8), epodos (4). All this looks pretty on paper, but to effect this even-numbered harmony it is necessary to delete the opening refrain—*cras amet*, etc.—which puts a fly in the ointment. But there is surely no objection—*pace* Buecheler and Scriverius—to opening with a refrain, as a little study of Virgil, Theocritus and his followers would show. There is absolutely no ground for believing (p. 53) that in the text of the poem, shown by Aldus to Erasmus, the line was omitted just because the title was *De Vere* (Erasmus) or *Ver* (Gyraldus).

Moreover, one of the former props of Clementi's theory has quietly slipped from its place. He remarks (p. 33) of the note *sunt vero versus* XXII, attached to the title of the poem, that some editors took it to refer to the total number of lines in the poem and others to the number of stanzas into which they believed the poem to be divided by the refrain. He goes on to explain, at unnecessary length, Riese's demonstration (in his

[8] This article is known to Clementi (p. 164). It is gratifying to know that there is a copy of "this French review in the library of Liverpool University," but I doubt not that this standard periodical may be found in any well-regulated library.

[9] Incidentally the S-looking figure with a stroke running vertically through it which, Clementi (p. 32) thinks, refers (in some cases) to corrections made in the text of S is really used (though sometimes carelessly placed) to indicate the beginning of a poem, as is especially apparent on p. 137, reproduced in full in Omont's facsimile. It may be nothing but a variation of the sign for a *capitulum* (our paragraph sign).

[10] See my later article, *T. A. P. A.* LXV (1934), 11-12.

edition of the *A. L.*[1], 1869) that the note refers to the number of poems in a section of the Anthology—a demonstration long overlooked or disregarded by certain editors of the *Pervigilium Veneris.*[11] But a brief paragraph with "Peccavi" at the end of it would have been more appropriate; for Clementi himself was among those who had misinterpreted this note. In particular, he endeavored in his previous editions to connect with it the initial refrain with this note, making the combination say (after emending XXII to XIII) "'Here begins the *Vigil of Venus* in trochaic metre. It contains thirteen verses—*Cras amet* etc.,' i. e. the verse *Cras amet,* etc., is repeated thirteen times in the poem."[12] After the rediscovery of Riese this hypothesis subsides.

More fatal still is the fact that the "mesodos" of four lines (37-39, 58) does not form a unity in itself. The theme is the embassy of virgins sent by Venus to Diana; but it needs for its completion the next two lines (40-41), which even an intercalated refrain cannot separate. Group these six lines together, as we should, and strophic responsion falls like a house of cards. Incidentally, the repeated *Ipsa* at the beginning of these responsive sections loses the significance that Clementi attaches to it (p. 52); for one of its instances (40) must fall within the real "mesodos (if such there be)," with another *Ipsa* at the beginning of the following line. This theory had better be abandoned, once and for all.

One point on the prosody of the poem. I made an attempt to relieve it of the metrical strait-jacket into which some editors had thrust it.[13] With part of that attempt Clementi is in sympathy (p. 86). He accuses me of a mistake, however, in objecting to the alteration of *Phoebus* into *Apollo* (l. 91) on the grounds that the metre is satisfactory enough and that the elision of the monosyllable *me* before Apollo is unexampled. He points out (what I had been aware of before) that *me* is thus elided in Virgil and Catullus (pp. 262 f.). But I was speaking not of all Latin poetry but of the work under discussion and of the simple character of the elisions permitted by its author. I would still regard the "emendation" erroneous.

On the date and authorship of the poem the author wisely, perhaps, ends with a *non liquet,* though since it is by no means sure that the poet has Apuleius in mind, it were better to set the *terminus a quo* as the reign of Hadrian rather than c. 160 A. D. I still have a fondness for the explanation that I suggested,[14] namely that the poem was written early in the reign

[11] *Rev. des Et. Lat., op. cit.,* pp. 83-86.
[12] 1911, p. 10; 1928, p. 31.
[13] *T. A. P. A., op. cit.,* p. 7, n. 20.
[14] *Rev. Etud. Lat., op. cit.,* pp. 91-92.

of Antoninus Pius and possibly by Florus. Indeed if "*Caesar*" (l. 74) be taken in the technical sense that came in under Hadrian, the exact date of the poem would be 138 A. D., when as Hadrian's heir Antoninus Pius received the title of Caesar, which he held only till Hadrian's death in that same year. But I cheerfully admit that the matter is not decided beyond peradventure.

In conclusion, I would not imply by the above strictures that this work is lacking in value. It is the fruit of years of wide-reading and assiduous toil and it contains important information.[15] But when a fourth edition appears, we hope that it will pay some deference to Hesiod's precept that the half is better than the whole.

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The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. XI. Cambridge, the University Press, 1936. Pp. xxvii + 997.

The task originally set for the *Cambridge Ancient History* series was the tremendous one of presenting in an attractive manner and yet worthily of modern scholarship all the many phases through which the culture of the Mediterranean has passed, in its retarded or its sudden changes, from the beginning of recorded history to the time of Constantine the Great. With this long volume, which presents the history and cultural accomplishments of the Roman Empire under the Flavian and Antonine principates and the contrasting civilizations of its neighbors beyond the borders, the important historical effort of the entire series approaches its end. In this long view the new volume will command the respect of all serious scholars in the field, the recognition of the courage and persistence of the editorial staff, and the gratitude for the generous gift of their time and specialized abilities on the part of the twenty-one British and European scholars who contributed to it. Individual differences of historical decision, even severe criticism, must be regarded as subordinate to the fact that any student or specialized scholar has now available, in this series, a safe point of departure in any effort he may wish to make to broaden or deepen his knowledge of the history of antiquity in any of its multiple forms of expression.

[15] The author deserves the thanks of scholars for his discovery of the only other copy besides that found by Omont of the *editio princeps* of Pithou in 1587. Incidentally, had Sannazaro printed his copy, with his emendations, the credit for the *princeps* would have fallen to him, some eighty years before.

The volume opens with a chapter by M. Charlesworth which gives a favorable judgment, on the whole, of the rule of the Flavian dynasty. As displayed particularly in his treatment of Domitian, Charlesworth maintains a careful balance between the bitter attacks upon him of contemporary Roman writers, the fact of his good appointments to provincial posts, and the satisfactory results of these appointments in good administration. The attempt to formulate into a readable text the small amount of literary evidence and the mass of archaeological remains upon the peoples of northern Europe is undertaken by Dr. G. Ekholm of Uppsala University and Professor A. Alföldi of Buda-Pest. It is obvious that these scholars know the archaeological evidence from their respective areas. Nevertheless, the *Germania* of Tacitus still bulks large in their accounts, as I suppose it must continue to do. Even with the skeleton furnished by the *Germania* the land is still filled with ghosts of peoples that once lived. Fibulae, buckles and drinking horns cannot be shaped into the ribbing, much less the flesh, of any living people. The further north one travels with Dr. Ekholm, the further one moves into a land of historical mists. When one arrives at the Finns, a Roman wine ladle and a few fundamental loan-words from the Norse (p. 67) become the only historical substance which remains. Contrary to the belief of ancient historians, Alföldi regards and treats the Getan culture as distinct from the Dacian and the two peoples as different elements of a larger Thracian stock. Only when he comes to the Dacians does the reader feel that the historical ground is firm.

Rostovtzeff's section of Chapter III on the problem of the Scythians and Sarmatians suffers inevitably from the same preponderance of merely archaeological evidence, though his skill in the use of such material is always masterly. His distinction between Sarmatians and Sauromatians (see also his *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, p. 113) is here maintained (p. 91). Mention of a Sarmatian, King Sauromates, in Pliny's letters to Trajan (X, 63, 64, 67), and inscriptions of that time had led me to the opposite conclusion. Rostovtzeff's sections on the Parthians and Parthian-Roman relations are new and fresh. As is his excellent habit, he has enlarged the scope of his discussion by treating the adjacent cultures and peoples on every side. His intimate knowledge of the new and important archaeological material obtained by the Yale excavations at Dura appears on every page. As usual he is vigorous and convincing in his presentation.

The discussion of the army and the frontier policies and activities of the Flavians has been done by Ronald Syme of Oxford (ch. IV) with too little attention to the river fleets and to the navy in general. Syme begins his chapter unfortunately—with a characteristically artificial phrase of Tacitean pessimism

regarding the narrow scope and lack of historical interest which faces one who writes upon the Empire. This, of course, is amply belied by the fascination of Tacitus' own narrative. Syme intensifies this false start by the statement that the imperial story is dull as compared with that of the Republic, and that Augustus meant it to be so. This is only true if the constant and destructive civil wars of the later Republic, which seems as depressing to the reviewer as they seemed to the poets of the Augustan period, are to be regarded as historically uplifting and exciting. That peace, too, may offer its major blessings and enthralling interests may be seen variously in this same volume. Among other examples stands the analysis, done by E. Albertini, of the Collège de France (ch. XII), of the penetration of Africa, Spain and Gaul by Roman-Italian ideas, and of the toughness and persistence of native fashions, modes of life and habits of thought in these same areas. Albertini has here presented, with great knowledge and sympathy, much material toward an understanding of the decentralization of ancient Mediterranean culture as its frontiers were advanced in the north. In like manner the Tacitean phrase quoted by Ronald Syme is disproven by Canon Streeter in chapter VII, upon the Rise of Christianity. There the reader will find that the apostles and early converts were human beings, bringing with them into the forming Church their individual psychologies and their own petty problems. The shift of ideologies in the Christian communities brought about after the fall of Jerusalem by the increase in conversions of Gentiles in admirably treated (pp. 268-272). "The Jew sought after righteousness, the Greek after wisdom."

Ronald Syme's knowledge is both wide and accurate, though presented, perhaps, in too great detail. Disagreement will chiefly arise with his summary phrases. He states that Roman foreign policy was, on the whole, indifferent to economic advantages (p. 139). It is certainly doubtful whether any great state supported upon, and supporting, a highly articulated economic structure can afford to be so. This is particularly true of Arabia, which gives rise to Syme's generalization, as shown by Augustus' luckless venture under Aelius Gallus along the Arabian coast (see J. G. C. Anderson in *Cambridge Ancient History* X, pp. 249-250. The economic motivation of the expedition to Arabia goes back to Strabo, a friend and companion of Aelius Gallus himself). The Parthian campaign of Trajan had also its economic bases (Consult Rostovtzeff, *Caravan Cities*, p. 31, and R. P. Longden in this volume, p. 239). Economic considerations, along with military necessities and problems of expansion, play their part likewise in the sound discussion of the peripheral provinces of Britain and of the Rhine and Danube (see pp. 516, 528-529), which are skillfully and interestingly handled in chapter XIII by R. G. Collingwood for Britain, K.

Stade of the Roman-German Archaeological Commission for the Rhine, and A. Alföldi for the Danubian areas.

R. P. Longden has written the narrative of the principate of Nerva and Trajan, chapters V and VI, on the whole, well. In opposition to many scholars and to the obvious logic of a distant and difficult campaign, he regards the Parthian War in 114 A. D. as the result of a sudden decision on the part of Trajan and refuses to believe (pp. 219, 239, note 2) that its preparatory period is the background of the correspondence of Pliny, as governor of Bithynia, with Trajan. In this decision he seems to close his eyes to much evidence which his own pages bring. For me Pliny X, 74 is decisive, by its implications, for the imminence of the war at that time and for Pliny's knowledge that it was to come.

Wilhelm Weber, of Berlin University, follows Canon Streeter's vivid pages on the Rise of Christianity with the narrative of the principate of Hadrian and his three Antonine successors. In the sober volumes of this series the two chapters of Weber offer strange reading. It is not a question of his learning (for that is proven on every page). It is a matter of his method of presentation, his constant use of the rhetorical question (of which four appear on p. 295 alone), of his labored effort to precipitate in words the ideologies of millions of people of a given time and express the spirit of that age in felicitous phrases. At times the thought becomes as cryptic as the phrases. What is the meaning of "the long canker of peace" (p. 347) which preceded the campaign of Verus on the Eastern Front in 162 A. D.? Perhaps Weber believes that war is a source of cultural energy and strength, and peace a long process of corrosion and decay. I do not know. Marcus Aurelius (on p. 368) "saved the Empire from its perils from without, but himself, his own soul, he could not save." Granting that Marcus Aurelius, as person, was a tragic figure, it is historically quite unimportant whether he saved his soul or lost it. Who, at any rate, can know whether he lost his soul or not? At the end of chapter IX an Emperor appears who embodied, according to Wilhelm Weber, a new spiritual unity. He was "the rising sun of a new world." He proclaimed in his person a new order which was destined to abide. Who, pray, was this prophet of a new order, this supernal fruit of the new age? None other than our old friend Commodus, slayer of elephants—also of lions—the Roman Heracles. If one must choose in historical writing between rhetorical passion and cold cynicism, give me cynicism. It is the safer guide in the direction toward truth.

One returns with a feeling of greater security to the calmness and clarity of Hugh Last's general discussion (chs. X and XI) of imperial administration. In marked contrast to his conservatism in acceptance of the dubious sources necessarily used in his

chapters upon early Rome (vol. VII, chs. 12, 13, 15) he here shows a refreshing reliance upon individual decisions and new interpretations, always backed by a thorough study of the source materials. Contrary to the current belief, he rejects the idea, in the imperial succession before Vespasian (pp. 407-408), of a single *Lex de Imperio* which at the outset of his principate presented each Emperor with a general grant of his powers. The precedents established by a gradual assumption of new functions by the forerunners of Vespasian were first conferred by a single enactment upon Vespasian himself. In my judgment, the old view, maintained by H. Stuart Jones (vol. X, p. 141), is still valid, though Last's theory is engagingly presented.

Another suggestion, which Last presents with some caution on p. 431, does not seem to me to be acceptable. This is that the change from freedmen to equites in high positions in the central government was a success "for Republican ideals of government against the menace of autocracy." When this change came it was much too late to talk of Republican ideals. However much one may be moved to contradict some of Last's decisions, as, for example, his insistence (p. 477) on the rule of an "aristocracy" at Rome and in the provinces, he is stimulating and has been willing, and able, to throw aside accepted and stereotype views.

The excellence of the editorial plan followed at this point deserves mention and praise. Hugh Last had given a synoptic view, from the center outward, of imperial administration, its efforts at good government and its results. This is followed by five chapters on large sectors of the Empire, done in each case by noted scholars with specific and intimate knowledge in each region. By this approach the persistence of the native habits and the consequent variety of the cultures of the Empire receive their correct recognition. The areas west of the Adriatic and Cyrenaica, as successfully and interestingly done by Albertini, Collingwood, the German archaeologist Stade, and the Hungarian scholar Alföldi, have already been mentioned. The eastern areas have fallen into equally competent hands. J. Keil has treated the Greek and Asia Minor provinces. A fine scholarship and profound knowledge of the regions is the warrant for the interest and value of chapter XV upon the provinces of southwestern Asia by Franz Cumont. H. Idris Bell, of the British Museum, has again shown his extraordinary knowledge, gained by years of work upon the Greek papyri, and his attractive and interesting style in a discussion of Egypt, which is extended by P. Romanelli's treatment of Crete and the Cyrenaica.

Time and space for this review are more than consumed. F. Sandbach of Cambridge has done the chapter upon Greek Literature, E. E. Sikes of Cambridge that upon the Latin Literature of the Silver Age. J. Wight Duff is responsible for the inter-

esting chapter XIX upon social life in Rome and Italy. The choice of Professor G. Rodenwaldt of Berlin University for the discussion of the art and architecture of the period could not well have been bettered. The closing chapter on Roman law of the classic period fell to a competent specialist in W. W. Buckland, of Cambridge University.

This volume grows constantly more impressive as one reads it through. In the great mass of its details the reader may sometimes lose himself and his sense of unity. But the period is one of marked changes and diversity. Perhaps it is the greatest praise of the volume that this impression results from its reading.

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GIORGIO PASQUALI. Preistoria della poesia romana. Florence, G. C. Sansoni, 1936. Pp. xii + 85. Paper covers. L. 12.

We live in a world of contrasts. Twelve years ago it fell to me, in one of the first reviews I ever wrote, to condemn a grandiose attempt to tell (in three volumes) a history of Latin literature before Greek influence; now it is my lot to review a more sober, more judicious, and altogether more critical pamphlet, that will have to be read carefully and seriously pondered by all future historians of early Roman letters. But we also live in a world of fashions, and it has been evident for some time that the fashion of theory (it is little more) concerning the saturnian metre has shifted more and more away from the opinions of its structure and origin that were held in favour still when I was an undergraduate, and which still perhaps hold the field in the handbooks. I say it is little more than a matter of fashionable or unfashionable theory; for the truth is that it is as much a tour de force now as ever to make bricks without straw, and it is so all the same whether the bricks be few or a whole waggonload. How much new evidence is there? But sometimes, to change the metaphor, a straw shows which way the wind blows, and if there are not enough saturnian straws for making bricks with which to construct a solid edifice, is there not perhaps an odd straw or two to show us the set of the saturnian rhythm, quantitative or accentual?

For this is the prime question. It is something worse than unfortunate that Pasquali prejudges this entire issue in his opening words: "chi scrive, ritiene non soltanto improbabile ma assurdo che il verso saturnio fosse accentuativo." Why? Because it is inconceivable that one and the same poet, Livius Andronicus, should have been able to compose verses on two different prin-

ciples. Now that is no good reason for Pasquali's assertion. It is a difficulty which those who maintain the accentual theory do not find altogether easy to overcome. For my own part I do not find it insuperable. Analogies drawn from the history of English prosody in the second half of the fourteenth century or from experiments such as those of the late poet-laureate have been urged by Lindsay and Hardie. Housman's was a "creative genius" equally at home in two totally different rhythmical principles—in different languages, yes. There's the rub. The question is not, as I see it, merely whether one and the same poet (not versifier, if you please, but poet) could compose in two different systems of verse, for he may and can and does; but whether one and the same language, at a given stage in its history, can admit extensive and free composition in two rhythmical systems so fundamentally different as the quantitative and the accentual. That the answer to this question is and must be in the affirmative is proved by the history of post-classical Latin versification, in the third century after Christ.

Pasquali might have used better arguments, such as Leo's or Zander's, in favour of the quantitative theory. He makes much of the contention, enunciated by Meillet, that the principle of counting two short syllables equivalent to one long syllable is a Greek innovation. The argument is not pertinent until the saturnian is first proved quantitative; and it is irrelevant if the saturnian was accentual. The proper method to handle the problem is to start not with an assertion but with an examination of the extant saturnian lines. There of course the trouble is that either theory may be made to work—after a fashion. Hence we are forced back upon other considerations. But if Pasquali's main premise be granted (I do not grant it), much might be said for his general theory (not for some of its details). It is, in brief, that practically every one of the various forms of both members of a saturnian is to be found in Greek poetry. Pasquali quotes, after Leo, numerous specimens from the cantica of the *Agamemnon* and the *Choephori* for comparison with the first member of the saturnian, before the diaeresis, and examines such differences as they show. These differences he unjustifiably minimises. Similarly, in the second member of the saturnian we are to recognise substantially three types of Greek verse—the ithyphallic, the iambic dimeter, and the so-called "Reizianus." The coincidences, as he calls them, between Greek rhythms and the saturnian *cola* are not, Pasquali holds, fortuitous; "dimmi con chi pratichi e ti dirò chi sei" is a sound principle for both Greek and Latin metrics. There is no mistaking with what we are dealing; nor can the "coincidences" which are "observed" be due to accident.

What then is the degree of relationship? Not, says Pasquali, a common inheritance, but borrowing by the Latins, nay by a

Roman (this is emphasised, pp. viii, 33; pity that Pasquali does not know his name, p. 60 "noi non sapremo mai il nome di quel Latino, di quel . . . Romano," as Fick knew the name of his Homeric redactor!), borrowing from the Greeks, not indeed (how could it be?) of the saturnian, but of the *cola* by the union of which that Roman genius created the saturnian! When did this marvel happen, we ask: "in eta molto antica" is the reply (p. 33), yes in the sixth century B. C. (p. 72), at the end of that century (p. ix). And a case can be made out for cultural contacts between Rome or Latium and the Greek world at that period (pp. 60 sqq.).

But then what becomes of Italic saturnians? Pasquali writes "devo confessare che io non conosco codesti antichi saturni italici." A confession of ignorance, in all earnest! Pasquali is well aware, to be sure, of Buecheler's claim that two North Oscan inscriptions (*I. D.* 216, 218) are written in saturnian rhythm. But he dismisses them as very doubtful saturnians, and, if such, as due to Roman influence: "i saturnii di Corfinio, se saturnii sono, saranno un fenomino di romanizzazione." With this I should never agree. We may indeed take warning, as I have written elsewhere (*Foundations*, p. 388, n. 4) "that Buecheler scanned as saturnians (as well as translated) an Oscan inscription of Bovianum Vetus (*I. D.* 169) which he took to be complete, but which Pauli subsequently showed to consist of mere fragmentary lines, broken on both left and right!" A better argument, for Pasquali's purpose, would be that the inscription of Corfinium shows elements foreign to Italic tradition, not only because it presents to us the fully developed epitaph, a thing conspicuously rare in the dialects, but also because it is permeated with Greek influence (e. *g. uranias empratois, praicime perseponas afδed*). As for the "carmen Oscum," as Buecheler labelled it, from Anzi—is it a "carmen" at all? And if it is, still it is written in the Greek alphabet, and may well therefore show other Greek influences as well. But Pasquali dismisses also the Faliscan saturnian *foied uino pipafo, cra carefo* — this on metrical grounds. Here too he might have confirmed his case by pointing out that the erotic scene on the vases bearing this text must ultimately be of Greek derivation. Evidently, however, Pasquali has not read Vetter's important paper, *Glotta*, XIV (1925), pp. 26-31, on the Faliscan inscription (CIE 8079):

ceres far me[l ferc]tom l[o]uf[ir] ui[no]m [dou]iad
euios mama z[e]xtos med f[if]iqod
prauios urnam so[kruei?] porded karai
eqo [u]rnel[a] telafitai dupes
arcentelom hut[ ]ilom peparai douiad

in which Vetter's claim to have discovered saturnian rhythm is not without foundation, and in which there is no manifest Greek

influence as there is at Corfinium. Vetter's contentions, in fact, have greatly strengthened Buecheler's and Friedrich's original discovery, and it does not appear at all that Pasquali has demolished the Italic saturnian.

Again, on Pasquali's theory, what becomes of any Indo-European rhythmical inheritance that the Italic peoples may have had? This he boils down to mere alliterative "carmina," and he analyses the prayer to Mars at the *suouetaurilia* (Cato, *agr.* 141) into constituent rhythmical elements—as Norden, with some differences, had done before him. And here he is prepared to admit analogies with Keltic alliterative prose and with early Germanic verse, but he allows the analogy with north-western European forms to go thus far, and no farther; that is, he admits comparisons only in linguistic units which can hardly be said to be concerned with rhythm strictly defined but imply rather "una forma letteraria, o, se letteraria par troppo, si dica una forma espressiva, commune agli Indoeuropei del nordovest"; comparisons in vocabulary and morphology he freely admits, for they are not to be denied.

Pasquali has put his case so temperately and so persuasively that I regret to proclaim myself unconvinced. I think he has argued his case, not too strictly, but too straitly. The extant saturnian material is too small in bulk, if not too dubious in rhythmical character, to sustain a categorical judgment such as many would fain have. Take the saturnians alone, by themselves, and it is theoretically possible to defend either the accentual or the quantitative theory. Hence the qualified judgment, which is all that we can hope for, must rest at least as much on what we know of the history of Latin utterance, both *before and after* the period in which the extant saturnians were written, as upon an examination of the actual lines that we have.

It is clear, however, that final judgment must wait on a greatly increased knowledge not only of comparative Indo-European metrics,[1] but also of primitive Italic rhythms.[2] What the ancients thought about the saturnian is of little or no help, but such stray hints as Horace's *rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor* (if Horace was actually thinking of saturnians when he wrote that) will eventually be worth taking into account. We are left, therefore, with no better means of reaching even an interim finding than such as is indicated by our knowledge of the enunciation of Latin, and of the Latin sense for rhythm, through the long history of the language. It is now generally agreed that Italic, Latin included, developed an initial accent in the place of the

[1] There are signs that in time we shall know more; cf. Friedrich, *Phil. Woch.*, LVII (1937), pp. 308 ff.

[2] Here too there are pointers to new enquiries (see, for example, *Idg. Forsch.*, LIV (1936), pp. 153, 278), though it must be acknowledged that these are not as yet very promising.

Indo-European free accent, and that in this peculiarity it agreed with Keltic and Germanic. It does not follow that these three branches made the same accentual change together or at the same time; there are chronological considerations which tell rather against that conclusion. But it does appear, French theorists notwithstanding, from the dialect evidence and the Latin evidence combined, that the new accent was an accent of stress. Now it is extremely important to observe that the effect of such an accent had not completely worked itself out by the date of our earliest Latin records (witness such forms as *sakros, numasioi, iouestod,* and above all else the careful preservation of a distinction of quantity in the utterance of vowel sounds), had not quite fully worked itself out even by the time of Plautus. A native rhythm, dependent on accent and composed of *cola* such as Meillet (*Origines,* pp. 12 sqq.) has traced back to Indo-European —marked by a number of syllables that was more or less fixed, and hence by a certain distribution of the accents—might, with some difficulty, have been brought under quantitative rules at any time within those two limits of date—by a sort of compromise. Is not that just what happened? And the saturnians that we have are the final (unsuccessful) result of the compromise, a failure, on the verge of disappearing by the third century B. C.? The history of the Latin accent itself points to just such a compromise between the native Italic and the Greek system,[3] with Greek influence prevailing in cultivated literary circles, but, in the end, it also, unsuccessful and abandoned. The quantitative verse of comedy likewise had to come to terms with accent—hence the old problem of ictus and word-accent. Greek influence held in check for some centuries the north-western European system of accent and partially "mediterraneanised"—for a time—the utterance of Latin, just as it partly mediterraneanised the Latin vocabulary. Somewhat parallel are other features of Latin, for example the attempt of Pacuvius to restore to Latin, after the Greek fashion, a free use of compounds; this was shorter lived. Again, the restoration of the full value of *-s* in classical verse was foreign to the popular pronunciation, but clearly a necessity in order to make the hexameter finally successful in Latin. The long delayed perfecting of the hexameter itself tells the same story. All in all, the nature and history of the *numerus saturnius,* so long as it lasted, seem to be peculiarly similar to those of the very speech of the *Saturnia tellus.*

Finally, as Lindsay quite rightly stressed, the alliteration that "belongs to the essence of saturnian, as of other European accentual verse," and not only alliteration but also phenomena of assonance and consonance point away from Greece. Pasquali

[3] See Buck's brief but eminently sane statement (*Comp. Gram.,* 1933, p. 167).

makes no attempt to deal with the striking co-incidence that such alliterative linking as is characteristic of certain types of native Old Irish verse seem to occur in some of our saturnians; compare

lug *sc*ēith, *sc*āl *f*ind
*f*o nimib nī ra*b*e *b*ed mac nĀine aidblithir,

and

inmortales mortales si foret fas *fl*ere,
*fl*erent diuae Came*n*ae *Na*euium poetam.

Even at the risk of being dubbed old-fashioned I still see the balance of evidence in favour of the accentual theory,[4] or at least of a semi-accentual theory. It is precisely because our extant saturnians belong mainly to the third century that "there is nothing surprising in the difficulty of finding a form applicable to all saturnians." At first an accentual verse, a desperate attempt was made to bring it under the quantitative rules of Greek metres. But the attempt failed so badly that it ended by destroying utterly the saturnian verse; and so saturnians ceased to be written.

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Physiologus, ed. F. SBORDONE. In Aedibus Societatis "Dante Alighieri," Milan 1936. Pp. cxvii + 332. L 60.

During the thirteen centuries or more of its popularity as a Christian folkbook, the *Physiologus,* in its Greek branch alone, passed into such a bewildering variety of textual forms that few scholars have even hoped for an edition of the Greek text that should render a critical account of the entire body of traditional data. Such an edition, however, lies before us in the book under review. For its preparation the editor has completely collated no less than seventy-seven Greek manuscripts—more than twice as many as had previously been mentioned in this connection. Moreover, he has explored the relationships of these MSS in detail, has drawn up stemmas for the principal recensions, and has reported the variant readings of all the significant MSS in his elaborate critical notes at the bottom of the page. Without reckoning the types peculiar to individual manuscripts or to relatively small groups of MSS, the Greek *Physiologus* may be said to exist in three principal versions: I, the original *Physiologus,* dating from around 200 A. D.; II, the Byzantine recen-

[4] It is astonishing to find Lindsay's ironical statement (*Early Latin Verse,* ch. i) of Leo's views misconstrued by Koster and Lenchantin as meaning that Lindsay had abandoned his own theory. What Lindsay would have said to that!

sion inappropriately referred to by Goldstaub (*Philologus,* Suppl. Bd. VIII, p. 371) as "die mittelgriechische Redaktion des Pseudo-Epiphanios" (cf. Sbordone, p. xliii); and III, the Pseudo-basilian recension, in which the allegorical explanations are ascribed to St. Basil (cf. Goldstaub, *Byz. Zeit.,* VIII, pp. 516 ff.). These three recensions are edited separately by Sbordone in the present volume, while the forty-eight chapters of the vulgar Greek metrical version, which might have been edited separately, are appended severally to the corresponding chapters in recensions I and II, from which they are derived. At the end there is an "Appendix ceterorum capitum quae praeter singulas tres redactiones individua supersunt" and an "Index nominum et verborum notabilium." A brief but adequate commentary dealing with the sources and diffusion of the zoological and other traditions mentioned in the text, together with a list of parallel passages in ecclesiastical and later writers, is appended to each of the forty-eight chapters of the oldest *Physiologus* and to those chapters of the later recensions which deal with new animals or with new φύσεις. These notes, in which the editor shows a first-hand acquaintance with a wide range of naturalistic and theological literature and in which he has occasionally pointed out for the first time the presumable or probable sources of the narrative found in the text, provide the most complete and most systematic conspectus of Physiologus-parallels, for ancient and Byzantine literature at least, that has yet appeared in any one place. Commentary of this sort is welcome here, as it might not be in another text, because the substance of the *Physiologus* passed into innumerable books of every kind in the Middle Ages, because its stories are often of obscure origin, and because the critical literature on the subject is scattered and hence not easy to consult. The value of the notes on recensions II and III is enhanced by the editor's practice of pointing out briefly, that they may be comprehended at a glance, those particular features of each chapter which are new in comparison with the old *Physiologus.* In the Prolegomena, and in connection with the II text of the oldest recension, from which the most popular Latin, as well as the Armenian, Georgian, and younger Syriac versions were derived, there is an illuminating discussion of the Latin *Physiologus* based upon new manuscript materials, wherein the author contributes substantially to our knowledge of the tradition and clears up much that was previously obscure. It is welcome news (p. lxviii) that he is preparing to edit one or more of these important Latin texts; they are likely to be of great help in the study of later bestiaries.

Modern editions of the *Physiologus* hitherto have been incomplete and based upon only a few, sometimes upon only one, manuscript. The *editio princeps* by Ponce de Leon (Rome 1587: reproduced without indication of its identity in Migne, *P. G.,*

XLIII, 517 ff.) consisted of twenty-five chapters belonging to a greatly modified Byzantine recension (no. II) and was further altered by the editor himself. In this connection it is interesting to note that Sbordone (pp. ciii f.) has identified at least one of the three MSS used by Ponce de Leon, that he found four handwritten copies of the latter's edition on Mt. Athos, and that he recognizes in cod. Paris. 834 the very copy that Ponce de Leon wrote out and submitted to his printer (p. xxix). As a supplement to the *editio princeps* A. Mustoxydes and D. Schinas (Συλλογὴ ἀποσπασμάτων ἑλληνικῶν, Venice, 1817) published eleven chapters belonging to the same recension and taken from cod. Marcianus IV 35 (= Nani 257); but it was not until 1855 that an edition appeared that was fairly representative of the *Physiologus* in its oldest form: I refer to the text published by J. B. Pitra in the third volume of his *Spicilegium Solesmense* upon the basis of cod. Paris. 2426 (= A). Besides A, Pitra reported the readings of five other MSS, the most valuable of which, in spite of many glosses and scholia, was Paris. 2509 (= Γ). Lauchert's edition of 1889 (*Gesch. des Phys.*, pp. 229 ff.) rests mainly upon W (= Vind. theol. gr., 128), with occasional adoptions from A. Two years later another old text (Σ = Mosquensis 298) was described by A. Karnejev,[1] and in 1894 the same scholar (*Byz. Zeit.*, III, pp. 26 ff.) published the *Physiologus* in Mosquensis 432 (= Π), which was found to be a close representative of the previously unknown form of the Greek text from which the Armenian, Latin (AB), and younger Syriac versions depend. In 1896 Zuretti (*Stud. Ital. di Fil. Class.*, V, pp. 113 ff.) published, along with v and t which belong mainly to recension II, and with p which marked the first appearance in print of recension III, the old and valuable text contained in Ambros. E 16 sup. (= a). Finally, we may mention the illustrated codex from Smyrna (= E, *saec.* xi) described and abundantly quoted by Strzygowski and Goldstaub in *Byz. Archiv.*, Heft 2 (1899), the text of which is closely akin to A. E, a beautiful MS and valuable in other ways, perished when the Evangelical School, to which it belonged, was burned by the Turks in 1922; but Sbordone has had the good fortune to find what he assures us is a faithful copy of the same in a 17th century MS on Mt. Athos (E′).

With the exception of M (= Ambros. A 45 sup., *saec.* xii or xiii?) which is closely related to Γ, and of O (Barocc. 951), which belongs in the W family, the manuscripts above mentioned include the most important of those used by Sbordone in constructing his text of the old *Physiologus*; the others need not concern us here. Sbordone finds that the manuscripts fall into four main groups, represented respectively by MΓ, Σalς, WO,

[1] In *Materiali i samietki po literaturnoi istorii Fisiologa.* St. Petersburg, 1890; cf. Polívka in *Archiv f. slav. Philol.*, XIV, pp. 374 ff.

and AEII. According to his stemma no one of these four traditions depends in origin on any of the others, but each, in spite of later modifications, goes back more or less independently to the archetype itself. This means that the choice of variants must often be arbitrary, since the readings themselves in many cases cannot be judged on the basis of their intrinsic merits. Thus, on p. 23, l. 5, we do not know whether to read *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον* with MΓ and Sbordone, or to omit it with ΣaWOAEII and the Aethiopic version. Problems of this nature necessarily confront us on every page. The present edition is critical in the sense that it eliminates much that has little or no authority in the four traditions or that is otherwise patently spurious; but beyond this point the *Physiologus* continues to defy scientific editing. Sbordone believes that MΓ contains on the whole the oldest and best tradition, though he offers no proof of this in his preface (pp. xlv ff.) and he points out that this family, like each of the others, has admitted a number of false additions and changes. Moreover, M contains only 38 chapters and Γ only 15. It may well be—and, as will be seen later, I have additional reasons for so thinking—that the MΓ family preserves the right reading more frequently than the others; but, in the presence of four traditions that are parallel as far back as the editor has been able to trace them,[2] it is better to choose between doubtful readings with reference to a plurality of good witnesses (and the greater the plurality the better) than to rely upon the authority of any one. For example, I should prefer MΓWO to ΣaAE, but not MΓ to ΣaWOAE. Sbordone's text is in large part eclectic, as any modern text of the *Physiologus* must be, and for that reason it was important to call in *all* the old witnesses. As it is, he has not done so; he never cites the faithful old Aethiopic version, which Hommel assigned with good reason to the 5th century, nor Tychsen's old Syriac, of about the same age, nor the Latin of Cahier's codex C. Although these translations are of little use in determining the precise phraseology of the Greek text, they nevertheless furnish valuable testimony concerning the presence or absence of many sentences and paragraphs in the ancient *Physiologus*. The absence in Sbordone's critical apparatus of any reference to these old translations is the more surprising in view of the fact that he brings in such relatively worthless testimony (for the Greek text) as that of the 12th-century chronicler Michael Glycas, who paraphrases some chapters of the *Physiologus*, that of Ps.-Eustathius, who paraphrased the text of the relatively late Π recension and conflated even that with extraneous sources (cf. Wellmann in *Hermes*, LII, 126 ff.; F. Zöpfl, *Der Kommentar des Ps.-Eusth. zum Hexa-*

[2] Sbordone states, however, that WO and AEIII are on the whole later forms of the text than MΓ and ΣaΛs, and that they are more closely akin to the latter than to MΓ.

emeron, Münster, 1927), and that of Hermes Trismegistos, whose *Kyranides* (recensions 1 and 2) the editor reckons usually among the imitations of the *Physiologus*, but occasionally also among its sources. On p. lxxviii Sbordone demonstrates that the text of the *Physiologus* used by Ps.-Eustathius belonged to the peculiar Π recension; and from this starting point he makes an interesting deduction concerning the date of the original *Physiologus*: "Id. opus (the *Hexaemeron* of Ps. Eust.) ad IV^{i} saeculi exitum conscriptum esse constat: sequitur ut codicis Π archetypus eo saec. ineunte circiter comparatus sit, familia vero AEI (cuius lectiones saepe deteriores quam Π, ordo vero et numerus capp. puriorem fontem testantur) saeculo III^{o} exeunte, recensiones ideo antiquissimae MΓ et Σaλs ad annum fere 200^{um} referantur." This tends to confirm Lauchert's view that the *Physiologus* originated some time in the 2nd century after Christ, as against that of Wellmann who recently assigned it (on mistaken grounds, it must be said) to the last quarter of the 4th.

It was unfortunate, though doubtless unavoidable, that Sbordone failed to find and use what is certainly the best, and probably also the oldest, of all Greek manuscripts of the *Physiologus*, namely, cod. 397 of the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York. I call it G, since it was formerly at Grottaferrata (Cryptoferratensis A 33, *saec.* 10 ad. fin.). G contains the first 47 chapters of the old *Physiologus* followed by a short paragraph concerning the cuckoo, which has no symbolical explanation and makes no reference to ὁ Φυσιολόγος. The order of the chapters shows definite kinship with that in MΓ, although it differs therefrom in many particulars, especially toward the end, and is often closer than M to the order of A and the Aethiopic, which has been adopted by Lauchert and Sbordone. In the text also G has more in common with M or MΓ than with any other group, and yet with one exception (chap. 25, p. 87, lines 1-2: *ἔστι ζῷον—καλοῦσι*) it contains none of the scholia or the rewritten or added passages, which Sbordone lists on pp. xlvi f. as being peculiar to M or to MΓ. In other words, although G shares many good readings alone with MΓ, it rarely agrees with them in error or in omission of genuine passages; and the same is true of G in relation to the groups Σaλs, WO, and AEIΠ respectively: with a few dubious exceptions it has none of the spurious additions, revisions, and corruptions belonging to these families that are enumerated by Sbordone on pp. xlviii-li. The following variants will further illustrate the character of G's text: Title, *Σὺν θεῷ βίβλος φυσιολογική*. Page 7, lines 3-4 (Sbordone) *τὸν—Χριστόν om.* GΩ. 8, 1 *ἀναπεσών—λέων* MΓ *om.* GΣλsWOAEΠΩ, the Aethiopic version, and Latin C; against this testimony it is surely not wise to follow MΓ with Sbordone, even though the words in question are part of the biblical passage here quoted. 8, 3, *ὡς* (*om.* G) *φησιν ὁ Φ.*

ΓΜΓΑΕΠ *aliter* ΣaWO. 11, 2, χαράδριος(*sic*)ΓΜΓasEΩ *alii aliter*. 16, 1, καλῶς *om.* ΓΜΓ. 17, 1, ὅταν ὀλίγον αὐξηθῶσιν *post* γονέων ΜΓW ἐν τῷ αὐξηθῆναι μικρὸν αὐτούς (*ibid.*) G. 17, 4, ἔρχεται *post* ἡμέρᾳ WOAΠ *om.* ΓΜΓΣa. 21, 2, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ΓΜΓaWO *om.* ΣAEI. 21, 5, φέρεται-πῶς ΓΜΓaW *om.* ΣOAEΠ. 22, 1, καλῶς-νυκτικόρακος ΣWOAEΠ *om* ΓΜΓa. 22, 5, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ καί ΓΜΓ *om.* ΣaWOAEΠ. 23, 2, τὰς παλαιάς ΓΜΓW *om.* ΣasOAEΠ. 24, 3, ἀποδυσάμενος ΓΜΓ. 25, 7, ἔρχεται GWOAEΠ εἰσέρχεται ΜΓΣa. *Ibid.* γομοῖ GAEΠ γεμοῖ a γεμίζει ΜΓWO πληροῖΣ. 29, 5, λέγουσι (+ οὖν, γάρ, *etc.*) GΣasW λέγοντες MAEΠ. 32, 6, καλῶς—ὀνάγρου MWO *om.*GΣasAEΠΩ; this again is one of the many places where the choice of variants can be made only by weight of testimony, and here, as often, I should disagree with the editor's choice (MWO). 34, 1, ὅταν GWO ἐάν MΣa. 37, 4, ἡμέρας τεσσαράκονταΓΜΓ τ. ἡμ. ΣaWOAEΠ. 38, 2, εἰσπέμψας GasΔE (which is to be preferred) εἰσπεύσας M ἔσπευσας Γ εἰσελθών WO ἐκπιέσας Sbordone. 39, 3, ἡ πύλη *post* ἐστίν ΣaWOAIΔ *om.* ΓΜΓΕΠ. 51, 5-6, ᾄδουσιν—ἀπόλλυνται AEIΠ (Sbordone) *om.* ΓΜΓa. 78, 2, καὶ—αὐτῆς AEΠ (Sbordone) *om.* GΣsW and the Aethiopic; I think that this sentence should be bracketed or left out. 93, 1, αὕτη μονόγαμός ἐστι καί ΓΜΓ *om. rell.* 99, 2-7, ὁ Κύριος—ἐνέργειαν ΓΜΓΣa(λ)s and Aeth. *om.* WOAEΠ. Pp. 113-115: GΣWsy and the Aethiopic have chapters 35 and 35a, including the ten bracketed lines Ραὰβ—βασιλεύς (113, 8-17), which are probably genuine. On the other hand neither of these chapters is in ΜΓ, and no. 35 is not in AEΠ. But no. 35b is found only in ΜΓ and should have been treated as spurious. 131, 6-8, ἡ δὲ φύσις—εἰσέρχεται: G and the Aethiopic as well as all the other MSS have these lines, but Sbordone brackets them on the ground that their substance pertains more properly to the stag than to the elephant; that is quite unwarrantable, since the Christian author of the *Physiologus*, or his source, often confuses the ancient zoological traditions.

For recension II the editor has used thirty-two manuscripts, and here the variations are even more numerous and complex than in the first recension. The situation is thus effectively described on p. lxxx: "Secundi quoque Physiologi, quem byzantinum viri docti nominare consueverunt, diuturna vis atque efficientia per longum saeculorum ordinem in varios textus erupit. Maximam librorum congeriem ad tres singulos typos referre potui: unusquisque vero typus per complures recensiones haud mediocriter inter se diversas traditus est, neque modo, quod semper evenit, in numero et ordine capitum, vel, quod saepissime, in dicendi ratione ac genere una quaeque recensio a ceteris eiusdem typi segregatur, sed proprias et fabulas et interpretationes ex integro confictas induxit. Quin etiam singuli codices ad eandem recensionem ascripti, etsi multa sibi communia et a ceteris familiis diversa servaverunt, lectionibus propriis redun-

dant." Undaunted by these difficulties, Sbordone proceeds to reconstruct as far as possible the archetypes of the three *typi* and by comparing these with each other, to arrive at something resembling the basic form of all three. His text (pp. 149-256) contains 27 chapters, although only 18 are common to the three types. The language of this recension is much further removed from the ancient norm than that of the old *Physiologus*. The redactor, for example, obviously did not know how to inflect γύψ and γρύψ (cf. p. 182, line 1; 183, 5; 184, 1); he uses ἀπό and ἐκ with the accusative and ἅμα as preposition with the genitive (cf. 175, 1; 178, 8; 182, 7; 252, 4; 253, 2 *al.*); the dative in place of the accusative for direct object as in modern Greek (cf. 205, 1, 5 and 7); and such words and expressions as μαῦρος for μελανοειδής (219, 1), θύλη for θήλεια (190, 2; 195, 7; *al.*), νερόν for ὕδωρ (218, 5-6), κάτα for γαλῆ (222, 1), ἀνιστᾷ for ἀνίσταται (150, 2), μεγέθη (*sic*) as adjective for μέγα or μεγάλα (153, 1; 154, 1; 158, 6; 182, 5), καταβιώνει for καταβύει (225, 7), ἁπλώνει (183, 1) for ἅπλοϊ, κλάνει (192, 3) for κλάει, μὲ τὸ οὖς for τῷ ὠτί (instrumental; 232, 1 and 233, 3), γλυκυτέρα ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν ἐδεσμάτων (206, 5; cf. 207, 2), ἐστι δεχόμενος for δέχεται (253, 8 and *passim*), and αἱ ἰχθύαι (178, 5). Partly for this reason, but also in consideration of the general history of popular books in Byzantine times, I cannot share the editor's belief that the archetype of this recension is to be dated so far back as the fifth or sixth century; in my opinion it is hardly older than the eleventh. I am influenced by the analogy of such books as the *Life* and *Fables* of Aesop, *Stephanites and Ichnelates*, and *Syntipas*; which, between the 11th and 15th centuries, underwent a rapid evolution, at times into relatively more vulgar forms, and which in this period achieved their greatest propagation. Moreover, the editorial tendencies which were responsible for the creation of recension II must have been essentially the same as those which manifest themselves so abundantly in the individual MSS and groups of MSS of a much later day. Since it is quite unlikely that all the different forms of this recension have been projected by isolated traditions from periods six-to-ten hundred years antecedent to the manuscripts themselves, it follows that some of the textual evolution—indeed much of it—took place in late Byzantine times; and if some of it, why not all? There are no traces of this type of *Physiologus* previous to the 12th century (supposed date of the earliest MS), and shortly afterward it became exceedingly popular—for what other reason than because it was created to suit the taste of that age?

The so-called Ps.-Basilian recension (III), in which the interpretations are expressly attributed to St. Basil in each of the 30 chapters, is edited on pp. 259-299 on the basis of 16 manuscripts, about five times as many as were previously known. The variants in these MSS are not nearly so numerous and

radical as in recension II—owing possibly to respect for the name of Basil—and the style on the whole is much better. Sbordone assigns this recension to the tenth or eleventh century, since it is partially dependent on II; I should date it rather in the twelfth century. The text of 28 chapters had previously been published by Zuretti from cod. p. 490; cf. *supra.*

In his commentary to each chapter Sbordone undertakes to distinguish between kindred traditions in other authors which belong with the source material of the *Physiologus* (*fontes*) and those which depend upon the *Physiologus* (*e Physiologo*). The distinctions thus made are often arbitrary and untrustworthy. Because a passage in the *Kyrandies* of Hermes or in Timotheos of Gaza bears a strong verbal resemblance to the story in the *Physiologus,* it does not follow of necessity that the author of this passage was indebted to the *Physiologus*; it is just as likely that his phraseology is derived from a common source. This is Wellmann's view regarding Hermes and Timotheos, and it is supported by the consideration that these authors have much from other sources that is unknown to the *Physiologus* and that in comparison with the latter their reports of the same traditions are often more original. The many verbal agreements between Horapollo and the *Physiologus* must have led Sbordone to the erroneous conclusion that the former of these was indebted to the latter, had he not known that Horapollo got most of his stuff from Apion-Chaeremon. The reader may also feel some distrust when he finds George of Pisidia, and once or twice even Hermes (p. 102) and Timotheos (p. 55), listed among the sources as well as among the imitators of the *Physiologus.* In the note on the ἀσπιδοχελώνη on p. 67 references should have been made to Strabo XV, 2, 12, Arrian *Ind.,* 31, and Ps.-Kallisthenes, III, 17. See also Miss Coulter's article "The Great Fish in Ancient Story" (*Trans. Amer. Phil. Assn.,* LVII, pp. 32 ff.). On p. 85 it is incorrectly stated that Aristotle once believed (*De Gen. Anim.,* III, 6, 757 A) that the hyena changes its sex; in the passage referred to Aristotle is actively refuting that notion. For Ἀναγώγια on p. 112 one should read Καταγώγια; see Aelian, *H. A.,* IV, 2, *ad fin.* In the note on the ὕδρωψ (p. 116) reference might have been made to Oppian's description of the ὄρυξ (*Cyn.,* II, 445 ff.), which is similar in a number of points (mention of the animal's fierceness and defiance of the hunter, its very sharp horns, its dwelling in the thickets, its horns becoming so firmly imbedded in another animal during combat that neither is able to free itself, and the arrival at length of a herdsman or plowman who comes upon the two bodies thus entangled); indeed it is not unlikely that the name ὕδρωψ in the *Physiologus* is a corruption of ὄρυξ. In the text of cod. G the animal's name is intentionally omitted and a blank space left in its stead; and the following chapter deals with the ἔννδρος. As a possible source for the story

of the *hydrippus* (p. 175) Sbordone is able to cite only a faintly parallel passage from Basil; but the real source for the part of this story that pertains to the breeding of fish is undoubtedly the tradition reported by Herodotus (II, 93) concerning the habits of certain ἰχθύες ἀγελαῖοι; see also Aelian *H. A.*, IX, 63. Incidentally the beginning of this account (178, 3) is more accurately told in the late Greek metrical version than in recension II, for there, as in Herodotus, the male fish precede on the way out casting the sperm behind them to the females; on the return, according to Herodotus, the males follow the females and devour the eggs, but this is omitted in the metrical version and confused with the exodus in recension II.

Certain features of this book make it hard to use. There is no table of contents and no headings at the top of pages, so that, in order to find any particular section or a given topic, it is necessary to waste time hunting it through page after page. The system of symbols used to designate manuscripts is also a nuisance, including as it does both capitals and lower-case letters from both alphabets. It entails the loss of much time, especially in an uncharted book such as this, to have to turn back and forth to the stemma, to the list of MSS, and to the sections describing these (of which there are two) in order to discover, for example, what AEIIIΔφryδΔaρBξ may imply concerning the text tradition. The nomenclature should be so devised as to reveal at a glance to what major group any individual MS chiefly belongs, e. g. Aa Ab Ac, Ba Bb Bc, etc. For a good example see Chambry's *Aesopi Fabulae*. In his note on p. 26, l. 3 the author bids the reader look in the Praefatio for further information on WO, but does not give him the page reference. Buried in the Prolegomena on p. li, where no one will find it, is the statement that the substance of p. 47, ll. 3-7 in the text is taken from Basil, but this pertinent information is omitted in the notes *ad locum* without even a cross reference.

The imperfections mentioned above are of small account in comparison with the lasting value of the author's contribution. His book, the result of an enormous amount of patient labor and research, will be welcomed as a valuable aid not only by Byzantine scholars but also by students of Romance, Slavic, medieval, and even oriental philology. Signor Sbordone deserves our best thanks and congratulations. The book is dedicated to the author's distinguished teacher, Professor Alessandro Olivieri.

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KLARA BUCHMANN. Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen Philosophie (*Philologus, Supplementband* XXIX, 3). Leipzig, Dietrich, 1936. Pp. 102.

Accepting without question the opinion that the *Theaetetus* marks a turning-point between the "middle" and "late" periods of Plato's philosophical development, the author of this dissertation sets up the thesis that in the *Meno* we have an analogous document marking the end of the early "aporetic" period and the beginning of the "Lehrschriften" which present Plato's positive philosophy. To establish this thesis she seeks to show first that the Socrates of the *Meno* unites the characteristics of the earlier and later portraits: In the *Meno* Socrates is at once "nichtwissender Frager und wissender Lehrer." The structure of the dialogue, too, differs from that of the earlier ones—except the *Protagoras*—, having the two parts given over to investigation separated by an interlude;[1] and in the rôle given Socrates in these three parts again a combination of earlier and later forms is found: "Einsetzend mit einer Frage an Sokrates als einen Wissenden kehrt der Menon . . . zunächst äusserlich zur Form der frühen Dialoge zurück, wächst in seinem Mittelteil zur Lehrform . . . und vereint schliesslich in der Untersuchung der Lehrbarkeit beide, die Lehrform mit der Frageform überdeckend."

The aporetic character of the early dialogues represents Plato's own uncertainty, Dr. Buchmann insists, and the change in the *Meno* (which, she holds, does not end in an aporia) is to be explained by assuming that Plato had now found the solution to the Socratic problems in the two positive doctrines which are here introduced, that of the εἶδος and ἀνάμνησις—with its corollary, ὀρθὴ δόξα. The εἶδος, of which this dialogue is the first to treat and of which it alone gives a real explanation (p. 38), is to be interpreted neither logically nor metaphysically (i. e. as transcendent) but as "gegenstands-immanente Grundgestalt." It solves the Socratic difficulty of the unity of virtue. The problem of the teachability of virtue is resolved by the new conception of "learning" involved in ἀνάμνησις, while the new intellectual factor of ὀρθὴ δόξα clears up the relationship of virtue to knowledge.

To review the arguments for and against the general theory of development would be fruitless; all that can profitably be done is to test the specific interpretations brought forward to

[1] Such is the structure of the *Protagoras* also, but the interlude which in the latter is "anmutsvolles Spiel" is in the *Meno* "bedeutungsvoller Ernst." Plato took over in the *Meno* structural elements of the *Protagoras* but instilled into them deep meaning (p. 19).

support each new construction.[2] In the first place, one will ask how the theory of ἀνάμνησις solves anything if the εἶδος is not somehow separate from the particulars. To this the author answers with the contention that the πάντα χρήματα which the soul has "seen" are not the "ideas" but "alles überhaupt Seh- und Erfassbare," "einfach das Gleiche . . . was sie auch in dieser Welt prinzipiell erkennen kann" (p. 60, n. 142; pp. 65 and 70). Yet obviously it was while disembodied that the soul got its knowledge so that what it "saw" could be only non-sensible; and, since in the *Meno* "to know" is admittedly to know the εἶδος, the εἴδη that the soul has known must be non-sensible.[3]

Whether transcendent or not, is the εἶδος in the *Meno* a "new conception" of Plato's? One thinks immediately of the *Euthyphro* (5 D, 6 D-E, 11 A). Dr. Buchmann has thought of it too (p. 51, n. 127); and, though she does not quite dare to declare the dialogue spurious, she can suggest no other way of avoiding the fact that it presents the notion of the εἶδος quite as clearly as the *Meno*. Her suspicions of it, however, are groundless. Pointing to 5 C (ποιόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῂς εἶναι) she says that in the *Euthyphro* there is no difference among ποῖον, τί, and εἶδος. Socrates' demand for a definition, however, does not

[2] The author guards herself by occasional remarks such as this: "Wie weit die inhaltliche Fassung der rein theoretischen Gehalt . . . der tatsächlichen Auffassung Platons zu diesem Zeitpunkt entspricht, dürfte sich endgültig vielleicht nicht entscheiden lassen" (p. 101). Yet her whole method presumes that "the first appearance" is equivalent to "Plato's discovery"; and on the same page she writes of the *Meno*: "Platon hat ein Jenseits entdeckt und sieht im Lichte dieses Jenseits die Probleme seiner Frühzeit . . . gelöst." So she thinks (p. 60) that, since the explanation of the possibility of knowledge ought to be the introduction to a positive system, it is improbable that Plato could have known before the *Meno* the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which here is introduced to solve this problem.

[3] Surely Dr. Buchmann would not contend that the doctrine that sensibles are perceived only through the bodily senses and non-sensibles by the mind alone was unknown to Plato when he wrote the *Meno*! It is further impossible to argue, as she does (p. 70), that when Socrates asks (85 D-E) whether anyone had taught the slave geometry, he implies that one can learn in this world exactly what one has learned in the other. That would only raise Meno's question again: how could the boy *then* have learned what he did not already know? Besides, Socrates indentifies all "learning" with recollection (81 D 2, 87 B 8 f.) and contends that the soul has come to know *everything* in the other world (81 D 1, 86 B 1). The question is dialectically necessary merely to show that the slave had not "known," in Meno's sense, what he had just remembered. Dr. Buchmann disregards Socrates' explicit statement that he is here concerned not with the theory in detail but only with opposing the "lazy counsel" of Meno's question: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διϊσχυρισαίμην κτλ. (86 B 6 ff.). Note the use to which he puts the notion of immortality in 85 B 1-4: since the soul is immortal we should not despair of the search for what we do not know; "leave Now for dogs and apes! Man has Forever."

really start until 5 D where he asks τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον; moreover, in 11 B in asking again ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν he makes explicit the distinction between οὐσία and πάθος (cf. *Gorgias* 448 E 6-7: οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις . . . ἀλλὰ τίς). Nay more,—in 12 A-C the genus-species relationship is carefully explained (cf. 12 C 5: ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι δέος αἰδοῦς), a notion of which Dr. Buchmann thinks that Plato was ignorant when he wrote the *Protagoras*; and justice and piety are explained as having this relationship (11 E 7-12 A 2; 12 C 10-D 4), although she believes that the suggested identification of the two in the *Protagoras* was due to Plato's ignorance of the logical nature of the concept (pp. 44-45). I doubt not that this will only strengthen Dr. Buchmann's suspicion of the *Euthyphro*, though I feel that the fault lies rather with her own theory about Plato's "development," just as, when I find mention of an idea of impiety, I am more inclined to doubt Stenzel's theory about εἶδος and ἀρετή than the Platonic dialogue,—but Dr. Buchmann seems to think that Stenzel must be right as against the *Euthyphro*. The *Euthydemus*, too, is incompatible with her theory. She places it before the *Gorgias* and *Meno* (p. 17, n. 55); but she does not mention the unmistakable reference to *transcendent ideas* which it contains: ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα [*scil.* τὰ πολλὰ καλά] ἔφην αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν καλλός τι (cf. *Hippias Major* 289 D, *Phaedo* 100 D). Still she may wish now to have the *Euthydemus* follow the *Phaedo*, where, according to her theory, such ideas first occur. After all, she assumes without argument the old theory that *Republic* I was a separate and "early" dialogue, the *Thrasymachus*; and she assumes this because on her theory Socrates is the "questioner" only in the early, "aporetic" dialogues and the one questioned in the later positive writings (p. 20).

Dr. Buchmann's notions about the *Meno* derive ultimately from her conviction that it is the first dialogue that does not end in an "aporia." Now it has long been recognized that this dialogue contains the material which in "later" dialogues is used to solve the Socratic puzzles; but that is not quite the same thing as Dr. Buchmann's thesis. After all, the statement that there is virtue which is θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἄνευ νοῦ is itself really a hidden aporia as is shown by the closing remark that this conclusion is the result of Meno's refusal to allow Socrates to investigate the question in the proper fashion: τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή (100 B 4-6). Dr. Buchmann does not give enough weight, I think, to the fact that the *Protagoras* ends with very nearly the same words (361 C 4-6). Since the virtue which is θείᾳ μοίρᾳ puts the statesmen on the same level as oracle-mongers, seers, and poets (*Meno* 99 D), it is difficult to believe that Plato thought himself to have presented here a new "positive" solution (cf. *Ion* 536 C);

and the attempt to press the word δόξα to yield a theory for the *Meno* which is dropped in the later theory of ideas will not, I think, stand the test of comparison. Even in the *Republic*, after the "völlig neu eingeführt" distinction between the objects of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη (477 E ff.), the word δοξάζειν is used of the activity of the best part of the soul as well as of the lower part (603 A) and in the *Theaetetus* (187 A) it applies to the soul ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. The evidence shows that Plato was likely at any time to use δόξα either "of the belief that accompanies αἴσθησις or of the operation of the mind as opposed to sensation" (Shorey, *Unity*, p. 49) or even as a general term to include both of these notions.

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WILLIAM ROBBINS RIDINGTON. The Minoan-Mycenean Background of Greek Athletics. Diss. (the University of Pennsylvania), Philadelphia, 1935. Pp. 94.

In this dissertation the author has collected the evidence which is used to connect the Greek athletic games with the Minoan-Mycenean culture. Glotz (*The Aegean Civilization*, pp. 289-298) maintains that the national athletic tradition of Greece developed from Cretan civilization; Gardiner (*Athletics of the Ancient World*, pp. 9-14) denies this theory. Obviously a collection of the evidence involved was desirable. The first and sixth chapters present the method and the conclusions; the second discusses the literary evidence in Homer and the *Homeric Hymns* with a particular account of the festival at Delos; the third, the important athletic sites; the fourth, the archaeological background in Crete; and the fifth, miscellaneous connections linking Crete with athletic festivals. In general the author argues in favor of the theory of Glotz and concludes that "through the cumulative evidence it has become apparent that the Minoan-Mycenean civilization was a notable influence in the development of the Greek athletic festival" (p. 86). He has indeed collected a mass of material to show that such influence was chronologically and topographically possible. The Greeks in Homer were undoubtedly under Minoan-Mycenean influence, and the sites of the athletic festivals at Delos and Athens and the four Panhellenic meets show a similar influence. However, the argument that Cretan influence on the site of an athletic festival tends to show the Cretan origin of that festival is not necessarily valid in view of the permeation of such influence in the Aegean basin.

Another explanation is perfectly possible, namely that Cretan influence was exerted on a people already old in the athletic tradition. It should be pointed out that the addition of many minor, doubtful points does not necessarily constitute a major argument. One specific instance (pp. 21-2) will show the danger of the argument advanced. Homer refers to the funeral games held at Thebes for Oedipus. A gold seal from Boeotia dating from the beginning of the 15th century B. C. and showing Oedipus slaying the Sphinx points to the Minoan-Mycenean origin of the story of Oedipus. The author then concludes that, if we allow this origin, "we can assume that in so far as the Homeric reference implies actual funeral games associated with the legend of Oedipus, it is reflecting games held under the sphere of a Minoan-Mycenean influence" (p. 22). It is perfectly possible and quite probable that the Greeks, when they took over this myth, added to the story elements drawn from their own customs. However, the facts so far collected do not give the argument of this dissertation a firm basis unless there is some genuine evidence of the presence of the fundamental elements of the Greek athletic festivals in the Minoan-Mycenean civilization. Hence the fourth and fifth chapters contain the crucial material. This material amply proves the existence of bull-baiting, acrobatics, dancing, boxing, and music. Only the last two were definitely connected with the Greek contests. I am inclined to agree with Gardiner (*op. cit.*, pp. 12-13) that the boxing exhibitions were closer to gladiatorial combats than to boxing matches. The archaeological evidence shows, then, that the Greeks owed much to Minoan-Mycenean civilization with regard to music and dancing, but it does not show any real debt with regard to athletics. Greek athletics owe their origin to invaders from the north. The thesis of the dissertation is not proved.

The dubiety of the conclusion drawn by the dissertation does not prevent it from being a valuable collection of scholarly material. It is clearly written, well documented, and reveals a full command of the subject matter. The citations in the notes are ample and pertinent though the references are over-abbreviated. There are a few minor slips in punctuation and italicising in the bibliography and notes. *Scimmia* is incorrectly spelt (p. 70, note 46). The inclusion of the Phaestus disk as evidence for Cretan life is a serious error (p. 66). In the discussion of the gold seal from Thisbê (note 35, p. 21) the reference to Sir Arthur Evans' article in the *J. H. S.* should be supplemented by a reference to *The Palace of Minos*, III (1930), pp. 416-18 (a volume which is listed in the bibliography) as well as the same work, vol. IV, 2 (1935), pp. 513-14 (a volume which was not available when this dissertation was published). Although Professor Glotz added two notes of corrections and additions to the English edition of his *La civilization egéene*, the date of the

French edition (i. e. 1923) should have been noted in the bibliography.

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JOS. SCHRIJNEN AND CHRISTINE MOHRMANN. Studien zur Syntax der Briefe des hl. Cyprian, Erster Teil. Nijmegen, 1936 (Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, Fasc. V). Pp. xii + 191.

The monographs on Christian Latin published under the direction of Professor Joseph Schrijnen of the University of Nijmegen in Holland are important not only to Latinists but also to students of linguistic development in general, for they exemplify the fruitful application of experience gained from work in general linguistics to the investigation of Christian Latin writers. Since the present monograph presupposes a full acquaintance with Professor Schrijnen's views on the nature of Christian Latin and on the method of its investigation, it will be well at the outset to summarize them: The introduction of Christianity into the Roman World and the conditions under which it was propagated occasioned the development of a Christian *Sondersprache*. Within this Christian *Sondersprache* itself subdivisions can be distinguished, as the language of the liturgy proper, the language of ecclesiastical legislation, the language of daily intercourse, etc. Christianisms in the Christian *Sondersprache* are direct and indirect. Direct Christianisms are linguistic usages which of their nature are exclusively Christian. Indirect Christianisms are linguistic usages which, although largely indifferent from the view-point of the Christian religion, are found in our extant remains of Latin either exclusively or almost exclusively in Christian writers. In the investigation of Christian Latin writers, then, our task is to note the elements of the Christian *Sondersprache* in all its phases in a given author or work and, at the same time, to differentiate what is common Christian in linguistic use from what is strictly individual and stylistic.

A full exposition of the views of Professor Schrijnen and his school will be found in: Jos. Schrijnen, *Charakteristik des Altchristlichen Latein,* Nijmegen, 1932; *id.* "Le Latin chrétien dévenu langue commune," *Revue des Etudes latines,* XII (1934), pp. 96-116; Christine Mohrmann, *Die altchristliche Sondersprache in den Sermones des hl. Augustin, Erster Teil,* Nijmegen, 1932, p. 8 ff. and *passim.*

The present monograph is devoted to the investigation of

selected syntactical usages and tendencies in the Letters of St. Cyprian which may be regarded as being largely confined to Christian Latin writers. With the exception of a section on sentence structure, the investigation is limited to nominal syntax. The authors have distinguished carefully between the usages occurring in the letters of St. Cyprian himself and those occurring in the letters of his correspondents. They have attempted, furthermore, to distinguish between usages which belong to the common Christian *Sondersprache* and those which belong strictly to Cyprian as an individual stylist. In treating of the language of St. Cyprian, which has already been the subject of extensive investigation, they could not hope to present much that is startlingly new. On the other hand, their sociological approach to the study of Cyprian's syntax combined with a thorough scientific knowledge of Late Latin in all its aspects and of the literature pertaining to it has enabled them to shed much additional light on old facts and above all to give the latter a more penetrating and sounder interpretation. I should like to call attention, e. g., to the excellent treatment of: *constitutus* and *positus* with the force of ὤν (p. 6 ff.), the pleonastic use of *dicens*, etc., in Christian Latin (p. 19 ff.), the use of the singular in the phrase *manum imponere* (p. 48 ff.), the use of *plebs* to designate the Christian community (p. 57 ff.), the use of the genitive of identity (p. 81 ff.), the use of adjectives of the type of *apostolicus* in place of the corresponding noun (p. 89 ff.).

The following minor criticisms and suggestions may be worth mentioning. P. viii: add H. Koch, *Cyprianische Untersuchungen*, Bonn, 1926. P. 37, line 7 from end: in the example cited from *Ep.* 27, 4 there can be no question of a nominative absolute, as *laborantes . . . nos* is the object of the verb *adiuvit*, and the example from *Ep.* 8, 2 is certainly best taken as a *constructio ad sensum*. P. 44, last line: in *tibi a collegis tuis dicendum est* the use of *a* with the ablative to avoid ambiguity is not unusual. Pp. 72 ff.: the loss of final *-m* should be mentioned here as a factor in the confusion of ablative and accusative in Vulgar Latin. P. 78: in the treatment of the genitive of the type *deliciae pueri* it should be noted that Hofmann regards this, not as a genitive of definition, but as a popular development of the partitive genitive (see Leumann-Hofmann, p. 391). P. 88: on the genitive of the type *canticum canticorum* add a reference to the excellent discussion in Leumann-Hofmann, pp. 390-391. P. 143: the use of τοῦ λοιποῦ and ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ with the meaning "for the future" may have contributed to the employment of *de cetero* with this meaning in Christian Latin. P. 144: the phrase *in aeternum* came to be used in a Christian sense but it is certainly not Christian in origin, as it is cited in Latin from Lucretius (cf. *T. L. L.* I, 1147, 46-74). Pp. 144 ff.: in future studies it is to be hoped that the authors will give a full dis-

cussion of the phrases of the type *in melius*, etc., which are listed here with almost no comment. Pp. 154 ff.: the discussion of *ille, ipse*, etc. would be much more satisfactory if it were based on a carefully interpreted statistical study and not on a few selected examples. P. 159: on the use of *qui* for *quis* reference should be made to the exhaustive study in Löfstedt, *Syntactica, Zweiter Teil*, pp. 79-96. P. 167: the discussion of the replacement of *ab* by *de* should be fuller, as the extent of this replacement is not made clear. I have noted only the following typographical slips: p. 22, line 20 and *passim*: for *Teksten* read *Texten*; p. 175: for *Ambrosiaster 90*, read *Ambrosiaster 99*.

The present monograph is from the viewpoint of content and especially of method a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Christian Latin.

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NOTICES.

A Handbook of Latin Literature by H. J. Rose (Methuen, 1936) "claims no originality," but it packs an immense amount of information (and rather too much misinformation) into 560 pages for those to whom Schanz-Hosius is not available. In fact it follows that handbook very closely, and usually fails when that is inadequate (Schanz-Hosius' vol. II apparently came out too late for full use). Rose is somewhat out of date on the "dramatic satura" (p. 10), on Livy's account of the early drama (p. 22), on the status of actors (p. 23), on the *Cistellaria* (p. 47), etc. It is hardly correct to say (p. 59) that "the society addressed by Plautus commonly used both Greek and Latin" and that the Nasica who destroyed the second theatre of Rome was a friend of Ennius (p. 61). The word *Afer* was at first used of Carthaginians, despite p. 61; no. 65 of Catullus was not written after the poet's return from the East (p. 143). We have known for nearly thirty years that *Delia* (p. 262) is not the subject of Catalepton I; and of course Livy did not die at the age of 42 (p. 297), and so on. Hasty judgments (e. g. on the historians Fabius Pictor, Calpurnius Piso and Licinius Macer) are numerous; the discussion of the Vergilian *Appendix* betrays no knowledge of Birt, Rand, DeWitt, Rostagni, and others who have written on it during the last thirty years; the treatment of Lucretius, Catullus, Horace, and Livy is wholly inadequate. The book needs a thorough revision.

T. F.

Ernst Bickel's *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (Winter, Heidelberg, 1937, 587 pp.) is a brave attempt to present in one volume the important facts of Latin literature in a setting of cultural history. The attempt fails chiefly because of an unwise arrangement; for, after the historical sketch has been given, the literature of each author is presented in shreds here and there according to types. Catullus, for instance, is accorded scattered pages under *Epigram, Epyllion, Elegie,* etc. The impression is confused and never unified. St. Augustine comes before Cicero's orations and these before the tragedies of Ennius. What is gained by the laudable attempt to give cultural background is lost by this merciless separation of each author's productions.

The historical sketch, though filled with modern phrases about *Barock, Romantik, Rokoko, Nordrassen,* and the like, is far from penetrating, while the aesthetic judgments are on the whole the old tralatician ones of a generation ago. The table talk of Trimalchio's Asiatic freedmen and the polyglot scribblings of Pompeii are said to be ordinary colloquial Latin (p. 117); the censorial exclusion of the *ars ludicra* in 115 B. C. and of the Latin rhetors is misinterpreted (122-3); Marx's unfounded dicta about Lucretius are repeated (449); Livy and Cicero are left in the limbo to which Mommsen chose to consign them. The author seems to have discovered that Lucretius, Catullus, and Vergil were Celts, that Terence was a Berber, though, to be sure, a blond Berber (56), and that Alfenus Varus was the subject of the sixth eclogue of Vergil. Because the Greek original of the 111th line of Catullus' epyllion is also found in Cicero, Bickel concludes that the whole poem was a translation of a Greek poem; but we now have the original of another of its lines in a fragment of Euphorion's *Thrax,* which of course proves nothing of the sort.

Such mistakes, and they are numerous, point chiefly to the fact that Bickel for some reason has failed to read the post-war contributions made by scholars outside of his own country. In the case of a scholar of Bickel's standing this can hardly be due to a lack of linguistic knowledge; presumably the economic stress of recent years, which hinders the exchange of ideas sometimes contained in foreign books and journals, is still continuing to sterilize scholarship in some countries.

T. F.

Arvast Nordh has produced a new study of the *Notitia* and *Curiosum* (*Prolegomena till den Romerska Regionskatalogen*) written under the guidance of Lundström of Gothenburg and with some aid from Boëthius, formerly of the Swedish School at Rome. The first part is largely textual in preparation of a new edition. The latter part, after disproving the current theories that these regionaries were lists of important objects within each

region or of objects on the boundary lines of the regions, persuasively offers a new and important theory. Nordh believes that early in the fourth century A. D. each *regio* was for administrative purposes divided into subregions, the names of which were taken from significant objects within each: i. e. streets, temples, monuments, and the like; and that at first the so-called *Curiosum* was merely an administrative document giving the lists of these *subregiones*. Later, when copies were used for guide-book purposes, some descriptive matter crept in (e. g. the height of Trajan's column). Nordh draws his support for this theory from a full collection of place-names of Rome found in *C. I. L.* VI and in the authors. Perhaps he has not absolutely established his point; the evidence does not suffice for proof. But if, as seems likely, the *Curiosum* is primarily a list of subregions and not only of monuments, topographers will of course have to interpret its contents in a new way. The dissertation seems to me important.

T. F.

Spargo's *Virgil the Necromancer* (Harvard Press, 1934) deserves careful study because of its diligent search for the first mention in medieval literature of every instance of magic attributed to Virgil, also for its refutation of Comparetti's theory that such tales grew up at and spread from Naples. We are duly grateful. However, the implication that crops out here and there that the first mention now available must be significant for the origins of the stories may be misleading. Mysterious beliefs about Virgil had started early, as is proved by Suetonius' tale of the poplar tree and Constantine's faith in the poet's prophetic powers. What accretions to the tale are due to the centuries between Constantine and John of Salisbury we shall never know because of the state of our sources of knowledge. When we recall that Eastern cohorts served all through the West during the centuries of declining Rome and that Oriental traders and slaves overran Italy and Gaul at that time, it is not surprising that tales of Oriental magic appear all over the West as soon as the natives become vocal. The full story of Virgilian magic will never be told. Meanwhile it is well to have a record of first literary instances, provided we do not fall into the error of thinking the record important.

T. F.

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